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Preface 
Of the very few studies devoted to the life and work of John Mackinnon 
Robertson (1856-1933), the most thorough is undoubtedly Conrad J. 
Kaczkowski's unpublished Ph.D. thesis John Mackinnon Robertson: 
Freethinker and Radical (St. Louis University, 1964).1 In over 600 pages, it 
attempts to discuss nearly every aspect of Robertson's dauntingly copious 
oeuvre, which embraces, with a comprehensiveness no longer a feature of our 
own highly specialised age, philosophy, economics, sociology, religion, and 
politics alike. However, what the thesis conspicuously does not do is pay any 
attention to Robertson's work on the topic that was in the end perhaps closest 
to his heart: literature. Kaczkowski's thesis even ends on the ominous note that 
'it may be observed that if Robertson followed the same "critical" norms in his 
literary efforts as he did in his Biblical criticism, there would be little value in 
attempting an investigation of this area.' 
Leaving aside for the moment the question of the validity of Robertson's 
biblical criticism, I had better not hesitate to state outright that the present study 
represents precisely that which Kaczkowski advises against: an investigation 
into Robertson's work as a literary critic. It is, in fact, my conviction that of all 
of Robertson's writings, those on literature and literary criticism are by far the 
most interesting. What I will attempt to demonstrate in the course of the 
following pages is that within the context of his time, Robertson was a 
noteworthy literary critic and theoretician of literary criticism, whose writings 
do not deserve the general neglect into which they have very clearly fallen. In 
his own spirit, the investigation will be a critical one, and one conclusion may 
well be that Robertson does not always attain the ambitious goals he sets 
himself. However, this does not mean that the goals themselves and the 
attempts to reach them should be any less interesting from a literary-historical 
point of view. The claim for Robertson is not that he succeeds in solving the 
problems literary critics and theoreticians before and after him have struggled 
with, but rather that his own struggle shows him to possess a powerful and 
independent mind, contact with which may significantly increase our 
1
 The other two are Martin Page, Britain's Unknown Genius. The Life-Work ofJ.M. 
Robertson (London, 1984), and JM Robertson (1856-1933): Liberal, Rationalist, & Scholar, 
ed. G.A. Wells (London, 1987). 
χ PREFACE 
understanding of the late-nineteenth, early-twentieth century literary 
landscape. 
From the very start of my research I have been aware of the problem that I 
would be discussing the work of an author with whose life and writings hardly 
anyone is familiar nowadays. Chapter 1 represents a first step towards 
remedying this situation by providing an outline of Robertson's life, paying due 
attention to the historical context in which Robertson rose to relative fame and 
notoriety as one of the most combative rationalists of the age. Whether he was 
discussing free trade or Tennyson's Maud, pagan mythology or the rhythms of 
Shakespeare's verse, Robertson would never let his readers forget that he was a 
rationalist first and foremost (which is not to say that he was always rational!). 
Chapter 2 takes up the theme of Robertson's rationalism, and is divided into 
two parts. Part 1 aims to establish the appropriate historical backgrounding for 
Part 2 with a general discussion of the rise of rationalism in Britain in the 
nineteenth century; Part 2 then takes a more detailed look at the philosophical 
foundations of Robertson's particular brand of rationalism. 
In Chapter 3, which is again divided into two sections, we will see how 
Robertson's faith in reason led him to the conviction that literary criticism 
could and should be based on a scientific footing. Part 1 will show that 
Robertson was by no means alone in this conviction by representing the ideas 
of a number of Victorian critics who all believed (though in different ways) that 
science could raise criticism to a higher plane; in Part 2 I will investigate 
Robertson's own thoughts and theories on the subject. Moving from theory to 
practice, Chapter 4 finally focuses on Robertson's concrete approaches to a 
number of literary figures and their work, in drama (Part 1), fiction (Part 2), 
and poetry (Part 3) respectively. As in the two previous chapters, I will attempt 
to place Robertson's writings in the contextual framework of the contemporary 
literary scene, not with a view to breaking new ground in topics like the rise of 
the novel or the aesthetic movement, but primarily in order to promote a better 
understanding of Robertson's viewpoints. Throughout all four chapters I will 
make frequent use of quotations from his work, which should at least give 
readers a 'taste' of Robertson's vigorous and always somewhat eccentric style 
of writing and may perhaps inspire them to look up the original book or 
article.2 
2
 Although generally the titles of Robertson's books and articles are given in full, for 
convenience's sake I have consistently abbreviated Essays towards a Critical Method and New 
Essays towards a Critical Method as ETCM and NETCM respectively, both in the main text 
and in the footnotes. 
Chapter 1 
The life of J.M. Robertson 
Introduction 
J.M. Robertson has not made life easy for anyone who chooses to write his 
biography. In fact, the scarcity of available biographical material is remarkable 
for a man who led so public a life. No full-length biography was ever written, 
nor did Robertson himself, unlike many of his friends and acquaintances, put 
his reminiscences to paper. Although he was as prolific in his correspondence 
as he was elsewhere in his writing, and we are indeed fortunate that several 
hundreds of his letters have survived (still a relatively small percentage of his 
overall output), he reveals very little of the actual circumstances of his personal 
life, let alone of his emotions. As a result, the biography of this man who 
combined extreme outspokenness in public affairs with careful reticence about 
his private life will largely have to be pieced together on the basis of secondary 
sources: a number of appreciations by friends, passing references in the works 
of friends or other contemporaries, and accounts of his activities in various 
freethought periodicals. In spite of the difficulties Robertson himself may have 
put in its way, the following chapter is an attempt to do just that, the ulterior 
motive being to provide a stepping-stone to the discussions of his various 
writings (notably his literary criticism) which are to follow. 
The Scottish Years: 1856-188S 
John Mackinnon Robertson, 'that most erudite of late Victorians',2 was bom at 
Brodick in the Isle of Arran on 14 November 1856. He was the second son of 
John Robertson of Pertshire, and Susan, daughter of John Mackinnon, of 
' The main source for this section of Robertson's biography is the short account of 
Robertson's life by J.P. Gilmour which is prefixed, together with appreciations by Hypatia 
Bradlaugh Bonner, Emest Newman, and John A. Hobson, to the 1936 edition of Robertson's 
History of Freethought. . . to the Period of the French Revolution. Notes are only given here 
when information from other sources than Gilmour is used. 
2
 Minutes of the Rainbow Circle 1894-1924, ed. Michael Freeden (London, 1989), 
p. 13. 
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Brodick.3 At an early age he moved with his parents to Stirling, where he went 
to school until he was thirteen years old. At school, where he managed to learn 
the rudiments of Latin, he acquired the habit of omnivorous reading that was to 
become such an essential part of his being. After Robertson's death, his school 
fellow and lifelong friend William Jenkins recalled how the two of them 
devoured all the books they could lay their hands on, with a marked preference 
for 'the thriller type'.4 In spite of his many explorations into more complex 
territory (or perhaps rather because of these), Robertson never lost his taste for 
this genre, and in later life developed 'a hygienic habit of reading thrillers after 
meals' in order, as he said with typical irony, 'to prevent my brains from 
working at those times.' It seems unlikely that he ever managed to accomplish 
this, however. To a polymath like Robertson, mental exercise was not only 
pleasurable, but, in fact, as natural and necessary as breathing. 
Since his parents were poor (his father was a crofter)5 and could not afford 
to continue his education after his thirteenth year, he went to work as a 
telegraph clerk on the railways in Stirling. He held this job for a year or so, and 
then moved to Edinburgh, where he worked in a law office for four years. This 
was followed by two years of clerking with an insurance company. This kind of 
job cannot have provided him with much of an intellectual challenge, although 
he must have been exaggerating when he commented several decades later: 'I 
claim to have learned as little law in four years as anyone ever did.'6 But there 
were plenty of intellectual challenges in his spare time. In the evenings he 
rubbed up his Latin, so that he could read Livy with little difficulty. To 
Robertson, the learning of languages was the key to the acquisition of the 
' Who's Who of British Members of Parliament. Vol. II: 1886-1918, eds Michael 
Stenton and Stephen Lees (Sussex, 1978), p. 306. 
4
 William Jenkins, 'Further Tributes to J.M. Robertson', Literary Guide (March 
1933), p. 53. Following Robertson's death on 5 January 1933, in February and March the 
Literary Guide published a number of tributes by friends. For over thirty years, Robertson had 
been closely associated with this rationalist monthly, to which he made countless 
contributions. Originally published by the rationalist publisher C.A. Watts under the title 
Watts's Literary Guide, being a record of liberal and advanced publications from November 
1885 to September 1894, it was continued as The Literary Guide, a monthly record and review 
of liberal and advanced publications from October 1894 to June 1896, and then with the 
sub-title A Rationalist Review from July 1896 to March 1954. The sub-title was absent from 
April 1954 to September 1956, and in October 1956 The Literary Guide became The 
Humanist. Its main interest was with rationalist issues in a very broad sense, not, as the title 
might seem to imply, with 'belles lettres' as such. 
5
 This is confirmed by several sources. Only one source states that Robertson's father 
was 'a fisherman at Lamlash': Robert Gunn Davis, 'A Journalist of Fame', Edinburgh Evening 
News (13 November 1943), p. 5. 
6
 J.M. Robertson, 'Speech on the Occasion of his Seventieth Birthday', Literary 
Guide (January 1927), p. 22. 
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widest possible range of knowledge. He studied German and French, and 
finally mastered six or seven languages, including - an unusual feat - Dutch.7 
A great deal of his time was also devoted to the ardent perusal of the works of 
Thomas Carlyle, much to his later embarrassment.8 Although Robertson's 
father, for one, was far from illiterate and even reproached him when he was 
about twelve for not reading Hugh Miller's Old Red Sandstone in the time he 
was spending on Robinson Crusoe,9 his perpetual reading filled his parents 
with worry: what was all this bookishness going to lead to?10 The boy himself 
had his eyes firmly fixed on a literary future of some sort, although he was 
willing to take a somewhat cumbersome detour. When he was sixteen years old 
he told himself: 'The thing for me to do is to master Spanish, get into the 
copper trade, make a reasonable fortune in twenty years or so, and then 
withdraw and devote myself to my books.'" This reckless plan was never 
executed, nor did Robertson ever succeed in making a fortune. The closest he 
ever came to fulfilling his ideal was in the last fifteen years of his life, when he 
did manage to dedicate the best part of his time to his studies, although his 
financial affairs always remained a source of worry. 
Looking back as an older man on his adolescence, Robertson observed that 
'his active instincts' had been 'mainly aesthetic', adding that if he had had a 
rich father, he would have become an artist, 'a fourth-rater at that'.12 However, 
Robertson's first priority in life was simply to earn his living, and this led him 
to the career that most effectively satisfied both his pecuniary and literary 
interests: journalism. Around the period of his clerking job at the insurance 
company, he started to contribute to local journals. He even wrote a novel, 
which was serialized in a provincial newspaper, and to which he would later 
refer apologetically as a 'pot-boiler'.13 He was now just over twenty, and 
clearly unusually well-equipped for the job he was drifting into. There was still 
a lingering hope that he could make money by writing plays and novels, of 
which he was always a ceaseless reader. He also developed a special interest in 
the history of the drama, which, as we shall see, he was never to lose. However, 
7
 F.J. Gould, Chats with Pioneers of Modern Thought (London, 1898), p. 127. In the 
interview Gould had with him, Robertson testified to his esteem for the Geschiedenis van den 
Godsdienst tot aan de Heerschappij der Wereldgodsdiensten (History of Religion, 1876) by 
the Dutch professor of theology C.P. Tiele (1830-1902), 'so much so that, in order to study his 
essay on Christ and Krishna, I took the trouble to learn Dutch.' 
' Modern Humanists (London, 1891), p. 42. 
9
 What to Read (London, 1904), p. 10. 
10
 Robertson, 'Speech on the Occasion of his Seventieth Birthday', p. 22. 
" Ibid 
12
 /Ш,р.23. 
13
 Unfortunately, Gilmour, who provides this information, specifies neither the 'local 
journals' nor the 'provincial newspaper'. 
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'always the lure of truth-seeking seemed to overpower all the other lures',14 
and since to Robertson the path of truth-seeking ran through journalism, it was 
there that his immediate future lay. 
In 1877 he met William Archer, who was the same age as Robertson, and 
who was already pursuing a career as a dramatic critic. Since 1875, he had been 
a leader writer for the Edinburgh Evening News. The two young men struck up 
a lifelong friendship, and when Archer decided to move to London in 1878, he 
recommended Robertson as his successor.15 Archer had been greatly impressed 
by his new friend's power of mind, with which he had become well-acquainted 
in the course of many country walks and evening talks in Archer's Hanover 
Street 'eyrie'. Robertson was introduced to 'Mr John', the editor, and, as 
Archer wrote, matters were arranged without the least difficulty.16 So there he 
was: twenty-one years old, and ready to instruct his fellow citizens on things in 
general.17 The Edinburgh Evening News was an organ of advanced Radicalism, 
the editor of which, John Wilson, was a disciple of Herbert Spencer. Once, 
when asked by a concerned northern clergyman to which denomination his 
young men in general belonged, he had answered in an off-hand tone: 'Ou, 
maistly Atheists.'18 
There is little doubt that Robertson, as one of these young men, had indeed 
become an atheist. He wrote to his friend Dobell: 'I gave up the "divine" notion 
in my teens: when I came to probe thoroughly the "human" problem I was long 
past attaching any meaning whatever to the "divine" conception.'19 He was 
gradually becoming more and more involved in the secularist movement, which 
was gaining popularity as well as notoriety in the years between 1874 and 
1880.20 In September 1878 Robertson attended a lecture by the redoubtable 
figurehead of the secularist movement, Charles Bradlaugh: 
H
 Robertson, 'Speech on the Occasion of his Seventieth Birthday', p. 23. 
15
 William Archer as Rationalist. With a biographical sketch by The Rt. Hon. J.M. 
Robertson, ed. J.M. Robertson (London, 1925), p. viii. The DNB-entry on Robertson by 
Harold Laski states erroneously that Archer was Robertson's colleague at the Edinburgh 
Evening News. 
16
 C. Archer, William Archer. Life, Work, Friendships, (London, 1931), p. 74. In this 
biography, Charles Archer also provides transcripts of the following letters between the two 
friends: WA to JMR, 21 October 1881; JMR to WA, 23 October 1881; WA to JMR, 26 
October 1881; WA to JMR, 8 January 1882; WA to JMR, 12 February 1882; WA to JMR, 6 
July 1923. These transcripts are the only surviving records of the correspondence. 
17
 Robertson, 'Speech on the Occasion of his Seventieth Birthday', p. 23. 
18
 Ibid. 
" Robertson to Dobell, 3 February 1906; Robertson's correspondence with his friend 
and bookseller Bertram Dobell is in the Bodleian Library, MS Dobell С 43, ff. 12-83. 
2 0
 Edward Royle, Radicals, Secularists and Republicans. Popular Freethought in 
Britain, 1866-1915 (Manchester, 1980), pp. 11-22. 
THE LIFE OF J.M. ROBERTSON 5 
I was told he was to lecture on Giordano Bruno in a hall in 
Edinburgh, and went to hear him. With that lecture, which first 
brought me in contact with the Freethought movement, I associate 
the only sensation of pain, and that not a severe one, which 
attended my abandonment of early beliefs. Thinking incon-
secutively for myself, with no Freethought literature to guide me 
save as so much of Paine as was contained in Watson's 
'Apology'21 - a work which has led probably more men to 
Freethought than it has established in orthodoxy - I slowly 
reasoned myself out of orthodoxy, and only retained a vague belief 
in a somewhat abstract Deity, with, I think, an equally attenuated 
notion of immortality.22 
Robertson's falling from faith may not have been quite as smooth a process as 
this account suggests. His parents were apparently very religious,23 and 
consequently pained by this gradual and quite irreversible change of opinion.24 
However, the secularist circles in which Robertson now moved provided a 
strong stimulus to throw off any final remnants of religious belief. 
Edinburgh was not a particularly active centre of secularism, but there was a 
vigorous circle of Bradlaugh-followers, led by John Lees, a rope and twine 
manufacturer who was a vice-president of Bradlaugh's National Secular 
Society (N.S.S.), and a close personal friend of its leader.25 Robertson joined 
the Edinburgh Secular Society, and in the early 1880s he became the leader of a 
group of young fellow secularists, who drew attention to themselves by their 
vigorous propaganda of freethought and secularism in the face of unbending 
Scottish orthodoxy. In addition to Robertson, the members of this group were 
Thomas Carlaw Martin, a Post Office administrator, who later became editor of 
the Scottish Leader and was given a knighthood for his editorial services in 
support of the legal case for the union of the United Presbyterian and Free 
Churches; W.E. Snell, of the Queen's Remembrancer's Office; Joseph Mazzini 
Wheeler, an accomplished scholar of freethought, whose mental instability 
21
 Richard Watson (1737-1816) was the author ofApology for the Bible, in Answer to 
Thomas Paine (1796). 
22
 J.M. Robertson, National Reformer (8 February 1891 ), pp. 83^*. 
23
 Arthur Moss, 'Famous Freethinkers I have known - ІІГ, Freethinker (5 
September 1915), p. 570. 
24
 Robertson to Edward Henry, 16 June 1931. This letter is a reply to a young man 
who was struggling with religious doubts and wrote to Robertson for advice. Somewhat 
surprisingly, the died-in-the-wool and widely feared rationalist counselled him 'not be 
aggressive about your opinions, contenting yourself with defending them when they are 
attacked.' The letter was acquired in 1995 by the then Secretary of the National Secular 
Society, Mr. T. Mullins, and is now in the N.S.S. archive at the Bishopsgate Library, London. 
25
 Royle, Radicals, Secularists and Republicans, p. 70. 
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doubtless contributed to bringing an early end to his unhappy life;26 and John 
Lees, at whose house the group met regularly. Allied with this group, though 
not actual members, were William Archer, who had moved to London in 1878, 
and Patrick Geddes, an Irish polymath who later distinguished himself as a 
biologist, educationist, and town planner. 
This energetic brotherhood of freethinkers was not without its Swinburnian 
touches. One of its conventions was to wear hyacinthine locks, to have 
whiskers and a beard, and, for the platform, to sport a brown or black velvet 
jacket. Malcolm Quin, freethinker and Positivist, recorded the following 
impression of a meeting with Robertson in 1881 : 
Another of the bright-witted and capable Edinburgh Secularists 
whom I then met for the first time was a dark-haired, dark-eyed, 
soft-spoken young man from the North named J.M. Robertson. He 
was then assistant-editor of the Edinburgh Evening News,21 and 
was already as alert in mind, and as remorselessly keen in speech, 
if not quite as omniscient, as he has since proved himself to be to a 
wide public. We always had a free discussion after my lectures, as 
after others; and if Robertson had any share in it - as I think he 
must have had - I am sure I must have suffered much from his 
dexterous spear-thrusts which then, as ever afterwards, he could 
give to his opponents, either in print or on the platform.28 
At John Lees's house at Portobello by the Firth of Forth Robertson met 
Hypatia and Alice Bradlaugh, Charles Bradlaugh's daughters and co-workers 
in the cause of secularism. Hypatia, who became one of Robertson's closest 
friends and allies, later recalled nostalgically how Robertson would sometimes 
shock the devout neighbours by taking boats out on the water on Sundays. He 
was, after all, a highlander from the Isle of Arran, and there was apparently 
little about a boat he did not know.29 
Although we do not know for certain whether Robertson ever met 
Bradlaugh himself at Lees's house, there is little doubt that he soon attracted 
the great man's attention. Robertson was starting to contribute regularly to the 
National Reformer, the official N.S.S. organ and Bradlaugh's main 
mouthpiece, as well as to two other freethought ventures: Progress, edited by 
the leading freethinker G.W. Foote, and Our Corner, edited by Mrs Annie 
26
 For Wheeler, see Royle, Radicals, Secularists and Republicans, pp. 104-5. 
27
 Actually, Robertson was leader writer, not assistant-editor. 
28
 Malcolm Quin, Memoirs of a Positivist (London, 1924), p. 66. 
29
 Hypatia Bradlaugh Bonner, 'John Mackinnon Robertson: a Tribute', Literary Guide 
(July 1926), pp. 111-12. 
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Besant.30 In both Progress (June 1884) and the National Reformer (15 June, 27 
July 1884) he reported on a debate he had attended in London at St James's 
Hall on 17 April between Bradlaugh and H.M. Hyndman, the Marxist Socialist 
and leader of the Social Democratic Federation. On his return to Edinburgh he 
organized a meeting to discuss the case of secularism vs Socialism, at which he 
defended Socialism against his friend John Lees, the chairman of the 
Edinburgh Secular Society.31 From the correspondence in the National 
Reformer which followed the Bradlaugh-Hyndman debate we learn that 
Robertson described himself as a 'Socialist and Pessimist',32 but his Socialist 
position was in fact so close to Bradlaugh's brand of Radical Liberalism that 
from the very first, Bradlaugh undoubtedly saw him as an ally rather than an 
opponent. 
Robertson had made his first brief visit to London in the first week of July 
1882, when he and his Edinburgh friend Joseph Wheeler accompanied G.W. 
Foote on a walking tour through the South London countryside. The three had 
an extremely pleasant day walking around Kew and Richmond, while 
discussing a long letter by William Archer from Italy, and reciting poetry, much 
to the bewilderment of 'the birds, the sheep, the cattle, and stray pedestrians'. 
Far less pleasant, however, was Foote's return home, where he found on his 
desk a summons from the Lord Mayor, commanding his attendance at the 
Mansion House next Tuesday, to answer a charge of blasphemy.33 In the issue 
of Foote's militantly atheist periodical the Freethinker for 28 May 1882, Foote 
had published an article with the provocative title 'What shall I do to be 
damned' by William Heaford, as well as an irreverent cartoon depicting God 
entitled 'Divine Illumination'. Foote was treated no better than a common 
criminal, and sentenced to a year in Holloway prison, which he duly served. 
Incidents like these, by no means uncommon and indicative of the notoriety of 
secularists in the eyes of the establishment, must have further strengthened 
Robertson in his resolve to dedicate his life to the freethought cause. To a 
combative spirit like his, here was a cause clearly worth fighting for. 
It was Bradlaugh's closest co-worker, the remarkable Annie Besant, who 
was finally instrumental in Robertson's removal to London in 1884. For a 
while, Mrs Besant had been looking for a replacement of the dedicated but 
utterly unreliable Edward Aveling on the staff of the National Reformer. Not 
only was Aveling a notorious womanizer, he also owed Bradlaugh large sums 
of money, which he never repaid. George Bernard Shaw, who knew Aveling all 
30
 Robertson's contributions to Progress as well as to Our Corner start with Volume I, 
1883. 
31
 Royle, Radicals, Secularists and Republicans, p. 234. 
32
 'Correspondence', National Reformer ( 15 June 1884), p. 402. 
33
 G.W. Foote, 'Prisoner for Blasphemy.- II', Progress, 4 (1884), p. 58. 
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too well, summed up his character in a nutshell: 'If it came to giving one's life 
for a cause one could count on Aveling even if he carried all our purses with 
him to the scaffold.'34 In the autumn of 1884 Annie Besant travelled to 
Edinburgh, and succeeded in persuading Robertson to come with her to London 
and become assistant-editor of the National Reformer, which he was to remain 
until Bradlaugh's death in 1891. 
In October 1884, Annie Besant presided over Robertson's farewell party, 
organized by the Edinburgh Secular Society. His secularist friends did not like 
to see their talented friend go, and it turned out to be a moving occasion for all 
involved. Robertson was presented with a handsome testimonial (quite 
appropriately 'a beautiful inkstand, stationary case, gold pen and pencil, and 
other requisites of a writing table'), and the hard-headed Scotsman replied in a 
emotional speech, his voice almost breaking at times.35 Rare instances like 
these show us that the stern rationalist exterior Robertson presented to the 
outside world may well have hidden an unexpectedly sentimental soul 
(although he would undoubtedly have objected to the use of that particular 
term). That he revealed such feelings only to those who shared his convictions 
is hardly surprising in the light of his life's mission. To display emotional 
'weakness' to his ideological enemies would only have undermined his 
position as an unwavering champion of the rationalist cause. Among his 
friends, he could afford to lower his guard. 
As soon as he found himself under Mrs Besant's wings, Robertson was not 
given much time to succumb to nostalgia. On arrival in London at St Paneras 
Station, he was taken straight to Mrs Besant's vast house at 19 Avenue Road, 
where, for the next three years, he was to be a lodger.36 Apart from his 
involvement in the National Reformer, Robertson was bent on making Mrs 
Besant's Our Corner as successful as possible, and after a ramble in Windsor 
Park with Mrs Besant shortly after his arrival in London, it was decided that his 
versatile friend Patrick Geddes should be asked to contribute.37 Having thus 
found his footing in London, it was not long before he became one of the 
pillars of the secularist movement, and a loyal, though never uncritical, disciple 
of Bradlaugh and Mrs Besant, its renowned leaders. 
34
 Quoted from Royle, Radicals, Secularists and Republicans, p. 106. 
35
 Annie Besant, 'Farewell to Mr Robertson at Edinburgh', National Reformer (12 
October 1884), p. 247. 
36
 Anne Taylor, Annie Besant. A Biography (Oxford, 1992), p. 171. As source, Taylor 
mentions a note, probably by Arthur Bonner, in the Bradlaugh Bonner Family Papers. 
37
 Robertson to Geddes, 1 November 1884; Robertson's correspondence with Patrick 
Geddes is in the National Library of Scotland, Geddes Papers, MS 10522, f. 239; 10523, f. 
229; 10524, ff. 3-9, 115, 137; 10535, f. 138; 10548, f. 183. Note that Taylor misquotes this 
letter by substituting 'Wimbledon Commons' for 'Windsor Park'. 
THE LIFE OF J.M. ROBERTSON 9 
Charles Bradlaugh, Annie Besant, and Secularism 
The early 1880s were the years in which the secularist movement reached its 
climax, and Charles Bradlaugh, president of the National Secular Society, 
achieved unprecedented popularity as a champion of the people. What did this 
movement, of which Robertson was at one time such an eminent exponent, 
stand for? 
Edward Royle, Robertson's most recent and prominent successor as a 
historian of freethought and secularism, provides the following outline: 
The Secularists were a relatively small group of men and women 
from the working classes whose mission was a radical 
restructuring of society by peaceful means. Their fundamental 
belief was that the evils of contemporary society were attributable 
to the baneful effects of religion, and their aim was to discredit 
Christianity and those social institutions which depended upon it. 
They were republicans in a country increasingly devoted to its 
Queen; and atheists in a society which, outwardly at least, was 
profoundly religious. Their hero was Thomas Paine.38 
The definitions of and distinctions between freethought and secularism present 
somewhat of a problem. Fundamentally, freethought and secularism are both 
before all else anti-religious ideologies. Robertson himself defined freethought 
as follows: 
. . . a conscious reaction against some phase or phases of 
conventional or traditional doctrine in religion - on the one hand, a 
claim to think freely, in the sense not of disregard for logic but of 
special loyalty to it, on problems to which the past course of things 
has given a great intellectual and practical importance; on the other 
hand, the actual practice of such thinking.39 
In practice, 'freethought' may be looked upon as a generic term, covering a 
wide variety of militant strands of unbelief, whereas 'secularism' is usually 
used to refer more specifically to the popular system of organized non-religion 
which emerged in the 1850s and soon became identified with Bradlaugh, the 
N.S.S., and the National Reformer. 
English freethought could point to a long and colourful tradition, of which 
Robertson provides a lucid summary in his short biography of Bradlaugh: 
Royle, Radicals, Secularists and Republicans, p. x. 
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English freethought, which began to take systematic critical form 
in the Discourse of Freethinking of Anthony Collins in 1713, and 
is recorded by responsible witnesses to have reached the working 
classes even in the age of the Restoration, became a matter of 
platform propaganda as early as Peter Annet, in 1739. If such 
polemic was overlaid in the latter half of the eighteenth century by 
new popular politics, it was powerfully reconstituted by Paine's 
Age of Reason, which seems to have been about as widely 
circulated as his Rights of Mam; and the Radicalism of the first half 
of the nineteenth century went hand in hand with all manner of 
freethinking. The movement of Robert Owen was impregnated 
with it; and no one who mingled long with the Chartists could fail 
to meet with it there.40 
In the 1850s, George Jacob Holyoake (1817-1906) tried hard to erect a national 
secular movement on the ruins of Owenite Socialism and Chartism. The 
movement was to have 'the social aims of Owenism but without its early 
theological debunking or its later canting promises, the political aims of 
Chartism without its working-class prejudices or bogus land schemes, and the 
moral aspirations of Christian Socialism without being tied to an incredible 
creed.'41 Although Holyoake succeeded in laying the foundations of the 
movement, he was not the type of powerful and charismatic leader who could 
bring unity to a highly diverse and fragmented movement. His freethinking 
critics found him too cautious and eager to compromise, too much concerned 
about respectability in the eyes of the middle classes, and not sufficiently loyal 
to the militant freethought tradition of the first half of the nineteenth century,42 
which, as Robertson points out, had its own history of propagandistic literature: 
Richard Carlile, who took up the sale of Paine's works when they 
were being officially suppressed, and who underwent nine years' 
imprisonment between 1819 and 1835, was one of the most 
energetic of democratic publishers, putting in cheap circulation a 
multitude of English, French, and American treatises, with 
Shelley's Queen Mab, of which the jurisprudence of the time 
refused to let the poet control the circulation. An almost continual 
succession of Radical and Rationalist journals, mostly of 
book-page size, had pushed such literature home during a quarter 
of a century. Meantime there had appeared in 1838 Charles 
Hennell's Inquiry Concerning the Origin of Christianity, praised 
40
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by Strauss, of which the sober documentary scrutiny was promptly 
assimilated by the popular propagandists. In 1846 came George 
Eliot's translation of Strauss's Life of Jesus.43 
In fact, the very neologism 'secularism', coined by Holyoake to avoid the 
immediate and hazardous association with atheism, is proof of his essential 
willingness to compromise. 
Although his task proved uncommonly hard and he never achieved the unity 
he strove for, Charles Bradlaugh, and not Holyoake, was the man who proved 
able to focus the movement into an influential social and political force. In 
contrast with Holyoake's politics of compromise, Bradlaugh preached open 
warfare, and his warcry was one that many secularists and Radicals all over the 
country were eager to rally to. It was not long before the average Victorian 
looked upon him as an alarming threat to established order and morality, and 
his advocacy of atheism, republicanism, Neo-Malthusian birth-control, and 
far-reaching political reform made him a veritable devil incarnate in the eyes of 
many an anxious Christian moralist. A threat to the establishment he certainly 
was, but there was nothing infernal about him. He may have preached atheism, 
but he was really an almost Puritanical public moralist of the typically 
Victorian kind; he may have advocated republicanism, but he was an ardent 
patriot and dedicated constitutionalist. His campaign for birth control was an 
attempt to liberate women from the straitjacket of constant childbearing, and 
had nothing to do with the propagation of free sex, of which he was incessantly 
accused. Bradlaugh aimed at reform, not revolution, and in politics the 
secularists found themselves on the extreme Radical left of the Liberal party. 
Although he was followed with a critical eye, William Ewart Gladstone was for 
many of them a name to be mentioned with reverence. 
Bradlaugh was born in Hoxton, North London, in 1833.44 His father was a 
poor solicitor's clerk, who (like Robertson's parents) could not afford to send 
his son to school after his twelfth year. Charles soon took a precocious interest 
in politics, and in his spare time he read widely and eagerly, and attended 
political meetings. When he was fifteen years old, he experienced the first of 
his many clashes with organized Christianity. He was then a Sunday school 
teacher, and when, in preparation for his Confirmation, he studied the 
Thirty-Nine Articles and the Gospels, and detected some disturbing 
discrepancies, he dutifully reported his findings to his superintendent, the 
Reverend J.G. Packer. The latter was outraged by these dangerous atheistic 
leanings, and Charles was suspended from school for three months. Thus 
43
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relieved from his church-going duties on Sundays, he now had ample time to 
attend the open-air meetings at Bonner's Fields in Bethnal Green. Here he 
listened to impassioned freethought lecturers who confirmed him in his 
emerging religious doubts. A further appeal to the Reverend Packer brought 
about Bradlaugh's removal from his house. 
He now found refuge with Eliza Sharpies, the common-law widow of 
Richard Carlile, the foremost promoter of British republicanism in the early 
nineteenth century. Now finding himself at the core of freethought activity, he 
soon shook off what vestiges of Christian faith he had left. His new, atheistic 
beliefs, however, lost him his job, and he got deeper and deeper into debt. 
Seeing no other way out, he joined the army in 1850, and went to Ireland, 
where his experiences sowed the seeds for a lifelong interest in the Irish cause. 
In 1853, a legacy enabled him to buy himself out, and he found himself a job as 
an attorney's clerk. Since he did not want to compromise his employer, he now 
undertook his propagandistic missions under the name 'Iconoclast', which he 
would continue to use until 1868. His work at two law offices provided him 
with extensive legal knowledge, an extremely useful asset in his secularist 
career. A formidable orator, he devoted his spare time to freethought and 
Radical lecturing, and rapidly became very popular with London audiences. 
After a successful provincial lecture tour in 1858, his popularity spread to the 
country as well. 
By the late 1850s, he had replaced Holyoake as the acknowledged secularist 
leader. In 1862 he became the sole proprietor of the National Reformer, a new 
weekly secularist newspaper that was originally based in Sheffield but was 
soon transferred to London. In 1866, Bradlaugh took the editorship into his 
own hands, and turned the National Reformer into the official organ of the 
secularist movement. In that same year, Bradlaugh founded the N.S.S., of 
which he was to be president until 1890. Although his leadership was never 
undisputed and he had many secularist enemies who accused him of despotism, 
he was in effect the embodiment of secularism, and after his death became 
what may well be called its secular Saint. 
To John Robertson, there would be no greater example in life, and 
Bradlaugh's teachings provided the foundation on which he built much of his 
own work. In an emotional 'In Memoriam' after Bradlaugh's death, he 
mourned the loss of a man who had, in many ways, been like a father to him, 
and whose example he felt under an intense obligation to emulate: 
For my own small part, I should be already false to his example if I 
did not avow that I can hardly conceive myself coming to aim at a 
life of straightforward doctrine even on a small scale, if this man 
had not by his dauntless sincerity both shown what degree of 
sincerity is possible find made the exercise of it easy. Verily, with 
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his stripes are we made whole. Since he forced his fearless way 
through the beast-peopled jungle, the path is broad and free; and 
we should be unworthy of having ever known him if we let the 
rank growth unite again, and the creatures of fang and sting regain 
complete possession.45 
Bertrand Russell's description in Ms Autobiography of Robertson as 'the man 
on whom Bradlaugh's mantle has fallen' was entirely accurate.46 Robertson's 
militant atheism, his views on the history of Christianity, his 
Neo-Malthusianism, almost his entire Liberal ideology, all these were inspired 
or engendered by Bradlaugh's example, and treasured by Robertson as a most 
precious inheritance. 
In 1874, the secularist cause gained a remarkable acquisition in the person of 
Mrs Annie Besant (1847-1933).47 A year before, Mrs Besant had shaken 
herself loose from her disastrous marriage to the Reverend Frank Besant, who 
has gone down into history (his wife made sure of that) as the rigid 
embodiment of all the Victorian values which constrained women in their 
freedom. Like Bradlaugh, she had read herself out of orthodox religion, much 
to her husband's distress. Her first contact with the world of freethought 
occurred in 1872, when she was visiting her mother in London. There she 
listened to the unorthodox preaching of Charles Voysey at St George's Hall, 
and became acquainted with Moncure D. Conway, the equally unorthodox 
minister of the South Place Chapel. She found a mentor in the person of 
Thomas Scott, a deistic publisher, for whom she wrote an anonymous tract on 
The Deity of Jesus of Nazareth. After her legal separation from her husband in 
1873, she felt free to break with conventions as she pleased. In July 1874 she 
bought a copy of Bradlaugh's National Reformer, and immediately liked its 
opinions. She wrote to Bradlaugh asking if she could join the N.S.S., and on 
receiving an encouraging reply, she attended a lecture at Bradlaugh's Hall of 
Science in Old Street, and was overwhelmed by his powerful presence on the 
platform. Three weeks later, on 25 August, she delivered her first public 
lecture, at the Co-operative Institute in Castle Street. August 30 saw the 
publication of her first weekly 'Daybreak' column in the National Reformer, 
under the pseudonym of 'Ajax'. Her career in secularism was now officially 
launched, and it was not long before she became, in fact, second in command 
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to Bradlaugh. In 1875 she became Vice-President of the N.S.S. and 
Bradlaugh's closest co-worker. From February 1877, she sub-edited the 
National Reformer, and she became co-editor in May 1881, a position she held 
until October 1887. 
From her very first appearance on the platform, Mrs Besant proved to be an 
extremely valuable asset to the freethought cause. She was an uncommonly 
gifted platform-speaker, and as such achieved great popularity among 
freethinkers all over the country. Missionary work was an essential and 
inevitable element of freethought, and only when it could rely on effective 
missionaries did the secularist movement really thrive. When the decline of the 
movement began to set in around the second half of the 1880s, G.W. Foote, the 
later president of the N.S.S., attributed it to 'the want of good lecturers'.48 
Conversely, the success of secularism in the first half of the 1880s is 
undoubtedly partly attributable to the smoothness with which the N.S.S. 
propaganda machine then ran. In 1883, there were no fewer than ten appointed 
lecturers, whereas by 1891, the number had dropped dramatically to only one.49 
When Robertson replaced Edward Aveling on the staff of the National 
Reformer in 1884, that periodical could boast of a number of highly qualified 
contributors, which ensured that the printed side of propaganda was well 
covered.50 But although the efforts of these dedicated propagandists certainly 
contributed to the success of secularism at this time, the actual cause has to be 
sought elsewhere. 
Bradlaugh was always well aware that success for the secularist cause had to 
be achieved through the channels of political Radicalism, in other words: 
through parliament. From 1868, he made several attempts to win the 
Northampton constituency, but it was not until his fourth attempt at the 1880 
elections that he was finally successful. Before he could take his rightful seat in 
Parliament, however, one barrier was still to be crossed: the oath of allegiance, 
which ran as follows: 'I do swear that I will be faithful and bear true Allegiance 
to her Majesty Queen Victoria, Her Heirs and Successors, according to Law. So 
help me God.'51 Bradlaugh notified the Speaker and the Clerk to the House of 
Commons that he believed that he had the legal right to affirm, and did not 
have to stoop to hypocrisy and take the oath. This resulted in a parliamentary 
struggle which lasted until 1886, when the opposition finally gave way, and 
which showed clearly just how dangerous a threat Bradlaugh appeared in the 
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eyes of the establishment.52 Bradlaugh's opponents, numbering among them 
prominent politicians like Randolph Churchill and Stafford Northcote, 
attempted to break him financially, and to undermine his reputation in every 
possible way. The effect was ultimately the exact opposite of what they tried to 
achieve. The 'Bradlaugh case', as it was called, became a cause célebre, and 
Bradlaugh himself a popular hero. The secularist movement was never to rise 
again to the heights it achieved during Bradlaugh's struggle to enter parliament. 
The N.S.S. reached its peak in 1883 and 1884," while from the mid-1880s, a 
gradual decline set in which proved unstoppable. Secularism, firmly rooted in 
the Liberal-Radical tradition, had to give way to a more radically reformist 
movement: Socialism. 
Robertson's Bradlaugh Years: 1884-1891 
Robertson not only replaced Edward Aveling on the staff of the National 
Reformer, he also replaced him in the triumvirate Aveling had formed with 
Bradlaugh and Mrs Besant. Robertson made countless contributions to the 
National Reformer, thereby allowing Bradlaugh to concentrate on his 
parliamentary career. He also became, as we have seen, Annie Besant's 
right-hand man on Our Corner, of which she was the sole proprietor. 
Initially, Our Corner tried to approach its missionary message from a 
popular, family oriented angle. There was a separate corner for a variety of 
subjects: Politics, Young Folks, Art, etc. After 1885, when Mrs Besant joined 
the Fabian Society, its slant became more serious and political, and in 1886-87, 
it turned into a Socialist magazine, while retaining a strong interest in literature. 
For Robertson, Our Corner became the most important outlet for his literary 
material, and, showing that his aesthetic instincts were still alive, he also 
published a number of poems in it. The following is a typical sample of the 
kind of youthful poetical lapses Robertson perpetrated in these days: 
To Schubert 
Son of the morning! who long ago 
Lit up my life with your glamour so; 
Changing the past to a land of dream, 
52
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Where sorrow gathered a silver gleam, 
And lingering love seemed to lose its fire 
In the glow of a nameless, new desire; 
Till life itself seemed a lesser thing 
Than the melody that you made it sing -
You who transfigured all for me 
In the radiance of strange harmony, 
Till with all the world I grew content, 
As at very worst but a kindly tent 
Screening me from a blaze of blue 
Too intense to live in - here come you 
Breaking my heart with a chord or two!54 
After the 1880s, Robertson seems to have completely abandoned his attempts 
to write poetry, no doubt also because he was well aware that his real strengths 
lay elsewhere. As to Our Corner, its gradual shift towards Socialism was 
entirely in keeping with the changing political views of its proprietress. Partly, 
this was due to the influence of an illustrious figure with whom Robertson too 
came into close and not always harmonious contact: George Bernard Shaw.55 
It seems likely that Robertson first met Shaw, who was the same age, in his 
capacity as editorial assistant of Our Corner. Mrs Besant had come to the 
conclusion that Shaw was not the 'loafer' he had proclaimed himself to be in a 
lecture at the South Place Institute in the beginning of May 1884, but was in 
fact 'very hard-working' and quite poor, and therefore worthy of patronage.56 
She decided to offer him space in Our Corner to publish the novels he had 
been peddling unsuccessfully with publishers of more conventional repute. 
Robertson may well have had a hand in this decision too. In an overview of the 
literature of 1884 in the National Reformer of December 1884, Robertson 
offered unusually high praise of Shaw's fifth novel, An Unsocial Socialist: 
On the whole, the most noteworthy piece of fiction I have lately 
seen has been the story entitled "An Unsocial Socialist", by Mr 
George Bernard Shaw, which has just been concluded in the 
magazine To-day. There is capital work in that novel - insight, 
brilliance of style and pith of dialogue; and the conclusion struck 
me as the most stringent and striking application of the cynical 
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method I had seen.... It is really abreast of the thinking of the day 
- perhaps on that account too advanced for many readers.57 
This is obviously the kind of review that may well spark off a friendship, and 
Shaw was grateful for Robertson's glowing words. When Macmillan rejected 
An Unsocial Socialist for publication, inviting him to write something 'of a 
more substantial kind', Shaw referred to Robertson as the one reviewer 'who 
really took the book in.'511 
The question to be solved was now: which of Shaw's remaining novels 
should Our Corner publish? This was debated by Robertson and Mrs Besant in 
the beginning of 1885. Robertson's attempt to convince Mrs Besant that 'the 
Irrational Knot is the least likely of your [Shaw's] novels to suit us' evoked a 
half playful, half irritated letter from Shaw, in which he asserted vigorously that 
'the Irrational Knot is very long, and highly moral, and deeply interesting. A 
child can understand it, and a stern man can weep over it (if he likes).'59 
Notwithstanding Robertson's preference for Love Among the Artists, it was 
Mrs Besant's favourite, The Irrational Knot, which was finally serialized in 
Our Corner from April 1885 to February 1887.60 
For this period, Shaw's diaries record frequent meetings with Robertson.61 
They had a mutual friend in William Archer, and they both spent many long 
days studying in the Reading-Room of the British Museum. After Shaw's first 
dramatic encounter with Annie Besant at the Dialectical Society on January 21, 
1885, at which she unexpectedly defended Shaw's advocacy of Socialism,62 
Shaw could often be found in the evenings at her house in St. John's Wood, 
where Robertson was a lodger. There, the three of them had long discussions in 
which Socialism undoubtedly figured as an important theme. Under 
Robertson's influence, Annie Besant had begun to adopt a more favourable 
attitude towards Socialism. In her usual, orotund style she writes in her 
Autobiography: 'The inclusion of John Robertson in the staff of the Reformer 
brought a highly intellectual Socialist into closer touch with us, and slowly I 
57
 J.M. Robertson, 'Literature in 1884', National Reformer (28 December 1884), 
p. 453. 
58
 Shaw to Macmillan & Co., 14 January 1885. Quoted from Bernard Shaw: Collected 
Letters 1874-1897, ed. Dan H. Laurence (London, 1965), p. 111. 
59
 Shaw to Robertson, 19 January 1885. Ibid., pp. 112-13. 
60
 Love Among the Artists was eventually published in Our Corner from November 
1887 to December 1888. 
61
 Bernard Shaw: The Diaries 1885-1897, ed. Stanley Weintraub, 2 vols (University 
Park and London, 1986). 
62
 Shaw: An Autobiography. 1856-1898, ed. Stanley Weintraub (New York, 1969), 
p. 141. 
18 J.M. ROBERTSON: RATIONALIST AND LITERARY CRITIC 
found that the case for Socialism was intellectually complete and ethically 
beautiful.'63 
Robertson himself hovered on the fringe of the Fabian Society, without 
apparently actually becoming a member. On 9, 10, and 11 June 1886, the 
Fabian Society organized its first conference, at the South Place Institute in 
London. Its aim was 'to discuss the present commercial system, and the better 
utilisation of national wealth for the benefit of the community'. On the first 
day, Robertson argued against Sidney Webb's view 'as to the non-cultivation 
of poor soils', while on the third day, he read a well-received paper entitled 'a 
Scheme of Taxation'.64 Shaw later wrote that in this paper, Robertson 
'anticipated much of what was subsequently adopted as the Fabian program.'65 
The reporter from Progress described Robertson's delivery as 'cool, dignified, 
and gentlemanly', as well as 'solid, temperate and conscientious', aptly 
contrasting it with 'the dry Irish witticism of Mr Bernard Shaw, whose 
pleasant, half-ironical smile makes us forgive nature for having endowed him 
with a deathly pale face, like that of the average vegetarian.'66 
Although at this time Robertson still sympathized with the Socialist ideal, 
and in spite of any contribution he may have made to the Fabian programme, 
he was never a Socialist in the sense that he believed in state monopoly or 
revolution. To Robertson, only gradual and painstaking reform could bring the 
founding of the Socialist state any nearer. His immediate concern was always 
with the social betterment of the here and now, and he had little time for the 
founding of a Utopia at some remote point in the future. Mrs Besant, however, 
preferred political ideas that soared up into the cloudy sky to those which 
remained firmly rooted in humble soil, and it was not long before she was 
convinced by Shaw to make those final steps towards Socialism to which 
Robertson would not acquiesce. This finally resulted in a painful breach 
between her and Bradlaugh, who rightly perceived Socialism as in direct 
competition with the secularist movement for the favour of the general public. 
In October 1887, Mrs Besant resigned as co-editor of the National Reformer, 
leaving Robertson with much of the editorial burden on his hands, especially 
now that Bradlaugh was preoccupied with his parliamentary duties.67 
In the many discussions Shaw had with Robertson, whether about Socialism 
or any other subject, he must have found the Scotsman a more than worthy 
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opponent. Robertson always had his encyclopedic knowledge at his fingertips, 
and he loved a good fight, as many of his friends (not to mention his enemies) 
could confirm.68 With Shaw he 'sparred', but not always entirely 
good-naturedly. The mixture of playfulness and irritation noted above is 
characteristic of their overall relationship. In a letter to Shaw dated 9 February 
1885, Robertson offers hair-splitting criticism of The Irrational Knot, 
suggesting, for instance, that Shaw change the title: 
'Irrational Knot' is irrational: it is knot in the knature of knots to 
be rational or irrational. Why 'Knot'? (Don't retort with Why 
not?). 'Mr Conolly's Experiments' - would that do?69 
This looks conspicuously like an uncharacteristic attempt on Robertson's part 
to adopt a tone of Shavian flippancy, which he cannot have felt entirely 
comfortable with. After sending Shaw the manuscript of a play he had 
written,70 he was driven to defend himself with an admission of failure: 'As 
regards the play, the damned thing wasn't worth discussion. You haven't 
mentioned half its faults.' 
Interestingly, he then proposed to Shaw to combine their strengths and 
cooperate in a literary venture: 
Suppose we do a play together? But the trouble is that neither of us 
is a plottist. Only I would keep your plot within the bounds of 
common-sense - my own Quixotism was perfectly conscious.71 
Robertson must have been aware of Shaw's earlier attempt to write a play with 
William Archer, their mutual friend. In that attempted collaboration, Shaw's 
supposed inability to come up with a good plot had also played a role. In the 
summer of 1884, Archer had outlined to Shaw the following master plan: 
Archer was to provide the plot, which he borrowed from a 'twaddling 
cup-and-saucer comedy' entitled Ceinture Dorée by Emile Augier, while 
Shaw could try and put a sparkle in the dialogue. Shaw started work on 18 
August, and by November he had completed the first two acts, but found it 
impossible to carry on.72 Now, only a few months later, we find Robertson 
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trying to get Shaw to embark on a similar venture. What Shaw thought of this 
plan has not been recorded, but one can imagine that after one misguided 
attempt in the recent past he was not so eager to run the risk of another failure. 
Even if he had been considering a successor to Archer at all, his distinct lack of 
praise for Robertson's own efforts indicates that he would hardly have thought 
of Robertson as his first choice. 
Given the fact that Robertson had written so highly of An Unsocial Socialist, 
Shaw may well have been unpleasantly surprised by Robertson's review of his 
fourth novel, Cashel Byron's Profession.73 Robertson pronounced Shaw guilty 
of 'dazzling his generation' rather than 'conquering it' and did not conceal his 
disappointment in Shaw's literary development. Shaw's diaries indicate that, 
after reading this review, Shaw sat down to write a long, quite possibly 
indignant letter to Mrs Besant. As it turned out, this would not remain the only 
critical blow Shaw had to receive at Robertson's hands. In the National 
Reformer of 6 December 1891, Robertson reviewed Shaw's Quintessence of 
Ibsenism,7* in which the Irishman had attacked the rationalist position by 
contending, among other things, that 
when Darwin, Haeckel, Helmholtz, Young, and the rest, 
popularized here among the middle class by Tyndall and Huxley, 
and among the proletariat by the lectures of the National Secular 
Society, have taught you all they know, you are still as utterly at a 
loss to explain the fact of consciousness as you would have been in 
the days when you were satisfied with Chambers' Vestiges of 
Creation.75 
Robertson, as always, did not mince his words and wrote off Shaw in his 
review as a light-weight thinker, incapable of deep philosophical analysis and 
always ready to let his latest whim take control of his mind; in short, a bad 
reasoner who 'must needs work in his own way, and say just what he feels for 
the time being.'76 When a year and half later he reviewed Shaw's first play 
Widowers ' Houses,77 his general verdict was mild, but he again attacked the 
author for the 'fitful and wayward way he probes life.'78 Clearly, he could not 
easily forgive Shaw for attempting to undermine the rationalist creed. 
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There were, however, no hard feelings on Shaw's side. He always valued 
Robertson very highly, and praised his honesty and 'exceptional ability' in 
letters to his friends.79 There is little or no factual evidence for the suggestion 
made by Stanley Weintraub, the editor of Shaw's diaries, that Robertson 
'professed friendship and admiration for Shaw but saw him as a rival for Annie 
Besant's favors and inserted unfavorable criticism into everything he wrote and 
said about Shaw and his work.'80 Robertson was perhaps often too 
uncompromising for comfort, but he was certainly above the kind of personal 
spite suggested by Weintraub, as Shaw himself well recognized. 
As far as Annie Besant's favours are concerned, it is true that in Shaw's 
diaries, Robertson appears to be always at Mrs Besant's side, almost as if they 
were a married couple. If he is not correcting proofs with her, he is escorting 
her around town on one of her numerous engagements. In an autobiographical 
note, Shaw wrote: 'There was a different leading man every time: Bradlaugh, 
Robertson, Aveling, Shaw, and Herbert Burrows. That did not matter.'81 At this 
point, Robertson was clearly her new 'leading man', and she could rely on him 
for support and intellectual stimulus. It seems unlikely, however, that there was 
any kind of romantic liaison between them, or that Robertson wished to 
establish one. Annie Besant may have referred to Robertson when she wrote 
complacently to a later 'leading man', W.T. Stead: 'Let us be honest, I have not 
worked with any man in close intimacy who has not fallen in love with me, but 
I have managed to steer through and . . . keep my friend.'82 But what she 
needed at this point was a reliable and supportive co-worker, not a lover, and 
Robertson fitted his appointed role to perfection. After Mrs Besant left 
secularism and Socialism for the misty heights of theosophy, Robertson 
retained his loyalty to her, in spite of their ideological differences. Mrs Besant 
was duly grateful and praised Robertson highly in her autobiography for being 
'a man of rare ability and culture, somewhat too scholarly for popular 
propagandism of the most generally effective order, but a man who is a strength 
to any movement, always on the side of noble living and high thinking, 
loyal-natured as the true Scot should be, incapable of meanness or treachery, 
and the most genial and generous of friends.'83 
Robertson's various activities throughout the 1880s show that he was indeed 
a powerful force within the secularist and freethought movement. He 
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contributed ceaselessly to the National Reformer, Our Corner, and G.W. 
Foote's Progress, while making incidental contributions to progressive 
periodicals such as the Westminster Review. Naturally prolific, he had, after all, 
no other means to earn his living than his pen. Platform speaking gradually 
took up more and more of his time, and in 1886, he made his first appearance at 
the Hall of Science as an appointed N.S.S. lecturer.84 The life of a platform 
propagandist was far from easy. Royle gives the example of Charles Watts, at 
one time Bradlaugh's chief ally, who, in 24 days in 1871, travelled 1400 miles, 
delivered twenty-seven lectures in twelve towns and villages, and held two set 
debates.85 Lecturing was always a major part of Robertson's daily existence. He 
later became an appointed lecturer of the Rationalist Press Association and the 
South Place Ethical Society, and he also spoke frequently to the many societies 
he was a member of. J.P. Gilmour, himself a died-in-the-wool freethought 
activist, gives the following impression of Robertson's lecturing practice: 
In the earlier period of his lecturing career "J.M.R." wrote out his 
lectures in full; in the middle period he spoke from notes; and 
latterly there was a reversion to manuscript, chiefly with a view to 
publication. . . . Even when reading from his manuscript, which 
from first to last was in a fair, firm, legible, and running 
penmanship, Robertson's delivery was easy, natural, and effective. 
His language and feeling would rise to heights of stately, 
chastened eloquence, but it was never cheaply rhetorical.86 
Robertson, habitually dressed in his favourite velvet coat, struck a handsome 
figure on the platform. One of his friends described him as 'of compact, alert 
physique, with a beautifully shaped head, dark beard and wavy hair, fine eyes 
and profile, a rich voice, and words that never failed.'87 He was generally 
known as 'the handsome Scotsman',88 and this, combined with his easy 
eloquence, ensured his success as a lecturer, even if the contents of his lectures 
may sometimes have been above the heads of his audience. Another friend and 
freethinker, Arthur Moss, was equally impressed by Robertson's appearance 
and lecturing prowess: 
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A fine athletic man with handsome, classical features, fine head, 
jet black hair, bearded like the pard [bard, i.e. Shakespeare], with a 
most impressive style of address, and splendid argumentative 
powers, these, added to remarkable erudition, made him a great 
attraction as a lecturer at various centres throughout the country. I 
heard him on several occasions, and was always profoundly 
impressed by his lucid methods of exposition and convincing 
power of logic. He was also a very skilful debater as a young man, 
and this power he has developed to an extraordinary degree during 
his many years of platform experience. His skill in analysing an 
argument, in dividing and sub-dividing its parts, until he had got 
to the very heart of it, so to speak, was extremely clever, and then 
to watch while he exposed its fallacies, soon convinced his hearers 
that they were listening to a logician and debater of the highest 
order.89 
His activities were not limited to writing and lecturing. In 1885, Robertson 
began to teach a course on Political Economy at the Hall of Science, 
Bradlaugh's headquarters. A year later, he himself gained first-class passes in 
'organic chemistry' and 'electricity and magnetism'.90 The Hall of Science 
School had been started in 1879 by Edward Aveling, who, however dubious his 
reputation may now appear in other respects, was an inspiring and extremely 
knowledgeable teacher. He was ably assisted by Annie Besant and Bradlaugh's 
daughters, Alice and Hypatia. In January 1882, Aveling even started a class to 
prepare candidates for London University matriculation. Initially, the Hall of 
Science school proved a very successful enterprise; specializing in science 
subjects,91 it provided education of a very high standard, mainly for skilled 
artisans between the ages of twenty and forty. Unfortunately, as secularism 
gradually lost its public appeal, so did its educational programme. By 1888, 
there were no longer sufficient pupils to keep the enterprise going.92 
A letter to Patrick Geddes dated 9 March 1887 indicates that not even John 
Robertson's capacity for work was unlimited. He complains that he is 
'overworking and consequently bilious', but cannot help it because 'it brings in 
money'. He then unfolds his plans for the future: 
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. . . one of these days I'll take flight abroad and settle down 
somewhere (Athens or Germany?) to produce one of my 
magnumopuses. I half think the first will be a 'History of 
Christianity, Sociologically Considered.' How's that for high? But 
there is the one on economics and the one on politics to do 
likewise. At thirty it's time to be building, as you know.93 
As his lengthy bibliography testifies, Robertson would eventually build many a 
'magnum opus', although he never did get round to settling quietly abroad. He 
did manage to travel occasionally, however. In November 1887, Robertson was 
in Germany, where he stayed with Dr Ludwig Büchner in Darmstadt. One of 
the purposes of his visit was to perfect his German language skills, which he 
found uncommonly hard. He admitted to being 'unusually backward in my 
comprehension of the tongue', and the German language struck him as a 
'frightful structure'.94 It is not clear exactly how long Robertson stayed in 
Germany, but by June 1888 he was back again in England.95 
On his return to England, Robertson found Mrs Besant involved in the cause 
by which she is most frequently remembered: the strike of the girl match 
workers at the firm of Bryant and May. This time, Mrs Besant's ally on the 
barricades was the Socialist Herbert Burrows. The actual strike - a protest 
against the inhumanly low wages paid in the match industry - lasted less than 
two weeks in July 1888, and Robertson was present among a group of Fabians 
to offer practical help.96 
In his absence, the growing involvement between Annie Besant and Shaw 
had reached a crisis. In his diaries, Shaw recorded how the intimacy between 
him and Annie had gradually ripened until the beginning of 1887, and had very 
nearly become an intrigue. In Robertson's absence, Annie offered Shaw an 
agreement to live at Avenue Road and join in her work, which Shaw, 
disconcerted by the serious turn their relationship was suddenly taking, refused 
with a consciousness of having been inconsiderate to her.97 Was it Annie's 
infatuation with Shaw that drove Robertson to Germany, as Shaw seems to 
imply vaguely in his diaries?98 It does not appear very likely. Even apart from 
the fact that there is no evidence that Robertson ever wished to 'adventure with 
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a landlady and employer nine years his senior and already married',99 few 
people were less inclined towards escapism than Robertson, while Shaw the 
philanderer was rather more given to self-promotion. 
Robertson now no longer lived in Mrs Besant's house at Avenue Road; he 
had moved to his own place in Broadhurst Gardens, West Hampstead. Sidney 
A. Gimson, an important Leicester secularist, recalled happy visits there 'with 
books everywhere, along the stairs, on the landings, and all over the floors and 
the walls of the rooms.' The visits were all the merrier because Robertson was 
apparently an excellent cook! Gimson also remembered him 'giving a realistic 
representation of a growling bear in a cave under my dining-room table, being 
violently attacked by my two yelling and delighted little sons.'100 This brings to 
the surface a more light-hearted side of Robertson, a side that was 
unmistakably part of his personality, but was perhaps not allowed much 
freedom in his later life filled with innumerable weighty causes. 
In 1890, Charles Bradlaugh, who was ill and could no longer muster the 
strength to combine a parliamentary career with his official duties as secularist 
leader, resigned the presidency of the N.S.S. Although Robertson, as 
Bradlaugh's most devoted disciple, seemed an obvious choice for his 
successor, and Bradlaugh did apparently wish to nominate him, he had doubts 
about Robertson's abilities to organize and direct a Society.101 So he appointed 
G. W. Foote, founder and editor of the Freethinker, and long-time freethought 
activist. For the next twenty-five years, it was Foote who presided over the 
decline of a movement which, even when at its peak, only rarely escaped its 
marginal status. It seems unlikely that Robertson, had he been president instead 
of Foote, would have been able to turn the tide. Bradlaugh was right: Robertson 
was too much of an uncompromising controversialist to provide a new impetus 
to a movement which had only achieved relative unity through the charismatic 
personal leadership of Bradlaugh. 
Charles Bradlaugh died of Bright's disease on 30 January 1891. Robertson 
was present at the funeral as one of the six pall-bearers. He had been chosen by 
his friend Hypatia Bradlaugh Bonner to represent British freethought. This did 
not please Foote, who, perhaps not surprisingly, had turned up at the funeral 
expecting to occupy the place Robertson had now. Foote later wrote 
indignantly to Arthur Bonner, Bradlaugh's son-in-law: 'I can hardly suppose 
an affront was intended to the President of the National Secular Society, or that 
any one could be disposed to choose, without my comment or knowledge, a 
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representative of the Society on that or any other occasion.'102 But Hypatia 
preferred Robertson 'as one who loved her Father, was ever loyal and devoted 
to him, and was most closely connected with him in many ways - and who 
stood high in his personal affection and esteem.'103 
The Pre-Parliamentary Years: 1891-1906 
The painful incident at Bradlaugh's funeral did little to improve relations 
between Robertson and Foote, which were strained at the best of times. Things 
grew even worse when a dispute arose between them over the future of 
Bradlaugh's Hall of Science in Old Street.104 Early in 1891, Foote proposed the 
Bradlaugh Memorial Scheme for the establishment of a Bradlaugh Memorial 
Hall. Robertson thought Foote's timing ill-advised, since he considered it a 
more practical tribute to Bradlaugh's memory to settle the considerable 
business debts the secularist leader had left behind. Nonetheless, Robertson 
went along with the plan, and the idea was now to look out for a site which 
could supersede the old Hall of Science. There appeared to be no immediate 
hurry, since it was generally understood that the building at Old Street had been 
rented from R.O. Smith in 1868 for a period of thirty years. However, not much 
later Smith denied that any such agreement had ever existed and threatened to 
sell his lease in the market unless the secularists were to take over the Hall of 
Science themselves. Foote now professed himself in favour of securing the old 
site at all costs, and of diverting the funds of the Bradlaugh Memorial Hall 
Company to the new National Secular Hall Society. 
As a director of the Memorial Hall Company, Robertson was appalled by 
this sudden change of policy and the underhand tactics he felt Foote was 
employing in winning over his fellow-secularists to this new scheme. He 
accused Foote of not having done his utmost to procure an extended lease for 
the Hall of Science while looking out for a more appropriate site. Organized 
freethought would not be served by the continuing association with the rowdy, 
'music-hall' atmosphere of the Old Street building, in which view Robertson 
was fully supported by Bradlaugh's daughter Hypatia. Foote and Robertson 
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attacked each other savagely in their respective periodicals, the Freethinker and 
the National Reformer, and it was not long before the secularists were 
effectively arranged into two warring factions. 
In the National Reformer of 4 June 1893, when the dispute had already 
lasted for two years, Robertson made known his decision to withdraw as a 
member of the National Secular Society. He felt he could no longer be a 
member of a society whose President he considered a man 'not very sagacious, 
who seeks to thrust his will on all points down the Society's throat, threatening 
resignation (meaning hostility) when opposed either on policy or on principle, 
and who at the same time does not represent the general feeling of freethinkers 
even as to methods of propaganda.'105 This is not to say that he gave up in any 
way on the freethought cause. On the contrary: 'The cause of Freethought is 
indestructible; it must go on gaining ground even if secularism be mismanaged. 
It has the best fighting case in the world; and every competent Freethinker has 
as much advantage over an orthodox opponent as an ironclad has over a 
Chinese junk.'106 Thus the Hall of Science dispute with Foote put an end to 
Robertson's active involvement in the society which had dominated his life for 
nearly ten years. The Bradlaugh Memorial Hall Company was eventually 
wound up in 1897, having achieved next to nothing.107 
Hypatia Bradlaugh Bonner would always be extremely grateful for 
Robertson's unflinching support in the difficult days after her father's death. 
Not only did he stand by her in the Hall of Science dispute, he also came down 
from Edinburgh, where he was again working on the staff of the Scottish 
Leader, to take over the editorship of the National Reformer, a burden then on 
Hypatia's hands.108 The National Reformer was no longer the official party 
organ; in 1890, the N.S.S. news had been transferred to its chief rival, G.W. 
Foote's Freethinker, which favoured a more populist, less scholarly approach. 
With Robertson as editor, the National Reformer knew a brief revival, but soon 
the circulation stagnated and continuation was no longer feasible. On 1 October 
1893, Robertson closed down what had once been Bradlaugh's and the 
secularists' flagship, and decided to follow it up with his own monthly Free 
Review, which, with its higher price of l i , was aimed at a more select 
market.109 In the first issue, the editor stated his intentions: 'It is primarily an 
attempt to make a platform for opinions which are more or less unlikely to get a 
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hearing in even the more advanced of the established reviews, with perhaps the 
exception of the Westminster.'M0 The Free Review ran under Robertson's 
editorship until September 1895, when it was taken over by Dr Rowland de 
Villiers, who from 1897 to 1900 continued it as The University Magazine and 
Free Review, to which Robertson continued to contribute. As we will see, 
Robertson's involvement with Villiers would have some unexpected 
repercussions. 
In the year he started the Free Review, Robertson married the American 
Maude Mosher, daughter of Charles Mosher, of Des Moines, Iowa.1" We do 
not know much about her, nor about Robertson's married life in general, but 
Sidney Gimson reported it on it as apparently quite happy.112 They had a son, 
Guy, and a daughter, Guenn. After his marriage, Robertson left his lodgings in 
Broadhurst Gardens, and moved with his wife to a house in Oakley Crescent, 
Chelsea. In 1896, they moved to Lansdowne Gardens, South Lambeth, and 
around 1900, to Baker Street. Before they settled down in their house in 
Pembroke Gardens around 1920, there were at least two other moves: to 
Westerham in Kent around 1906, and to Pembury, also in Kent, some years 
later.113 
Part of the motivation for moving so frequently may have been Robertson's 
need for more space to house his rapidly expanding library. He was an 
incurable book buyer, and even when his financial means would hardly allow 
it, he kept adding to his library. On one particular occasion, his friend John A. 
Hobson found him stealing into his room 'with an armful of books which he 
was seeking to conceal from the landlady who had expressed her alarm lest the 
weight of the library should break down the ceiling of his room.'114 At his 
death, Robertson left a collection of over 20,000 volumes, and his entire output 
as a writer bears testimony to the fact that he must have read more of these than 
would seem possible to most ordinary mortals. Books were Robertson's main 
tools, and his library was that of a reader, not a collector. 
As far as his career as a writer is concerned, Robertson was now producing 
the 'magnumopuses' he had looked forward to in his letter to Patrick Geddes. 
In fact, between the years 1891 and 1906, Robertson wrote several monumental 
works, such as his Short History of Christianity, Short History of Freethought, 
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Introduction to English Politics, and Courses of Study, each of which 
separately would have served any lesser scholar as a lifetime's work. In 
addition, Robertson never ceased to contribute to a plethora of periodicals, and 
he continued his missionary activities as a lecturer around the country. It comes 
as no surprise that this man worked twelve hours a day, seven days a week, as 
his friend Sidney Gimson recalled.115 When his wife was delivered of his son 
Guy in November 1896, he reported to his friend Dobell that both were doing 
well, adding somewhat insensitively that he was now prevented from going to 
the British Museum.116 Although Robertson's views often clashed with the 
typical Victorian system of values, he clearly did subscribe wholeheartedly to 
the Victorian gospel of work. 
After Bradlaugh's death, Robertson started on a long struggle to become his 
successor in parliament.117 As Bradlaugh's loyal follower and colleague, he 
seemed an obvious choice for Bradlaugh's old seat in Northampton. However, 
at the 1892 elections, Robertson was rejected as an official Liberal Party 
candidate, due to rather dubious manipulations within the party. The same 
thing happened at the elections three years later, when a trade union candidate 
was given preference over him. This time, he decided to stand as an 
Independent Radical Candidate, received quite a considerable number of votes 
(1,131), but was not elected. His election programme had comprised eleven 
remarkably progressive points, among which were such controversial issues as: 
old age pension, decrease of armaments, the vote for women, Home Rule for 
Ireland, and free education for higher schools and universities.118 A 
Bradlaughite candidate eventually secured the Northampton seat in 1900,"9 but 
Robertson had to wait until the 1906 Liberal landslide before he won his seat, 
not for Northampton, but for the heavily industrial Tyneside division. 
In view of all this fervent journalistic and political activity, it is surprising 
that Robertson still found the time to travel. In November 1895 we find him in 
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Paris, where he staid at 235 Faubourg St. Honoré for six months.120 Two years 
later, on October 14, 1897, he embarked on an extensive lecture tour in the 
United States.121 For the next few months, his address was 7 Ware Street, 
Cambridge, Massachusetts. The tour was apparently quite successful, and took 
him around the principal universities. It seems likely that he had contact with 
important American freethinkers, and he may have sought out their renowned 
leader, Robert G. Ingersoll, who was Bradlaugh's match as an inspirational 
platform propagandist. Robertson was apparently none too impressed by the 
standard of American freethought. He attended an Ethical Culture service 
which was 'remarkably well-attended', but otherwise 'a factitious display, 
wrought of literary and philosophic commonplaces, carefully draped and 
carefully posed, but inherently trite, jejune, and distant alike from opinion and 
from action'. When he went to church on the following Sunday, he found to his 
surprise that 'the preacher was, of all the clergymen I have known or heard, one 
of the most palpably genuine, the most manly, the most compulsively 
sincere.'122 Coming from Robertson, this is rare praise indeed, and it shows 
that, in spite of his undeniable dogmatism, he was still capable of appreciating 
in his religious enemies the qualities he regarded so highly himself. 
When Robertson was back in Europe again in the spring of 1898,123 he took 
a well-earned holiday in Brittany, but did not allow himself to stop working. 
Having finally returned to London in September, he thanked his bookseller 
Bertram Dobell for a note, which 'followed me to Brittany on my holiday; and 
having, as usual, work to do every other day there, I finished correspondence as 
much as possible.'124 However, the strain was beginning to tell even on 
Robertson. In December he complained of having been 'heavily overworked 
for some time back'.125 There are, however, no indications that he slowed down 
the pace at which he worked. 
One of the reasons why Robertson crossed the Atlantic may have been 
financial. The three visits Bradlaugh had paid to the United States had been 
attempts to restore his precarious financial position, and the American lecture 
circuit appeared to be relatively lucrative.126 Whether Robertson's attempt was 
a financial success is not clear, but that money was becoming more and more of 
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a problem to him is evident from his correspondence. His 1895 election 
campaign had him writing to Dobell for a possible loan,127 and a year later he 
admitted: 'As for my finances, I must own that I have borrowed more than I 
have earned lately.'128 He unfolded the following money-making plan to 
Dobell: 
Months ago, apprehending money pressure, I began to work out an 
old scheme of mine for a sensational story, to be entitled 'Treasure 
England', and to deal with search for buried treasure in England, 
as a variation on the customary resort to the Spanish Main and 
pirate Islands. It is not at all an ideal literary undertaking: my main 
aim is to make some money to pay my debts. 
Robertson wrote three chapters, which, perhaps fortunately so, have not 
survived.129 Money remained a problem, but it did not worry him overmuch. In 
his Short History of Freethought he remarked that 'nearly every freethinking 
writer is advised by prudent friends to give up such unprofitable work',130 but 
that was not a kind of prudence Robertson admired. The following 
autobiographical sketch summarizes his attitude in matters financial: 
My wife will remember how in the old days, when, at times, owing 
to the failure of some payment (that was one of the experiences in 
those days of the penman), it seemed distinctly doubtful whether I 
could pay the next quarter's rent.. . I had always an unbreakable 
rule, and that was when things were looking thoroughly bad to go 
out to a restaurant and have a good dinner and a bottle of 
wine.... That seemed to be the time that you needed it.131 
Here, for once, we catch a pleasant glimpse of this stem rationalist's more 
whimsical side, which he doubtlessly possessed but, as he grew older, was less 
and less inclined to reveal. 
The year 1900 took Robertson further away from England than he had ever 
been: South Africa. He left on the 'Briton' on June 2nd, while the 'Dunvegan 
Castle' saw him safely back in England by mid-December.132 Robertson was 
commissioned by the pro-Boer Morning Leader 'to report on the working of 
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martial law in that country'. The letters he wrote from Cape Colony and Natal 
under the pseudonym of Scrutator were later revised and published as a book, 
Wrecking the Empire. It was his unpopular opinion that 'the policy of crushing 
the two Dutch Republics in South Africa is on the one hand preparing the 
dismemberment of the British Empire by creating an irreconcilable hatred of us 
among the South African Dutch, who are bound greatly to outnumber the 
British when the Johannesburg gold mines are exhausted, if not sooner; and, on 
the other hand, is degrading the moral code of the British majority alike in the 
colonies and the mother country.'133 The extent of Robertson's notoriety as a 
pro-Boer is illustrated by the account of his friend Alfred Cox: 
He [Robertson] was a 'pro-Boer' and on more than one occasion 
was assaulted at meetings. I remember one night when there had 
been a pre—Boer meeting in Newcastle at which one of the 
speakers was Dr. Spence Watson, a Quaker, and a distinguished 
member of the Liberal Party. Some Gateshead 'patriots' resolved 
to make things hot for him. He lived within a stone's throw of my 
house and we heard the tramp of the crowd . . . , as it proceeded to 
the Spence Watson house and demanded that he should come 
outside. When he declined they broke several of his windows and 
would have done worse if the police had not intervened. I'm glad 
they did not know that Robertson, a still more notorious pro-Boer, 
was at that time staying with me.134 
However, Robertson was not one to shirk unpopular causes. He was fiercely 
opposed to jingoism and imperialism, and never afraid to speak out openly 
against these, in writing or on the platform. The parliamentary career on which 
he was about to embark did nothing to change this, as we will see. 
The beginning of this century still saw Robertson wavering between two 
very different 'career options'. He wrote to Dobell: 'As to Parliament vs 
authorship, my instincts are all for the latter; but the point of influence has to be 
considered. Which way can I best get a hearing?'135 Eventually, Robertson 
decided in favour of Parliament, although throughout his parliamentary career 
he continued to write at a more than respectable pace. His political position at 
this time can be described as 'new Liberal'. In 1899, Robertson had joined a 
remarkable and influential discussion group, the Rainbow Circle. The group 
was formed in 1893 'to include progressives of all shades of opinion'. Its aim 
was 'to provide a rational and comprehensive view of political and social 
progress, leading up to a consistent body of political and economic doctrine, 
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which could be ultimately formulated in a programme of action . . . for social 
reformers.'116 Among its other members were well-known names like Herbert 
Samuel, Ramsay MacDonald, and John A. Hobson, a close friend of 
Robertson's. In 1896, the Circle founded its own journal, the Progressive 
Review, and according to Hobson, this event marked the origins of the 'New 
Liberalism' of which Robertson was to become an important exponent.137 The 
immediate intention of the 'New Liberals' was to unify the 'multiplicity of 
progressive movements', to come to grips with 'that huge unformed monster', 
the social question, and to implement 'a specific policy of reconstruction' 
based on a new conception of 'economic freedom . . . the conscious 
organisation of the functions of the state.'138 The historian Michael Freeden 
sees as their main achievement that they did not 'theorize in a vacuum' but 
attempted to combine 'the major intellectual tendencies of the time, to form a 
powerful framework within which to tackle those concrete issues' such as 'dire 
poverty, unemployment, and disease'.139 
Within the context of the Rainbow Circle and the 'New Liberalism', there 
was an important role for the Ethical Societies, which 'served as a fusion point 
of liberal, Idealist, evolutionary, and moderate Socialist thought, and redirected 
the traditional liberal concern with morals and justice.'140 As in secularism, 
lecturing was an essential activity for the Ethical Movement. In 1900, 
Robertson, together with Hobson and the Socialist Herbert Burrows, became an 
appointed lecturer for the South Place Ethical Society, a particularly active 
centre of radical intellectual thinking.141 He delivered his last lecture at South 
Place shortly before his death, while he remained a member of the Rainbow 
Circle until 1931.142 
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The Robertson Libel Casew 
Having decided in favour of a political career, Robertson went on a lecture tour 
that took him around the northern counties in 1901 and 1902. The tour was a 
success, and in October 1902 he was invited by the Executive Committee of the 
Liberal Party to become the Liberal candidate for the Tyneside Division of 
Northumberland. In December he delivered a speech before the Committee, 
and the following January another one, and he was subsequently adopted as the 
Liberal candidate. Robertson's fervent lecturing had made him well-known to 
the Tynesiders, and he had every reason to be optimistic about his prospects. 
However, the year 1903 would be marked for him by an awkward incident that 
nearly posed a serious threat to his political ambitions: the Robertson libel case. 
On 2 November 1903 Robertson brought a libel suit against the Leeds and 
Yorfahire Mercury, a professedly Liberal newspaper of long standing. He had 
decided to resort to this drastic measure after the paper had published the 
following offending paragraph on 4 February 1903, under the heading 'A Few 
Facts for Tynesiders': 
The only explanations which can be found here for the selection of 
Mr. J.M. Robertson as Liberal candidate for Tyneside are either 
that those responsible were ignorant of his past achievements in 
the political and 'literary' world, or that they belonged to that 
pitiful section which, rather than see the triumph of the vast 
majority, is ready to wreck the whole party. I have already said 
that Mr. Robertson is a rabid Little Englander; but this appears to 
be among the least of the peculiarities which render him an 
absolutely undesirable candidate. In pamphlets issued by the 
Freethought Publishing Society, and in a magazine of which he 
was the first editor, he has dealt with matters unmentionable in 
polite society. Of the character of this magazine it is sufficient to 
say that it described itself as 'the only periodical in England which 
allows free discussion of unconventional and tabooed subjects,' 
and that it disappeared in 1898, after a police raid - followed by a 
prosecution - on the publications of the firm by which it was put 
out. In the last number the editor referred to this publication as 'the 
courageous experiment initiated by Mr. J.M. Robertson and Mr. 
Charles Bradlaugh.' It will be interesting to observe whether the 
Tynesiders will tamely submit to having this gentleman foisted 
upon them as the only alternative to a Tory. 
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The case was tried before Justice Grantham and a special jury at the King's 
Bench Division; the defendants were Messrs. Baines & Co., the proprietors of 
the Leeds and Yorkshire Mercury, and CM. Annesley, the publisher. 
The above paragraph from the Leeds Mercury was certainly well-calculated 
to arouse Robertson's ire. It was not so much the reference to him as a 'rabid 
Little Engländer' which he found offensive, as the way the Mercury journalist 
insinuated that he had been involved in somehow obscene and indeed criminal 
proceedings. Robertson felt that he owed it to his political supporters as well as 
to himself to undertake action against what he considered a libellous piece of 
journalism. He must have been well aware that he was taking a considerable 
risk, if only financially, but his stern sense of morality did not allow him to 
remain passive. 
The Mercury journalist was, in fact, referring obliquely to the widely 
publicized Bedborough trial, which had given rise to much collective 
indignation among freethinkers in the course of 1898.144 George Bedborough 
was then the twenty-seven year old editor of The Adult, the official organ of 
the Legitimation League, a little London society whose aim was the legalizing 
of illegitimate children. In the Adult, Bedborough defiantly advocated the more 
progressive causes of the day, such as free love and divorce by mutual consent. 
Flying thus in the face of established morality, Bedborough and the 
Legitimation League attracted a keen interest on the part of the police, which 
was increased by the fact that the meetings of the League were attended by 
large numbers of anarchists. When the police were alerted that Bedborough 
sold copies of Havelock Ellis's Sexual Inversion, Part I of his Studies in the 
Psychology of Sex, from the front room of his home in John Street, they 
decided it was time for action. Bedborough was arrested, the premises were 
raided, and a number of books and periodicals were seized. These did not only 
include copies of the Adult and Ellis's book, but also of the Free Review, the 
University Magazine and Free Review, and of Robertson's The Saxon and the 
Celt and Montaigne and Shakspere, hardly books to bring a blush to any young 
maiden's cheek. 
Nonetheless, Robertson's name was thereby linked in the eyes of the public 
with Bedborough's, whom he did not even know until he read of his case in the 
papers, as he testified in court. He did, however, join the colourful company 
that rallied to Bedborough's defence in the Free Press Defence Committee, an 
initiative taken by an anarchist friend of Bedborough's, Henry Seymour. Apart 
from Robertson, members included George Bernard Shaw, Frank Harris, 
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George Moore, Edward Carpenter, and several other illustrious figures. The 
Committee announced that it was 'formed in order to resist this police attack 
upon liberty. Its members belong to many different schools of opinion. They 
are not in any way connected with the particular views entertained by Mr. 
Bedborough, or set forth in the writings which form the ground of the 
prosecution. The present is neither the time nor the occasion to express either 
agreement or dissent. The one thing to be done is to defend the liberty of all 
opinions.' The Reformer reported that on 5 September 1898, Robertson 
presided over the third public meeting of the Committee at St Martin's Town 
Hall, and Opened with a vigorous speech in which the attack was soundly 
characterised.'145 Apart from that, he does not seem to have been very actively 
involved. 
However, there was one further connection between Robertson and 
Bedborough in Robertson's one-time dealings with the publishers of the Adult 
and Havelock Ellis's Sexual Inversion, Dr Rowland de Villiers and George 
Astor Singer, who operated under the dubious flag of the Watford University 
Press. In September 1895, Robertson had sold the Free Review to Villiers, who 
made Singer editor. In 1897, the periodical was discontinued, only to be 
revived as the University Magazine and Free Review, this time under the 
editorship of Villiers himself. A somewhat shady character at best, Villiers 
continued to put out what was considered 'indecent literature' until 1902, when 
he was prosecuted and arrested and found himself the centre of a public 
scandal. In court, Robertson again testified that this had only come to his notice 
through the papers, and that he had long ceased to have any personal contact 
with either Villiers or Singer. However, for those who wished to see it, his 
connection with Bedborough and his publishers was sufficient evidence that 
Robertson moved in less than respectable circles. 
The reports on the 'Robertson libel case' that appeared in the Daily News, 
Morning Leader, Leeds and Yorkshire Mercury, Times and especially the 
freethought Reformer™6 make this painfully clear. In the Reformer, Robertson's 
old friend Hypatia Bradlaugh Bonner commented on the animus displayed 
against him in court, and this does not appear to have been too far from the 
truth. In the opening statement, Robertson's counsel Rawlinson explained the 
exact nature of his involvement with De Villiers and Bedborough, showing that 
there was no factual ground for the Mercury's insinuation that Robertson 'had 
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been party to the writing, editing and publishing of filthy and obscene literature 
of a character unmentionable in polite society.' Rawlinson asserted that it was 
this that Robertson objected to, not the criticism of his political views. 
Robertson then went into the witness-box to be cross-examined by the 
defendant's counsel, Sir Edward Clarke. In the examination, the main issue was 
whether the Mercury's claim that Robertson in his writings had 'dealt with 
matters unmentionable in polite society' could be substantiated. Clarke 
questioned Robertson at length about the doctrines of Malthusianism and 
Neo-Malthusianism which Robertson had advocated with such missionary zeal 
in the Free Review and elsewhere. When asked to define Malthusianism, 
Robertson stated that 'Malthusianism is commonly understood to mean the 
doctrine that population tends to multiply faster than the means of subsistence, 
and therefore some steps to check it are necessary to keep down poverty.' 
Neo-Malthusianism, Robertson explained, was a modification of this theory, in 
that 'the only rational check Malthus admitted was postponement of marriage 
until late in life. The Neo-Malthusianist suggests that it should not be 
postponed until late in life, but that it should be entered upon at an earlier date, 
and that prudence should be observed as to the number of the family.' 
It is clear that Robertson now found himself on dangerous territory. Birth 
control, to which Neo-Malthusianism amounted in practice, was a highly 
sensitive and controversial subject, often seen as bordering on the obscene and 
certainly not a fit subject to discuss at the dinner table. In his advocacy of birth 
control, Robertson had followed in the footsteps of his master, Charles 
Bradlaugh, whose Neo-Malthusian writings and lectures had made less 
progressive souls shudder in horror over two decades earlier. On this occasion, 
it seemed that little had changed since then. Extracts from a lecture by 
Robertson on 'Over-Population', delivered to the Sunday Lecture Society on 
27 October 1889, were read out to the jury by Sir Edward Clarke, and Justice 
Grantham explained emphatically to the jury that 'the whole point was that the 
writer in the "Leeds and Yorkshire Mercury" said in his judgment a man who 
lectured on Neo-Malthusianism was not a fit and proper man to be a candidate 
for Parliament... The plaintiff admitted he held those views, or did hold them. 
Was not a writer justified in saying so?' Further extracts from other articles on 
the population question were read out, and Robertson was made to repeat 
several times that he did not think such a matter unfit for polite society. At this 
point, Justice Grantham intervened and remarked that he 'had been looking at 
one of the subjects published before the Sunday Lecture Society, which seemed 
to him to be practically a direct incentive to abortion.' Robertson's indignant 
objection that he had spoken of abortion as 'injurious' was of no avail. 
Proceedings were then swiftly wrapped up. Justice Grantham did not allow 
Robertson's counsel to present other evidence or to call further witnesses in 
support of the case. The final word was for Sir Edward Clarke, who claimed 
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that he had proved the offending article to be 'accurate from beginning to end'. 
Without much ado, the jury then reached its verdict: they did not feel that the 
alleged libel exceeded fair comment, and a verdict was returned for the 
defendants. Robertson's attempt to clear his reputation had backfired and he 
now had to face the consequences. 
Partly, these were of a financial kind. The verdict left Robertson with a very 
heavy bill of costs to pay, while running an election campaign was already 
more than he could really afford.147 Fortunately, he could always depend on his 
fellow freethinkers to come to his aid. In the Reformer, Hypatia Bradlaugh 
Bonner asked her readers 'to put their hands in their pockets' for Robertson 
once more,148 and there is little doubt that, in time-honoured freethought 
fashion, this is exactly what they did, taking at least some of the burden off his 
shoulders. 
The political consequences, though, seemed more of a direct threat to 
Robertson's career. Immediately after the trial, he placed his resignation in the 
hands of the Executive Committee of the Liberal Party and expressed his wish 
that a meeting should be called to consider a new candidate. Once again, 
however, he found that he had not been deserted by his supporters. On 
November 5th, the Executive Committee of the Tyneside Liberal Association 
held a fully-attended meeting, at which a resolution was carried that expressed 
unabated confidence in Robertson as a candidate. A similar resolution had then 
already been passed by the Women Liberals, who had met earlier.149 His 
political future was now no longer in jeopardy, although it was not until the 
Liberal landslide of the 1906 elections that Robertson could finally enter 
Parliament. 
The Robertson libel case may in itself seem a fairly minor incident, that was 
not even given much publicity in contemporary newspapers. The significance 
of the case, however, lies in the way it illuminates Robertson's position in the 
eyes of what we may conveniently term the establishment, represented here by 
the defendant's counsel Sir Edward Clarke, and, more particularly, by Justice 
Grantham. The surviving newspaper reports make it sufficiently clear that to 
them, Robertson, as Bradlaugh's pupil and ideological successor, appeared as a 
dangerous threat to the stock middle-class values of decency and propriety. 
Much more was at stake in this trial than a relatively simple decision about the 
literal truth or untruth of a certain newspaper passage. The fact that the plaintiff 
was an outspoken advocate of birth control on Neo-Malthusian principles and 
a freethinker made sure that it was he, rather than the proprietors of the Leeds 
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Mercury, who found himself forced to put up a defence. Justice Grantham's 
overall attitude and in particular his insinuation that Robertson was a promoter 
of free abortion shows clearly how squarely he sympathized with the moral 
indignation which had given rise to the paragraph in the Leeds Mercury. Under 
these circumstances, the fact that the article had done precisely what Robertson 
accused it of was of little importance. Whereas a man like John Morley, as 
Robertson's counsel noted, could deal with Neo-Malthusianism without raising 
any eyebrows, Robertson's ideological stance was too far left of the centre to 
become generally accepted as at least 'respectable'. That such an incident did 
little to mellow an already irascible temperament is perhaps not too difficult to 
understand. 
The Parliamentary Years: 1906-1918 
The prime issue of the 1906 elections, which were finally going to see 
Robertson in Parliament, was Free Trade. In 1903, Joseph Chamberlain had 
started his campaign for Tariff Reform, which proposed protectionist measures 
favouring the Dominions, and thereby linked the principle of Free Trade, of 
which Robertson was a staunch and inveterate defender, with Imperialism, 
which he abhorred. His election campaign for the Tyneside Division of 
Northumberland was marked by an endless string of lectures and debates on 
Free Trade. John A. Hobson called him 'the best platform advocate of Free 
Trade that that controversy has produced in my lifetime', adding that 'it was his 
desire to do what he could for that cause which kept him in politics - a sphere 
in which his severely logical mind must often have felt very uneasy.'150 
Robertson conducted his campaign from the house of his friend Alfred Cox at 
Gateshead. Cox recalled that 'the fight was a hard one, his [Robertson's] 
opponent being Mr Samuel Storey of Sunderland, who, though a Liberal, had 
fallen for Protectionism.' Robertson made himself immensely popular with his 
constituents by persistently going into all the mining villages in the division.151 
His efforts were not wasted: with 4,611 votes he achieved a comfortable 
majority,.152 and duly entered Parliament. 
The outlines of Robertson's parliamentary career are easily sketched. In 
1911, Asquith appointed him secretary to the Board of Trade, a position he had 
to give up when Asquith's Coalition government was formed in May 1915. In 
that same year he was made a Privy Councillor. One year later, he was elected 
chairman of the Liberal Publications Department, which he remained until 
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1927. He also became Chairman of the Government Committee on Food 
Prices. At the 1918 'Coupon' election, his loyalty to Herbert Asquith, and his 
aversion to Lloyd George made him reject the 'coupon' which was offered to 
all Lloyd George Liberals who were prepared to co-operate with the 
Conservatives in a Coalition Government. He was therefore not returned to 
parliament, and this was indeed the end of his parliamentary career. 
Parliamentary life weighed heavily on Robertson's shoulders. For one thing, 
he was under severe financial pressure. When he was asked in 1906 to 
subscribe to a fund raised for the Liberal politician George Howells, he had to 
refuse: 'My expenses have so much increased by reason of my parliamentary 
life that I am distinctly embarrassed; having to earn more, and much less time 
to earn it.'153 Financial pressure combined with an ever-increasing workload 
could induce even Robertson to an irritated outburst: 'My standing difficulty is 
that I have all the time to earn my living, and the hundred and nineteen good 
causes are each one singly enough to occupy one's time!'154 The truth seems to 
be that Robertson did not really have the makings of a successful politician, as 
Hobson confirms: 
Though later in the early twentieth century he was drawn into 
active participation in the Free Trade controversy, was elected into 
Parliament and even held office as Undersecretary in the Board of 
Trade, his heart never lay in politics. He could never become a 
sound party man, for, though certain early excesses of the Rising 
Labour movement repelled him and drove him into the Liberal 
camp, he was never quite at ease there and was, I think, glad to 
return to his books and his controversial theories.155 
Labour politician Philip Snowden considered Robertson's appointment as 
Secretary to the Board of Trade his 'undoing as a Parliamentary debater', since, 
in his opinion, 'he was never meant to be the mere spokesman of a Government 
Department.'156 
Snowden was right, of course. Robertson was a controversialist to the core, 
who, as he grew older, found it increasingly difficult to appreciate that not 
everyone had his mental powers; moreover, he never wavered from his own 
conception of truth. These qualities did not equip him for a smoothly successful 
political career, but they did make him one of the best and most feared debaters 
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in the house, as Snowden recalled: 'I consider the two best debaters I have 
known in the House of Commons to be Mr J.M. Robertson and Mr Ellis 
Griffith. . . . In the House of Commons he [Robertson] would tear an 
opponent's case to shreds with remorseless logic.'157 Robertson's 
logic-chopping did not particularly endear him to his opponents. Balfour 
observed sourly that 'he does not make the House generally more sympathetic 
with his arguments when he thinks that everybody who disagrees with him is 
either an ignoramus or a fool.'158 
Robertson's asperity in dealing with political affairs was partly the result of 
the undeniable fact that his heart really lay elsewhere: in literature. Although he 
still wrote more in these years than most writers manage in a lifetime, by his 
own standards his pace slackened, simply because he had less time to spare. 
His publications were now more geared to his political activities, and he wrote 
numerous pamphlets on various controversial political issues, notably Free 
Trade and Tariff Reform. It was not until after 1918 that Robertson could 
devote himself more fully to his literary studies. 
For many years during his political career, Robertson was actively involved 
in the Rationalist Peace Society, founded in 1910, with Robertson's old friend 
Hypatia Bradlaugh Bonner as chairman and Robertson as president.159 In 
Hypatia's biography, the society's founding principles were summarized as 
follows: 'Its special objects were to promote international peace by the 
advocacy of international arbitration, to oppose militarism in all its forms, and 
to promote friendly understanding between the various nations. Emphasis was 
laid upon the desire to co-operate with other peace organisations on every 
possible occasion.'160 The Society was partly intended to provide the peace 
movement with a rationalist outlet, where it was previously dominated by 
Christians. Although its goals were set high, its achievements were finally 
limited: 'Beyond passing a resolution opposing compulsory military training in 
schools, and standing out against any form of conscription, there was little the 
Peace Society could do.'161 In 1921, the Society was dismantled.162 
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The Final Years: 1918-1933 
After Robertson's defeat in the 1918 election, he remained active in the Liberal 
party. He kept his position as chairman of the Liberal Publications Department 
until 1927. He was President of the National Liberal Federation in 1920 and 
from 1921 to 1923. He continued his busy practice as a public lecturer, and he 
was active in the International Arbitration League and the Malthusien League 
(he had been a member of the latter for many decades). In spite of his 
continuing political activity, he was happy not to be an M.P. any more, as his 
correspondence indicates.163 
A seemingly endless stream of publications now poured from his pen, 
adding several new 'magnumopuses' to his already more than impressive list. It 
was Hypatia Bradlaugh Bonner's opinion that 'perhaps the subject most dear to 
John M. Robertson's heart throughout his life has been his study of 
Shakespeare.'164 Robertson now found more time to devote himself to his old 
love, and he turned his critical attention to the question of the real authorship of 
Shakespeare's plays. As Chapter 4 of this study will show, he was as keen a 
controversialist in matters Shakespearean as he was in politics and religion, 
conducting an extensive correspondence with many major Shakespeare 
scholars of his day, like John Dover Wilson and Edmund Chambers. Always 
ready to storm the barricades, he regarded himself as 'having to fight 
singlehanded against the banded academics'.165 Robertson's 'disintegrating' 
views on Shakespeare made him widely known as a Shakespearean scholar, but 
although he did confess that he was perhaps growing 'unduly impatient of 
academics',166 his increasing asperity and lack of tolerance towards those 
members of the academic establishment who could not share his views also 
brought him much notoriety. As a Shakespeare scholar, Robertson always 
remained an outsider. One might argue that this was perhaps the perspective he 
was most comfortable with, but in the last decade of Robertson's life a tone of 
bitterness and vindictiveness tends to creep into his writings which shows that 
the lack of recognition he experienced as a Shakespeare scholar left him far 
from untouched. 
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However, Robertson could always count on the general respect of his fellow 
freethinkers. In 1926, Charles A. Watts, Vice-Chairman of the Board of 
Directors of the Rationalist Press Association (which had published so many of 
Robertson's books), took the initiative to open a Seventieth Birthday 
Testimonial Fund. Nearly a thousand pounds were raised, and offered to 
Robertson at the Trocadero Restaurant, Piccadilly, on November 14, 1926. The 
gathering was chaired by Graham Wallas, and among the guests and speakers 
were many well-known secularists, rationalists, and Liberal politicians. 
Robertson's speech at this occasion is in fact the only autobiographical account 
of any length he left to posterity, and his statement on his own work is 
particularly interesting: 
I should say . . . that I have always been doing the same thing. 
Whether it was in mythology, or sociology, or hierology, or 
politics, or history, or ethics, or economics, I always felt myself to 
be just finding things out, trying to find the truth about something, 
wanting to know what really happened in the particular case, and 
how did the thing go; or, in matters of dispute with regard to 
aesthetic criticism, what is the right judgment, what constitutes the 
right judgment, what are the principles of right criticism. One of 
my volumes has been entitled Explorations. I sometimes think that 
that should be the title of all of them - Explorations in Seventy 
Volumes; and, whatever I may have found out, at all events I have 
had a very good time in the journey.167 
In the same speech, Robertson made known his intention to rewrite 'properly' 
his History of Freethought in the Nineteenth Century. Together with the 
History of Freethought. . . to the Period of the French Revolution, this was 
perhaps his most widely acclaimed scholarly work. 
In a letter to a friend dated 26 July 1930, Robertson explains that he had not 
been able to reply more promptly because of 'a rather crushing pressure of 
unexpected work'. He never allowed himself to work less as he grew older. In 
fact, he observed that 'the older I grow, the more things I seem to have to 
attend to',168 and Robertson was never one to neglect his manifold duties. He 
kept revising and expanding his older works, and in 1932, a year before his 
death, he had completed a new, revised, and enlarged edition of his massive 
bibliography Courses of Study, which was meant as a guide to reading for those 
intrepid students who wished to follow in Robertson's footsteps. The editing 
proved very burdensome, even by Robertson's standards, and this may have 
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contributed to bringing about the slight stroke he had on September 1, which 
was accompanied by partial aphasia and some loss of mental capacity. It was 
only with the greatest difficulty that his doctor could persuade him to take 
complete rest, but in the end he obeyed, and he recovered sufficiently to be able 
to lecture at the South Place Ethical Society on October 16. Although he was 
obviously not entirely well, 'his delivery was characteristically vigorous', as 
J.P. Gilmour recalled. By December, he was still full of plans for large-scale 
literary enterprises: 'Besides books ready in my desk, a small one in the press, 
and one partly done (which hopes to be my best on Shakespeare), I am getting 
on steadily with one on Thirty Years of Egypt, for next autumn, and then 
perhaps some.'169 
Robertson would not live to see his next autumn, and the book on Egypt 
would never be completed. It is significant that the greater part of Robertson's 
last literary efforts should be spent on Egyptian affairs. Throughout his 
parliamentary career, Robertson had been a tireless advocate of Egyptian 
self-government, sharply condemning Lord Cromer's governorship of the 
country, which he felt 'was more directed to the development of English 
interests in Egypt than to any progressive preparing of the people for any 
species, for even the simplest form, or the beginnings of self-government.'170 
Sir Eldon Gorst, Cromer's successor, did find favour with Robertson for being 
'the instrument of carrying into effect the only display of really progressive 
policy that we have made in Egypt for a number of years.'17' In Robertson's 
view, England's continuing presence in Egypt could only be justified if the 
English made a concentrated effort to prepare Egypt for self-government. 
However, at the outbreak of the First World War, Egypt was officially declared 
a British protectorate and its reigning monarch Abbas Hilmi II was deposed 
while abroad. It was not until 1922 that the protectorate was ended and the 
Kingdom of Egypt was founded, although the British had far from withdrawn. 
In the last ten years of his life, Robertson's interest in Egypt seems to have 
intensified. He conducted an extensive correspondence with the exiled Khedive 
Abbas Hilmi II, whom he considered Egypt's rightful leader. The Khedive was 
a man of considerable intellectual accomplishments, who had received his 
education in Vienna in the 1880s and 1890s, and had a perfect command of 
German, French and English.172 Robertson took great pains to bring the 
Khedive's case to the notice of influential political figures like the former 
169
 Quoted from J.A. Hammerton, 'Further Tributes to "J.M.R."', Literary Guide 
(February 1933), p. 38. 
170
 Hansard (27 July 1911). 
171
 Ibid. 
172
 Jacques Berque, Egypt. Imperialism and Revolution, trans. Jean Stewart (London, 
1972), p. 164. 
THE LIFE OF J.M. ROBERTSON 45 
Foreign Secretary Lord Grey, while in the mean time keeping Abbas 
scrupulously informed of the latest political developments. He edited and wrote 
an introduction to A.H. Beaman's sympathetic The Dethronement of the 
Khedive,173 and assisted in the editing and publishing of Abbas's own A Few 
Words on the Anglo-Egyptian Settlement."* 
Abbas Hilmi II showed himself grateful for the propagandistic work 
Robertson performed on his behalf. He invited Robertson and his wife to stay 
with him on the Riviera, but Robertson declined on account of having too 
much work to do. He was, in fact, growing aware that he might not have the 
time left to finish his literary and critical mission: 'And, now that I am over 73, 
I want to clear off as diligently as I can some of the historical and critical tasks 
that I have set myself, which do not seem likely to be done as I think they 
should be by anyone else.'175 There may be a touch of Robertsonian arrogance 
in such a remark, but it also shows how much he considered his work a moral 
duty to the world, to be fulfilled with complete self-denial when necessary. He 
wrote in answer to the Khedive's invitation that 'it will be one of my great 
comforts if I live to see .уоиг wrongs redressed'176 and there is a good deal more 
in this remark than mere politeness. 
Robertson would not have long to live. On 5 January 1933, he had lunch 
with William Jenkins, one of his dearest friends, with whom, long ago, he had 
been to school in Stirling.177 In the evening he and his wife listened to a 
wireless talk on Saving, a subject to which he had devoted many an article and 
several books. A few hours later he had a second, fatal stroke, and died 
instantaneously. Two days later he was cremated at Golders Green, without 
ceremony of any kind, and with no more than thirty mourners present. They 
included Robertson's son Guy, representatives of the Rationalist Press 
Association, the N.S.S., the Ethical Union, and the South Place Ethical Society, 
as well as his old friend Hypatia Bradlaugh Bonner, who was to die soon 
afterwards. Robertson's only daughter Guenn was absent; she had been living 
in the Unites States since her marriage to an American Mr Farrington.178 
Robertson's house in Pembroke Gardens, Kensington was filled to 
overflowing with a library of over 20,000 volumes, which included a unique 
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collection of works on freethought. He had wished to leave this collection to 
the Rationalist Press Association, which did not, however, have the space on its 
premises to house it. Besides, a note in the Literary Guide states rather 
ominously that 'he was not in a position which would justify him in 
bequeathing it to the organization.'179 This seems to hint at the dire state of 
Robertson's finances, and although we do not know this for certain, Robertson 
may well have been in debt when he died. A few of the rarer books were 
bought by the R.P.A., but the remainder was put up for auction with Hodgson 
& Co., on April 26th, 27th, and 28th. The sale was reported by the Literary 
Guide as 'a very successful one': although only two or three books were 
individually worth more than £5, the total amount raised by the 740 lots was 
£1,485. Two of Robertson's friends, John Burns and Isaac Foote, were present 
àt the sale.180 
By the time of the sale, Robertson's wife was no longer alive. According to 
the obituarist in the Literary Guide, she had never recovered from the shock of 
her husband's sudden and unexpected death. She had a seizure on February 24, 
and was unconscious to her death five days later. Within forty-eight hours her 
remains were cremated at Golders Green. The Literary Guide obituarist 
described her as 'an accomplished lady', whose 'attachment to her husband was 
in every way ideal.' Apparently 'she often accompanied him at R.P.A. 
functions, where she was a very welcome visitor',181 and when Robertson's old 
friend Sidney Gimson tried to 'get him out for dinner and a band at one of the 
various shows at Earl's Court', Mrs Robertson was always ready to come to his 
aid.182 On the whole, one is left with the impression that these attempts cannot 
have been successful very often, and that Mrs Robertson's part in her 
husband's life must necessarily have been somewhat limited. Although it is 
impossible to say whether this marriage was as 'ideal' as Gimson describes it, 
at least there appears to be no evidence to the contrary. 
As far as Robertson's children are concerned, the few glimpses we are 
afforded of them occur, curiously enough, in relation with Abbas Hilmi Π. In 
the year after her father's death, Guenn Robertson wrote to Abbas, offering to 
dedicate herself and her fiancé to the Egyptian cause, so as to be able to 
continue her father's work.183 Apparently, her marriage to the American 
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Farrington had come to an end, and she and her new fiancé were now in urgent 
need of work. She speaks of her father in terms of the highest possible respect, 
and indicates that she had for many years assisted him in his various scholarly 
investigations. The tone of this and the following letter borders on desperation, 
and it is in itself an inauspicious sign that Abbas is the only of her father's old 
friends she can tum to for help. She refers to her brother Guy as having been 
'very much affected by the war' and having run through the small patrimony 
that was hers, leaving her virtually penniless.184 
Abbas's answer to this plea has unfortunately not been preserved, but in 
1939 Guenn again writes to Abbas, this time for an even more compelling 
reason.185 She explains how she had returned to London to put her little 
daughter in the old school she herself had attended as a girl. However, her plan 
could come to nothing now that certain business prospects had utterly failed 
her, and left her in a desperate situation, with no one else to turn to. She saw 
herself forced to ask Abbas for a loan of £100 to enable her to return to 
America. Again, Abbas's answer has not been recorded, and it is at this crucial 
point in her life that we lose track of Guenn Robertson entirely. Her 
correspondence with the exiled Khedive of Egypt indicates poignantly that in 
his final years Robertson seems to have become an isolated figure, leaving his 
daughter with few friends to turn to. 
After Robertson's death, obituaries appeared in all the major newspapers, 
and in many minor ones. Although not all the papers were, of course, 
sympathetic towards Robertson's militant anti-religious views, they agreed that 
a man of great intellectual stature had passed away. Over forty years after 
Bradlaugh's death, Robertson was still generally labelled as Bradlaugh's 
'disciple' and 'chief helper'. In the leading papers, Robertson's 
accomplishments as a Shakespearean scholar rather than as a freethinker, 
rationalist, and Liberal politician were stressed. However, already there were 
some signs that Robertson's work on Shakespeare was not destined to live on. 
The Times obituarist declared that 'the elaborate structure of his work must be 
pronounced baseless',186 and it was not long before this became the generally 
accepted view. Overall, for a man who lived his life so much in the public eye, 
Robertson was allowed to sink into oblivion very quickly. It is a significant fact 
that so few of his books were reprinted after his death. 
However, this is not to suggest that his close friends forgot him as easily as 
the general public. In 1936, an edition of his History of Freethought. . . to the 
Period of the French Revolution was published, to which were prefixed 
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appreciations of Robertson by his old friends J.P. Gilmour, Hypatia Bradlaugh 
Bonner, Ernest Newman, and John A. Hobson. Among much gratitude for the 
intellectual stimulus Robertson provided as well as for his steadfast loyalty as a 
friend, Hobson introduced a critical note: 
I sometimes thought his immense knowledge of the errors of loose 
thinkers, and of his obligations to expose them, made him too 
combative, preventing him from developing and applying his 
creative and constructive gifts which I am certain he possessed, but 
which never found full scope.187 
Many who knew Robertson were well and sometimes painfully aware of this 
combativeness. Shortly after Robertson's death, F. Maddison wrote a letter to 
Hypatia Bradlaugh Bonner in which he observed that their mutual friend 'did 
not mellow with age.'188 He had had a heated discussion with Robertson at the 
National Liberal Club over some economic issue, and they had parted with 
angry words. In fact, 'mellowness' was never one of Robertson's outstanding 
qualities. In an obituary in the Star, the Socialist politician Manny Shinwell 
remembered a brush with Robertson thirty years ago:189 
A keen individualist, he had been denouncing Socialism, and when 
I mildly ventured to cross swords with him he referred with 
contempt to my youthful appearance and my still more youthful 
arguments. 
I retorted by reminding him 'that a man's intelligence was not 
determined by the length of his whiskers.' Robertson - who wore a 
beard - seemed to regard this as a personal affront, and was 
furiously angry. He turned on me and poured forth a torrent of 
phrases that completely shrivelled me up. I said no more. 
When Hobson once tried to confront Robertson with his ferocity in 
argumentation, Robertson replied: 'You forget that I am only four generations 
from a painted Pict.'190 What should perhaps be remembered in the first place 
was that he was an autodidact of lower-class origins who had to fight all his 
life to be taken seriously by an establishment generally hostile to his views and 
background. To Robertson, attack always seemed by far the best defence. 
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Although many who knew him well testified to Robertson's loyalty as a 
friend, his uncompromising adherence to the principle that the truth (or at least 
his own version of the truth) should never be disguised sometimes tended to 
put even the warmest of friendships in jeopardy. When his friends asked him 
for criticism of their own or their friends' literary work, Robertson made no 
effort to mince his words. In one case, Bertram Dobell was stung to the quick 
by Robertson's frank criticism of the poetry of his protégé James Thomson. 
Robertson's response to Dobell's demand for explanation was characteristically 
unyielding: 
I don't at all mind your plain expression of your feeling, which I 
have met with plain answers. It is a question of reason and 
consistency. If you answer that Thomson had a right to put on airs 
of supremacy towards Tennyson, but that I am not entitled to 
criticize him otherwise than deferentially, there is of course 
nothing more to be said.191 
In another case, Robertson's young friend Richard Curie was less than pleased 
when Robertson thus criticised his latest collection of starkly realistic 
shortstories: 
Certainly these things of yours are better than Arnold Bennett's 
pot-boilers, which are mere literary crimes; but they are not worth 
doing in comparison with his real books. 
You must forgive my persistent dissent: I can't help it. You can 
do far sounder and stronger things than these; and Гт not going to 
encourage you in the blue-and-green light business.192 
When Curie voiced his displeasure in an angry letter, Robertson responded 
with a fifteen-page epistle in which he minutely explained what exactly it was 
he objected to in the younger man's work. The opening lines show sufficiently 
clearly that Robertson was not inclined to be conciliatory: 
I fancy the heat must have got on your nerves, or you would see 
that my letter was just in the vein that my talk has always been in 
with you - the perfectly free speech of a friend. You and I were 
not wont to be mealy-mouthed in critical talk. That you should 
call my letter "acrimonious," I confess, startled me. So did your 
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inference that I regarded your stories as pot-boilers. Surely I 
expressly said that, though they worried me, I admitted them to be 
higher things than pot-boilers.193 
In both cases, the friendship finally survived, but one is left with serious doubts 
about Robertson's ability to see that 'the perfectly free speech of a friend' is not 
always the wisest mode of address. In that respect, he must sometimes have 
been as daunting a figure to his friends as to his enemies. 
All in all, what biographical material we have of Robertson resists a 
convenient summing-up of his life and personality in a few terse lines. On the 
one hand we have the abrasive public controversialist who is always ready, 
whether in print or on the platform, to crush his opponents with his reasoning 
and erudition; the self-made scholar perpetually scorning established authority; 
the fearless freethinker whose life's mission it was to undermine religion in all 
its varied manifestations. These are the faces Robertson presented to the 
outside world and this is how, if at all, he is remembered today. On the other 
hand there is also Robertson the cook, Robertson the impersonator of bears, 
Robertson the sentimental soul whose tears flowed at the departure from his 
beloved Scotland. Those are the rare glimpses we catch of a Robertson with his 
rationalist guard lowered, in a more relaxed and personal mode. We will not 
see much of this Robertson in the following pages, but he did exist, and it can 
do no harm to remind oneself occasionally of the fact. 
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Chapter 2 
Robertson and nineteenth-century 
rationalism 
Introduction 
It would be impossible to move straight from an account of Robertson's life to 
a discussion of his literary criticism without paying due attention to his other 
work, massive in proportion and so rarely consulted now but by a small number 
of specialists. It was, after all, in a relatively small part of his work that 
Robertson focused on literary matters per se, and a proper understanding and 
placement of that particular part cannot be achieved without considering the 
main body of his writings and the system of values which underlies it. 
Like many contemporary men of letters, Robertson was not at all convinced 
of the obviousness of a strict dividing line between 'belles lettres' and other 
kinds of writing. He believed such a separation to be artificial and 'a matter of 
convenience rather than of fundamental distinction',1 although he did admit 
that in actual practice, there was probably no avoiding it. Nor can it be avoided 
in the present discussion; however, Robertson's unwillingness to pigeonhole 
particular fields of literary activity should make us aware of the necessity to 
look beyond his literary criticism for the origins and fundamentals of his ideas. 
In this chapter I therefore intend to provide some appropriate insight into the 
philosophical and theoretical foundations of Robertson's work, against the 
background of the intellectual turmoil of his age. An outline of some of the 
essential currents and developments in nineteenth-century rationalist thought in 
Britain will set the scene for a discussion of Robertson's particular brand of 
rationalism. In that discussion, my main concern will not be to provide short 
outlines of Robertson's separate works, but rather to arrive at a synthesis of 
certain elementary ideas which are in evidence throughout his writings. 
Considering the sheer volume of Robertson's output, it is hardly surprising that 
it is full of echoes and reverberations, many of the origins of which may be 
traced to the mainstream of Victorian intellectual currents. 
J.M. Robertson, Elizabethan Literature (London, 1914), p. 7. 
52 J.M. ROBERTSON: RATIONALIST AND LITERARY CRITIC 
Part 1: British Rationalism in the Nineteenth Century 
Introduction 
The use of a term such as 'nineteenth-century rationalism' inevitably suggests 
that one is dealing with a coherent philosophical system or movement, of 
which the principles as well as the followers may conveniently be listed. 
However, it is one of the truisms of history that movements are seldom handed 
down to us in such neat packages, and so it is with the rationalism of the 
nineteenth century. In fact, we are faced with a plethora of sub-movements and 
'isms': materialism, naturalism, determinism, positivism, agnosticism, etc. 
Each of these would certainly fall under the heading of rationalism, while there 
are probably as many points of divergence between them as of agreement. 
A further, related problem in dealing with Victorian rationalism is that it 
automatically involves us in a discussion of many of the main currents and 
developments in Victorian religious and intellectual life. The history of 
rationalism is the history of evolutionism, the rise of science, Victorian doubt, 
and many other concepts central to Victorian intellectual history. On these, a 
whole industry of Victorian researchers and scholars is presently at work, and 
to give even the briefest overview of their work would be impossible in this 
place. However, a proper understanding of Robertson's work can only be 
achieved by viewing him in the light of the rationalist tradition, so an attempt 
to distil something like the 'rationalist spirit' from Victorian intellectual history 
is still required. 
Terms and Definitions 
In his book In Pursuit of a Scientific Culture, Peter Allan Dale's opening point 
isthat 
the essential intellectual history of the nineteenth century may 
fairly be described as a search for an adequate replacement for the 
lost Christian totality, an effort to resurrect a saving belief, as 
Carlyle poignantly put it, on the ashes of the French revolution.2 
Although its very 'sweepingness' may render such a statement questionable, 
Dale does touch upon one of the central issues of the age. Throughout the 
nineteenth century, the Christian religion was gradually, but dramatically, 
losing ground. The general story of that process is now a familiar one. The 
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findings of the geologists, the influence of German biblical criticism, the 
concept of evolution as developed by Darwin: these three factors are most 
commonly referred to in short-hand descriptions of the erosion of Christian 
belief in the Victorian age. Dale's point summarizes the view of many 
historians that the decline in Christian belief, the downfall of the Christian 
creed, was counterbalanced by the simultaneous rise of a new creed which 
seemed to hold infinite promise: the creed of science. Where before 
Christianity had been the source of human moral and social values, science 
now took its place as providing the light for man to live by. In the 1870s and 
1880s, the trust in science as the bringer of truth reached unprecedented 
heights, and the scientists and scientific thinkers of the day had become the 
high priests of the new religion of science. 
This 'cult of science' is described with great acumen by Fabian socialist and 
pioneer sociologist Beatrice Webb (1858-1943) in her autobiography My 
Apprenticeship: 
. . . it is hard to understand the naive belief of the most original and 
vigorous minds of the 'seventies and 'eighties that it was by 
science, and by science alone, that all human misery would be 
ultimately swept away. . . . For who will deny that the men of 
science were the leading British intellectuals ofthat period; that it 
was they who stood out as men of genius with international 
reputations; that it was they who were the self-confident militants 
of the period; that it was they who were routing the theologians, 
confounding the mystics, imposing their theories on philosophers, 
their inventions on capitalists, and- their discoveries on medical 
men; whilst they were at the same time snubbing the artists, 
ignoring the poets and even casting doubt on the capacity of the 
politicians? Nor was the cult of the scientific method confined to 
intellectuals. 'Halls of Science' were springing up in crowded 
working-class districts; and Bradlaugh . . . was the most popular 
demagogue of the day.3 
For all the bitterness of her post-war perspective, Webb provides a splendid 
impression of the all-encompassing influence of science in these two decades, 
Robertson's formative years. Few people were better qualified to paint such a 
picture than Beatrice Webb. She was, after all, the solace of the great Victorian 
philosophical system-builder, Herbert Spencer (1820-1903), in his sad declin-
ing years, and she sat at the feet of such eminent promoters of science as 
Thomas Henry Huxley (1825-1895), John Tyndall (1820-1893) and Francis 
Galton (1822-1911). These men, it was felt, were bringing to the world the 
}
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'note of joy, part relief, part excited hope of discovering a new philosophy of 
man and the universe'4 that filled the void left by a Christianity in dire straits. 
Dale concluded that the philosophical term which would best cover this 
'attempt to establish something we may fairly call a religion of science' is 
positivism.5 He defines positivism more precisely as 'the conviction that 
science offers the only viable way of thinking correctly about human affairs.'6 
A similar conclusion was reached before by the historian of the philosophy of 
science, Maurice Mandelbaum. His characterization of positivism involves 
three points: 
First, positivism rejects metaphysics on the ground that the 
questions with which metaphysics is concerned presuppose a 
mistaken belief that we can discover principles of explanation or 
interpretation which are more ultimate than those which are 
directly concerned from observation and from generalizations 
concerning observation.7 
This sums up the fundamental empiricist position, traceable in the British 
context to the work of Francis Bacon in the seventeenth century, that any 
attempt to go beyond the 'phenomena' which we can experience through our 
senses is a waste of effort. We can never hope to discover any sort of 
'underlying reality', however much we might wish such a reality existed. This 
rejection of metaphysics is apparent, for instance, from the ringing tones in 
which the rationalist and man of letters George Henry Lewes (1817-1878) 
introduced his Biographical History of Philosophy: 
О reader! let us hear no more of the lofty views claimed as the 
exclusive privilege of Philosophy. Ignorant indeed must the man 
be who nowadays is unacquainted with the grandeur and sweep of 
scientific speculation in Astronomy and Geology, or who has 
never been thrilled by the revelations of the Telescope and 
Microscope. The heights and depths of man's nature, the heights to 
4
 Walter E. Houghton, The Victorian Frame of Mind 1830-1870 (New Haven and 
London, 1957), p. 50. 
5
 Dale, In Pursuit of a Scientific Culture, p. 7. This philosophical temi should not be 
confused with Auguste Comte's Religion of Humanity, of which Richard Congreve and 
Frederic Harrison were prominent British adherents. Whenever that system is referred to, it 
will be spelled with an initial capital: Positivism. 
6
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7
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which he aspires, the depths into which he searches, and the 
grander generalities on Life, Destiny, and the Universe, find as 
eminent a place in Science as in Philosophy, with the simple 
difference that they are less vague and are better founded.8 
However, this type of empiricism is naturally not the exclusive property of 
nineteenth-century British positivism. As a further distinguishing 
characteristic, Mandelbaum adds the theory 'that the adequacy of our 
knowledge increases as it approximates the forms of explanation which have 
been achieved by the advanced sciences.' In the above quote, Lewes points 
dramatically to the accomplishments of such 'advanced sciences' as astronomy 
and geology, and their ability to interpret man and man's place in nature far 
more effectively than philosophy and, by implication, religion. If we are able to 
state the laws that govern man and nature with as much certainty as we are able 
to formulate, for instance, the laws of physics and mathematics, then we will 
have achieved an adequate degree of knowledge, and that must be our goal. In 
that way, science comes to be equated with truth, and since there can only be 
one kind of truth, science leaves no room for metaphysics and religion. This is 
Mandelbaum's final point: 
. . . a scientific explanation does not involve appeal to any 
immanent forces nor to any other transcendent entities: to explain 
a phenomenon is to be able to subsume it under one or more laws 
of which it is an instance. A law, in its turn, is simply a 
well-authenticated general descriptive statement of uniformities 
which have been observed to occur in the past. 
In sum, Mandelbaum sees nineteenth-century positivism as involving: 'first, a 
rejection of metaphysics; second, the contention that science constitutes the 
ideal form of knowledge; third, a particular interpretation of the nature and the 
limits of scientific explanation.' 
These definitions by Dale and Mandelbaum bring us somewhat closer to 
some of the fundamentals of the rationalist outlook on life, since rationalism is, 
to all intents and purposes, emphatically positivist in nature. A further step may 
be taken by looking in brief at the work of two seminal philosophers of the 
Victorian age: Auguste Comte (1798-1857) and John Stuart Mill (1806-1873). 
8
 George Henry Lewes, The Biographical History of Philosophy, library ed. (New 
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Comte and Mill 
At first glance, the French philosopher Auguste Comte seems a decidedly 
unlikely candidate for the position of father of nineteenth-century British 
rationalism, even apart from his nationality. His desperate love for Clotilde de 
Vaux and the bizarre system of worship he surrounded her memory with after 
her death of consumption, all these are well-documented facts that hardly fit 
the picture of the hard-headed reasoner. But as a rationalist thinker he was 
immensely influential in British intellectual circles. His Cours de Philosophie 
Positive (1830-1842) was promoted to great effect by Mill and George Henry 
Lewes, and through the latter Comte came to exert a powerful influence on 
George Eliot (1819-1880). Other important followers included John Morley 
(1838-1923), who opened the pages of the Fortnightly Review to Positivist 
writers, Frederic Harrison (1831-1923) and Richard Congreve (1818-1899), 
both of whom remained ardent promoters of the Religion of Humanity until 
their deaths, when Positivism had long lost the sway it had once held over 
mid-Victorian intellectual life.9 
'To study Comte', Basil Willey has said, 'is to find the clue to much that the 
Zeitgeist, in a less systematic way, was doing through other minds in other 
countries.'10 To study Comte, therefore, is also to examine some of the 
essential assumptions of Victorian rationalism. Comte's all-encompassing 
philosophical system was built on the dogmatic assertion that the application of 
the scientific method, the method of the natural sciences, to human thought and 
social life, would lead mankind to discover and unite the truth of its existence. 
W.M. Simon describes how this assumption was worked out by Comte 'by way 
of two interlocking and interdependent propositions'. First, Comte formulated 
the famous Law of the Three Stages: 
The human mind inevitably developed from a first, theological 
stage in which it explained the world in terms of the will of 
anthropomorphic gods, by way of a second in which it explained 
the world in terms of metaphysical abstractions, to a third and 
final, positive stage in which it explained the world in terms of 
scientific truth.11 
' For the impact of Comtism in Britain, see W.M. Simon, European Positivism in the 
Nineteenth Century (Ithaca, 1963), pp. 172-238; Susan Budd, Varieties of Unbelief. Atheists 
and Agnostics in English Society ¡850-1960 (London, 1977), pp. 190-9; T.R. Wright, The 
Religion of Humanity. The Impact ofComtean Positivism on Victorian England (Cambridge, 
1986). 
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But man's knowledge as a whole could not attain to this final, Positive or 
Scientific stage all at once. Comte saw knowledge as consisting of several 
disciplines which passed through the three stages one at a time, 'in a definite 
order, the order of their decreasing generality and increasing interdependence 
and complexity, nar¥elAr/fitheìfòi^WtKyraiib pbusice, chemistry, biology, 
sociology.'12 It was^t>mie^MeepesWotMraoffTOarin4he nineteenth century, 
th«jnorneBtous development was now finally reaching its logkal conclusion. 
now be achieved with regard to sociology. The perfecting of sociology, the 
understanding of man and his place in society, was the ultimate step. It was the 
philosopher's task to draw sociology into the realm of science, so that Europe 
as a whole could enter upon its final and perfect stage of development. The 
so that he 
lis finally 
made Comte 'the founder both of the final science and the philosophy based on 
the complete set of the sciences'.13 
Comte's Cours de Philosophie Positive was obviously far more than an 
abstract treatise on the sciences amLÜieir methods and hierarchy. Its aim was 
ultimately of a moral and social nature, wriat Comte wanted to bring about was 
a total reorganization of society on scientific grounds. Comte's Positivist 
philosophy and his science of sociology were to give humanity (at least in the 
western world) its due, and .to.achieve its final 'redemption and regeneration', 
where Christianity fiad fañeqno.xloТаз. . Priests were fo oe replaced by philos­
ophers, who would? п Ш е М № т а У < г а е п % > b u t 
moral regeneration & 6 & « Γ ? $ 8 Μ г^&ЖіШШиІсі follow."5 
This is of course only the barest oiflfine of a vast and intricate philosophical 
construct, and the reasons why this system appealed so powerfully to the 
Victorian mind are equally complex. In general terms, one might say that 
Comte provided a philosophical framework for many of the currents that were 
already in the mid-Victorian air. Не^гежпесг order and progress to ears that 
could hardly have been more receptive to the message. Order was sorely 
needed in an age swept by tempestuous developments in intellectual and 
religious life, with the geologists appointing man to a humble and transient 
place in nature, with G e M a ^ ß i ^ M ^ f ^ e M ^ S w i n g dark doubts on the 
authority of the Bible, and with tri? mPp^Jading concept of evolution looming 
12
 Ibid, p. 5. 
13
 Ibid 
14
 Ibid, p. 6. 
15
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on the horizon. But deeply disturbing as these developments may have been, at 
the same time they held promise of immense progress, of the religious yoke 
being thrown off and social justice no longer being a Utopian ideal. The idea of 
progress through science was deeply rooted in the Victorian consciousness, and 
Comte was able to provide it with a coherent philosophical context. Besides, 
Comte did not merely attack theology, he replaced it with a theology of his 
own, the Religion of Humanity. If, as Willey said, Comte epitomizes the 
Victorian age, that is because the age saw itself mirrored in his philosophy. 
Among the first of Comte's advocates in Britain, John Stuart Mill played an 
essential role in introducing Comte's Cows to the British public. However, 
although he greatly admired Comte and thought the Cours a work of eminent 
importance, he was far from a true Comtean disciple. In his Autobiography, 
Mill assesses the debt he owed the French philosopher in the writing of the 
System of Logic: 
My obligations to Comte were only to his writings - to the part 
which had then been published of his 'Cours de Philosophie 
Positive': and . . . the amount of these obligations is far less than 
has sometimes been asserted. . . . I derived from him many 
valuable thoughts . . . but it is only in the concluding Book, on the 
Logic of the Moral Sciences, that I owe to him any radical 
improvement in my conception of the application of logical 
methods.16 
The System of Logic is Mill's own philosophical chef d'oeuvre, and it is 
indisputably one of the seminal works in Victorian intellectual history. Leslie 
Stephen describes how the young graduates of the 1850s tested their 
philosophical mettle on Mill's work by endlessly discussing his teachings 'as 
keenly as medieval commentators used to discuss the doctrines of Aristotle.'17 
The Logic clearly was, as Annan put it, one of those books which capture the 
mind of a generation. We are not so much concerned here with the 
technicalities of Mill's method of logical reasoning as with the fact that the 
work raised some questions which were of immense consequence to the 
Victorian mind: 
Are the actions of human beings, like all other natural events, 
subject to invariable laws? Does that constancy of causation, 
16
 John Stuart Mill, Autobiography (London, 1969), pp. 147-8. 
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which is the foundation of every scientific theory of successive 
phenomena, really obtain among them?18 
These questions Mill answered boldly in the affirmative. The principle which 
underlies the whole of his work (and so much of Victorian philosophy and 
philosophizing) is that of the oneness of nature. Effective reasoning is to Mill 
impossible if it is not founded on the premise that nature is governed by 
unalterable laws. And since man is emphatically part of nature, and the same 
laws operate on him as on the rest of the organic world, the methods of science 
should also be able to unlock the secrets of mankind: 
. . . the science of Human Nature may be said to exist, in 
proportion as those approximate truths, which compose a practical 
knowledge of mankind, can be exhibited as corollaries from the 
universal laws of human nature on which they rest." 
Mill far from· underestimated the difficulty of establishing a science of 
human nature, and it is clear that such a doctrine held vast implications, which 
were as disturbing to the theologians as they were full of scientific promise for 
the rationalist. For one thing, 'religion' saw the exclusive right to moral values 
wrested from its hands. If natural phenomena are all that man can know, and 
man is himself such a phenomenon, then morality too is an element of nature, 
and subject to the laws which apply throughout nature. It logically follows that 
there are no scientific reasons for believing that morality has its origins in 
religion. From the science of human nature and morality that Mill envisaged, 
religion was epistemologically excluded. 
Mill also paved the way for a naturalistic science of psychology. Natural law 
operates in the human mind as it does in all natural phenomena, so that there is 
no reason why the mind should not.be fruitfully subjected to scientific inquiry. 
However, Mill himself did not make the step which many of his followers saw 
as only logical: regarding mind as matter. The science of phrenology, the 
physiological study of the brain as the exclusive organ of the mind, was 
practised with enthusiasm by many leading Victorian intellectuals and enjoyed 
great success in the vulgarized version of 'bump-reading'. The general notion 
of mind as matter was to become one of the central rationalist tenets.20 
18
 Houghton, The Victorian Frame of Mind, p. 33. 
" John Stuart "Mill, A System of Logic, 2nd ed. (London, 1846), p. 502. 
20
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The one law which Mill saw as ultimately regulating all the manifold laws 
of nature was 'the Law of Causation'. Universal causation entails that every 
natural phenomenon may be traced to natural causes. So it is for Mill with the 
human mind: 
. . . given the motives which are present to an individual's mind, 
and given likewise the character and disposition of the individual, 
the manner in which he will act may be unerringly inferred: that if 
we knew the person thoroughly, and we knew all the inducements 
which are acting upon him, we could foretell his conduct with as 
much certainty as we can predict any physical event.21 
In the following chapters we will see how this principle was to become an 
important cornerstone for Robertson's theory of scientific literary criticism. 
Mill's views on causality in history were equally influential. Since to Mill 
history is a process of organic, natural phenomena, the discovery of the laws 
which govern that process, by combining the study of history with that of 
human nature, opens up infinite possibilities. Through knowledge of those laws 
we may hereafter succeed not only in looking far forward into the 
future history of the human race, but in determining what artificial 
means may be used, and to what extent, to accelerate the natural 
progress in so far as it is beneficial; to compensate for whatever 
may be its inherent inconveniences or disadvantages; and to guard 
against the dangers or accidents to which our species is exposed 
from the necessary incidents of its progression.22 
This quotation links Mill with Comte in two ways. First of all, there is the 
belief in progress, which was such a typical characteristic of Victorian thought. 
Mill leaves no doubt about his faith in the process of continual progression in 
mankind, claiming confidently that 'the general tendency is, and will continue 
to be, saving occasional exceptions, one of improvement; a tendency towards a 
better and happier state.'23 However, both Mill and Comte assert that this 
tendency towards improvement should not be left to itself. In both their 
philosophical systems, the concern for social and moral reform was an 
ingrained element, as it was to be in the work of Herbert Spencer and 
somewhat less central figures such as G.H. Lewes, Frederic Harrison, and J.M. 
Robertson himself. British philosophy in the nineteenth century was of a 
predominantly practical nature, built on the British empiricist tradition but 
21
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infused with new ideals of social change. Of this brand of rationalist 
philosophy, Comte and Mill may be said to have been the two founding fathers. 
Mill's doctrine of universal causation was embraced without exception in 
the circle of Victorian intellectuals among whom he moved. In her book 
Making it Whole. ^  /IO?i^f^(Çi^^^l^Ç^'^4Pi\^<^îeir World, Diana 
Postlethwaithe provides vaniaole ïnsignTsÉhto the way these figures were 
interrelated, both biographically and intellectually. This is not to suggest that 
they constitute a strictly homogeneous group; as Postlethwaithe points out, its 
rStobfefiPferíWbwfloírdmVS dívíSse^ffige o A t í l e ^ a f ^ é a r l o i A h e Ш 
<ШШ^і£шЬ, ^ugiisHarÇrJmfe "ЭЪ# а !ШЧіШ а , м'гЙ, t(wgr(rÉivÇr-arrekày· 
dfe«Si§edand:ißr.(A^r ЭДййеЯиЖ f^!èïhw%Aescfe8rMlier^,(^ffigdnefeF 
r&tètìemip tlwe^urSéor|è is BornSê- (1788-1858) and Robert Chambers 
(18Î№T87Î9, Фй&ІДеФЕЙуЬда ^ f i Í8#aM l mr№t 1 Í^^ff ta^^r^ w - 1 í¥7^f 
№m%§4mfy ШШЫВДФ Hemrf^neè¥,c!h<ÌPf?r^^^ 
ЖЙИШ, t ^ ^ o f f e t ^ ^ i a i t i r ^ i a ö i e r y а^§гйОУ1ас1к ^ Ы^ІггЧіУ&аБГ' 
і к » а & Р ; < ^ й Й ^ а У Ф ^ ^ ^ SSSBMfii1 
ЧЗеШаіУегШШ^Ъуе^й оёа^о^ 
My>'ajyitM i^iMÌa»8raJAÌàWff tò ^аЙеШУ ^р^і^г^геТР^оіСеУеагогі; 
tfiáseféntífiOivVefMt^ íewraThere were few disciplines in which George Henry 
Lew&e «^fsfled a^äÜfif,o^qfoltee!r»£ ігс¥йГй§гйПае^Ш§^Й^ЙО'1Ь|^? 
rJhi&StetípKyt bflp&è Msftir^^iiideaX, Ч*^МазапЙег#г^^еп%га (гШС ÍP 
pMöSöptiiÖil S^tenpröft^as^^p'ro^o¥e^r#ÏSi sAfiïfttffoûri&iffoiis. I T # ; 
rfäffle'qtfitSe&pe ®4®|k,fíffenys<ríéeHsaRé lfflro^c4Me<al^îrJa^£«r;tn^Mêasf 
cli^atftgQ№br^t"Of^ewí^Stpeímetetíteí?iov«ls?ocial History, Amsterdam; 
RSdtnfifföpéMCtmbüahhJiö^rifiic^ iMbmEmbOS áfafiftf ?Ш№»ЕЧГі& 1Ж?> 
h^b^£ö;Heeactes^&tón^i l l to^ 
iMfeEO^aWM¥^tgo®Ml ,^Q(tti¿KiaCaímteagsa QUflU ШЬ^ьЫ^ШпШ^ 
гАйпЬіеаіП«Ьщ tft ll^SStafH^Ìitte^asl^tìistiiaìW&loÌPg«^ агРШ г^ёеаёейТШ/ 
itípHti¿c®Jtte fetitottâtog spiri» ®Ш&еіО»Ш£Шге9НеФ^^ oJbSßmsfct 
Hbwatietç tftfojelieàstàft aflrßeebible to discuss the impact of Darwin's theory of 
е оЬаюптщ^пшІеЫШоЛгДО&ШІЖІё (^Hbet^i^«^k«№&^^^<^ti^|¡br^r 
DfawiïgbbiaA»Qnë^gq)ltótRf>fe«éwïagÏ.Hfe and the secularist movement with 
me, and also for introducing rse to Terry Mullins, former Secretary of the 
№ t S ¡ ^ ^ Í ^ £ í í u e t Y ™ ^ J¡!&j$í&rf-esearch 
would not have been half as rruitful or enjoyable without him. I am also 
Igihtefbòùk Шеі Ш№ШіОшітта(паі^іЬпфі^,ШІ^Ш\Мт^еео85е5 this 
genarttoi^oIDm&iœ^aHffieran^irôo^ 
tlia\ahgld»dlsBmöet&o^c£iBäle4«wtesaäecteferthteu^edai]ä thtertdtaikpjidnsrofr 
thtuáerts rßtacal, wtfaodáunttditfaeirFbaiake ddorapeMraralisrnHsiwleabifrfiirtaée 
'èftki^oiai^oSiiBÔrenYeiioitite Agmiratkerianrl' djretifaiteo¥>li&feidi»giätu»y 
rül^fcyrhövigntlireguiarityhälkeff bdMcairrgvrastdißibaT^maurifebPof souJliieet 
bhasé dniseanlaîqirirthqjlBmtinue.^ support of my friends and former colleagues 
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However, before that could be achieved, two requirements had to be met: 
First, the ordinary Englishman must be persuaded to look toward 
rational, scientific, and secular ideas to solve his problems and to 
interpret his experiences rather than toward Christian, 
metaphysical, or other prescientific modes of thought. Second, 
scientifically trained and scientifically oriented men must supplant 
clergymen and Christian laymen as educators and leaders of 
English culture.24 
To describe this particular ideological stance, far more aggressively 
anti-theological and pro-science than the generation of Comte and Mill, 
Turner suggests the use of the term 'scientific naturalism'. He prefers it to the 
term 'rationalism', which to him fails 'to suggest the crucial role of science in 
addition to critical reasoning'. However, as he elsewhere claims that 'its 
exponents aligned themselves with the specific physical theories of the third 
quarter of the century', scientific naturalism may be seen as a particular 
manifestation of the Victorian rationalist spirit. 
Who were these exponents of scientific naturalism? The main figures are 
described by Turner: 
The leadership of this effort to educate and to persuade the public 
consisted of [Thomas Henry] Huxley himself, professor of biology 
at the Royal School of Mines and chief apologist for Charles 
Darwin; John Tyndall, a physicist and successor to Faraday as 
superintendent of the Royal Institution; Herbert Spencer, the 
philosopher par excellence of evolution; W.K. Clifford, an 
outspoken mathematician at University College, London; and Sir 
Francis Galton, cousin of Charles Darwin, a eugenicist, a 
statistician, and an advocate of professionalism in science. 
Another coterie related to this core but more closely related with 
English Positivism included Frederic Harrison, a lawyer and 
leading English Positivist; John Morley, a freethinker and the 
editor of Fortnightly Review, in which most of these men 
published; and G.H. Lewes, Positivist, historian, and psychologist. 
Anthropologists, such as Edward Tylor and John Lubbock, 
extended the theories of science into the study of society. Biologist 
E. Ray Lankester and physician Henry Maudsley wrote and spoke 
on behalf of naturalistic ideas. Among essayists and men of letters 
who advocated the cause of science, Leslie Stephen was the 
24
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outstanding author. He was joined by lesser literary figures such as 
Grant Allen and Edward Clodd.25 
Ibis list, as Turner rightly adds, is far from exhaustive, and, among other 
names, that of J.M. Robertson would certainly merit inclusion. These men were 
instrumental in establishing science as the only possible way to truth. 
Extremely powerful and versatile as propagandists of the cult of science, they 
represented a very real and serious threat to established religion. It was in the 
years when the enthusiasm for science was at its peak, the 1870s and 1880s, 
that books such as John Draper's History of the Conflict between Religion and 
Science (1874) and Andrew White's The Warfare of Science (1876) were 
written, the titles suggestive of the militancy of the scientific naturalists and 
their opposition to metaphysics and theology.26 
More recent research, however, has shown that this black-and-white 
opposition between science and religion is in need of considerable 
qualification. Robert M. Young has stated his belief 'that there is little evidence 
to show that any of the principal figures in the debate were antitheistic, much 
less atheistic.'27 In fact, no one is more eager to point this out than J.M. 
Robertson himself, who is particularly adept at detecting lingering traces of 
theist sympathy in the works of the champions of rationalism. He deeply 
deplored such a conciliatory statement as made by Mill in his posthumously 
published essay on 'Theism' to the effect that 
we may well conclude that the influences of religion on the 
character which will remain after rational criticism has done its 
utmost against the evidences of religion, are well worth preserving, 
and that what they lack in direct strength as compared with those 
of a firmer belief, is more than compensated by the greater 
strength of the morality they sanction.28 
Nor could Robertson condone Herbert Spencer's view, expressed in his First 
Principles, that religion was altogether outside the realm of science, since for 
25
 Ibid, pp. 9-10. 
26
 The Victorian conflict between science and religion has been the subject of 
innumerable studies. See Victorian Science and Religion: a bibliography with emphasis on 
evolution, belief, unbelief, comprised ofwork published from с 1900-1975, eds Sidney Eisen 
and Bernard V. Lightman (Hamden, 1984). 
27
 Robert M. Young, 'The Impact of Darwin on Conventional Thought', in The 
Victorian Crisis of Faith, ed. Anthony Symondson (London, 1970), pp. 13-37. 
и
 J.S. Mill, 'Theism', in Collected Works of John Stuart Mill. Volume X: Essays on 
Ethics, Religion and Society, ed. F.E.L. Priestley (London, 1981-6), p. 488. For Robertson's 
reaction, see for instance his Modern Humanists (London, 1891), pp. 80-5. 
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Spderetattdkigivdi&edhfee iappoeiTstetìbJat 'ReHgidBieevœ^whwetpiyseilflasiia-' 
\lífflfjseapíing through the weft of human history, expresses some eternal fact.'29 
It isKrtmr^rifeMe0i#ti#fe9érr^ffgn^ 
seretolddaeiclisciiaaHig áhadopsiif ojreyi «etteaí ttòtasebrae tób»di\ttòirbjadteff<tì£ 
(^odexi&eäo^aindithufai^äe'uE^äcallathqiECiaents a first step towards 
геіРмі^г^^^$^іЙете ірегерівЕ\ш} FitttóeMITelraetsiMiosliifeiipgcièdgttiHfe 
іЛйедІнШС) ahoüitfctaDtcbè roptetóritea'tefo^tertemïtaaètbe fytoriapc&iramnfl 
gttödriqSycip-«BSfv«f thcienast cagdm^eOTtlortíietcodsáieeagroó^ptthácaie arak 
tAfâ$ i^^ 0 f i ^ sT# toe rT l sd i î9^4a^^^ 
Akd^e^t^e'aai^eaRlièiedscaDVvMwbrnaeVetrlebh/^ iefldeœfl»gketfiaitalipc*amti 
iretiteMtó^tafitfcttlmlr&stqp^téwla^ sqnthflídcletwáaflüeasre «Jknláfty. 
^wfctíptWhbtajíss aqKitìfytfai^tpì^eheBtearB^iAlrcTOmìiiirjaaddpitìtóéedftt^ 
ttoéo priöst Pert Ih^rnsctenttóRbli^ la tlscappropwate htntliirgolri^chgrptooès^ Ы 
$ётЩп]к ectóur^cftorriÌTÈlKttyais^roviiling еййияиефкаійаІшрШЬапрІгёиІ 
tfrquégttóns ttílIШ^шüfetóïφabfe<шiswferшlcbyiÜlйj5ШátìsîІDnal scientist. 
In Chapter 3, which is again divided into two sections, we will see how 
BtäitättuadlÜhlapttasfiDlaivinimto the conviction that literary criticism 
could and should be based on a scientific footing. Part 1 will show that 
ïtefaiytsjdh й\<доЬ^го£шаздЫа1воі£іШШіія*тх^^ 
fc^areoiifeítifaf tfibftcyiarf orttitçrdmieH Ь^еімф](Миіц^іпШ&гвгй Щщац/іШ. 
і^и№тЬ(^&ЩХШ\аейіШ>Ы5№г^Ыіі^;фШбМУІ8а.8. йіІйвЩ thuaèdogaOÊ 
^adasbamasfwiaitilowglTâfidndelhdopBSeûri теяайдо1.сДО(яйі>фйіптігигаіуЛо> 
i(wr-*^ tisfc,pÉjh^ fltad %lfeadyy dbiteses lengfi^ irisCOTys^ofihiirlesap^Hnainfas dom 
'т&ф<Шк}Н&Ші^ wspkctnv^rsAsÜntHis рлюгргЗетантаЬфШладі wigealicaiifet 
Síop^tRíhlaeeaQnieipateiligeiUEtbí ihfflçîpiiiaiefefflrôwddni l ^ ^ ^ 
ghffld^flc$ney<n^oi¿ry theorbo tfe^i^ptiW^rbamiicktopiï44ilàS3i^jiaiirf 
FberB^aictettewKthethDTOdtaeraeiilabn^^ mbetoer 
(Spsbäesiipdt^iaifidtorJHflls^ IaftèH 
DiakeirfVsqowt tlheofly" chadateken ftòm iriientifik, wdribh b^oHtdnat lèœhgiote 
ï^k^aaftïSte'r^I^tó3CMlifö\d^m5utoarhfe áhflageneemEtH^rerirartiienítpte 
(He \WOhgi<aralyrrpcoqaeáiapK;cinBÍíiig tfeerLatnatohJc tbp ämraslgHiMphDdtseif 
article.2 
29
 Herbert Spencer, First Principles, 6th ed. (London, 1937), p. 16. For Robertson's 
reaction, see, for instance, the essay on Herbert Spencer in Modern Humanists, pp. 212-60. 
30
 Frank M. Turner. 'The Victorian Conflict between Science and Religion: A 
Professional Dimension', in Religion in Victorian England. Vol. IV: Interpretations, ed. 
Gerald ParA>№(íll4lif«*eetei]M!tte)jtfesl9f Robertson's books and articles are given in full, for 
convert^n^esd^dilMWidí^ttfantioíuibtirftl&tiáá^^ 
t&W}?'t<fa<eéfí№áerHi^Wiiib&a£)£fflAlamUt}&T^ 
ppdluWthecCootnotes. 
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physically to its environment, aiQhàptendbptations are preserved in future 
generations. The famous example is that of the giraffe, which was supposed to 
have obtained its long neck through having to find its food in the tall branches 
of trees. LamMçk's theory.of evoiutioa through adaptation has been his chief 
claim to fameThe life o i J M . Kob e n s on 
In 1844 a book appeared which played an important role in the 
popularization of the evolutionary idea. This book was the Vestiges of 
(SflWrtSftlW/BHblished anonymously, but written by Robert Chambers, journalist 
and popular educator, editor of Chambers's Journal, and author of some thirty 
b ^ s R H b è w ^ h à ^ è l ™ ^ ll«Pg^hy0IItaW^rigrwbò töJtëoSesths h ^ f Hft 
ФШрЙрйуУ BPÍá&e ffl^iwimtt^PTSitìÌteWhifetb^^ftVAiifecSfiyiaf (^remarkable 
for a man who led so public a life. No full-length biography was ever written, 
nor did íícrtígrfs^R^^fm^itle^Ar^hgf rTOPffîë1$#%fMra^Wfertoinces, put 
his r e m i f t e « ^ ftf fe^jffih^g^ríe^fe'&s^bn^^íffni^árfg^ondence 
as he w r t S f c t ë « W f f f M V ^ n A ^ t e r t í t several 
ι 3 jtne.-wnole time, .though the oneration of some of these.laws may ,-, . hundreds or his .letters have^uryjveu (stiTI a relatively small percentage of his 
„ now be Jess conspicuous,tnan irtthe early ages, from some oTfheD 
overall o & t D ^ e t f e y ^ ^ ^ ^ ofh.s personal 
life, let alone of his emotions. As a result, the biography of this man who 
w^filtüW^rf Ш!гЖ 
Aeathought periodicals. In spite of the difficulties Robertson himself may have 
P u KTmriug^^äf ib^^mk c toSver i ШР|гДО fàriîflaffiy' ШМяШ% 
М й Ш т п Ш а .
п
А ^ the work of 
Herbert Spencer, self-taught scientific philosopher, who spent a lifetime con-
Шс&^'£!$Ш?о1Щ[оЩІу in which the whole of human knowledge and 
experience could find its proper place. The details of Spencer's .evolutionary 
Jfl1öaM^ëv8hflfoi^^ 
'survival of the fittest', often ascribed to Darwin himself. 
In fact, it was not primarily Darwin's evolutionism which shocked the 
Victorian intellectual world. As we have seen, when Darwin published his 
Origin, oL Species, the „idea of .evolution., of .development, as .ooposed tor ö
 .-ТпеЛпат source for fhjs sectiorj oFRobêrtson s biography is the shorvaccQunt of 
«вв&еидаій^ У¥УСШЙЙГЧ»ЙЙВ &гргШхадщшАг? дас^м*1^ щ$& 
^MafiJ^ÍB^^B»ltóíBb^*«^s^dcj^/noíJ№hA,hutti^p^ ttìiflflhitgepMbMèéfthi 
History ofFreethought. . . to the Period of the French Revolution. Notes are only given here 
When infoi Illation from ölfier Sources than Gilmour is used. 
Ä
 I ^ e r № f iÄÄ:f f i f a^ Щ>· 
[Р.' 143. Quoted from Himmelfarb. Darwin and the Darwinian Revolution, p. 179. 
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the belief in progress was so deeply rooted. What made Darwin's work scien-
tifically innovative and at the same time deeply disturbing was the principle of 
natural selection, and its application to man. Natural selection, briefly put, 
builds on a number of basic propositions.33 The first is that organisms vary 
randomly, that 'under changing conditions of life organisms present individual 
differences in almost every part of their structure'. Then, in order for these 
variations to be preserved in the struggle for life, they must be hereditary: 
But if variations useful to any organic being ever do occur, 
assuredly individuals thus characterised will have the best chance 
of being preserved in the struggle for life; and from the strong 
principle of inheritance, these will tend to produce offspring 
similarly characterised. 
The final proposition is that this principle of preservation ultimately works to 
the benefit of each individual organism, that it 'leads to the improvement of 
each creature in relation to its organic and inorganic conditions of life; and 
consequently, in most cases, to what must be regarded as an advance in 
organisation.' Herbert Spencer may have coined the term 'survival of the 
fittest', but h is in Darwin's theory that it thus gained its full significance. 
Here is how the rationalist historian of ideas A.W. Benn saw the impact of 
this principle of natural selection in 1906: 
Moreover, the theory of natural selection, among other incidental 
consequences, has had the effect of greatly extending our hopes of 
what may be done in the way of scientific explanation. For here 
was a method of hitherto unsuspected power, which, when once 
brought to bear on the problems of biology, exhibited them in an 
entirely new light, suggesting an alternative explanation of what 
had hitherto been attributed to design, utterly fatal to the confident 
mferences of Paley and his school. Darwin might be right or 
wrong; but all felt that he was working on truly scientific lines, 
while the method of his theological opponents appeared by 
comparison utterly obsolete and illusory.34 
Darwin's principle of natural selection was considered scientific proof for the 
deeply felt conviction, so prevalent among the Victorian intellectuals since 
Comte and Mill, that nature was one and indivisible, that man was as much part 
of nature as any animal. For the scientific naturalists, this did not so much 
" Charles Darwin, The Origin of Species, Everyman ed. (London, 1928), pp. 124-5. 
M
 A.W. Benn, The History of English Rationalism in the Nineteenth Century, 2 vols 
(London, 1906), II, p. 165. 
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suggest a picture of 'nature red in tooth and claw' - which the discoveries in 
geology had evoked for Tennyson's generation - as it opened' up a vista of 
endless promise. As William Irvine said of Huxley: 
He defended Darwinian evolution because it seemed to constitute, 
for terrestrial life, a scientific truth as significant and far-reaching 
as Newton's for the stellar universe - more particularly, because it 
seemed to promise that human life itself, by learning the laws of its 
being, might one day become scientifically rational and 
controlled.35 
That this constituted a powerful repudiation of any supematuralist claims to 
truth is beyond doubt. At the same time, as Benn asserts in the above quote, the 
principle of natural selection was itself considered the epitome of science, a 
beautiful example of what could be achieved by means of the most advanced 
scientific method and the highest attainment of scientific naturalism so far. 
Darwin became the saint of the myth of science, and when that myth reached 
its peak in the 1870s, Darwin's work became generalized into a theory which 
was used not only to explain all processes of change but also to justify them. 
Susan Budd describes how 
Around his ideas grew ever-thicker layers of interpretation, theory 
and generalization, as they were extended to aesthetic, political 
and metaphysical doctrines. The original statement became ever 
more general and moralized, and less clearly related to each other 
and the evidence.36 
The cult of Darwin and the cult of science ended up inextricably mixed, and the 
mixture was used as a potent weapon against theology. 
Rationalism and Biblical Criticism: Essays and Reviews 
In the mean time, biblical criticism was making its own contribution to the rise 
of rationalism. March 1860 saw the publication of Essays and Reviews, a 
collection of critical treatises which created an immense furore.37 For its 
35
 William Irvine, Apes, Angels, and Victorians. The Story of Darwin, Huxley and 
Evolution (New York, 1955), p. 7. 
36
 Budd, Varieties of Unbelief,?. 137. 
37
 For a comprehensive history of the Essays and Reviews controversy, see Ieuan 
Ellis's Seven Against Christ. A Study of 'Essays and Reviews ' (Leiden, 1980). See also Basil 
Willey, 'Septem Contra Christum', in More Nineteenth Century Studies (London, 1956), 
pp. 137-85. 
<68 ЛМ.МШЙ^ЕПЖШіШШШШЫКГіШЛЙШПІІШ.ШЖОаШІЕ: 
'pieeejül-dtc'liBJKief гЫйпз-зввкнкф'э^ жнш^ to majpoweTtâbtfr&talaav&œs^bY 
and ^eeMRobetiHKtetbf ^hnirtrbtbHsaèkscfeadaiisffipDiagli jilBröïbarji,ÖhuMai 
tappeáhábhia HtìBBKdiataiftitùiicabjtheology do not strike us now as particularly 
гелІоІіИШакгу. ii^\WiJfentlièr(^ErNvocmtrasutbf ssaoieth^ev^iftti>evIecei, snidi 
^bttWH6^iraad€fptranÍBgiaraiEhrÍ8Sumlramdtrc)uralithanBidvk&7át, Üffiliaebeonf 
юШіаёіітфтіе&йіссЕаЫшк^Екшъа^ ífeaBiogíualtsoíltrowHgicsai struck up 
a lifòihHgiftàdadtìiBpvvarid ар^оагАгскфакшиЫІ^аіншеаІоіЬсАіфгідігаі Slíájliet 
іЙга1гагнеоАа11еКа±ейЕва\ж^еіізгаао(ісё5атІе1і^ шіігіаі§агЬево grealèyiœfci|3rrasplfe 
ty^adnrasténeí<RHg!b$eRofrilamii,>^J^^ 
iBatenciPiimsclbf(ftrad§rsajüníf>' öedtelrpdaE\'€hi%d^№dinyi.ißhist'(5v^äiä¥on 
?¥èeirl#oïèatISJbaght№>MaiktBaàJseii (RedfBtrofdlmcolhCeüäge, нарг^. 
АясЬВефйвпгЛа««« ^ogioErËigË^wittofuSlèdclaasOdffîid^^ti'é Snljheissbm 
^ ка^.
[
^ШііШфпШіфШпвпі^Мті ^ulrarfengmtofìadiamiCdaRdièraliiaina 
tiwiedrtoriibdhwiiadd, ifcöra ШІЫщізмаяіяп^зофів^ Herbert Spencer. Once, 
when asked by a concerned northern clergyman to which denomination his 
young men invgéraMaMtbmgeafchexjiBiisatetieftìtì tMra№wffèthand!hifcne: 'Ou, 
maistly ^SMsfetWei1" views they cannot, consistently with moral honesty, 
There Н Ч П Ш ^ ^ І п К п ^ й о К ^ І Й Щ е а з ^ п ^ ^ Р ^ ^ ^ п ^ І І ^ Д й indeed 
become ar f І і№. а гАтоЧе% Й З В Д о ^ Ш п ^ г Ж Ш rn^ *fev"H?e" notion 
gradually oecoming more and more involved in the secularist movement, which 
¡Tax when, m löoz, ^wuson anaι ~wimams were rriea in me 
ïâiouna guilty ór Keresy. if wL· nor until two years later that 
they were acquitted on appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. 
—The Essays mid Reviews may show us how beside the point it would be to 
equate т^^^^^0^ткі^к^Шт^9РШіІ^Ш^^^^ H e r e t h e 
ггліогі&\і№8ртіАвсШгъісііврв*аШ іпоттііщйі^оі^іша^щі therms мвпШаек 
/ГроетМФге «diside. S<siMtjem]Œolhfeia\l^f,divieïepïiber$^ 
¥a r?e1ifefô!fTamh¥Œ^%%}e&^ öfihcfêiWrtëSs*. 
Tâ^ë^^îTrtstance^.Mark Pattisqn-in.his 'Tendenciesnf Religious Thought in 
τ: AÌ РіФ&\ч^Шат лгспег. Ч/е' Work, Friendships,(London, T931J, p. 74. m this 
Uioffiajffîy,' Спит íes Атспег also provides transcripts of the following letters between the two 
friends: WA to JMR, 21 October 1881; JMR to WA, 23 October 1881; WA to JMR, 26 
October 18BfttNVtha(OMRji8ahriilii(V*8ffîd\ JMR, 6 
July 1923. réHjtttfrfhtìicipttiedetjif iWkawtéemfenteDrThefltírteityrefpjpártipmay 
" %^^j^nSB«eqfe@nt{hA^c^cp^p^fc&fv^tJaÌ^«tì^iHÌtFha3who 
%téhes to trace the descent of religious thought, and the practical 
" Robertson to Dobell, 3 February 1906; Robertson^ correspondence with his friend 
and bookseller Bertram Dobell is in the Bodleian Library, MS Dobell С 43, ff. 12-83. 
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Ww№ng)bf tte reltgteuáeidtas, trmaSi&itìaaotltotnthrtHjghtólItlie 
plüebiKèbyiiri'e^ïJtüdöyt^ïiiteïd. Wtìhatiettitec^eteiearhtcbiftiit 
bowgty,noe wrtfântHrt iwtletfasficatthistgfy ro»\imçrebfetfeBs§ooialg 
thanotHyt »Eipitiisingifiipidne parfythát atol outsiofetheoBhurelhiab 
sihmtìewe ib^pp^KitEaieteit^. Siili Ärtfrefcafefoe ffomtóng attempt 
$oc^pl^Jhfctaiw?so^lwil^i^oaiîdeefiTlJi£gkicfeÉfflatOT®fœgiriiimrite 
$bee:oaíses<)f BBgllïh(j6eiflo^39as was contained in Watson's 
'Apology'21 - a work which has led probably more men to 
Such a sl&terlterttgHfttftiffia ^ ^ ^ о й б Ы г ^ а # 0 ^ а Й § а У р т о а е ^ О Д У ' Ь е studied 
with s c i ¿ ¡ f f l f f i U f f l f ^ ^ & f t № 9 t o domain 
of theoldly? ШТШ 'ШебЩрІ& ¡іШН#ШШ í l í i 'p f^cat ion of 
~ notion of immortality." 
Essays ana Reviews. J 
September 1915), p. 570. 
24
 Robertson to Edward Henry, 16 June 1931. This letter is a reply to a young man 
who was ftfagglRgtiwth fffltgüwsciteubfe AitfgMrasteTtou^ehbofin^ddvi6&8Sb7ittWdiáli 
sSri^0^^i^idJçdt)iredhtfc«nirin34e6t^i4i|i>'2fâf6d rationalist counselled him 'not be 
aggressive Ribotte pciginspjfittesteimrfogrtb^cjsiaistriftheitbnllBifeiitfitig WetopUjhBoaltl&jciare, 
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3θ«»«φί^ (BaWnltìrBaadlJerntoHJè'lBS I^p .^SlftfitBive at the Bishopsgate Library, London. 
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The definition of agnosticism provided by Bernard Lightman places the 
agnostic squarely in the anti-metaphysical Victorian system of thought: 
The essence of agnosticism was epistemological. Although often 
directed at claims to certain knowledge of God, agnosticism could 
as easily say that claims to knowledge of self or an external world 
composed of matter are baseless. Any object that could be termed 
part of the transcendental or noumenal world was considered to be 
beyond the limits of human knowledge.42 
In this way, Lightman refutes the claims that agnosticism was in essence hostile 
towards Christianity, atheistical, and certainly irreligious. Agnosticism was 
primarily a profession of ignorance, and agnostics like Huxley and Stephen 
agreed that the human mind was incapable of gaining absolute knowledge 
about God, but that the existence of such a God was therefore not necessarily 
ruled out. 
In fact, many of the agnostics, who ranged in their rejection of Christianity 
from vehemence to sorrow, possessed deeply religious sensibilities. If they did 
not believe in the doctrines of Christianity, they did believe religiously in the 
new creed of science and nature. In an age of material and scientific progress, 
the agnostics found in Darwin's evolutionism the scientific justification for 
their belief that they were building a new world in which the moral restraints 
imposed by Christianity would be supplanted by a moral science founded on 
the laws of nature. Moved by a profound moral fervour, they turned the tables 
on religion and accused orthodox Christianity of deeply ingrained immorality. 
To give up organized religion was not to give up morality; in fact, it was the 
abandonment of Christianity which was the first step to attaining truth, which 
was every man's moral duty. Ultimately, the agnostics were as much concerned 
with the foundation of a new faith as with the destruction of the traditional faith 
which they saw as obstructing the path to truth. 
Varieties of Unbelief: Secularism and Materialism 
Agnosticism is perhaps the best known variety of Victorian unbelief which may 
broadly be ranged under the ideology of scientific naturalism. However, 
agnosticism was both in competition and entangled with a multitude of other 
'strands of unbelief. One of those strands we have already come across in the 
first chapter: Bradlaugh's working-class secularism, 'made out of scraps of 
41
 Lightman, The Origins of Agnosticism, p. 40. 
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science and positivism',43 with its strong politically radical orientation. The 
high-minded middle-class agnostics were far removed from what they 
perceived as the smoky, somewhat rowdy atmosphere of the 'Halls of Science', 
nor were they happy to be ranked among the followers of Comte. Although 
they shared with Positivists such as Richard Congreve, Edward Beesley and 
Frederic Harrison the scientific world-view, they were repelled by the ritualism 
founded on Comte's later works. In Huxley's well-known words: 'Comte's 
philosophy, in practice might be compendiously described as Catholicism 
minus Christianity.'44 How could the foundation of a pseudo-religion lead to 
anything other than pseudo-science? 
One charge frequently levelled at the agnostics was that of being 
materialists. This referred in particular to the doctrine of scientific materialism 
which is associated with the names of the German scientists Karl Vogt 
(1817-1894), Jakob Moleschott (1822-1893) and Ludwig Büchner 
(1824-1899). This type of materialism was an almost exclusively German 
phenomenon which was developed during the 1840s. Its most famous 
exposition was Biichner's Kraft und Stoff oí 1854 (English translation 1870), 
the title indicating the materialist's belief that the universe consisted of force 
and matter only. The doctrine is explained by Owen Chadwick: 
The axiom was physical. Force means matter and matter force. 
Therefore 'spiritual' force is nonsense. Creation is impossible 
because matter must be eternal and can only change, cannot be 
added to. Creation equals force and therefore cannot have existed 
before matter.45 
In such a system, religion naturally has no place. If the mind and the spirit are 
matter, what is the point of discussing something like an eternal soul? The 
materialists' rejection of religion is of the most strenuous kind, although 
materialism itself, as Mandelbaum points out, is fundamentally a metaphysical 
position.46 It was because of this, the fact that materialism replaced one 
metaphysical hypothesis with another, however 'scientific', that most agnostics 
were eager to dissociate themselves from Büchner and his followers. It should 
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be noted that there was a strong connection between secularism and materi-
alism in Bradlaugh's friendship with Büchner.47 
Conclusion 
This last statement brings us back to Charles Bradlaugh, the man to whom 
Robertson owed such a great intellectual debt. The past pages have been an 
attempt not so much to give a precise characterization of nineteenth century 
rationalism, as to provide an overview of some of the most important rationalist 
impulses. For one thing, such an attempt shows the difficulty of artificially 
disentangling currents and movements which, in actual reality, were never 
perceived as separate. However, the above overview may help to elucidate 
some of Robertson's more theoretical viewpoints, and to give him his proper 
place in a long line of rationalist thinkers. 
Part 2: Robertson as a Rationalist Thinker 
Introduction 
Of the many terms which may be used to label J.M. Robertson as a writer and 
thinker, rationalist is the one I have chosen for here. In a sense, secularist, 
Liberal or freethinker are equally plausible designations, but rationalist seems 
to me to be most broadly and generally descriptive of Robertson's theoretical 
and philosophical position. Also, it immediately places him in the complex 
movement of thought outlined in the previous section. 
As I have attempted to demonstrate, there are many sides to 
nineteenth-century British rationalist thought, and the suggestion that we are 
dealing with a coherent world view is dubious at best. Robertson, however, had 
few doubts about what constituted the actual core of rationalist thought and lent 
the whole movement cohesion as well as direction. His characterization of the 
true rationalist is unambiguously anti-religionist as 'one who rejects the claims 
of 'revelation,' the idea of a personal God, the belief in personal immortality, 
and in general the conceptions logically accruing to the practices of prayer and 
worship.'48 The same applies to his definition of freethought, the term he 
himself finally seems to have preferred to rationalism as more suggestive of the 
throwing off of religious shackles: 
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Freethought may be defined as a conscious reaction against some 
phase or phases of conventional or traditional doctrine in religion 
- on the one hand, a claim to think freely, in the sense not of 
disregard for logic, but of special loyalty to it, on problems to 
which the past course of things has given a great intellectual and 
practical importance; on the other, the actual practice of such 
thinking.49 
Although the latter definition is somewhat wider, both definitions boil down 
to the same radically anti-religious stance. The basic opposition between 
rationalism and naturalism on the one hand, and religion and supematuralism 
on the other hand is the driving-force behind the bulk of his work. Robertson 
left no room for subtle gradations. For him, the warfare between rationalism 
(with science as its natural ally) and religion was a living reality, and there was 
no other choice than between these two camps. At present, rationalism was still 
at a disadvantage, locked in combat with a formidable opponent, since the 
battle was 'broadly one between unpaid freelances and an army of professional 
defenders'.50 However, the rationalist spirit was gradually gaining ground, and 
it was the rationalist's task to look both forward and backward: backward, to 
find evidence for the eventual victory of rationalism in the progress of unbelief 
through the ages, and forward, to enlist as many new campaigners in the 
rationalist army as possible, so as to speed up the gradual progress towards a 
world ruled by reason. 
Of this dual task, Robertson's histories of freethought represent perhaps the 
most telling examples. A Short History of Freethought, Ancient and Modern 
was first published in 1899, and, over the years, became one of Robertson's 
best-known and best-selling works. For over three decades, he continued to 
revise and add to it, so that it finally came to comprise four volumes. The first 
two volumes, entitled A History of Freethought, Ancient and Modern, to the 
Period of the French Revolution, reached their definitive form in the fourth 
edition of 1936, while the two subsequent volumes, A History of Freethought 
in the Nineteenth Century (an expansion of the brief account which appeared in 
the first Short History), saw the light in 1930. Together they represent a 
remarkable achievement in terms of scholarship and grasp of historical data, 
and may well constitute Robertson's greatest claim to fame as a rationalist 
writer outside the field of literature. The contributions to rationalist progress 
through the centuries by hundreds of 'humanists', ranging from the generally 
famous to the particularly obscure, are carefully charted, and add up to a vast 
panorama of which the unmistakable message (unmistakable, that is, to the 
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convinced rationalist) can only be that religion is gradually but inevitably 
giving way to the rise of unbelief. How can a philosophy which appears to be 
backed up by the entire course of western intellectual history not be infinitely 
superior to a religion founded merely on unproven hypotheses and dubious 
authority? This is the question that may be read between the lines of every page 
of Robertson's historical accounts of freethought, and the answer to which is 
never obscured by the obstacles - sometimes formidable enough - religion 
continues to throw in the way of the rationalists' advance. 
What should be made clear at this point is that Robertson's uncompromising 
opposition to religion is much more the basis for his development as a thinker 
than its outcome. Once Robertson had established for himself in his youth that 
he was an unbeliever, it was his unquestioned, dogmatic unbelief which 
became the starting-point for most of his non-literary work. Robertson's 
rationalism is therefore a bold statement of unbelief first and foremost. The 
theoretical, philosophical and scholarly details were sketched in later in the 
many volumes in which he attempted to discredit the religion of Christianity. 
In general terms these attempts were founded on the view proposed in the 
eighteenth century in David Hume's Natural History of Religion that the 
springs of religious feeling were not vaguely divine but belonged to the very 
definite reality revealed to us by our senses; that religion, like any other natural 
phenomenon, was subject to the principle of causality. In his books on religion 
and Christianity, of which Pagan Christs and Christianity and Mythology are 
arguably the most important,51 Robertson examines the origins of religion, 
reaching the conclusion (although one might argue that it is really the premise 
underlying his whole line of reasoning) that religion is essentially the result of 
man's failure to come to terms with the natural circumstances of his existence, 
a leap in the dark when sufficient rational light is as yet unavailable. Religion, 
to Robertson, 'consists primarily in a surmise or conception, reached by way of 
simple animism, of the causation and control of Nature (including human life) 
in terms of quasi-human personalities, whether or not defined as 
extra-Natural.'52 In order to retain a measure of control over his natural 
surroundings, primitive man framed explanatory myths for himself which, 
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however, proved remarkably persistent in the course of history. Not 
surprisingly, Robertson particularly regretted the survival of the Christian myth, 
which he saw as one among many mythical fabrications rendered obsolete by 
the advent of new and rational knowledge. The science of mythology was to 
ensure that Christianity would be divested of its claims to special authority, and 
that Jesus would be viewed as a historically non-exceptional figure who 
represented a particular mythical context, not a historical reality. The 
foundation of Robertson's theory of the non-historicity of Jesus is to be found 
in his Pagan Christs and Christianity and Mythology; later he devoted three 
smaller volumes to this question: The Historical Jesus. A Survey of Positions 
(1916), The Jesus Problem. A Restatement of the Myth Theory (1917), and 
Jesus and Judas. A Textual and Historical Investigation (1927).53 In all these 
books, as well as in the literally hundreds of articles he wrote on the subject, 
Robertson presents himself as an aggressive polemicist who is armed to the 
teeth with the widest possible knowledge of old and new literature alike, and 
will not budge an inch to allow his opponents some leeway. The rationalist 
cause was after all not served by displays of religious tolerance. 
In the present discussion, we are not so much concerned with the details of 
Robertson's particular religious theories, as with his overall rationalist 
philosophy of life. Two books stand out among his works as attempts to 
provide a general account of his more general theoretical viewpoints. In 1902 
Robertson published the first edition of his Letters on Reasoning, which he had 
'planned to be read by my children when they are grown up'.54 Not that 
Robertson toned down its strident rhetoric for the occasion: it is as fearless a 
piece of anti-religious polemics as any of his more openly controversial 
writings. In 1912 this book was followed by an 82-page pamphlet on Rational-
ism, which summarizes the rationalist doctrines already presented in Letters on 
Reasoning. As far as their philosophical ideas are concerned, neither book can 
make much of a claim to originality, but they provide instructive introductions 
to Robertson's system of values. I shall loosely follow the outline of 
Rationalism to provide a basic overview of some of Robertson's main ideas, 
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referring to Letters on Reasoning and various of his other books when 
necessary. 
Terms and Definitions 
In the first chapter of Rationalism,55 Robertson is concerned with the choice of 
a proper term to cover his intellectual position. His decision in favour of 
'rationalism' is grounded in the conviction that in the course of history, the 
term has always been applied to systems of thought tending to be inimical to 
religion. However, perhaps more interesting than this positive choice for 
'rationalism' are his reasons for rejecting several other terms. 
'Naturalism' is dismissed with some regrets. Although he does regard it as 
'a highly convenient term for the view of things which rejects 
'supernaturalism" [4], he is mainly anxious to avoid any connection with 
thinkers who 'appear to formulate as a philosophic principle the doctrine that 
the best way to regulate our lives is to find out how the broad processus of 
'Nature' is tending, and to conform to it alike our ideals and our practice.' [5] 
As we will see later, such a conception of naturalism was entirely alien to 
Robertson's interpretation of the law of evolution. That he certainly was a 
naturalist in philosophical terms will become clear as we follow the line of 
reasoning in Rationalism. 
'Positivism' too is rejected, though more reluctantly, on the grounds of 
avoiding confusion with a group of differently-minded thinkers. The set of 
terms 'positive', 'positivist' and 'positivism' is characterized by Robertson as 
standing for '(1) the provable, (2) the attitude of the seeker for intelligible proof 
in all things, (3) the conviction that the rights of reason are ultimate and 
indefeasible.' [6] These empiricist tenets of testable truth, so typical of 
Victorian positivism, Robertson can wholeheartedly endorse. However, he is 
particularly concerned to avoid any confusion with Comtean Positivism, which, 
as a system, he considered 'incompatible with the positive spirit.' [6] Comte's 
Religion of Humanity, 'with Ideal Humanity in place of Deity, and his deceased 
friend Clotilde de Vaux as impersonating the Virgin Mother or Female Ideal'56 
smacked too much of Catholicism in disguise to be palatable to Robertson. In 
spite of Comte's ardent advocacy of the application of the methods of the 
natural sciences to the study of human life, Robertson regarded Comte's work 
as 'seriously anti-scientific, forbidding as it did the very lines of inquiry which 
were soon to build up a new evolutionary science'.57 For Robertson, to whom 
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the discovery of evolutionary law was a pivotal moment in human history, this 
was damning criticism indeed. Although he had some praise for Comte's Law 
of the Three Stages, Robertson seems to have been unaware of the considerable 
ideological debt he and other rationalists owed Comte. 
Rationalism and Progress: Buckle and Darwin 
Having thus settled on 'rationalism' as a suitable compromise, in the second 
chapter Robertson then turns to the 'practical position' of the rationalist. 
Rationalism, he asserts, ultimately involves the substitution of private judgment 
for the reliance on authority, and it should be the rationalist's aim 'to seek by 
reflection a defensible theory of things rather than accept enrolment under 
traditional creeds which demand allegiance on supernaturalist grounds.' [8] 
One of the Letters on Reasoning is devoted to philosophical doubt as the 
beginning of wisdom (and, by implication, the end of religion). To Robertson, 
there is nothing cold or dark about doubt or rationalism in general. It is doubt 
which has enabled man to continue his progress towards civilization 
throughout the ages: 
As for man, every step he has made in civilisation has been taken 
in virtue of either doubt or the doubt-involving substitution of a 
new belief for an old; and every such step, depend on it, has been 
resisted by experienced people who denounced criticism as their 
type to-day denounces doubt and reason.58 
Robertson is, of course, referring to the religionist, the theologian, who 
constantly abuses his authority by throwing it in the way of progress. From 
every page of Rationalism, it is apparent that Robertson is an unqualified 
believer in the possibilities of progress, a faith for which he mainly found 
legitimization in the work of Buckle and Darwin. 
Critical to the core, Robertson was generally not given to displaying profuse 
signs of respect or admiration. However, there is one author of whom 
Robertson might almost be called a disciple: Henry Thomas Buckle. The debt 
owed to Buckle by Robertson is acknowledged by Kaczkowski, who even 
claims that many of Robertson's ideas are 'but extensions of theses expounded 
in the Introduction to the History of Civilization in England*,59 the work that 
made Buckle both famous and notorious. Its first volume was published in 
1857, the second followed in 1861. These two volumes were part of a massive 
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undertaking, a history of civilization in England on a scientific basis, which 
Buckle never even came close to completing. He died in Damascus in 1862, 
aged forty, having suffered from ill health throughout his life.60 Robertson had 
nothing but the highest praise for Buckle's personality and the depth of his 
learning, and he showed particular respect for the fact that, like himself, Buckle 
had never had any public school or university training. There is no doubt that 
Robertson felt great, and for him unusual, affinity towards Buckle, both on a 
personal and on an intellectual level. His Buckle and his Critics, though critical 
of Buckle in some points, is an acerbic vindication of Bucklean doctrine 
against charges from the side of critics such as Leslie Stephen and Theodore 
Parker.61 
The central question Buckle asked was this: 'Are the actions of men, and 
therefore of societies, governed by fixed laws, or are they the result either of 
chance or of supernatural interference?'62 His unhesitating choice for the first 
option shows him to be a believer in the law of universal causation, a follower 
of Comte and, in particular, Mill. His conception of the science of history is 
based on the determinist contention that it is possible to discover the fixed laws 
governing collective and individual human behaviour by applying the methods 
of the natural sciences to history. However, Buckle deviates from Mill by 
finding proof for this contention in statistics. He points to suicide, for instance, 
to show that although suicide seems entirely a matter of individual free will, the 
number of suicide cases remains remarkably constant from year to year. Free 
will, in other words, is a chimera; universal causation operates on man as on 
the rest of nature. 
The rise of civilization is therefore also a causal process. Buckle is perhaps 
best known for his theory of the influence of climate on the rise of civilization, 
which led him to the conclusion that Britain was geographically uniquely 
positioned to enjoy rapid progress.63 In Europe, but especially in Britain, the 
physical conditions of life had never stood in the way of progress, so that the 
real source of progress could do its work unimpeded. That source, the great 
uplifting factor in the course of history, Buckle held to be knowledge: 
60
 The standard Victorian biography of Buckle is A.H. Huth's The Life and Writings of 
Henry Thomas Buckie, 3rd ed., 4 vols (London, 1880). The most recent account of Buckle's 
life is Giles St Aubyn's A Victorian Eminence (London, 1958). 
61
 Buckle and his Critics. A Study in Sociology (London, 1895). Robertson published a 
revised and annotated edition of Buckle's work in 1904. 
62
 H.T. Buckle, History of Civilization, 2nd ed., 2 vols (London, 1871), I, p. 6. 
63
 Peter J. Bowler, The Invention of Progress. The Victorians and the Past (London, 
1989), p. 28. 
ROBERTSON AND NINETEENTH-CENTURY RATIONALISM 79 
So that, in a great and comprehensive view, the changes in every 
civilized people are, in their aggregate, dependent solely on three 
things: first, on the amount of knowledge possessed by their ablest 
men; secondly, on the direction which that knowledge takes, that is 
to say, the sort of subjects to which it refers; thirdly, and above all, 
on the extent to which the knowledge is diffused, and the freedom 
with which it pervades all classes of society.64 
This emphasis on intellectual activity as the basis of human progress, the 
belief that the steady diffusion of knowledge will eventually do away with 
social evil - which he believed in large measure to be upheld by the organized 
religions - , is essential to Robertson's conception of rationalism. It would not 
go too far to say that Robertson's entire oeuvre may be considered a monument 
to the view that the gradual extension of knowledge and reason will eventually 
lighten the burden of mankind. It seems fitting that the last book Robertson 
published in his lifetime was the revised and expanded edition of his Courses 
of Study, a huge bibliography intended to provide the novice student of 
rationalist thought with 'lines of guidance in a number of fields of 
non-professional study'.65 That Robertson considered such study, of which his 
own writings too were the product, an essential part of the process of social 
reconstruction, is evident throughout his work. 
The one addition to man's knowledge which Robertson considered the 
greatest turning-point in history was the discovery of the Law of Evolution by 
Darwin, 'of all the ideas which undid the hold of traditionary creed on the 
general intelligence of the modern world, the most widely potent'.66 
Robertson's acceptance of the theory of evolution was complete and, it should 
be added, remarkably uncritical. He was little concerned with the finer 
scientific points of Darwin's theory. Instead, he saw evolutionism as the final 
death-blow to the traditional religious creeds and as the all-encompassing 
scientific justification for the establishment of a naturalistic, progressionist 
'creed of science': 
The 'creed of science' is and remains the conviction of invariable 
sequence without 'supernatural' interludes. The knowledge of the 
process is a matter of perpetual patient reconsideration, in which 
myriads of men play their part, modestly or otherwise, as so many 
insects, building a coral reef. And the definite establishment of this 
creed for all thoughtful minds as against the older religious creed 
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of 'Providence' is the total achievement of Freethought in the 
nineteenth century.67 
So momentous was the discovery of evolution to Robertson that it led him to 
the conclusion that 'this changes everything.'68 All the 'human sciences' now 
had to be re-thought in the light of evolutionary doctrine. Sociology, 
ethnology, anthropology and hierology, psychology, ethics: all these fields were 
to be revalued from the evolutionary perspective of natural selection and causal 
sequence. As we will see in subsequent chapters, literature and literary 
criticism were to prove no exception. In the separate discussions of the human 
sciences in Robertson's History of Freethought in the Nineteenth Century,69 
Darwin himself is left mainly in the background. In fact, the influence of 
Buckle, who wrote before Darwin, is at all times very much in evidence, so that 
Darwin's main function seems often to consist in conferring scientific authority 
on theories already present in Buckle's work. Although Darwin's principle of 
natural selection stresses the randomness of variations occurring in nature, 
Robertson saw in Darwinian theory the justification of Buckle's theory of 
gradual progress through increased knowledge. 
Robertson emphasized the gradualness of progress: evolution, not 
revolution. In this evolutionary process, genius may have its place as 
pioneering new ideas, but Robertson does not adhere to the Carlylean 
viewpoint according to which the rise of a great genius may radically change 
the course of history: 'Genius is but the pioneer; sequent reasoning supple­
ments and corrects its error; and the 'general deed of man' slowly assimilates 
the truth.'70 Progress remains a slow and natural process that may and even 
must be stimulated, but can never be forced. Translated into political terms, we 
here have the source of Robertson's opposition as a liberal to the revolutionary 
ideologies of Socialism and Marxism. 
Rationalism Challenged: The Question of Morality 
What challenges, then, does a rationalist, steeped in evolution and natural law, 
have to meet from the side of religion? After the above excursion, we may now 
turn to the third chapter in Robertson's Rationalism, in which he addresses that 
particular question. The main challenge, and one that every nineteenth-century 
unbeliever was obliged to grapple with, was that a decline in religious belief 
would inevitably lead to a disastrous decline in moral standards. Would moral 
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perversity be let loose on the world if every man were to rely on his private 
judgment? Robertson is never more emphatic in his advocacy of reason than 
when he deals with this issue, a set piece for debates between theologians and 
rationalists. His initial answer is 
that undoubtedly the application of reason to moral issues incurs 
the risks of fallacy which beset all reasoning in science so-called; 
but that, on the other hand, every one of these risks attaches at 
least equally to all acceptance of 'authoritative' teaching. [14] 
Rationalists may not be able to attain to a perfect system of morals yet, but 
there is no more unanimity about what is morally right among religious 
believers. And if the religionist further challenges the rationalist by accusing 
him of relying on the Kantian 'categorical imperative', then Robertson is quick 
to declare that Kant's principle is nothing but 'a form of self-deception'. [16] 
Robertson does not believe in the voice of conscience, in an innate sense of 
'ought', so if the religionist charges him with, on the one hand, inducing 
immorality through advocating unbelief, or, on the other hand, simply doing as 
he likes by listening to some form of 'inner voice', Robertson can easily meet 
that charge: 
Religious morality, as finally ratified by the more thoughtful 
among religious men, is but the endorsement of 'natural morality'. 
There is not one social commandment, as distinguished from 
religious or ritualist dogma, that did not emerge as a prescription 
of the natural moral sense, primitive or otherwise - a 
supererogatory proof that the religious prescriptions are from the 
same source. [16] 
Since nature operates in accordance with uniform laws, and observable nature 
is all that man can presume to know, it follows logically that both morality and 
religion have their origins in nature, as only history can show us. Much of 
Robertson's scholarly work was concerned with tracing morality and religion to 
their roots in primitive society, as in his Short History of Morals and The 
Dynamics of Religion™ 
In ethics, Robertson was a strict utilitarian, who believed that morality had 
evolved as a result of the usefulness of 'right conduct' within primitive society. 
The ground rule of ethics, 'do as you would be done by' proved essential to the 
survival of primitive social life, inasmuch as 
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those groups in which a simple code of reciprocity, as distinct 
from mere self-defence against immediate aggression, was set up 
and inculcated by comparatively thoughtful individuals, would be 
so far more likely to leave progeny.72 
In this way, Robertson denied that man, throughout his history, had ever 
benefited from relying on a supposed innate sense of moral righteousness, a 
spontaneous capacity for telling right from wrong. The evolution of morality 
was, is, and will always be a natural function of man's adaptation to his social 
situation. True utilitarianism is therefore exempt from charges of Gradgrindian 
egotism: 
. . . the utilitarian who says of a given line of action for men in 
general that it will promote their happiness, and who condemns 
another line of action on the score that it will worsen life all round, 
is applying the one test by which sane moral life in the mass is 
controllable and improvable.73 
Naturally, such a view leaves no room for a conception of morality in which 
religion can play any possible role, religion being, in Robertsonian terms, 
finally no more than a mere irrational appeal to intuition. 
As the origins of morality were in Robertson's view traceable to natural law 
and social structure, so were those of religion. He saw the rise of religion as 
nothing more than an attempt on the part of primitive man to reduce a 
seemingly hostile universe to human proportions: 
The Gods and Goddesses, in fact, are made out of man's needs and 
passions, his fancies and his blunders, his fears and his hopes; and 
it would be strange if he never made them, even the highest of 
them, from the nucleus of his reverent and affectionate retrospect 
of his own kind. Round his elders and his ancestors were formed 
his first and fundamental notions of right and duty and obedience. 
How then should he fail to bring at times his religious and his 
primary ethical ideals into combination?74 
If the roots of religion are in man's primitive endeavour to interpret the 
universe, then it is clear that science is the exact opposite and perfect 
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replacement of religion, as Kaczkowski points out.75 For Robertson, science 
does correctly what religion does wrongly and to the detriment of humanity's 
progress. The fact that religion has become institutionalized in powerful 
churches is the root of age-old evil: 
. . . the church is an instrument of a twofold demoralization, a 
'two-handed engine' of retrogression. Primarily, it is an endowed 
machinery for the preservation of wom-out beliefs and disproved 
dogma, for the imposition of the dead hand of an ignorant past on 
the living present. . . . It is impossible to overrate the historic 
hindrance thus put upon the greatest human interests by organized 
religion: no rhetoric can do the truth justice.76 
The rationalist clearly finds himself faced with a powerful opponent. 
However, we find there is moral comfort to be drawn from this underdog 
position: 
One can but add that, seeing that in terms of the case he began by 
unprofitably avowing an unpopular opinion, he is presumably, on 
the average, rather less likely to lie for gain than those who 
confessedly find the sheer fear of consequences a highly important 
consideration in their own plan of life, and who have at the same 
time the promise from their own code of plenary pardon for all 
sins on the simple condition of ultimate repentance. [20] 
Samples of this kind of thinking, of deriving one's 'lightness' from being part 
of a repressed minority, are scattered everywhere throughout Robertson's work. 
It shows again how little room he leaves for any position between radical 
unbelief and straight orthodoxy. 
Consistency, Science, and Tests of Truth 
In chapter four Robertson, then, ostensibly sets out to defend rationalism 
against the challenge of the philosopher. However, the chapter deals in 
particular with the principle of bias. According to Robertson, the rationalist is 
gifted with a particular 'moral bias', a 'moral taste': 
He has a conception of goodness in virtue of which he finds 
'revelation' frequently repellent and the popular 'God' a chimera; 
even as the believer finds them satisfactory because they are in 
75
 Kaczkowski, 'John Mackinnon Robertson: Freethinker and Radical', p. 21. 
76
 The Dynamics of Religion, p. 244. 
84 J.M. ROBERTSON: RATIONALIST AND LITERARY CRITIC 
part conformable to his moral and speculative bias, and he been 
brought up to pretermit judgment beyond those limits. [21] 
This bias is partly innate, and partly it is acquired through training, and the 
rationalist's bias is such that he 'carries the processes of doubt, analysis, and 
judgment further than do persons of a different habit of mind'. [21] Both the 
believer and the rationalist frame their hypothesis about the state of things, but 
whereas the rationalist follows through his line of reasoning to the logical end, 
the believer habitually jumps to supernatural conclusions. He may be a reasoner 
when he starts off, but he cuts off the reasoning process where the rationalist 
goes on, motivated by his particular bias. The believer may therefore be 
charged with what is to Robertson a capital sin: inconsistency. As will become 
clear, it is consistency that is the true Robertsonian test of truth. 
It is because of his alleged inconsistency that the agnostic in religion cannot 
meet with Robertson's approval. In fact, Robertson denies the existence of real 
agnosticism. The agnostic cannot help but share the rationalist bias for 
coherence and consistency, and therefore 'He does not in effect merely say, 'I 
do not know': he implicitly says 'You do not know' to the professor of 
non-natural knowledge.' [24] The agnostic, therefore, may think he is steering 
a middle course between belief and unbelief, but in actual practice he is 
enlisted in the rationalist army by sheer force of bias. Here too, Robertson 
shows his essential unwillingness to concede any middle ground between 
atheism and religion. 
When finally in this chapter Robertson turns to the philosophical challenge 
of rationalism, it becomes clear that he is preparing for a major skirmish with 
one of his favourite enemies: A.J. Balfour, future prime-minister and author of 
A Defence of Philosophic Doubt (1879) and The Foundations of Belief (1894). 
Balfour's sceptical challenge of reason, revolving around the idea that there are 
no beliefs which are really and truly founded in reason, is dealt with at length 
by Robertson in chapters five ('The Sceptical Religious Challenge') and six 
('The Meaning of Reason') 
In chapter six, Robertson summarizes Balfour's sceptical views of reason: 
The point is that no belief whatever concerning life and death and 
morality and the process of nature can be justified by 'reason'; and 
that accordingly no religious belief whatever can be discredited on 
the score of being opposed to reason or 'unreasonable.' If not more 
reasonable than the most carefully tested or the most widely 
accepted belief in science, or the belief that the sun will rise or fire 
burn to-morrow, or that we shall all die, it is not less reasonable 
than they. Therefore, believe as your bias leads. [38] 
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Balfour's philosophical scepticism is well geared to arouse Robertson's 
polemical anger. It represents, from Robertson's point of view, the attempt to 
destroy the supremacy of reason by means of reason itself, and, at the same 
time, to smuggle in religion through the back door. If science cannot yield us 
tested truth, why should we then require from religion to do precisely that? It is 
not surprising that to Robertson, such a challenge should perhaps appear even 
more dangerous than what was commonly thrust at the rationalist from the side 
of orthodox religion. 
It should also be noted that to Robertson, there is no real distinction between 
rationalism and science. Although Robertson's belief in science as the only 
method to achieve truth - and therefore in direct competition with religion - is 
fundamental to his conception of reason and rationalism, he never explicitly 
makes a statement to that effect in Rationalism. That a defender of reason and 
private judgment should use the methods of science as a weapon to destroy the 
believer's claim to authority is a premise Robertson feels no need to question, 
here nor anywhere else in his work. 
Nor is he ever specific about what exactly constitute the methods of science. 
He clearly feels no need to define with any degree of accuracy what to him is so 
obviously clear. In the definitions he does provide, 'simply' and 'just' are the 
operative words: 
Scientific method is just careful, critical, reflective, tested and 
consistent method.77 
[Science is] but the application of a stricter common sense to a 
problem where common-sense has reached either a wrong or an 
insufficient solution.78 
[Science] is simply a convenient way of naming either what we 
believe to be systematized and verified knowledge, or the process 
by which such knowledge is brought to system and verification.79 
Since for Robertson, science is primarily a matter of solid common sense, he 
shows himself far from intimidated by Balfour's attack on its validity. The 
philosophic sceptic, he asserts, logically overreaches himself.80 If the 
truth-value of a scientific proposition is questionable since it has been achieved 
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by reasoning, and reasoning can never achieve absolute certainty about any­
thing, as Balfour held, then that conclusion has in itself been achieved by a 
process of reasoning, and should be subject to the same criticism. There is 
simply no getting away from reason: anyone trying to undermine its supremacy 
cannot avoid using reason himself. Therefore, any attack of rationalism on 
reasoned grounds is always a concession to the rationalist's point of view, 
whether that attack be made by the philosophical sceptic or the religionist. 
The fact that science and reason cannot always lead to fully testable truth 
(after all, Robertson argues, we can only infer that the sun will rise again 
tomorrow from past evidence, there is no absolute certainty) does not diminish 
their epistemologica! value, since 'Reasoning is our name for the process of 
comparing or stating 'reasons why' certain propositions or judgments should be 
believed or disbelieved, or certain acts done or not done.'81 There is, of course, 
nothing very startling about such a definition. As Robertson himself admits, his 
definitions of reason and reasoning conform quite unsurprisingly to those found 
in dictionaries. They also imply that no human activity in the intellectual field 
can be exempt from reason, so the charge that reason disregards or 
underestimates the emotions is simply irrelevant: 'even the feelings are, as it 
were, part of the stuff of Reason'.82 In Letters on Reasoning he similarly states 
(in the typical idiom of the hard-boiled rationalist): 
The phenomena or forces of emotion and imagination may as well 
as any other forces be subject-matter of logical propositions; and 
if, in any argument which claims to trace and explain a process of 
social or personal causation, the actual play of emotion and 
imagination in all such processes be overlooked, the argument is 
so far fallacious.83 
By implication, the accusation that the reasoner must necessarily be blind to the 
emotive qualities of the arts is easily met. He gives his children the following 
ardent piece of advice: 
Never, I beg you, let yourselves be browbeaten by people who tell 
you that to cultivate your reason is to lose the faculty for enjoying 
poetry, music, or any other art. The truth lies the other way. 
Exercise of the reason may indeed raise you above some kinds of 
enjoyment that appealed to your untrained mind, but it will rather 
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enlarge your faculty for enjoying greater art, by widening, so to 
speak, the range of vibrations of your feelings.84 
This point will become of particular importance in the discussion of 
Robertson's views on the science of criticism in subsequent chapters. 
In chapter 7 of Rationalism, Robertson looks at 'the test of truth' more 
closely. Again, his conclusions constitute what is basically an appeal to 
common sense: 
For the generality of instructed men, truth in secular affairs means 
not merely 'that which is trowed,' but (a) that which we have 
adequate 'reason' to trow, and (b) that of which our acceptance is 
consistent with our way of testing credences of any or all other 
kinds. The ultimate criterion of our beliefs, in short, is the 
consistency with which we hold them. [48] 
Throughout his work, Robertson preaches this gospel of consistency with great 
persistence and missionary zeal. It is part and parcel of his views on the 
uniformity of nature, and lies at the core of his philosophy: 
. . . in order to reach a tenable and coherent philosophy of life and 
practice, there is needed an earnest and continuous effort after 
consistency as the final criterion of truth, an anxious regard for 
evidence, a steady watchfulness against the snares of 
prepossession and predilection.85 
Nor was it a principle that he held with academic aloofness. He seems to have 
been genuinely troubled, if not annoyed, by displays of inconsistent thought, 
feeling that 'There is something disturbing to the moral sense in the spectacle 
of transformations ill-explained; something that troubles the intelligence in the 
sense of either apparent or felt inconsistency.'86 Not surprisingly, Robertson 
feels that it is the religionist who is the main offender against the law of 
consistency. Although the religionist may reason, and may reason well, in all 
kinds of non-religious issues, when he attempts to come to terms with religion, 
he suddenly applies vastly different standards. In sum: 
. . . the case for rationalism as against the creeds is that they 
recognise no rational test for truth, and apply none. They are all, to 
say the least, grossly improbable in the light of the fullest human 
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knowledge; and the acceptance of them means either passive 
disregard of the principle of sufficient reason or the habitual 
employment of argument which upon any other kind of issue 
would be recognised by all competent men as at best utterly 
inadequate. [54-55] 
It should be noted that to Robertson, the law of consistency is not one that 
applies solely to the intellectual life. There is an important moral dimension to 
consistency in thought, in the sense that 'Consistency in thought is the gist of 
right thinking, of good reasoning; and consistency in action is the gist of right 
conduct.'87 The theoretical distinction Robertson draws here between thought 
and action is not one he tends to follow through. In general, one could say that 
Robertson believes the consistent reasoner to be morally superior to the 
inconsistent one, and with the latter he, of course, refers to the religionist. His 
goal is, as it were, to turn the tables on the believer, and to show that it is he 
who is prone to moral deviations rather than the consistent atheist. The 
principle of consistency, then, is to Robertson not so much a philosophical law 
within a particular system of thought, as it is one more method of showing the 
error of the believer's way. 
Robertson rounds off his defence of rationalism (which is, as we may now 
conclude safely enough, to an equal extent an attack on religion) with a 
statement showing profound confidence in the progress of the spirit of 
rationalism: 
The time is for him [=the true rationalist] even in sight, as it were, 
when most men will recognise and live by that law [=the law of 
intellectual consistency]; and when that day comes there will be no 
more need to profess rationalism than to profess, as a creed, any of 
the daily reciprocities by which society subsists. [61] 
Robertson's display of confidence in progress through reason may partly be 
seen as a corollary to his propagandistic aim: the rejection of religion. 
However, the confidence or belief in progress does genuinely belong to the core 
of Robertson's thought on man and his place in nature. Although the course of 
progress will not be (as it never has been) unobstructed, the rationalist bias, the 
insistence on private judgment and consistency in thought, will eventually 
come to prevail. When challenged, the rationalist may claim that his bias 'is the 
bias to perfection in the intellectual life as the bias to order and sympathy is the 
bias to perfection in the civil.' [61] Finally, Robertson can confidently conclude 
that the critical rationalist is entirely impervious to criticism from the side of 
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religious believers, and may even make a logically validated claim to moral 
superiority. 
Conclusions 
One conclusion that may justifiably be drawn on the basis of the above outline 
of Robertson's rationalist system of thought is that his contributions to 
contemporary philosophy were, to say the least, limited. Philosophy, the history 
of which he undeniably had at his fingertips, was to him mainly a means to an 
end, a weapon to be used in his and his fellow rationalists' struggle against 
religious oppression. To engage in philosophical speculation for the sake of 
speculation itself was never one of his ostensible goals. 
Did Robertson ever even attempt to understand the human impulse towards 
religion? The following statement by William Irvine on Т.Н. Huxley's lack of 
insight into the human values of religion may with equal justice be applied to 
Robertson: 
That scientific freedom might be bought at some cost to the human 
spirit, that an absurd theory about the origin of the world could be 
a valuable repository of spiritual energy, that it could somehow be 
psychologically linked with the soundness of contemporary 
morals, Huxley was too optimistic to believe.88 
Nowhere in Robertson's work, which spanned over fifty years, can he be 
caught displaying any sign of sympathy or respect for religion, and he never 
appears to have practised anything other than the consistency he preached. Not 
for him the signs of doubt that lie below the surface of the work of agnostics 
like Leslie Stephen or John Morley. In his Modern Humanists (1891) and 
Modern Humanists Reconsidered (1927), Victorian rationalist prophets like 
John Stuart Mill and Herbert Spencer are indignantly reprimanded for the 
theistic leanings Robertson detected in their work, and although there was an 
interval of over thirty years between the appearance of each book, Robertson's 
'reconsiderations' certainly had no bearing on his anti-religious position. If 
anything, Modern Humanists Reconsidered is even more fiercely anti-theistic. 
As the heir of Bradlaugh's militant lower-class atheism, far more than of the 
respectable middle-class agnosticism debated in the Metaphysical Society, only 
the strictest rejection of religion could satisfy him. 
It is an ironic fact that where the rationalist position in the 1870s and 1880s, 
Robertson's formative years, had mainly been one of defiant attack, in 
subsequent decades it was the dogmatic rationalist who found himself 
Irvine, Apes, Angels, and Victorians, pp. 7-8. 
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increasingly forced into a mode of defence. In the first chapter we already saw 
how militant secularism went into gradual decline from the second half of the 
1880s onwards. Partly, the movement was the victim of its own success, now 
that unbelievers were no longer prosecuted for blasphemy, professing atheists 
were allowed to enter parliament, and church attendance dropped to ever-lower 
rates.89 However, not only organized secularism was losing ground: on the 
whole, rationalists saw an increasing number of critical challenges levelled at 
them.90 
In Rationalism, as we saw, Robertson deals at length with the influential 
philosophical scepticism of A.J. Balfour, who attacked the unquestionable 
authority of science. An even more serious threat to science and the rationalist 
spirit Robertson felt to be posed by Benjamin Kidd's work on Social Evolution, 
published in 1894. Kidd put forward a powerful defence of Christianity, on the 
grounds that religion was 
a form of belief, providing an ultra-radical sanction for that large 
class of conduct in the individual where his interests and the 
interests of the social organism are antagonistic, and by which the 
former are rendered subordinate to the latter in the general 
interests of the evolution which the race is undergoing.91 
In other words, rather than as a supernatural sanction on immoral behaviour, 
Kidd saw religion as a necessary lubricant in the evolution of society, 
transcending the fixed boundaries of scientific values. Only religion could 
overcome man's natural selfishness, standing in the way of social progress. For 
this view, as for any attempt at reconciliation between science and religion, 
Robertson expressed nothing but the deepest disdain.92 The use of reason to 
discredit reason was to him a logical non sequitur, which he fervently 
denounced. 
However, the tide of the times was more and more against him. Among the 
philosophers of the late-Victorian age who gave religious sensibility a place in 
the scientific world-view, William James was perhaps the most influential. 
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Robertson paid tribute to James's 'remarkable literary power',93 but had little 
patience for James's emphasis on the importance of religion for man's 
emotional response to his existence. This need for a particular emotional and 
spiritual fulfilment was also strongly felt by a group of thinkers described by 
F.M. Turner in his book Between Science and Religion. The Reaction to 
Scientific Naturalism in Late Victorian England: Henry Sidgwick, James Ward, 
Alfred Russell Wallace, George John Romanes, Frederick W.H. Myers, and 
Samuel Butler. Although these men, working in different fields, accepted the 
general concepts and theories of science and renounced the doctrines of 
Christianity, they felt themselves constrained by the narrowly conceived 
dogmas of the creed of scientific naturalism. As the 'honest doubters' of the 
religion of science, they eventually looked beyond scientific naturalism and 
orthodox Christianity to, for instance, a non-Christian belief like spiritualism. 
In Britain, their efforts met with approval from writers like Edmund Gurney, 
Edward Carpenter, Walter Leaf, Oliver Lodge, George Bernard Shaw, and 
F.C.S. Schiller, while Ravaisson, Boutroux and Bergson were kindred spirits in 
France, as was Lotze in Germany. 
While the world was changing around him, and scientific rationalism 
continued to lose ground, Robertson never conceded any territory. In the 
chapter on nineteenth-century and Edwardian rationalism in her book on 
Varieties of Unbelief, Susan Budd notes an element of grimness as part of the 
rationalist's mental make-up: 
There is an adulation of hard-headedness which is a corollary of 
the Victorian view of science as essentially a practical and 
material form of knowledge, the feeling that the harsh demands 
which nature and reality make of mankind must be faced with 
stern endeavour and an indomitable will.94 
Even a cursory reading of Rationalism or Letters on Reasoning suffices to 
show that Robertson was indeed in many respects the very type of the 
hard-headed, hard-hitting rationalist. However, the automatic conclusion that 
he was therefore unable to sympathize with the demands of the emotional life, 
a logic-chopping machine incapable of aesthetic appreciation, is fully beside 
the point. Peter Allan Dale has shown that 'the break between romantic 
aestheticism and positivist science was far from radical',95 that the critical dis-
w
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courses of art and science were not so neatly and irrevocably 
compartmentalized. In the following chapter I will attempt to show in detail 
how Robertson's strict scientific rationalism (it is, in fact, hard to imagine a 
stricter adherence to the creed!) impinged on his approach to literature 
generally and to literary criticism in particular. 
Chapter 3 
Robertson and scientific literary 
criticism 
Introduction 
If it is true, as I have suggested in the previous chapter, that one of the 
dominant strains in Victorian intellectual life was the gradual extension of the 
methods of the natural sciences to all fields of human knowledge, then it 
should come as no surprise that eventually science was brought to bear upon 
the particularly elusive discipline of literary criticism. As early as 1761, Lord 
Karnes, in his Elements of Criticism, had spoken of criticism as 'a rational 
science', 'a regular science, governed by just principles'.1 Karnes, however, as 
Robertson commented, did not have available to him the scientific 
methodology to justify his use of these terms, so that 'Karnes throughout yields 
a musty odour, as of dry-rot, bodefully significant to those of us who follow his 
craft.'2 But the great rise of the natural sciences in the nineteenth century, 
engendering such hope and enthusiasm for what science might eventually 
accomplish in all fields of human knowledge, inspired a far from negligible 
number of men of letters to turn their attention to the application of scientific 
principles to literary criticism. Considering J.M. Robertson's faith in scientific 
rationalism and profound interest in (indeed, love for) what he himself 
preferred to call belles lettres, it is not surprising to find him among these. 
Science, it seemed to Robertson and his fellow scientific critics, had opened 
vast possibilities to save criticism at last from the whims of subjective 
appreciation, and to set decisive and final standards for aesthetic judgment. If 
science seemed capable of solving the great riddle of the universe, why would 
it not be able to settle such a relatively minor issue as the principles of literary 
evaluation? After all, as Robertson noted in 1889, there appeared to be a 
general consensus that science had already effected great strides forward in 
morals, politics and economics, fields no less prone to the vagaries of 
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subjective interpretation.3 Why should it then be impossible to found a science 
of literary criticism? 
The second part of this chapter will be devoted to a detailed examination of 
J.M. Robertson's ideas and theories about scientific literary criticism. The aim 
there will be to establish exactly how Robertson saw the role of science in the 
critical evaluation of literary texts. In the first part, I will try and set the scene 
for this examination by presenting the views of a number of critics who shared 
Robertson's conviction that science and literary criticism could and indeed 
should go hand in hand. 
Part 1: Victorian Scientific Criticism 
Introduction 
Although in the past few decades scholarship has succeeded in substantially 
adjusting the picture of the Victorian critical landscape as a vast, almost empty 
plain dominated by the mountainous presence of Matthew Arnold, most critics 
who expressed their faith in the importance of science for literary criticism 
have received scant attention. In his history of British and American criticism 
from 1750 to 1990, Patrick Parrinder, for instance, even goes so far as to state 
categorically that 'Victorian positivism did not address itself to the 
development of a science of criticism' and that the 'better-known 
mid-Victorian reviewers such as Bagehot, G.H. Lewes and R.H. Hutton were 
all opposed to the idea of criticism as science.'4 Although it is certainly true 
that in the mid-Victorian period, scientific literary criticism was hardly at the 
forefront of the literary panorama, G.H. Lewes, at one stage in his career, 
decidedly was interested in the establishment of a critical science, and the mere 
fact of opposition suggests another side of the issue as well, as we shall see. By 
the 1880s, at the height of the scientific vogue, the critics which I shall present 
in this chapter saw the infusion of literary criticism with a sound dose of 
science as a fruitful and, indeed, a necessary undertaking, which they attempted 
to bring to the centre of the literary scene. According to Parrinder, Victorian 
positivism felt that literature eluded scientific codification because 'it was a 
medium of individual, idiosyncratic expression',5 but the fact that literary 
criticism was and always had been such a subjective affair was precisely the 
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reason why these critics of the second half of the nineteenth century concluded 
that here there was a tremendous task for science to work upon. 
In short, Victorian positivism did quite emphatically address itself to the 
development of a science of criticism, especially in the last two decades of the 
century. 
This is particularly apparent when we read those critics who noted with 
misgiving and sometimes even outright suspicion the changes that science 
seemed to be working in contemporary criticism. In an article on 'The Decay of 
Literature' for the Cornhill Magazine, Leslie Stephen observed how 'criticism 
has arrayed itself in some of the dignity of a science' and concluded that 'our 
judgments are more catholic - more scientific, if you like - and rest upon a 
much wider induction, and more minute examination of the facts.'6 This was 
not, however, a development he could wholeheartedly applaud, adding 
And yet do we not miss something? If we are less narrow in our 
principles, are we not blunter in our perceptions? Have we not lost 
something of the fineness of tact which belonged to men trained in 
a fixed tradition? Criticism has become more scientific, but less 
delicate and less really sympathetic.7 
Stephen's attitude to scientific criticism, or science in criticism, is 
characterized by a high degree of ambivalence. On the one hand he, as one of 
the most prominent positivist thinkers, was far from blind to the advantages a 
scientific approach could bring to the study of literature. In his essay on 
Charlotte Bronte he claims that 'though criticism cannot boast of being a 
science, it ought to aim at something like a scientific basis, or at least to 
proceed in a scientific spirit.'8 On the other hand, he felt very deeply that the 
appreciation of literature was after all purely a matter of individual taste. This 
ambivalence is clearly expressed in a passage such as the following: 
So far, then, as the study of literature can be - 1 will not say made 
truly scientific, for it is idle to speak of science in relation to the 
vague and tentative judgments which alone are possible now, but -
treated in a scientific spirit, that is, examined impartially and 
placed in due correlation with all the truths known to us, it is 
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essential to understand in some degree the time as well as the man, 
because only through the time can we fully understand the man.9 
Stephen never attempted a full exposition on the science of criticism himself, 
but the above passages indicate that the subject was clearly of considerable 
importance to him, demonstrating the overall impact ideas on scientific 
criticism had in this period.10 
Stephen's ambivalent attitude towards literary criticism on a scientific basis 
was shared by the Irish critic Edward Dowden, who in 1889 observed in an 
article for the Fortnightly Review entitled 'Hopes and Fears for Literature' that 
'In the literature of criticism the influence of science has brought loss and 
gain.' On the one hand, Dowden was willing to accept that criticism could not 
afford to ignore the scientific impulse: 
We cannot do things by halves. Literary research, like historical 
research, must be exact and thorough or it is of little worth. It has 
opened new regions and buried ages for our study; yes, and for our 
enjoyment. It has illuminated the past. It has widened our 
sympathies. It has substituted for that dogmatic criticism which 
pronounced imperious judgments a new natural history of poets 
and prose-writers. Our library has become a kind of museum, in 
which specimens of the various species are arranged and 
classified. What we had read any way for our pleasure we must 
now study in chronological sequence, so that we may observe and 
follow a development. We reconstruct our author's environment, 
we investigate his origins." 
On the other hand, he also stated a clear proviso with which Stephen would 
have found himself in full accord: 
. . . that we do not forget the end of study in the means, that we 
somehow and at some time get beyond the apparatus. . . . The 
student of chemistry may find as interesting a subject of analysis 
in a bottle of that claret which bears the venerable name of an 
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eminent and versatile statesman as in a bottle of the rarest vintage; 
but wine has other uses than that of affording a field for analysis. It 
rejoices the heart of man, and this quality of the juice of the grape 
deserves at least a certain degree of attention.12 
With his plea for preserving the human, moral element in criticism, 
demonstrating for one thing that scientific criticism formed a serious topic of 
debate at the time, Dowden responded in particular to the scientifically inspired 
work of two French critics, Hippolyte Taine and Emile Hennequin, which we 
shall have occasion to discuss in more detail later in this chapter. 
Like Stephen and Dowden, such a seminal critic as George Saintsbury 
(seminal, that is, in terms of the late-Victorian literary scene) could not ignore 
the rise of a new approach to criticism. In one of his rare moments of reflection 
on critical theory, Saintsbury commented with asperity on 'the notion, now 
warmly championed by some younger critics both at home and abroad, that 
criticism must be of all things "scientific"'.13 The concept clearly held no 
attraction for this 'King of Critics' and conservative to the core: 
For my own part, I have gravely and strenuously endeavoured to 
ascertain from the writings both of foreign critics . . . and of their 
disciples at home, what 'scientific' criticism means. In no case 
have I been able to obtain any clear conception of its connotation 
in the mouths or minds of those who use the phrase. . . . Only I 
have perceived that when this 'scientific' criticism sticks closest to 
its own formulas and ways, it appears to me to be very bad 
criticism; and that when, as sometimes happens, it is good 
criticism, its ways and formulas are not perceptibly distinguishable 
from those of criticism which is not 'scientific.' For the rest, it is 
all but demonstrable that 'scientific' literary criticism is 
impossible, unless the word 'scientific' is to have its meaning very 
illegitimately altered.14 
In an age when science seemed to be infringing on every walk of life, 
Saintsbury felt it necessary to stress the ultimate dichotomy between art and 
science, and the impossibility of capturing the individual's mind between the 
covers of a scientific manual: 
12
 Ibid.,p. 183. 
13
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" Ibid, pp. xi-xii. 
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For the essential qualities of literature, as of all art, are 
communicated by the individual, they depend upon idiosyncrasy; 
and this makes science in any proper sense powerless. She can 
only deal with classes, only with general laws; and so long as these 
classes are constantly reduced to 'species of one,' and these laws 
are set at nought by incalculable and singular influences, she must 
be constantly baffled and find all her elaborate plant of formulas 
and generalisations useless. . . . To put the matter yet otherwise, 
the whole end, aim, and object of literature and the criticism of 
literature, as of all art, and the criticism of all art, is beauty and the 
enjoyment of beauty. With beauty science has absolutely nothing 
to do.15 
Saintsbury was of course not the only critic who feared that science might 
completely overrun art. In his protestations against scientific criticism we hear 
the echoes of a wider debate on science versus literature in which the name of 
Matthew Arnold figures prominently. Roughly from Literature and Dogma of 
1873 onwards we may witness Arnold attempting to set off his own concept of 
'poetic truth' against that of the positivists' 'scientific truth'. In his lecture on 
'Literature and Science', Arnold admits initially that 'in natural science the 
habit gained of dealing with fact is a most valuable discipline and that everyone 
should have some experience of it',16 but he then goes on to a defence, on 
moral grounds, of humane letters over against science. The scientists, Arnold 
argues, may be able to provide us with new knowledge of our world, but 
still it will be knowledge only which they give us; knowledge not 
put for us into relation with our sense of conduct, our sense of 
beauty, and touched with emotion by being so put; not thus put for 
us, and therefore, to the majority of mankind, after a certain while, 
unsatisfying, wearying.17 
If it should ever come to a choice between humane letters on the one hand and 
science on the other, mankind would do well to opt for an education in humane 
letters, since 'Letters will call out their being at more points, will make them 
live more.'18 Although Arnold never appears to have responded directly to the 
attempts at scientific criticism discussed in this chapter, it is obvious that he 
would hardly have applauded them, and that his own powerful influence and 
15
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that of his followers must have counted as an important check on further 
investigations in scientific criticism in the last decades of the nineteenth 
century. 
However, this did not prevent the phrase 'science of criticism' from 
becoming so commonplace that by the 1890s it came to be taken somewhat for 
granted that criticism had indeed, in some way or other, been raised to the 
status of a science. One conspicuous example of this phenomenon is provided 
by the New Review of 1891, which contained a collection of three short articles 
headed 'The Science of Criticism'; the prominent authors were Henry James, 
Andrew Lang and Edmund Gosse.19 Apart from the fact that James's piece 
shows an infinitely deeper understanding of the problems involved in literary 
judgment, one other thing is particularly striking: none of the articles so much 
as mentions the word 'science' or 'scientific'. They are, in fact, mostly made up 
of long invectives against the deplorable level of contemporary 
mass-reviewing. James's comments are especially sharp: 
The vulgarity, the crudity, the stupidity which this cherished 
combination of the offhand review and of our wonderful system of 
publicity have put into circulation on so vast a scale may be 
represented . . . as an unprecedented invention for darkening 
counsel. The bewildered spirit may ask itself, without speedy 
answer, What is the function in the life of man of such a 
reverberation of platitude and irrelevance? Such a spirit will 
wonder how the life of man survives it, and above all, what is 
much more important, how literature resists it; whether indeed 
literature does resist it and is not speedily going down beneath it.20 
Both Lang and Gosse echo these statements in slightly different tones, but none 
of these three writers even attempts to set up a definition of a science of 
criticism as a weapon against the practice of sloppy mass-reviewing. The 
heading 'The Science of Criticism', possibly coined by the editor as a kind of 
'eye-catcher', is simply left to suggest that effective criticism equals scientific 
criticism, which is what every critic should finally strive for. On the one hand 
this shows how familiar a term 'scientific criticism' had become: it was 
possible to use it without further explanation and would not strike any 
well-informed reader as anything out of the ordinary. On the other hand such a 
general use of the term indicates that it lacked definition and could, in fact, be 
19
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made to mean any number of things, as long as it remained suggestive of the 
intention to improve the overall standard of criticism. 
Indeed, if there is one thing that the critics whose work will be evaluated in 
the following sections have in common it is their concern with the raising of 
critical standards, however different their views on and approaches to these 
standards may have been. They turned to science in the genuine hope that it 
could do for literary criticism what it had already achieved in so many other 
fields: to afford at least a glimpse of 'first principles', of fundamental and 
indisputable truths on which future practitioners of the discipline might 
profitably base their work. With these high hopes for future progress, the search 
for a science of criticism seems no more than a natural and inevitable 
outgrowth of the overall positivist project, to which no critic was more 
whole-heartedly committed than J.M. Robertson. 
It is not until the mid-Victorian period that we encounter the first two critics 
who, like Robertson, dedicated themselves to basing critical judgment on 
scientific principles: G.H. Lewes and E.S. Dallas. In order to provide a wider 
overview of how views on scientific criticism developed in Britain, it is then 
necessary to turn to France, where the idea of a science of criticism on 
naturalistic lines was much more strongly rooted than in the British Isles.21 The 
great name here is that of Hippolyte Taine, whose ideas exerted a powerful 
influence on the British theoreticians of critical science in the last two decades 
of the century.22 The work of two of Taine's followers, Ferdinand Brunetière 
and Emile Hennequin, which managed to attract attention from across the 
Channel, will also be discussed at some length. We then return to the British 
literary scene of the last two decades of the century, when the idea of a 
scientific criticism gained its widest currency in the wake of the general 
enthusiasm for scientific progress. The discussions of the theoretical work of 
H.M. Posnett, R.G. Moulton, and J.A. Symonds will be followed by some 
21
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general conclusions and observations on the phenomenon of Victorian 
scientific criticism. 
G.H. Lewes's Principles of Success in Literature 
George Henry Lewes's Principles of Success in Literature of 1865 is not the 
first theoretical discussion of scientific standards for literary criticism in the 
Victorian age.23 Strictly speaking, that honour might perhaps be awarded more 
appropriately to E.S. Dallas's Poetics: An Essay on Poetry, which appeared as 
early as 1852. However, since that work was expanded and revised by Dallas 
into The Gay Science of 1866, to be discussed below, it does not seem 
unreasonable to let a discussion of Lewes's work precede that of Dallas. Also, 
quite apart from chronology, Lewes's Principles of Success makes a suitable 
starting-point for our present purposes, since it may serve to introduce a 
number of concepts and problems which continued to reverberate in many of 
the later attempts at a science of literary criticism. 
The Principles of Success in Literature was originally published in 
instalments in the Fortnightly Review, which Lewes edited from 1865 to 1867, 
and of which he was also one of the co-founders; the first issue of the 
Fortnightly also saw the publication of the first chapter of the Principles.2* 
Lewes announced his goals as both practical and theoretical in kind: 
I propose to treat of the Principles of Success in Literature, in the 
belief that if a clear recognition of the principles which underlie 
all successful writing could once be gained, it would be no 
inconsiderable help to many a young and thoughtful 
mind... . There is help to be gained from a clear understanding of 
the conditions of success; and encouragement to be gained from a 
reliance on the ultimate victory of true principles. [21] 
In other words, Lewes's purpose was to provide guidelines for the young and 
uninitiated writer and critic which were to be based on sound scientific 
principles: 
23
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No man is made a discoverer by learning the principles of 
scientific Method; but only by those principles can discoveries be 
made; and if he has consciously mastered them, he will find them 
directing his researches and saving him from an immensity of 
fruitless labour. It is something in the nature of the Method of 
Literature that I propose to expound. Success is not an accident. 
AH literature is founded upon psychological laws, and involves 
principles which are true for all peoples and for all times. These 
principles we are to consider here. [22] 
Here, Lewes does not speak of a science of criticism per se, but it soon 
becomes apparent that the principles he seeks to establish are, by extension, 
also those of a scientific criticism. Lewes posits his primary test of merit in 
literature as that of 'success'. At first glance this may seem a curiously naive 
proposition, but what Lewes has in mind is not, in fact, success in the sense of 
popularity. He defines it more narrowly as 'the measure of the relation, tem-
porary or enduring, which exists between a work and the public mind' [27], 
and when Lewes writes of the 'public mind', he refers as a matter of course to 
the kind of well-informed, intellectual readership the Fortnightly Review could 
command. True, enduring success is finally only achieved by works which 
'while suiting the taste of the day, contain truths and beauty deeper than the 
opinions and tastes of the day, but even temporary success implies a certain 
temporary fitness.' [29] 
It is possible to appreciate why 'success' should have appealed to Lewes as 
a test of literary merit. It has the attraction of seeming to offer an empirical, 
scientific standard for literary evaluation. However, the validity of such a 
criterion ultimately depends upon the strictness of its definition, and it is here 
that Lewes fails to convince. He proceeds to group the principles which govern 
literary success under three heads: the Principle of Vision (which takes an 
intellectual form), the Principle of Sincerity (which takes a moral form), and 
the Principle of Beauty (which takes an aesthetic form): 
Unless a writer has what, for the sake of brevity, I have called 
Vision, enabling him to see clearly the facts or ideas, the objects or 
relations, which he places before us for our own instruction, his 
work must obviously be defective. He must see clearly if we are to 
see clearly. Unless a writer has Sincerity, urging him to place 
before us what he sees and believes as he sees and believes it, the 
defective earnestness of his presentation will cause an imperfect 
sympathy in us. He must believe what he says, or we shall not 
believe it . . . . Finally, unless the writer has grace - the principle of 
beauty I have named it - enabling him to give some aesthetic 
charm to his presentation, were it only the charm of well-arranged 
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material, and well-constructed sentences, a charm sensible 
through all the intricacies of composition and of style, he will not 
do justice to his powers, and will either fail to make his work 
acceptable, or will very seriously limit its success. [35-36] 
It is in his discussion of these three principles that Lewes fails to transcend the 
level of commonsensical injunctions to inexperienced writers. Lewes does, 
however, introduce his treatment of the Principle of Beauty with some show of 
scientific invention and objectivity: 
The Principle of Beauty is only another name for Style, which is 
an art, incommunicable as are all other arts, but like them 
subordinated to laws founded on psychological conditions. The 
Laws constitute the Philosophy of Criticism; and I shall have to 
ask the reader's indulgence if for the first time I attempt to 
expound them scientifically in the chapter to which the present is 
only an introduction. [110] 
On the same note he states elsewhere that 'our inquiry is scientific, not 
empirical; it therefore seeks the psychological basis for every law, 
endeavouring to ascertain what condition of a reader's receptivity determines 
the law.' The five psychological laws into which Lewes then subdivides the 
conditions of style are those of Economy, Simplicity, Sequence, Climax, and 
Variety. However, Lewes's appeal to scientific psychology is largely a 
rhetorical gesture, since his formulation of the five laws of style does not rise 
above mere common sense, and sometimes not even above the platitudinous: 
Economy 'rejects whatever is superfluous' [133], Simplicity is 'using the 
simplest means to secure the fullest effect' [134], Sequence 'gives strength by 
giving clearness and beauty of rhythm' [150], etc. In spite of Lewes's 
professions of scientific intent, what he provides is basically a practical 
beginner's guide to 'writing well', rather than a theoretical treatise on the 
psychological laws governing style and composition. 
The chapter on the principle of sincerity leaves no doubt as to what Lewes's 
primary concern really is: morality in literature. His plea for sincerity in 
literature shows that he has learned the moral lessons of the prophets of his day, 
especially Arnold and Ruskin, well: 
Nothing but what is true, or is held to be true, can succeed; 
anything which looks like insincerity is condemned. In this respect 
we may compare it with the maxim of Honesty the best policy. No 
far-reaching intellect fails to perceive that if all men were 
uniformly upright and truthful, Life would be more victorious, and 
Literature more noble. [86-87] 
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Lewes makes no attempt at a scientific definition of sincerity, he confines 
himself mainly to earnest and occasionally even passionate injunctions directed 
at 'the young and strong'. Although the chapter on sincerity is the shortest of 
the book, it is here that the centre of gravity of Lewes's critical ideology lies. 
. The chapter, however, in which Lewes's scientific pretensions are most 
clearly in evidence, is that on the principle of Vision. Lewes's demand that a 
writer should 'look for himself and tell truly what he sees' is again expressive 
of his primarily moral concern, and cannot fail to remind us of Arnold's 'seeing 
the object as in itself it really is'. However, Lewes also offers a formal 
exposition on what constitutes the principle of Vision, in which he equates 
vision with imagination and proposes to deal with the place of the imagination 
in literary creation. Lewes defines imagination as 'the power of forming 
images; it reinstates, in a visible group, those objects which are invisible, either 
from absence or from imperfection of our senses.' [65] His thoughts on 
imagination are embedded in his theories of human cognition, of which the 
roots are to be found in his Biographical History of Philosophy, and which 
were further elaborated upon in his later Study of Psychology and Mind as a 
Function of the Organism. The gist of his theory here is that the mind of the 
true, 'successful' artist has an unusual capacity for turning sense impressions 
into concrete images, whereas the less artistically gifted mortal tends to 
assimilate these impressions as mere abstractions: 
Their [the poets'] vision is keener than that of other men. However 
rapid and remote their flight of thought, it is a succession of 
images, not of abstractions. The details which give significance, 
and which by us are seen vaguely as through a vanishing mist, are 
by them seen in sharp outlines. The image which to us is a mere 
suggestion, is to them almost as vivid as the object. [46] 
However much his ideas are couched in terms taken from association 
psychology, Lewes finally seems to leave us with the traditional Romantic ideal 
of the poet as visionary, as seer. A visionary, it should be added, who should 
not close his eyes to the realities of the world which surrounds him: 'A poetical 
mind sees noble and affecting suggestions in details which the prosaic mind 
will interpret prosaically.' [82] Elsewhere, Lewes puts it in more prosaic terms 
when he calls attention to the fact that 'fairies and demons, remote as they are 
from experience, are not created by a more vigorous effort of imagination than 
milkmaids and poachers.' [69] With this in mind, it is not surprising that Lewes 
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should have become the first English exponent of realism in the novel, as 
Wellek has noted.25 
One may conclude that, whatever its merits in other respects (Lewes's prose 
can be admirably elegant and lucid), as a scientific or theoretical treatise on the 
standards for literature and literary criticism, Principles of Success in 
Literature fails to offer much beyond the rather hazy principle of success as a 
pseudo-empirical test of literary merit. It is finally Lewes's moral earnestness 
which leaves the strongest impression on the reader, while the scientific 
terminology of his theory of the imagination seems dated and hardly central to 
the issues at hand. As a case study in the problems involved in establishing a 
science of criticism, however, the book remains instructive. It shows clearly the 
difficulties of finding empirical tests for literary merit, as well as a beginning 
awareness of the role psychology might play in such an endeavour. To the role 
of psychology we shall return presently in discussing the work of E.S. Dallas. 
E.S. Dallas and The Gay Science 
Literary history has on the whole been considerably kinder to G.H. Lewes than 
to Eneas Sweetland Dallas, who, for one thing, did not have the benefit of a 
close personal connection with one of the greatest writers of the age. However, 
although now quite obscure, Dallas was by no means a negligible figure in his 
own time, as even a brief outline of his biography will show.26 Bom in Jamaica 
in 1828, Dallas studied philosophy at Edinburgh University under William 
Hamilton, although he never took his degree. Having embarked upon a career 
in journalism, he moved to London in 1855 and joined John T. Delane's staff 
on The Times, to which he was for many years a leading contributor. It was 
Dallas who wrote the Times reviews of such epoch-making works as Adam 
Bede, The Mill on the Floss, Silas Marner, Great Expectations, Romola and 
Felix Holt. Indicative of Dallas's status in the London literary world of the late 
1850s and 60s are, for example, George Eliot's words on the reception oí Adam 
Bede: 'the best news from London hitherto is that Mr Dallas is an enthusiastic 
admirer of Adam'.27 Dallas did not limit himself to literature, nor did he write 
solely for The Times: he contributed regularly on biographical, political, 
cultural and other subjects to the Daily News, Saturday Review, and Pall Mall 
Gazette. A man of many talents and interests, Dallas even wrote on cookery 
25
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and gastronomy, and it is his much reprinted Kettner 's Book of the Table, a 
Manual of Cookery, first published two years before his death in 1879, which 
was his most successful work.28 His works of literary-critical theory Poetics: 
An Essay in Poetry (London 1852), and The Gay Science (2 vols., London, 
1866),29 the continuation and expansion of Poetics which is the subject of this 
section, could boast of no such popularity: they were almost entirely 
disregarded by his contemporaries.30 
In the preface to The Gay Science, Dallas announces his main objective as 
'an attempt to settle the first principles of Criticism, and to show how alone it 
can be raised to the dignity of a science.'31 [V] Dallas's use of the word 
'dignity' is significant here: science is presented as having a kind of established 
status which criticism, in its present disorganized state, cannot yet hope to 
achieve. Like most attempts at scientific criticism, Dallas's enterprise is 
motivated by his sense of disorder in contemporary criticism, a crisis which 
only rigorous systematization could dispel. In his Poetics of 1852, Dallas had 
already written that 'We have critical opinions in great abundance, and often of 
great value, but we have no critical system. The critics feel their way, do not 
see it; we walk by faith, not by sight; our judgments too often show instinct 
without understanding.'32 
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In Dallas's view, a scientific critical system was, although difficult, far from 
impossible to achieve, but the establishment of such a system ultimately 
depended on the insight that 'it must of necessity be the science of the laws of 
pleasure, the joy science, the Gay science.' [6] Dallas argued that 'a science of 
criticism, embracing poetry and the fine arts, is possible only on the 
supposition that these arts all stand on common ground; and that, however, 
varied may be the methods employed in them, their inner meaning and purpose 
is the same.' [76] What, then, is this 'common ground' which unites all the 
arts? Dallas's conclusion is that 'it is admitted that the immediate end of art is 
to give pleasure' and that 'if this be granted, and it is all but universally 
granted, it entails the inevitable inference that criticism is the science of the 
laws and conditions under which pleasure is produced.' [91] 
Dallas saw the general disregard of the mental sciences as an immediate 
obstacle in the way of the establishment of such a 'science of pleasure'. He felt 
that the immense successes of the physical sciences had generated a kind of 
one-sided devotion which was greatly to the detriment of the mental sciences. 
G.H. Lewes's Biographical History of Philosophy, for instance, was 'burdened 
with the fallacy that because what is called metaphysics is impossible, therefore 
any attempt at a science of the mind must be vain.' [55] A science of the mind, 
however, was exactly what was needed as a foundation for a science of 
criticism: 'In point of fact, the great fault of criticism is its ignorance - at least 
its disregard of psychology.' [57] That such a science cannot claim the same 
level of exactitude as, say, mathematics, is no reason not to pursue it. After all, 
not all the sciences could be equally exact, and 'why then should a critical 
science, if there is ever to be one, do more than all the other sciences in leading 
its disciples into a land free from doubt?' [63] In the end, Dallas concluded, 
'system is science', and it is systematization that every science should finally 
strive for. [59] 
The science of criticism, then, was to be achieved through the application of 
a systematized science of mind which was to concentrate on the imagination 
'as the fountain of art' if we, as Dallas had argued, 'accept art also as 
essentially a joy, for imagination is the great faculty of human joyance.' [171] 
Dallas sees a profound understanding of the imagination as imperative to the 
establishment of a science of criticism: 'This power of imagination is so vast 
and thaumaturgie that it is impossible to lift a hand or move a step in criticism 
without coming to terms with it, and understanding distinctly what it is and 
what it does.' [170] What Dallas subsequently sets out to provide is, 
ambitiously enough, 'the first and only attempt to give an exhaustive analysis 
of imagination'. [173] 
Dallas does not see the imagination as a special faculty separate from the 
regular workings of the mind, but rather as a special function of the mind: 'It is 
a name given to the automatic action of the mind or any of its faculties - to 
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what may not unfitly be called the Hidden Soul.' [194] Dallas's definition of 
the 'hidden soul' at the opening of the chapter with that title has remarkably 
modem overtones: 
The object of this chapter is not so much to identify imagination 
with what may be called the hidden soul, as to show that there is a 
mental existence within us which may be so called - a secret flow 
of thought which is not less energetic than the conscious flow, an 
absent mind which haunts us like a ghost or a dream and is an 
essential part of our lives. [199] 
It is, in fact, from this 'secret flow of thought', this 'hidden soul' which 
harbours the imagination, that artistic creation originates. But not only is the 
unconscious or subconscious the source of art, it is also the explanation of its 
appeal and the measure of its worth: 'Art is poetical in proportion as it has this 
power of appealing to what I may call the absent mind, as distinct from the 
present mind, on which falls the great glare of consciousness, and to which 
alone science appeals.' [316] It is the subconscious which is the seat of the 
creation and appreciation of art, whereas it is the conscious which is the 
province of reason and science. Therefore it is the analysis of the unconscious 
which provides the foundation for a science of criticism. 
Dallas's theories of the unconscious might lead to the attractive conclusion 
that he anticipated Freud by a good many years. However, as Jenny Taylor has 
pointed out, Dallas does not point to certain cornerstones of Freud's theory, 
such as his conception of sexual repression, nor - and this is probably even 
more important - was the 'unconscious' a concept that sprang into being with 
Freud for the first time.33 Dallas himself notes that 'It is but recently that the 
existence of hidden or unconscious thought has been accepted as fact in any 
system of philosophy which is not mystical', indicating that he is fully aware of 
the currency of the concept. [201] 
Rather than as a theoretician of psychology and a precursor of Freud, it is as 
an innovator and systematizer of literary criticism that we should assess Dallas. 
If we look at such assessments in the past, it is remarkable that it should be 
George Saintsbury, so staunchly opposed to any theoretical approach of 
criticism and literature throughout his career, who was the first Victorian critic 
of note to have praise for Dallas's scheme: 
" Taylor, 'The Gay Science: The 'Hidden Soul' of Victorian Criticism', p. 197. On 
Dallas and psycho—analysis, see also Thomas С Caramagno, 'The Psychoanalytic Aesthetics 
of Eneas Sweetland Dallas', Literature and Psychology, 33 (1987), pp. 21-31. 
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I must admit that, having been disgusted at the time of the 
appearance of The Gay Science by what I then thought its 
extremely silly, and now think its by no means judicious, title, I 
never read it until quite recently, and then found (of course) that 
Mr Dallas had said several of my things before me, though usually 
with a difference.34 
However, Salisbury's praise remained far from unqualified, and his main 
objection to Dallas's proposal for a science of criticism was that he failed to see 
how Dallas could ever direct it 'to that actual criticism of actual literature', a 
question which every scheme of scientific criticism would ultimately have to 
answer.35 
Of more recent date is René Wellek's verdict that Dallas in fact erected 'a 
Victorian style Crazy Castle, a thing of rags and patches that cannot come to 
life again and remains a curiosity of the time.'36 It is certainly true that Dallas, 
in spite of his obvious erudition and wit, failed to furnish the well-organized 
system of criticism on scientific principles he aspired after. However, his 
attempt is much more ambitious than Lewes's, and Dallas manages to touch on 
far more issues relevant to the question. We may at this point quote R.A. 
Forsythe, who felt that Dallas's critical awareness of the problems of literary 
criticism 'deserved wider acclaim, not only for its insight, but also because of 
the novel "remedy" he suggested. For it was his contention that the crisis was 
one both of intelligence and taste, and that science, the main causative factor, 
would prove to be the only effective curative one as well.'37 While Lewes 
started from the a priori assumption that success was the decisive criterion in 
literary criticism, Dallas went much further in attempting to unravel the 
processes which underlie artistic creation and the critical judgment of it. 
Although inevitably the product of an age in which a science of psychology 
was itself only beginning to emerge, Dallas's psychology of the unconscious 
may at least be credited with having pointed the theory of literary criticism in 
the direction of an important instrument for future investigation. 
Hippolyte Taine 
No critic has done more to give wide currency to the idea of a scientific literary 
criticism than Hippolyte Taine. In order to place in perspective the various 
34
 Saintsbury, History of Criticism and Literary Taste in Europe, III, p. 511. 
35
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attempts at such a criticism in the final decades of the Victorian age in 
England, we must therefore now turn to France. Taine's theory of literature, 
which reached England mainly through his History of English Literature,3* 
appeared to open doors which critics like Lewes and Dallas had been struggling 
to unlock. They too had turned to the findings of the relatively new disciplines 
of psychology and sociology as buildingstones for a new science of criticism, 
but their efforts had lacked system and coherence and, what was worse, had 
failed to come to terms with the problem of the subjectivity of aesthetic 
judgment. Success and pleasure did not, as they had hoped, furnish the 
rock-solid criteria by which all literature could be judged objectively. Taine, 
however, offered a scientifically inspired approach to literary criticism and 
literature in general which seemed to make it possible to avoid the problem of 
value-judgment altogether.39 As a philosopher with a strong positivist bias, 
Taine was fundamentally interested in the observation of the workings of the 
law of cause and effect. In his Philosophie de I 'Art, Taine indicates how he 
sees the difference between the old, subjective method and the new, supposedly 
objective approach to literature: 
The old esthetics gave first the definition of the beautiful, saying, 
for instance, that the beautiful is the expression of the moral ideal, 
or that the beautiful is the expression of the invisible, or better, 
that the beautiful is the expression of human passion; then, taking 
one of these definitions as a code article, it absolved, condemned, 
admonished, and guided . . . The modem method which I try to 
follow, and which begins to be applied in all moral sciences, 
consists in thinking of human works and particularly works of art 
as facts, products of which one must point out the characteristics 
and seek the causes - nothing more. Science thus understood does 
not proscribe or forgive; it observes and explains.40 
In the 'old method' Taine describes here we can still plainly recognize the 
critical practice of Lewes and Dallas, in spite of their scientific pretensions. It is 
never their intention to limit themselves merely to describing literary 
38
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phenomena. In the end, scientific literary criticism is still for them a matter of 
creating prescriptive rules rather than deducing descriptive laws. This naturally 
begs the question: did Taine's critical theory enable him to stay clear of the 
primacy of value judgment? 
The locus classicus for answering this question is Taine's introduction - as 
notorious as it is famous - to the History of English Literature. Here, Taine 
does indeed propose to deal with literature as so many scientific data, detached 
as much as possible from personal appreciation. To Taine, the work of 
literature appears to be not so much an end in itself, as the means to discover 
what, or rather who, is behind the literary artefact. In his own words: 'So you 
study the document only to know the man.' [2] Literary criticism thus becomes 
a scientific tool which may be used to investigate the psychology of its creator. 
This does not, however, lead Taine in the direction of a primarily 
biographical approach to literature, as adopted by his great master 
Sainte-Beuve. His observance of the laws of cause and effect makes Taine go 
much further. If the literary work unveils the psychological make-up of its 
creator, by what then is this psychology in its turn determined? The principle of 
universal causality determined for Taine that 'every complex phenomenon 
arises from other more simple phenomena on which it hangs', which led him to 
the much-debated conclusion that 'vice and virtue are products, like vitriol and 
sugar.' [11] It is important to note here that Taine does not argue that vice and 
virtue are in any way like vitriol and sugar. His point is rather that there is 'a 
system in human sentiments and ideas: and this system has for its motive 
power certain general traits, certain characteristics of the intellect and the heart 
common to men of one race, age, or country.' [13] 
Taine then famously postulates race, surroundings, and epoch (race, milieu, 
moment) as the three main determinants of these 'characteristics of the intellect 
and the heart'. [13] It is this triad which has become the catchphrase by which 
Taine is widely known, and it is hardly necessary to reiterate the familiar 
refutations of the scheme: the dubious overtones of the concept of race in the 
light of 20th-century history, the indeterminacy of the definitions of milieu and 
moment, etc. However, it is relevant to emphasize Taine's overall adherence to 
the principle of universal causality: 
So much we can say with confidence, that the unknown creations 
towards which the current of the centuries conducts us, will be 
raised up and regulated altogether by the three primordial forces; 
that if these forces could be measured and computed, we might 
deduce from them as from a formula the characteristics of future 
generations. [24-25] 
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In such a seemingly rigid system, the place of literature would appear a very 
limited one. Taine believed, at least in principle, that literature could provide 
the key to the working of the three 'primordial forces' in history: 'It is then 
chiefly by the study of literature that one may construct a moral history, and 
advance toward the knowledge of psychological laws, from which events 
spring.' [35] This could perhaps lead one to expect, viewed from our modern 
perspective, that Taine would be as interested in mediocre literature as 
documents of social history as in the acknowledged classics. As a matter of 
fact, this is hardly the case. Taine saw literature as the quintessence of a 
nation's history, a quintessence that could only be expressed by the best a 
nation had produced. It is at this point that we become aware how far removed 
Taine really was from a critical perspective which views literature as an object 
of research per se. There is no avoiding the conclusion that value-judgment of 
an intensely personal kind finally lies at the core of Taine's system. It is, after 
all, the critic who decides which works of art are most representative of a 
nation's development, which is evident throughout the History of Literature in 
England. At the same time, Taine's conclusions regarding national character 
arrived at on the basis of these subjectively selected masterpieces tend to 
reiterate familiar commonplaces, a fact which did not escape Leslie Stephen in 
his review of Taine's book for the Fortnightly Review.*1 Stephen, although in 
substantial agreement with Taine that 'we ought to study the organism in 
connection with the medium', takes him to task over the triteness of his 
depiction of English national character: 
Hogarth, in one of his pictures, represents the jovial Englishman 
confronted by the wretched frog-eaters at Calais; and M. Taine 
gives us the frog-eaters' view of the contrast. We are large, 
overfed, beer, port wine, and gin swilling animals; coarse, burly, 
and pachydermatous, with little external sensibility, and no love 
for things of the intellect; but yet with strong passions which 
sometimes express themselves in broad humour, and sometimes 
give birth to a rich but overcharged poetry. All this, however, 
which sometimes verges upon caricature, is no more than we have 
heard before. It does not require a philosopher, with theories about 
race, climate, and epoch, to tell us as much. . . . M. Taine's 
criticism is thus apt to become superficial.42 
41
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In contrast, the fact that Taine still found himself entangled in the web of 
personal taste and judgment gave him at least some credit 'with such an 
arch-conservative and largely anti-theoretical critic as George Saintsbury: 
Hippolyte Taine was a critic, although too often (not always) a 
'black horseman' of criticism. He was a great aesthetician, he was 
a brilliant literary historian - that is to say, what should be a critic 
on the greatest scale.43 
This praise did not, however, make Saintsbury's final condemnation of Taine's 
theoretical approach to literature any less severe: 
Taine is, therefore, the capital example of the harm which may be 
done by what is called 'philosophy' in criticism. If he had resisted 
this tendency, and had allowed himself simply to receive and 
assimilate the facts, he might have been one of the greatest critics 
of the world.44 
Although Taine may not have been successful in solving the problem of 
aesthetic judgment within the context of a scientific approach to literature, his 
use of sociology, history and psychology as tools for literary-critical research 
provided the starting-point for a number of notable endeavours in scientific 
literary criticism, in France as well as in England. One of Taine's greatest 
followers in France was Ferdinand Brunetière. 
Ferdinand Brunetière 
The name of Ferdinand Brunetière now has a considerably less familiar ring 
than that of Taine, whom Brunetière followed in his efforts to bring science to 
literary criticism. Nevertheless, Brunetière's position was a particularly 
powerful one in his lifetime: from 1893 to 1906 he was editor-in-chief of the 
authoritative Revue des Deux Mondes, he was the foremost professor at the 
Ecole Normale from 1886 to 1900, and he became a member of the French 
Academy in 1893. From these highly influential platforms, Brunetière made a 
stand against wide-spread subjectivism and individualism by attempting to 
close the gap between literature and science.45 It was not an attempt that caused 
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many ripples across the channel, but Brunetiere's critical theory is relevant in 
the present discussion for its endeavour to base a science of criticism on 
Darwinian evolutionary theory. 
Although Brunetière was essentially in agreement with Taine as to the 
necessity of bringing the rigorous systematization of science to literary 
criticism, he found the framework in which Taine had attempted to capture 
literary history too restrictive. Taine's theories, which - at least in principle -
approached the work of art as constituting so many scientific data, had not 
sufficiently taken into account the individual human element in literature and 
literary criticism, and it was in order to fill this deficiency that Brunetière, 
perhaps surprisingly, turned to Darwin: 
When faced with human works we cannot refrain from approving 
or rejecting, from loving, admiring, or feeling repulsion. What is 
the cause of this admiration? This is one more question that Taine 
neglected to answer, or rather, attempted to answer in his lessons 
on art, but without success. It is at this point that I read and re-read 
Darwin. He, too, was triumphant at that time, after being subjected 
to much opposition. Thanks to him, a new biology was rising on 
the ruins of the old. As I accepted in principle the similarity 
between literary history and natural history, I decided to carry this 
principle to its limit, and, if possible, to introduce the theory of 
evolution into literary criticism.46 
The analogy between literary history and natural history provided Brunetière 
with a model for literary criticism: 
. . . de Linné jusqu'à Cuvier, de Cuvier jusqu'à Darwin, et de 
Darwin jusqu'à Haeckel, on peut dire avec assurance que chaque 
progrès de la science est un progrès ou un changement dans la 
classification. De confuse et de vague systématique; de 
systématique en devenant naturelle; et de naturelle en devenant 
généalogique, la classification, toute seule, par son progrès même, 
a bouleversé les sciences de la nature et de la vie. Il en sera 
quelque jour ainsi, il en est ainsi, dès à présent, de la critique.. .4? 
In his Évolution des Genres dans l'Histoire de la Littérature of 1890, 
Brunetiere's goal is the scientific classification of literary genres on the 
** Quoted from Gullace, Taine and Brunetière on Criticism, p. 22. 
" Ferdinand Brunetière, L'Évolution des Genres dans l'Histoire de la Littérature. 
Introduction: L'Évolution de la Critique depuis la Renaissance jusqu 'à nos Jours, first pbd 
1890,6th éd. (Paris, 1914), p. 31. 
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principles he derived from natural history and Darwinian theory. In 
Brunetiere's view, literary genres resemble zoological species in that they are 
the products of evolutionary processes involving constant and gradual 
differentiation and transformation. It is as a result of these processes that genres 
rise to their heights as well as fade into extinction in the course of literary 
history. What should be understood is that to Brunetiere, a genre was not 
simply a label to be stuck relatively arbitrarily on literary products of a 
generally similar kind. Rather, he saw genres as the fundamental buildingstones 
of literary history, present in some primordial form even before the actual 
creation of the work of art. To describe the evolution of literary genres was 
therefore to describe the essential course of literary history. 
For Brunetiere, the theory of the evolution of genres is the key to the 
establishment of scientific criteria for literary judgment. The function of 
criticism, he argued, was to classify the individual works of art in relation to 
the evolution of their genres. It was against the moment of a genre's fullest 
evolutionary maturity that the literary work should be measured. Only the 
individual work which is closest to its genre at the height of its evolutionary 
development can claim true classical status. In this way, critical judgment 
theoretically no longer depends on individual taste, but is rooted in the 
observance of evolutionary principles in literary history. In other words: it is 
history itself which is the true scientific critic. 
However, it is not difficult to see that this theory finally backfires upon 
itself. Who, after all, will decide when a particular genre reaches its peak in the 
evolutionary process, and who, again, will measure how far removed from this 
peak the individual work of art really is? In the end, Brunetiere cannot escape 
the charge that he too, like Taine, bases his theories on preconceived notions of 
value, which in his case are of a strongly traditionalist, moralist, and classicist 
kind. Here, his strong condemnation of, for instance, Zola and Baudelaire on 
moral and aesthetic grounds are cases in point. In his Short History of Literary 
Criticism, Vemon Hall Jr. asks himself with evident surprise 'Who could have 
predicted that the beloved genres of the neoclassicists would now come back 
under the protection of the theory of evolution?'48 René Wellek, who has much 
praise for Brunetière's contribution to critical theory, has also pointed out how 
Darwinism is finally not central to his interests, but rather a sign of the times: 
Brunetiere . . . lived at the time in which Darwinism made its 
deepest impression, and he adopted from it not the idea of 
historical evolution alone but specifically the idea of the evolution 
of species. Though literary genres exist as institutions exist and 
one can write their history, they are not biological species, and the 
Vemon Hall Jr., A Short History of Literary Criticism (New York, 1963), p. 124. 
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analogy between the history of genre and the evolution of a species 
• 49 
is a tenuous one. 
As mentioned earlier, Brunetière's theories in themselves may have had few 
repercussions in England, but a critic like John Addington Symonds was 
strongly influenced by evolutionary theory. Before, however, we return to 
England, there is one other French 'scientific' critic who needs to be mentioned 
in this context, a critic even more obscure nowadays than Brunetière, but 
certainly of greater contemporary influence in England: Emile Hennequin. 
Emile Hennequin 
Emile Hennequin's proposal for a scientific system of literary criticism, a small 
book entitled La Critique Scientifique, was published in 1888, the year in 
which Hennequin died in a bathing accident at the age of 28.50 Hennequin's 
only other works, two collections of miscellaneous essays entitled Ecrivains 
francisés and Quelques Ecrivains français, were published posthumously in 
1889 and 1890 respectively. All three of these books were forgotten quickly 
enough, but at least La Critique Scientifique created an initial stir which is 
worth noting, especially since it did not go unobserved in England either. The 
book was reviewed by Edward Dowden in the Fortnightly, and, as we shall see, 
discussed at length by J.M. Robertson in his New Essays towards a Critical 
Method." 
Of all the proposals towards scientific criticism discussed here, Hennequin's 
La Critique Scientifique is the one which has the outward appearance of being 
the most rigorously scientific. From the start, Hennequin leaves no doubt that 
he wants to dispense with judgment altogether. For him, 'real' literary criticism 
is unequivocally objective analysis in terms of cause and effect, a 'travail de 
science pure, où l'on s'applique à démêler des causes sous des faits, des lois 
sous des phénomènes étudiés sans partialité et sans choix.' [2] 
For this type of scientific criticism, Hennequin coins the term 
esthopsychologie, which he further defines as 'un ordre de recherches où les 
oeuvres d'art sont considérées comme les indices de l'âme des artistes et de 
49
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l'âme des peuples.' [3] Here, it is clear that Hennequin has taken his cue from 
Taine, whom he saw as the initiator of a line of literary investigation which 
regarded the literary work as a collection of signs revealing the psychology of 
its author and of the nation from which it springs. Although Hennequin felt that 
Taine's efforts had in some respects failed to be true to their own theoretical 
starting-points, especially with regard to the race, milieu, moment theory, he 
took from Taine the outlook on literary criticism as a psychological and 
sociological science, and defined his own new science of esthopsychologie as 
'la science de l'oeuvre d'art en tant que signe.' [22] This science, Hennequin 
contended, sat somewhere between three analogous sciences which had already 
achieved a more advanced state: aesthetics, psychology, and sociology. Before 
an 'esthopsychological' synthesis could be arrived at, literature as a system of 
signs should be examined separately from the three angles of these sciences 
first. 
With regard to the aesthetic analysis of literature, the first task for the 
literary 'analyste' is to determine the exact nature of the emotions produced by 
a literary work, as well as the conscious and unconscious means employed by 
the author to produce these emotions. Hennequin distinguishes - somewhat 
obscurely - between real emotions and aesthetic emotions. Real emotions are 
those which are inevitably and objectively aroused by a particular work of art: 
the 'real' emotions stimulated by a tragedy are naturally different for everyone 
from those triggered by a comedy. Aesthetic emotions, however, 'un 
phénomène cérébral additionel', are of the most intensely personal kind, 
attached to our most private experiences of pleasure and pain: 'elles 
comprennent le moi comme sujet souffrant et joyeux.' [36] It is of these 
emotions that the essential artistic experience is constituted, and it is the task of 
the science oí esthopsychologie to determine by which elements in the work of 
art they are produced. Hennequin believed, with all the optimism of his 
positivist perspective, that it would become possible to do this with scientific 
precision, and that esthopsychologie could even make a considerable 
contribution to psychology, 'la connaissance générale des émotions'. [57] 
In the psychological analysis of literature which Hennequin proposes next 
the work of art should be regarded in relation to its producer. As far as the artist 
himself is concerned, Hennequin held that 'L'oeuvre d'un artiste est le signe 
compréhensible de son esprit.' [85] He displayed great confidence in the 
findings of contemporary moral scientists like Spencer, Wundt, Taine, Bain, 
and Maudsley: 'Grâce à ses progrès des sciences morales, notre travail 
d'interprétation et d'explication doit aboutir à la connaissance complète de 
l'esprit dont on aura analysé les manifestations et pénétré les parties.' [87] 
Exactly how the esthopsychologiste should go about dissecting the individual 
psychology of the author by means of his work, Hennequin does not indicate. 
By the end of this chapter, he can only repeat that psychology and 
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esthopsychologie combined may contribute significantly to our knowledge of 
the human psyche: 'Elles vérifieront les lois sur leur objet même et 
contribueront à faire découvrir celles qui appartiennent au développement 
propre de l'homme.' [92] 
In his analysis of literature on a sociological basis, Hennequin does provide 
a new and potentially interesting methodology. Much of this chapter is 
concerned with a refutation of Taine's theory of race, milieu, and moment, 
which, Hennequin felt, did not sufficiently take into account the forces 
contributed by the individual. Hennequin believed profoundly in the ability of 
'great men' to determine the course of history, and it was therefore only with 
extreme caution that certain characteristics of the artist might be traced back to 
race, environment, or epoch. Hennequin then makes the fruitful suggestion that 
criticism should not so much seek the relation between the author and the three 
determinants suggested by Taine, as between the literary work and its 
appreciative audience, its 'admirers': 
. . . les admirateurs d'une oeuvre d'art doivent posséder une 
organisation psychologique analogue à celle de son auteur, et 
l'âme de ce demier étant connue par l'analyse, il sera légitime 
d'attribuer à ses admirations les facultés, les défauts, les excès, 
toutes les particularités saillantes de l'organisation mentale qui lui 
aura été reconnu. [139] 
Hennequin concludes that it is not so much the milieu which creates the artist, 
as Taine had suggested, but the other way round. The artist creates his own 
audience, and it is by studying this audience that the spirit of a nation reveals 
itself: 'une littérature exprime une nation, non parce que celle-ci l'a produite, 
mais parce que celle-ci l'a adoptée et admirée.' [162] Again, however, 
Hennequin fails to supply the tools by means of which a sociological 
examination of an author's audience would become possible, and the 
suggestion is unfortunately largely left to stand on its own. 
Finally, an esthopsychological examination of a work of art should be a 
synthesis of the three types of analysis described above. As an example of such 
a synthesis, Hennequin devotes an appendix to a specimen examination of 
Victor Hugo. This has the form of an analytical table, employing a great variety 
of headings and sub-headings. The 'Analyse Esthétique', for instance, first 
distinguishes between the means of arousing aesthetic emotion, and the effects 
of such emotions. Then the means are further broken down into external and 
internal means, after which the internal means are described under headings 
like vocabulary, syntax, composition, etc. The whole analysis ends with some 
short conclusions, which immediately show up the central deficiency in 
Hennequin's system. Of Hugo's admirers, for instance, he concludes that they 
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possess 'un verbalisme exalté, se traduisant par un idéalisme optimiste vague et 
humanitaire, mais impratique et non résultant de l'expérience; peuple 
idéologue.' [242] One might well ask why such an elaborate system of analysis 
is needed to arrive at such a trite conclusion, as did the anonymous reviewer of 
La Critique Scientifique in the Spectator of 29 December 1888: 'This is a 
sufficiently severe and comprehensive judgment, but it has no more force or 
authority than if it had been arrived at by more ordinary means; and, indeed, we 
doubt whether an exclusive use of M. Hennequin's method would enable him 
to form it.'52 The inevitable conclusion is that Hennequin finally proved unable 
to bridge the wide gap between his theory of criticism and its practical 
applications. His emphasis, however, on the relevance of readership analysis to 
critical investigation may stand as an important contribution to 
nineteenth-century critical theory. 
Hutcheson Macaulay Posnett 
In his La Critique Scientifique, Hennequin on the whole has little praise for 
British criticism, which he finds distinctly lacking in scientific discipline. He 
does, however, make a notable exception for the work of Hutcheson Macaulay 
Posnett, whose Comparative Literature appeared in 1886, the fruit, as Posnett 
later wrote, of ten years of labour.53 Immediately after the publication of his 
book, Posnett, who was trained as a lawyer, left England to become Professor 
of Classics and English Literature in Auckland, New Zealand.54 When fifteen 
years later Posnett looked back upon the effects his book had had in an article 
for the Contemporary Review,55 he noted with satisfaction that his suggestion 
of establishing university chairs of Comparative Literature had been adopted in 
the United States, France, and in other countries, and that on the whole, the 
idea of comparative literature was still very much alive. However, the book had 
of course also had its share of adverse criticism, which Posnett put down to the 
obtuseness of 'amateur critics', whose only function was to act as 'a guidepost 
to popular ignorance'. [856-857] In order to counter this ignorance, he set out 
in his Contemporary Review article to provide a short sketch of the leading 
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principles of the new science of comparative literature which he had first 
proposed in his Comparative Literature, and it is this sketch which provides 
the most convenient access to Posnett's ideas. 
At the foundation of Posnett's proposal for a theory of literature and literary 
criticism is a triad which shows that he has had the opportunity to learn from 
both Darwinian and Spencerian theories of evolution, as well as from Taine: 
social evolution, individual evolution, and the influence of the environment on 
the social and individual life of man. First of all, Posnett followed Spencer in 
defining social evolution as 'the multitude of recorded facts that prove a 
progress of human society from smaller and less organised to larger and more 
complex systems.' [858] With regard to the nature of these systems, Posnett 
assumed 'the gradual expansion of social life, from clan to city, from city to 
nation, from both of these to cosmopolitan humanity, as the proper order of 
studies in comparative literature.'36 He then set out to demonstrate how each of 
these phases left its mark 'in a literature peculiarly its own', making even the 
technical definition of literature a different thing at different periods. [859] 
Unlike Hennequin, Posnett is clearly no believer in the theory that 'great 
(literary) men' are dominant determinants in the evolutionary process: 'All 
these nice discriminations of time and sound, upon which the strength and 
beauty of a literature so largely depend, are madeyôr the man of letters and not 
by him.' [861] Nonetheless, Posnett does not underestimate the importance of 
the individual in literary evolution. He defines the term individual evolution as 
'only a brief expression for a vast mass of facts that show a development of 
human consciousness, a development of conscious feeling as well as of 
conscious reason.' [861] There is no mistaking the positivist tendency in such a 
statement, and Posnett clearly believed in the upward direction of evolutionary 
processes, seeing continual mental progress in all history: 'The progress of 
consciousness is no mere surmise, but the faithful interpretation of man's 
mental history.' [862] 
As far as the influence of the environment is concerned, Posnett perceives a 
subtle interaction between the influence of the environment on the one hand 
and social and individual evolution on the other hand. He describes how the 
poet, in moving away from his social group towards an 'intense' individualism, 
develops a new relationship towards the environment, finding in it 'a meaning 
and a magic charm', to which a less developed consciousness would not be 
sensitive. [863] It is only a poet in such an advanced and new relation to his 
environment who is capable of what Posnett calls 'world-literature', a 
universal kind of literature severed from the influence of a defined social 
group, displaying an ideal range of human sympathy. 
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What, then, is the method of comparative literature by means of which we 
can arrive at a more precisely defined conception of this 'world-literature'? 
Posnett defines it concisely as follows: 'It consists in retracing the steps man 
has taken individually and collectively in reaching the highest social life, the 
widest and deepest personal consciousness as yet within his ken.' [864] He 
respectfully acknowledged his theoretical debt to the legal work of Sir Henry 
Maine: 
I found in Ancient Law and other works of Sir Henry Maine 
splendid examples of an historical principle . . . This principle, in 
its legal form, was the progress of society from status to contract; 
and I soon found that it was only the legal aspect of the much 
larger principle of evolution from communal to individualised life 
and thought which summarises a vast mass of facts to be found in 
ethical and economic and logical studies as well as in 
jurisprudence. [871] 
In 1882 Posnett had published a small book entitled The Historical Method, in 
which he had attempted to show that 'the function of the historical method lies 
in tracing back all kinds of truths, popular or scientific, ephemeral or of more 
permanent value; to the experiences that give them birth.' [871] In The 
Historical Method, Posnett had confined himself to the fields of law, ethics and 
economics, and it was in his Comparative Literature that he attempted to apply 
the same method to literature. 
Posnett's decision to apply the comparative method to literature appears to 
have been motivated to no insignificant extent by his contempt - this does not 
seem too strong a word - for the arbitrariness of contemporary critical 
standards. The literary-critical scene of his day appeared to him a profoundly 
disturbing spectacle: 'In the absence of historical and comparative study 
criticism resolves itself into an incoherent mass of personal dicta dependent on 
the likes and dislikes of critics and coteries of critics and on the changing 
fashions of literary opinion.'[867] It is interesting to note that this contempt has 
its roots deep in moral soil. Posnett embraces Goethe's ideal of 'Literary 
imagination in the service of the highest truths and diffusing these truths 
through the medium of human emotion' and expresses the need for a 'strong 
desire to separate historically and practically the living truths from the dead, 
and a noble resolve to carry out this work of separation with fearless honesty'. 
[869] Here, after extensive meanderings in the land of science, we are back on 
familiar Victorian critical territory, where Arnoldian signposts once again show 
us the way. In terms of practical criticism, this led Posnett to a sharply 
expressed disapproval of aesthetically inclined critics and literary men, those 
'artistic fops who degrade literature into a stylist's toy and talk with amazing 
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effrontery of what they are pleased to call the moral indifference of art'. [869] 
To Posnett the Victorian theorist of literature, art and morality are inseparable, 
as are morality and science. That this makes Posnett very much a child of his 
time, he would perhaps have been the first to admit. 
Posnett's theory of literature and literary criticism, although hardly part of 
mainstream critical history, has not entirely escaped twentieth-century notice. 
Posnett is generally credited with giving currency to the term 'comparative 
literature',57 and his name tends to be mentioned by comparatists at the opening 
of histories of the discipline of comparative literature, although not always with 
approval.58 Elinor Shaffer, however, has claimed for Posnett's work that it 
'marks a very important phase not only in the development of comparative 
literature, but of modern literary criticism in general: for the scientific 
pretensions of criticism are a notable feature of our own century.'59 This is a 
claim that might profitably be extended to include the other (British) scientific 
critics mentioned in the present chapter, although it should be added that 
Posnett's approach, with its pretensions to laying bare the springs of 
world-literature, in a sense has the widest theoretical scope. Although driven 
by an intense dislike of the practice of literary criticism as he himself 
experienced it, Posnett offers little by way of guidelines for practical criticism. 
His main interest is in Has phenomenon of literature, not in its evaluation on the 
basis of value-judgment, and in this sense Posnett is perhaps closest to the 
spirit of present-day literary theory of all the scientific critics dealt with here. 
Be that as it may, its antiquated scientific terminology stamps Comparative 
Literature as very much a product of its time, and a rather arid one at that. 
Posnett betrays little love or enthusiasm for literature, and while his book is 
certainly of historical interest, it remains somewhat of a literary-critical 
curiosity. 
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Richard G Moulton 
Richard Green Moulton (1849-1924) was one of the pioneers of the University 
Extension Movement in Great Britain, and later in the United States, where he 
became Professor of Literary Theory and Interpretation and Head of the 
Department of General Literature at The University of Chicago.60 The 
following is the confident opening-statement of his Shakespeare as a Dramatic 
Artist. A Popular Illustration of the Principles of Scientific Criticism, the first 
edition of which appeared in 1885.61 
In the treatment of literature the proposition which seems to stand 
most in need of assertion at the present moment is, that there is an 
inductive science of literary criticism. As botany deals inductively 
with the phenomena of vegetable life and traces the laws 
underlying them, as economy reviews and systématises on 
inductive principles the facts of commerce, so there is a criticism 
not less inductive in character which has for its subject-matter 
literature. [1] 
More particularly, this statement stands at the beginning of the 'Introduction', 
in which Moulton makes a case for an inductive science of literary criticism as 
opposed to the loose practice of judicial criticism. The advocacy of a more 
systematic approach to literary study based on the inductive method is a 
recurrent theme in Moulton's work and is variously reflected in studies like The 
Ancient Classical Drama (1890), The Literary Study of the Bible (1895), World 
Literature and Its Place in General Culture (1911), and finally in his 
theoretical magnum opus, The Modern Study of Literature of 1915, in which 
Moulton attempted 'to arrive at a synthetic view of the theory and interpretation 
of literature.'62 However, to gain the clearest impression of Moulton's views on 
scientific literary criticism, the 'Introduction' to his Shakespeare as a Dramatic 
Artist provides a suitable starting-point. 
As the opening statement shows, Moulton felt strongly that the fate of a 
scientific literary criticism relied on its unequivocal endorsement of the 
inductive method. Indeed, Moulton argued, 'the whole progress of science 
60
 For Moulton's biography, see W. Fiddian Moulton, Richard Green Moulton (New 
York, 1926); S[hailer] M[atthews], 'Moulton, Richard Green', Dictionary of American 
Biography, (New York, 1934), XIII, pp. 291-2. 
61
 Richard G. Moulton, Shakespeare as a Dramatic Artist. A Popular Illustration of 
the Principles of Scientific Criticism (Oxford, 1885). The page references in square brackets 
inserted in the main text refer to the third, revised and enlarged edition of 1893. 
62
 Richard G. Moulton, The Modern Study of Literature: An Introduction to Literary 
Theory and Interpretation (Chicago, 1915), pp. vii-viii. 
124 J.M. ROBERTSON: RATIONALIST AND LITERARY CRITIC 
consists in winning fresh fields of thought to the inductive methods', and since 
induction was generally accepted as 'a regimen for healthy science', it was 
actually no more than common-sense to apply it to the field of literature also. 
[1] There it would be able to perform a most important function by moving 
criticism away from mere value-judgement. As with most other critics with 
scientific pretensions mentioned in this chapter, Moulton's adoption of the 
scientific method is motivated by his dissatisfaction with the arbitrariness of 
critical judgment as handed out by all and sundry, whether in the press or in 
popular conversation. Although Moulton did not feel that such judicial 
criticism was wholly without function, he argued that literary criticism could 
never attain the status of a science without a clear separation between criticism 
as judgment and criticism as investigation. There is no mistaking Taine's 
influence when Moulton states that 'the one is the enquiry into what ought to 
be, the other the enquiry into what is', and 'the criticism of taste analyses 
literary works for grounds of preference or evidence on which to found 
judgments; inductive criticism analyses them to get a closer acquaintance with 
their phenomena.' [2] 
Moulton then anticipates a charge likely to be levelled against inductive 
criticism from the side of the advocates of judgment. Is not literary appreciation 
'a thing of culture' and is not judicial criticism 'a wise economy of 
appreciation, the purpose of which is to anticipate natural selection and 
universal experience'? [6] Moulton's answer consists of the counter-charge 
that, rather than aiding literary appreciation, judicial criticism may prove no 
inconsiderable obstacle to it, since 'the mere notion of condemning may be 
enough to check our receptivity to qualities which, as we have seen, it may 
need our utmost effort to catch.' [7] Moulton has no difficulty in listing several 
pages of notable blunders in the history of Shakespeare criticism, leading him 
to the conclusion that 'the whole history of criticism has been a triumph of 
authors over critics.' [8] He accordingly provides an outline history of criticism 
in five stages by which he attempts to show the gradual progress away from 
judgment and towards analysis. Perhaps somewhat paradoxically, he does 
afford judicial criticism a place in literary study, but one that is entirely outside 
the realm of science: 'It finds its proper place on the creative side of literature, 
as a branch in which literature itself has come to be taken as a theme for literary 
writing; it thus belongs to the literature treated, not to the scientific treatment 
thereof.' [21-22] It is the failure to keep judicial and analytical criticism 
separate that has resulted in a whole history of mutual confusion. 
Subsequently, Moulton turns to the more direct question of what is implied 
by the inductive treatment of literature. Contrary to those critics who 
approached scientific criticism from the external frameworks of history, 
sociology, anthropology etc, Moulton proposes to focus exclusively on the 
'facts' of literature and art, 'the literary and artistic productions themselves: the 
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dramas, epics, pictures, statues, pillars, capitals, symphonies, operas - the 
details of these are the phenomena which the critical observer translates into 
facts.' [22] The stumbling-block of the elusive nature of literature is to be 
overcome by reference not to taste but to the literary production itself. To the 
inductive critic, 'the question is not of the nobler view or the view in best taste, 
but simply what view fits in best with the details as they stand in actual fact.' 
[24] Moulton thus arrives at the following axiom: 'Interpretation in literature is 
of the nature of a scientific hypothesis, the truth of which is tested by the 
degree of completeness with which it explains the details of the literary work as 
they actually stand.' [25] In this way, the critic should be able to arrive at 'a 
superstructure of exposition' which does not rely on some given authority, but 
rather 'upon a basis of indisputable fact'. [25] 
Thus Moulton arrives at his view 'that inductive criticism is mainly 
occupied in distinguishing literary species.' [32] Here he puts great emphasis 
on the existence of law in art, not in the sense of prescriptive rules, but rather as 
'descriptions of the practice of artists or the characteristics of their works, when 
these will go into the form of general propositions as distinguished from 
disconnected details.' [33] As there are laws in nature, like Newton's law of 
gravity, so there are laws in literature, which leads Moulton to his next axiom, 
'that art is part of nature'. [36] Moulton asked himself 'If there is an inductive 
science of politics, men's voluntary actions in the pursuit of public life, and an 
inductive science of economy, men's voluntary actions in pursuit of wealth, 
why should there not be an inductive science of art, men's voluntary actions in 
pursuit of the beautiful?' [36-37] Such a science should, however, be in 
accordance with Moulton's fourth axiom, 'That literature is a thing of 
development.' [37] The inductive critic should at all times be wary of judging 
by fixed standards and adopt the highest degree of historical relativism, he will 
'accord to the early forms of his art the same independence he accords to later 
forms.' [39] Free from historical prejudices, he may become a true scientific 
investigator. 
After this introduction (of which the above has been a brief outline), the 
main part of Shakespeare as a Dramatic Artist is taken up by studies often of 
Shakespeare's plays, followed by a Survey of Dramatic Criticism as an 
Inductive Science, in which Moulton attempts to deal with the question 'how 
much of the total effect of Shakespeare's work arises from the fact of the ideas 
being conveyed to us in the form of dramas, and not of lyric or epic poems, of 
essays or moral and philosophical treatises.' [321] Moulton draws up a 'simple 
scheme for Dramatic Criticism', in which 'all the results of the analysis 
performed in the first part of the book could be readily distributed under one or 
other of the main topics - Character, Passion and Plot'. In spite of his claim to 
simplicity, Moulton goes quite far in his enthusiasm for classification and, by 
way of example, provides elaborate tables outlining the plots of nine of 
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Shakespeare's plays. The book finally ends with the observation that 'the 
discussion of Shakespeare has again and again reminded us of just that 
greatness in the modem Drama which judicial criticism with its inflexibility of 
standard so persistently missed.' [397] 
This final observation, containing both an explicit value-judgment and a 
general refutation of such judgments, points to a central - and, by now, familiar 
- deficiency in the practical outcome of Moulton's theoretical work which 
contemporary critics were not slow to point out. Robertson, as we shall see, 
devoted a lengthy chapter in his Essays towards a Critical Method to a 
demonstration of Moulton's failure to avoid a priori judgments in his 
discussions of Shakespeare's plays. Robertson's friend and fellow-rationalist 
William Archer, writing in Macmillan 's Magazine, called Moulton's theory 'an 
outgrowth of acute Shakespeareolatry'.63 Archer contended that 'Far from 
being inductive, Mr. Moulton's criticism is in reality a series of deductions 
from the pregnant axiom "Shakespeare can do no wrong.'"64 Moulton does, in 
fact, get into hopeless difficulties when he tries to put his theory into practice. 
His critics rightly point out that Shakespeare as a Dramatic Artist is replete 
with value-judgments, and that the intended separation of judicial and 
objective criticism never even comes close to being carried out. 
John Addington Symonds 
Of all the English Victorian critics who concerned themselves with the 
establishment of a science of criticism, John Addington Symonds is probably 
the best known, although it seems it is mainly for biographical rather than for 
literary-theoretical reasons that Symonds continues to incite interest today. 
Judging from what we know of Symonds's life and personality, one might even 
go so far as to say that he would make an extremely unlikely defender of the 
rigours of scientific method. Symonds had only second-hand knowledge of 
contemporary scientific theory and practice and seems to have lacked any real 
understanding of it. However, his work shows him embracing the findings of 
science and in particular of evolutionary theory with a wholeheartedness and 
ardour that is suggestive of a profound personal need characteristic of the age. 
For him as for so many of his contemporaries, Darwin's and Spencer's 
evolutionary theories seemed to offer a promise of future progress which, amid 
the ontological confusion that scientific revelations had caused, filled a 
deeply-felt want. To Symonds, science was no enemy to religion, but rather the 
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means by which religion might be revitalized: 'The tendency of scientific 
ideas . . . is to spiritualise religion, to dissipate the materialistic associations 
which environ theology in its mythological stages, and to emancipate the 
individual from egotism in the presence ofthat universal Being of which he is a 
part, and to the manifestation of which he contributes.'65 
Furthermore, evolution provided Symonds with a scientific framework in 
which to place his own historical research. Symonds's biographer Phyllis 
Grosskurth has called his masterpiece Renaissance in Italy a 'testament to 
Symonds's faith in science'.66 Renaissance in Italy represents the culmination 
of Symonds's idea that works of art undergo the same evolutionary process of 
growth, maturity and decay as any other organism: 
All things with which we are acquainted are in evolutionary 
process. Everything belonging to human nature is in a state of 
organic transition - passing through necessary phases of birth, 
decline, and death. Art, in any one of its specific 
manifestations . . . avoids this law of organic evolution, arrests 
development at the fairest season of growth, averts the decadence 
which ends in death, no more than does an oak.67 
In terms of criticism, Symonds argued in his Renaissance that this evolutionary 
perspective would enable the critic to place the work of art in relation to the 
overall stage of evolution of a particular period, which calls to mind 
Brunetière's theory of the evolution of literary genres. On the one hand, the 
evolutionary approach to art would help to engender a high degree of historical 
relativism, so that criticism would no longer have to worry about 'the decline 
of Gothic architecture into Perpendicular aridity and flamboyant feebleness, 
over the passage of the sceptre from Sophocles to Euripides or from Tasso to 
Marino', etc. The critic would be led to 'comprehend the whole' and adopt 'the 
habit of scientific tolerance'.68 
On the other hand, this 'toleration and acceptance of unavoidable change' 
should not lead the critic away from what was after all his true function: to 
judge.69 Symonds affirmed emphatically that criticism, viewed from whatever 
angle, finally came down to the exercise of judgment. However, the critic as 
judge was to make use of a set of rules which was applicable specifically to art. 
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It would not do for the critic of art 'to apply the same rules as the moralist, the 
naturalist, or the hedonist.' Great art has its own eternal laws, its own 'abiding 
relations', as Symonds calls it, which provide the test of right aesthetic 
judgment.70 Symonds defines these laws in moralistic terms which are strongly 
reminiscent of Arnold's famous dictum of great literature as 'the best that is 
known and thought in the world': 
All art is a presentation of the inner human being, his thought and 
feeling, through the medium of beautiful symbols in form, colour, 
and sound. Our verdict must consequently be determined by the 
amount of thought, the amount of feeling, proper to noble 
humanity, which we find adequately expressed in beautiful 
aesthetic symbols.71 
Although Symonds expresses his awareness that it would be unrealistic to 
expect that the uncertainties of private, subjective judgment could ever be 
eliminated from criticism, he is convinced that by concentrating on 'abiding 
relations', the permanent laws in literature, these uncertainties can be 
considerably diminished. Symonds's conception of the true critic is finally that 
of the 'enlightened man', whose judgment 'will . . . be the taste of a mentally 
healthy and impartial person, who has made himself acquainted with the laws 
of evolution in art and society, and who is able to test the excellence of work in 
any stage from immaturity to decadence by discerning what there is of sincerity 
and natural vigor in it.'72 
These are, in sum, Symonds's views on the relation between science, 
evolution and criticism as expressed in his Renaissance in Italy of 1887. He 
later took this section as a starting-point for an article entitled 'On Some 
Principles of Criticism', which is the main source for Symonds's views on 
scientific literary criticism.73 Here, Symonds distinguishes three conceptions of 
criticism. The first is that of the critic as judge which we have already noted. 
The second is described by Symonds as that of the critic as 'showman', a rather 
awkward denomination for the critic who has resigned his pretension to the 
function of judge, and has adopted that of'literary botanist' instead: 
It is not his function to pronounce from the bench on what is right 
or wrong, to acquit or to condemn, to apply canons and extend the 
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province of orthodox taste by enforcing laws. On the contrary, he 
ought to be content with studying and displaying the qualities of 
things submitted to his intellect and sense. He must unfold the 
'virtues' of the works of art with which he has been occupied. He 
must classify and describe them, as a botanist the plants with 
which he has to do. [66] 
Although this type of critic seems to correspond conspicuously with Taine's 
conception of the objective scientific critic, this is not what Symonds has in 
mind. Rather, the function of the critic as 'showman' seems to be to convey as 
lively an impression as possible of his own personal reading experience, 
without translating this experience into rules of criticism to which others 
should adhere. It is, regrettably, not quite clear what exactly Symonds is aiming 
at. He fails to give examples of the 'critic as showman' and his image of it 
seems on whole a rather hazy one. 
With his third conception of the critic as a scientific analyst we are on more 
familiar territory, occupied by the likes of Taine and Hennequin. As far as 
judgment is concerned, this type of critic finds himself occupying a middle 
position between the critic as 'judge' and the critic as 'showman': 
He must become the natural historian of art and literature, must 
study each object in relation to its antecedents and its consequents, 
must make himself acquainted with the conditions under which the 
artist grew, the habits of his race, the opinions of his age, his 
physical and psychological peculiarities. Only after having 
conscientiously pursued this method, may he proceed to deliver 
judgments; and these will invariably be qualified by his sense of 
relativity in art and literature. [66] 
Although Symonds subsequently pronounces that the ideal critic should 
combine the qualities of all three types in one, there is little doubt that his 
sympathies are finally with the scientific type of critic. He is, however, 
curiously hesitant to admit so. On the one hand he obviously feels attracted to 
what science has to offer to criticism of art, but on the other hand he also tends 
to shy away from science, feeling instinctively that it does not do sufficient 
justice to the human element in literature, 
This becomes especially clear when Symonds next proceeds to the question 
whether it is possible for criticism ever to become a 'real' science. Although 
criticism can obviously never become a science in the sense that mathematics 
or geology are sciences, Symonds speculates initially that it may attain to the 
status of a science in the way that ethics and political economy have: as 'a 
department of systematised and coordinated knowledge'. [70] However, he 
immediately undercuts his own argument by stating that criticism is, after all, 
130 J.M. ROBERTSON: RATIONALIST AND LITERARY CRITIC 
'not of the same nature as science', and is, in fact, 'not a department of 
systematised knowledge, but an instrument or organ ancillary to all sciences 
and to every branch of investigation which implies the exercise of judgment.' 
[71] Symonds then goes on to a closer investigation of the problem involved in 
subjective judgment, along psychological and sociological lines which may 
well have been suggested to him by his predecessors in the field of science and 
criticism:74 
In criticism the mind of one individual, qualified by certain 
idiosyncratic properties, and further qualified by the conditions of 
his race and age, is brought to bear upon the product of another 
human mind, itself qualified by certain idiosyncratic properties 
and further qualified by the conditions of a certain race and 
century. [75] 
This 'intrusion of subjectivity', as Symonds calls it, makes correct 
interpretation one of the prime difficulties in criticism. The only remedy finally 
lies in a heightened awareness of the problem itself, in a deeper reflection on 
the principles underlying critical judgment: 
To this extent, then, through the perception of what criticism ought 
to be, through the definition of its province, and through the 
recognition of what is inevitably imperfect in its instrument, the 
method tends to being in its own way scientific. [78] 
In this way, Symonds can be seen to waver between a distinct attraction 
towards a scientific conception of criticism on the one hand, and a general 
feeling of uneasiness that science is after all incapable of fully interpreting 
human experience on the other. Although Symonds is much more emphatic in 
his claims as to the services science may render literary criticism, his 
ambivalent attitude towards the subject finally resembles that of Leslie Stephen 
as discussed earlier this chapter. In the end, Symonds's criteria forjudging both 
art and criticism of art are, like Stephen's, made of the kind of solid Arnoldian 
moral stuff which should be familiar enough to readers of Victorian literary 
criticism. 
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Conclusions 
In a sweeping survey of a century of literary theory, Wallace Martin draws 
attention to the fact that the very word 'theory' was in fact 'introduced into the 
critical vocabulary by writers interested in creating a 'science of criticism", 
such as Emile Hennequin and J.M. Robertson.75 Martin rightly points out that 
the term only gained currency with later writers like I.A. Richards and the 
Russian Formalists, but the fact itself is there. The 'scientific' critics whose 
work I have discussed in the previous pages constitute an early phase in the 
development of literary theory which has hardly received its fair share of 
scholarly attention. The names of E.S. Dallas, H.M. Posnett, and R.G. Moulton 
are all but forgotten, and our familiarity with figures like G.H. Lewes and J.A. 
Symonds partly depends on factors which have little to do with their work on 
critical theory. The Victorian age is only too often depicted as virtually devoid 
of literary-theoretical reflection, and in the previous pages I hope to have 
shown that this is a marked misrepresentation of the case, whether or not the 
scientific critics whose ideas I have presented were fully successful in solving 
the problems they set out to address. Moreover, their impact on the 
contemporary literary scene should ensure them a place in literary-critical 
history, even apart from the question whether their writings still have any value 
within the context of current theoretical debates. That, however, is not a 
question I propose to answer here. 
When surveying these Victorian attempts at establishing a science of 
criticism (recognizing that J.M. Robertson's ideas have so far been left out of 
the equation), a number of overall conclusions present themselves. First of all, 
there seems to be little ground for referring to an actual 'movement' of critical 
science. In one of the few books that deal with the phenomenon of scientific 
literary criticism, the historian of science Herbert Dingle catalogues (though 
incompletely) the various proposals for a scientific criticism which the past 
hundred years have witnessed, and concludes (in my view correctly) that 'a 
noteworthy feature of these attempts is their independence of one another.'76 
Every critic, Dingle argues, who set out to devise a scientific approach to 
criticism seems to have started out with a clean slate. We are, in fact, not 
dealing with an organized effort on the part of a small band of critics to create a 
uniform system of scientific standards for criticism. Although there are 
certainly many links and similarities between the ideas of these scientific 
critics, what we actually have are so many individualistic efforts, often (this 
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certainly goes for Robertson, as the second part of this chapter will show) 
highly critical of previous attempts which on the surface would seem to be 
striving towards the same goal. It is true that the works of Taine and Darwin 
have proved important sources of inspiration, as in the case of Symonds, but 
from a strictly theoretical point of view their influence is limited. Symonds's 
guiding light may be Darwin's theory of evolution, but he is fascinated by the 
idea of it, not by its technical and theoretical ramifications. In the end, each 
critic attempts to devise his own 'system', turning variously to evolution 
(Symonds), psychology (Lewes and Dallas), and anthropology (Posnett) for 
inspiration and scientific legitimization of their theories. 
Dingle tentatively attributes this high degree of individualism to 'the fact 
that the matter has been almost entirely in the hands of critics and not of 
scientists; and critics, however impartial they may succeed in making their 
judgments, necessarily inherit a tendency to judge rather than to describe.'77 
Whether or not critical science had better be left to scientists than to literary 
critics readers must decide for themselves, but Dingle does highlight an 
important element these Victorian scientific critics had in common: their 
difficulty in combining the role of judge with that of scientist. The most 
extreme case is surely that of R.G. Moulton, whose elaborate plea for an 
inductive, objective science of criticism cannot hide his lack of awareness that 
he is constantly meting out the most subjective of value-judgments. Although 
all these critics turned to science hoping to find a basis for a more objective 
approach to the study of literature, none of them finally proved capable of 
effectively separating the role of 'objective' scientist from that of 'subjective' 
critic. It appears, in fact, that at the bottom of this conflict lies an even more 
fundamental problem, namely the question as to the exact definition and nature 
of scientific method. This question is not explicitly or extensively addressed by 
any of these critics, and we are finally left with the suggestion that 'scientific 
criticism' was to no small extent a term which had the right ring of authority, 
and could conveniently be used to cover any number of theories. 
An analogous situation may perhaps be found in the rise of a science of 
history, which was, far more than scientific literary criticism, a hotly debated 
issue in the second half of the nineteenth century. With the rise of history as a 
professional discipline came the demand for a new historiography which was to 
be objective and factual.78 It was Robertson's great example Henry Thomas 
Buckle who, with his monumental History of Civilization in England, made 
one of the most ambitious attempts at establishing a science of history. Buckle 
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refuted the view that 'in the affairs of men there is something mysterious and 
providential, which makes them impervious to our investigations' and set out 
to trace the 'fixed laws' which had governed human behaviour in the past and 
still governed it now.79 Although Buckle was widely respected for his 
tremendous erudition, his views were generally rejected or even ridiculed by 
the intellectual establishment.80 A revealing reaction to Buckle's ideas may be 
found in J.A. Froude's essay on 'The Science of History' of 1864. Froude's 
response is characterized in a nutshell by the following passage: 
Philosophies of history, sciences of history - all these, there will 
continue to be; the fashions of them will change, as our habits of 
thought will change; each new philosopher will find his chief 
employment in showing that before him no one understood 
anything; but the drama of history is imperishable, and the lessons 
of it will be like what we learn from Homer or Shakespeare -
lessons for which we have no words. 
The address of history is less to the understanding than to the 
higher emotions. We leam in it to sympathise with what is great 
and good; we learn to hate what is base. In the anomalies of 
fortune we feel the mystery of our mortal existence, and in the 
companionship of the illustrious natures who have shaped the 
fortunes of the world, we escape from the littleness which clings to 
the round of common life, and our minds are tuned in a higher and 
nobler key." 
After reading such a statement, it may come as somewhat of a surprise to find 
that Froude advocated an approach to history which emphasized analysis and 
impartiality, and stressed the importance of presenting facts rather than 
interpretations and theories: 'The historian, we are told, must not leave the 
readers to themselves. He must tell them what he himself thinks about those 
facts. In my opinion, this is precisely what he ought not to do.'82 Myron C. 
Turnan has observed how it was this advocacy of impartiality and objectivity 
which came to be labelled by late-Victorians as 'scientific', leaving Froude and 
others 'in the seemingly difficult position of advocating history as a science 
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while simultaneously rejecting nomothetic thinking.'83 Once again it becomes 
clear that the epithet 'scientific' was one that found many disparate uses. 
If we now translate this brief characterization of late-Victorian 
historiography to the literary-critical scene of the same age, we find that those 
critics we have labelled 'scientific' would have ranged themselves 
unequivocally on Froude's side. We might even go so far as to say that if we 
replaced the word 'history' in the longer quotation from Froude by 'literature', 
none of the scientific critics would find anything substantial to quarrel with 
(although they might not relish the high emotional tone). They too advocated 
impartiality and objectivity, but, as the summaries of their works were meant to 
show, beneath the modern guise of scientific methodology lay the familiar core 
of Victorian morality, with its persistent Romantic belief in the ennobling 
qualities of literature. Again and again these critics stress that their scientific 
efforts are directed towards a moral purpose, and this makes it impossible to 
maintain the not uncommon division of Victorian criticism in a moral, 
aesthetic, and scientific branch. Parrinder too makes use of this triad when in 
his Authors and Authority he discusses these moralistic, aesthetic and 
utilitarian (or scientific) positions as alternatives which existed, as it were, in 
separate universes.84 What the foregoing discussion has attempted to show is 
that these positions tended to overlap continually, and in some cases even 
coincided completely. A strict classification of the type Parrinder maintains 
(admittedly in the service of providing a bird's eye picture of the Victorian 
critical landscape) both oversimplifies and obscures our view of Victorian 
literary-critical theory. If there is one thing that binds these critics together, it is 
not so much their scientific pretensions, as the fact that they propose to 
approach literature from a theoretical point of view. They may have done so 
with varying degrees of success, but the efforts themselves remain worthy of 
serious scholarly attention. 
Part 2: Robertson as a Theorist of Scientific Literary Criticism 
Introduction 
It is now time to turn to J.M. Robertson's own thoughts on scientific literary 
criticism, a subject which was always close to his heart and to which he 
devoted much time and energy. His main efforts in the field of scientific 
*
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literary criticism belong to the last two decades of the nineteenth century, when 
such ideas were, as we have seen, gaining a noticeable degree of currency. In 
1889, he published his Essays towards a Critical Method. Of the four essays 
which this collection contains, two were first published in Mrs Besant's Our 
Corner ('The Fable of the Bees' and 'The Art of Tennyson'), while one first 
saw the light in the more prestigious pages of the Westminster Review ('Mr. 
Howells' Novels').85 The 148-page treatise on 'Science in Criticism' which 
opens the volume was, however, especially written for this collection, and 
represents Robertson's first major effort to come to terms with the problems 
involved in approaching literary criticism in a scientific manner. Divided into 
four parts, the first part is entitled 'Historic Phases' and provides a sweeping 
survey of the history of criticism from Aristotle to Arnold; the second part 
discusses 'Recent Nihilism', i.e. the contemporary tendency (embodied by R.G. 
Moulton in particular) to look upon judgment in criticism as entirely subjective 
and therefore to be dismissed as futile; the third part is headed 'The Problem 
Stated', while in the fourth, Robertson proposes to discuss 'Principles of 
Practice'. In spite of what this seemingly strict division might suggest, the 
structure of the essay remains relatively loose, and it admittedly bears some of 
the marks of a first attempt, such as a general lack of economy in the 
presentment of new ideas and concepts. However, in spite of these rough edges, 
the essay is on the whole remarkable for its breadth of ideas, historical scope, 
and insight into the processes underlying the formation of critical judgment. 
In 1897, New Essays towards a Critical Method appeared, containing essays 
on Poe, Coleridge, Shelley, Keats, Bums, R.L. Stevenson on Bums, and 
Clough. Most of these essays had already appeared in print elsewhere,86 but the 
first piece in the collection (counting 53 pages) was again a new theoretical 
treatise on science and criticism, entitled 'The Theory and Practice of 
Criticism'. Remarkably enough, this essay never once refers to the earlier work 
on the same subject, thus creating the impression that Robertson was bent on 
making a radically new departure. This, however, would be a distinct 
overstatement of the case, since many of the points made in 'Science and 
Criticism' are reformulated in the later essay, albeit more concisely and 
economically. However, in one crucial aspect 'The Theory and Practice of 
Criticism' does represent a new start from the earlier treatise. In the Preface to 
ETCM, Robertson expresses his regret that he had not been able to make use of 
Hennequin's La Critique Scientifique, which he had only been able to examine 
*' 'The Fable of the Bees', Our Corner, 7 (1886), pp. 92-103; 'The Art of Tennyson', 
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after the manuscript of the collection had already been placed in the publisher's 
hands. He commented that 'It was impossible to read that able treatise without 
gaining new ideas and new points of view; and I weighed the expediency of 
readjusting my own essay so as to embody some of these.'87 [ETCM iv] At the 
time, Robertson decided against this course of action, but eight years later he 
did refer extensively to Hennequin's theories in NETCM, and the French 
critic's influence is very much in evidence there. This may lead us to the 
conclusion that the need to afford Hennequin's ideas a place in his own 
theoretical framework may well have inspired Robertson to attempt a new 
formulation of his thoughts on the subject of science and criticism, without 
reference to the earlier work. 
The essays in ETCM and NETCM are Robertson's main theoretical 
statements on the relation between science and literary criticism. In a letter to 
T.S. Eliot of September 1922, Robertson writes of his work in this field in the 
tones of an older man who has seen the error of his ways, referring to the days 
of his youth as the time when 'I dallied with the hope of establishing a decent 
method in criticism.'88 However, only three years earlier Robertson had 
published an article on 'Criticism and Science' in the North American 
Review,™ showing that he had far from abandoned the ideas he had developed 
over thirty years ago. If anything, this article provides further proof of the 
astonishing continuity in Robertson's work, and might as plausibly have been 
written in the days of ETCM and NETCM. 
In fact, even in such a relatively late work as Modern Humanists 
Reconsidered of 1927 (when, by the way, his productivity had by no means 
abated), he remains preoccupied with the science of literary criticism, as the 
following statement clearly shows: 
It is the penalty of literary criticism that, seeking to be in itself, in 
some degree literature, yet also science in respect of demonstrable 
truth, it normally tends to be as subjective as the writings it judges; 
whereas its true function is the rendering of reasons. Failing in 
that, it is justifiably dismissable as falling short of the nature of 
science - as being, in fact, only egotistic didactic literature, 
possibly attractive as such, but as judgment negligible.90 
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For Robertson - more than for any of his predecessors or contemporaries in the 
field of science and criticism - a scientific approach to literary criticism was 
the inevitable and logical consequence of the rationalist axioms which he held 
highest in the world, epitomized in the above quote by the familiar 
Robertsonian phrases 'demonstrable truth' and 'the rendering of reasons'. 
Since he held unwaveringly to these tenets all his life, it need not surprise 
anyone that he remained equally loyal to the idea of science in criticism 
throughout his career. 
In the following pages, I will examine what exactly Robertson meant when 
he mentioned the words 'science' and 'criticism' in the same breath. An 
economical introduction to some of his central critical concepts is provided by 
his 1919 article on 'Criticism and Science', which I will therefore give separate 
treatment. Subsequently, for a more detailed analysis of Robertson's views on 
the subject, I will turn to the essays on science and criticism which appear in 
ETCM and NETCM. Since there is a great deal of overlap between these two 
works, I have resisted the initial impulse to deal with these separately, and have 
instead opted for what may be called a 'bird's eye perspective' of Robertson's 
critical position, with particular emphasis on his reactions to those scientifically 
inclined critics whose ideas I have presented in Part 1 of this chapter. Finally, a 
number of general conclusions are drawn with regard to Robertson's overall 
status as a theoretician of literary criticism. 
'Criticism and Science ': Key Elements 
Although this essay was written over twenty years after Robertson had made 
his two major statements on science and criticism in ETCM and NETCM, it 
provides a particularly useful introduction to a number of key elements in 
Robertson's overall approach to the subject. First of all, Robertson sets out to 
clarify the conception of science and scientific method which underlies his 
critical views. He attacks the view that criticism is not a science by careful 
discrimination between the expressions 'a science', 'science', and 'scientific'. 
'A science', he argues, is usually defined as 'a body of ascertained and 
co-ordinated knowledge, formulated in textbooks, and in the main or in large 
part agreed upon among special students, with reservation only of those matters 
in dispute for the time being.'91 [692] To this specialized, fixed view, 
Robertson opposes the more general and flexible concept of 'science', which 
he describes as follows: 
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Science, which primarily means simply knowledge, has come to 
mean exact and tested and coordinated knowledge, and thus really 
signifies just the carefully ascertained truth about things; even as 
'scientific' points to a methodical and circumspect as against a 
haphazard or purely impressionist way of thinking, inquiring, and 
judging. [692] 
Within the terms of this definition, it is true that criticism cannot claim to be 'a 
science'. However, nor can geology, astronomy, or biology, fields of 
knowledge which have progressed through countless errors, rectifications and 
reformulations, and to which scientific status is nevertheless generally granted. 
On these grounds, Robertson reaches the conclusion that 
Scientific method is just careful, critical, reflective, tested and 
consistent method. For that very reason, there arises in regard to 
literary criticism, which claims to be reflective and judicial, the 
demand that it shall become less haphazard, less arbitrary, more 
consistent than it has been. [693] 
Here, Robertson effectively equates science with his own brand of 
rationalism, so that a concise definition of his scientific method may be said to 
run something like 'rationalism practically applied'. The emphasis on 
consistency should by now have a familiar ring, and it becomes evident that for 
Robertson, literary-critical science is fundamentally bound up with the 
formulation of consistent literary judgments. Through criticism, it should be 
possible to achieve a certain measure of consensus regarding literary 
phenomena.92 Therefore, to dismiss the question of judgment with a simple 
statement to the effect that 'tastes differ' would constitute a vast 
underestimation of the possibilities of science. 
If scientific criticism is in fact the rationalist's attempt to achieve order and 
consistency in critical judgment, how does it propose to go about in the specific 
case of literature? Robertson's answer is that 
the proposed critical science, or scientific criticism, would aim at 
tracing law and causation in respect of literary effects, following 
up the literary phenomena on the one hand to the mental structure 
of the writer studied, and on the other hand to the varieties of 
92
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mental structures and bias which determine the varying responses 
of the reader. [693] 
The initial object of literary criticism is therefore threefold: to study the literary 
work itself, to study its author, and finally to study its readership. These three 
elements are entangled in a web of complex causal relations, which it is finally 
the critic's task to unravel. Robertson's use of such naturalistic phraseology as 
'mental structures' is indicative of his belief in the critic's ability to achieve 
quite definite conclusions in this area. 
Robertson then proceeds to attack the view that science and literature 
occupy distinctly separate realms and are naturally at odds. If there is one thing 
that science and literature have in common, he argues, it is the fact that 
'Science and literature alike are at perpetual grips with inertia: the struggle is 
the eternal and fundamental conflict between the forces of change and the 
forces of resistance to change.' [694] Far from being enemies, science and 
literature fight shoulder to shoulder on the side of progress in the battle against 
the spirit of conservatism. 
Here we are afforded a glimpse of one of Robertson's most stringent criteria 
for literary judgment: only literature which furthers human progress may be 
considered of the highest possible rank. There is, therefore, an unquestionably 
political and moral dimension to Robertson's system of value judgments, a 
dimension which, in its turn, has its origins in an evolutionary conception of 
literary history. If literary products are looked upon as engaged in a struggle for 
survival, only those products which are most effectively suited to the overall 
line of evolution - which progresses ever upwards - may survive the test of 
time and become true classics. To name but one example: in spite of 
Tennyson's obvious formal virtuosity, in Robertson's view he can never aspire 
to the true status of a classic due to his deeply ingrained conservatism. 'Such', 
this article concludes, 'is the law of evolution, in literature as in life.' [696] 
Thus 'Criticism and Science' conveniently brings to the fore a number of 
aspects we will encounter again and again in his major literary-theoretical 
works: the view of science as 'simply' the methodical, consistent way a 
rationalist goes about solving a problem, in the full awareness of the 
subjectivity of value judgments; the emphasis on the intricate causal relations 
in the work-writer-reader triad; the evolutionary conception of (literary) 
history fuelled by a very Victorian trust in progress, and the use of this 
conception as an evaluative criterion in criticism. These elements do not only 
form the building blocks of Robertson's 1919 article on 'Criticism and 
Science', but they are also fundamental to an understanding of his overall 
theoretical approach to criticism. Bearing these in mind, we may now more 
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profitably turn to the essays on science and criticism which appear in ETCM 
and NETCM, and constitute Robertson's main statements on the subject.93 
ETCM and NETCM: Definition of Criticism and the Role of Judgment 
Both ETCM and NETCM are, as I mentioned before, characterized by a rather 
loose composition, which, in combination with Robertson's occasional 
tendency to let his eloquence run away with him, does not simplify the task of 
offering a structured account of the ideas presented in these essays. I have 
therefore chosen to follow certain thematic threads which run through both 
essays. First of all, Robertson's attempts at defining criticism and the role of 
individual judgment in criticism are given careful consideration. This is 
followed by a discussion of the particular issues which Robertson saw as 
essential to the formulation of a scientific approach to criticism: consistency of 
appreciation; the relation between criticism and the concepts of evolution, 
progress, and rationalism; the role of the moral and aesthetic element in 
judgment and the causal factors involved in the formulation of a 'criticism of 
life'. Robertson's criticism of other critics' views on these subjects will be 
continually present in the background. 
The first question Robertson sets out to answer in both essays is a 
deceptively simple one: what is criticism? As always, Robertson approaches his 
goal with the highest degree of confidence, and his statements on the subject 
are strongly expressive of the feeling that since even the dimmest of critics 
might inadvertently have stumbled upon the answers, it is all the more 
astonishing that celebrated critics like Arnold had failed to do so. In ETCM, 
criticism is defined in typical off-hand fashion as 'a process that goes on over 
all the field of human knowledge, being simply comparison or clash of 
opinion.' [ETCM 1] The definition which opens NETCM is somewhat wider in 
scope, though similar in intent: 
Criticism is obviously enough the expression of the most general 
and the most fundamental form of mental activity, indeed of the 
essence of all activity, the play of attraction and repulsion, liking 
and dislike. Even if the word be limited to the naming of a process 
of strife, it points to what the ancient thinker saw to be the 'parent 
of things.' The serenest and the dullest of us must needs criticise: 
there is no respite from the function while we live and think. 
[NETCM 1] 
93
 In referring to these essays, I will use the titles of the collections in which they 
appear, i.e. ETCM and NETCM, rather than the somewhat impractical and potentially 
confusing proper titles of the separate essays. 
ROBERTSON AND SCIENTIFIC LITERARY CRITICISM 141 
This makes criticism as natural a function of the human constitution as 
breathing, and it is therefore no more than logical that criticism should also turn 
its attention towards literature, literary criticism being 'only a department of 
inquiry entered from the same kind of motives as lead men to scientific 
research commonly so-called.' These motives are further specified as 'the 
impulses of curiosity and self-expression - the desire to know, and the need to 
express notions.' [ETCM 1] To expect literature to be exempt from such 
impulses would be a gross denial of one of mankind's most deeply-rooted and 
universal characteristics. 
Such a 'naturalistic' view of criticism obviously has far-reaching 
implications for the problem of judgment in literary criticism which so 
preoccupied critics like Hippolyte Taine and R.G. Moulton. To Robertson, the 
whole question whether judicial literary criticism is a worthwhile activity 
hardly merits serious consideration: 
The last question [i.e. whether criticism is a worthwhile activity] 
we must just dismiss, as we do that other, as to whether life is 
worth living. Whatever be the truth about the poet's singing, we do 
every one of us criticise because we must: the trouble is only too 
clearly that as a rule we pipe bat as the linnets sing. The decisive 
proof of this is that those writers who expressly set out to veto 
judicial criticism, to restrict criticism to a mere process of 
descriptive cataloguing, always end by practising judicial criticism 
like other people. [NETCM3] 
Two of the three opponents of judicial criticism Robertson particularly has in 
mind here we have already met: Hippolyte Taine and R.G. Moulton. The third 
is the leading American novelist and man of letters William Dean Howells. 
Not surprisingly, Robertson applauded Taine's search for method in literary 
criticism and willingly conceded that 'the method of M. Taine has helped to set 
up intelligent currents through the whole area of criticism.' [ETCM 141] 
Furthermore, he considered the Frenchman's method 'a valuable step to the 
right conception of a writer as being like every one else an organism in an 
environment, conditioned by that as well as affecting it.' [NETCM 18] 
However, with regard to solving the problem of the intrusion of subjective 
feelings into critical judgment, Robertson saw Taine's approach as markedly 
deficient. In spite of his claims to setting up a criticism which abstained from 
pardoning and proscribing while limiting itself to description and classification, 
Taine, Robertson observed, 'proscribed and pardoned like the rest of us, and 
that avowedly.' [NETCM 3] The problem was that, in his proposal to study 
every work of art as the outcome of the combined causal forces of race, 
environment, and moment, 'Taine was taking for granted a number of 
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sociological propositions which were themselves in the stage of tentative 
science, and which were thus a bad foundation for detailed judgments.' 
[NETCM IS-19] 
Robertson illustrates his critique of Taine by means of a practical example. 
In his view, the customary outcome of a 'pre-scientific' comparison of 
Shakespeare and Corneille tended to be that 'Shakespeare had great passion 
and imagination but little judgment in the use of incident' while Corneille was 
said to be 'stiff and declamatory'. [NETCM 19] Taine's method greatly 
improved upon such generalizations by looking at the characteristics of the 
audience, the methods in use on stage, and the literary taste of the time, before 
reaching any conclusions. Thus, Taine brought to criticism a much wider 
scope, a much broader perspective: 
Taine's method is in fact a method of historical conception, 
involving judgments on a dozen points besides those of literary 
effect considered in vacuo, or the abstract merit of a tragedy as 
such; and the widening of the survey is almost sure to purge the 
student's mind of some of the prejudice which sets uncultured or 
narrow-minded people gibing against whatever in an alien product 
is specially strange to them. [NETCM 19-20] 
However, Robertson saw clearly that Taine's pretensions to strict objectivity 
were impossible to maintain: 
Yet not only does this widening of the survey still leave room for 
dispute on the original issue of the aesthetic merit of the given 
work, but it opens up new ground of dispute as regards the critic's 
view of the "race," his picture of the environment, and his account 
of the prevailing influence or "moment." On all of these heads he 
may be prejudiced, hasty, or arbitrary. He may falsely simplify his 
task by slumping the race in terms of a few of many 
characteristics, a few of many types; he may give a mere section of 
the environment as showing the whole, and he may be equally 
arbitrary as regards the "moment." Some of us think Taine has at 
times done all these things 
In this manner, Robertson demonstrates convincingly that any attempt to 
exclude the element of subjective judgment from literary criticism (or, indeed, 
criticism in general) is inherently doomed to failure. This tenet applies in equal 
measure to the literary-theoretical work of R.G. Moulton, in which the demand 
for objectivity in criticism is even more strongly expressed. In ETCM, 
Robertson devotes an entire section of eighteen pages (entitled 'Recent 
Nihilism') to a discussion of the theory of inductive criticism which Moulton 
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had expounded in his Shakespeare as a Dramatic Artist. Moulton's book 
rouses him to a level of relentless destructive reasoning which he normally 
reserved for the staunchest of religious defenders. Robertson's main point is 
that Moulton does exactly that which he proposes to dispense with: pass 
judgment on literary merit. Although Moulton's contention that all formal 
criticism should be based on analysis can only be welcomed, his chosen 
analytical method misses its mark completely: 
To show that 'judicial criticism' - the criticism which praises and 
blames - is always non-inductive and always non-scientific, he 
selects old critical judgments which he regards and knows to be 
generally regarded, as absurdly wrong. These he exhibits as 
sample cases of judicial criticism, saying nothing of the judicial 
criticism which has condemned them, but describing the survival 
of the contrary opinion as a case of 'defeat of criticism' by 
'science,' or by 'authors.' [NETCM48] 
Moulton, in other words, is not only guilty of cooking the books by 
manipulating his evidence, but, even more perversely, of 
passing 'judicial criticism' of the most Rhadamantine order, 
praising and blaming the critics, past and present, for their virtues 
and vices, and pronouncing the miscarriages of Addison and 
Johnson, oddly enough, 'odd anachronisms,' when one would 
think that was the one thing they were not. [ETCM 50-51 ] 
And where Moulton, in spite of his theory, has no problems criticizing the 
critics, he stops being critical at exactly the wrong moment: 
In the very act of protesting against the criticism which praises and 
blames and frames hierarchies, Mr. Moulton exultingly announces 
that 'Finally criticism comes round entirely to Shakspere'94 - that 
is, puts him at the top of the hierarchy, as does Mr Moulton, who 
pronounces him (p. 40) 'the great master of the Romantic Drama.' 
[ETCM 55] 
What Robertson accuses Moulton of is, in fact, an extreme form of 
Shakespeare idolatry, a subject on which he would have much to say in his own 
work on Shakespeare, as the following chapter will show. His final conclusion 
is that Moulton's book makes but a 'harrowing spectacle, in which the pathos 
of failure is dashed by a sense of the Icarian presumption which would neither 
* This is the spelling of Shakespeare used by Moulton in the first edition of his book. 
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hesitate to blame nor stay to calculate difficulties.' [NETCM 64] Regrettably, 
Moulton's reaction to this devastating - but acute - criticism has not been 
recorded. 
One might expect Robertson to have been a little more charitably inclined 
towards William Dean Howells's view on the same subject. Robertson was an 
admirer of Howells's novels and praised their realism, while Ho wells agreed 
with the Scotsman on the necessity to pursue literary criticism in a more 
scientific vein.95 However, with regard to the question of judgment in criticism 
they could not see eye to eye. We find Howells's view most extensively 
expressed in an influential essay on 'Criticism and Fiction' which he published 
in 1891, and in which he offered the following scathing characterization of the 
contemporary judicial critic: 
It is still his conception of his office that he should assail with 
obloquy those who differ with him in matters of taste or opinion; 
that he must be rude with those he does not like, and that he ought 
to do them violence as a proof of his superiority. It is too largely 
his superstition that because he likes a thing it is good, and 
because he dislikes a thing it is bad; the reverse is quite possibly 
the case, but he is yet indefinitely far from knowing that in affairs 
of taste his personal preference enters very little. 
However, among Howells's biting comments we also find a vision of what the 
critic should ideally accomplish: 
He is not tolerant; he thinks it a virtue to be intolerant; it is hard 
for him to understand that the same thing may be admirable at one 
time and deplorable at another; and that it is really his business to 
classify and analyze the fruits of the human mind very much as the 
naturalist classifies the objects of his study, rather than to praise or 
blame them; that there is a measure of the same absurdity in his 
trampling on a poem, a novel, or an essay that does not please him 
as in the botanist's grinding a plant underfoot because he does not 
find it pretty. He does not conceive that it is his business rather to 
identify the species and then explain how and where the specimen 
is imperfect and irregular.96 
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The critic as botanist is a familiar enough simile which may be traced back to 
Taine and is also adopted by Moulton. Howells actually goes even further by 
denying the critic all but the very lowest step on the creative ladder when he 
remarks how 'Sometimes it has seemed to me that the crudest expression of 
any creative art is better than the finest comment upon it.'97 
This was a view of criticism and the critic which held very few attractions to 
Robertson, and when Howells first voiced such opinions in an issue of 
Harper's Magazine for June 1887,98 he felt called upon to react in strong terms. 
To Robertson, there was no reason to privilege the artist over the critic: 
Mr. Howells' novels are, in their degree, criticism of life by the 
representation of it; that is to say, he gives us what purports to be 
views of persons and society, saying in effect, This is how things 
go. Now, it is no special prerogative of the artist so-called to tell 
his fellows how things go: it is equally the right of the moralist, the 
historian, the politician, the philosopher, the critic - the preacher, 
if you will; and to say that any one of these is not free to contradict 
the artist is no more reasonable than to say that the members of 
any class may not contradict each other, or members of the other 
classes; which would be a sufficiently idle dictum. [ETCM123] 
It is interesting to note that he therefore also found it impossible to subscribe to 
Arnold's casual remark in 'The Function of Criticism at the Present Time' to 
the effect that 'Everybody . . . would be willing to admit, as a general 
proposition, that the critical faculty is lower than the inventive.'99 Most (late-) 
Victorian critics would indeed have been in substantial agreement with Arnold 
on this point, but Robertson, for one, did not believe in such distinctions of 
merit: 
We have seen that the only generic difference between the 'critic' 
and the 'original' writer is that the former, as such and as a rule, 
writes apropos of books, while the latter, as a rule, writes apropos 
of things, events, and ideas. [ETCM 145] 
He even felt that 'the careful prose stylist may be more "creative" than the 
careless poet' [ETCM 145], a point of view certainly not frequently found 
among his Arnoldian-influenced brethren. In fact, Robertson even appears to 
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anticipate the views of certain present-day literary theorists, who, in the words 
of Christopher Norris, 'would welcome the signs of a growing rapprochement 
between creative and critical writing.'100 
Robertson, then, did clearly not see the inevitable subjectivity of literary 
judgment as an insurmountable obstacle to establishing a scientific approach to 
literary criticism. He was, however, fully aware that the scientific critic could 
not avoid coming to terms with this element of subjectivity in some way or 
other: 
It is the getting behind spontaneous judgment, the ascertaining 
how and why we differ in our judgments, that the critics so-called 
have mostly left unattempted. . . . But, for one thing, the attempt 
must be made by somebody, and one would fain see an 
experienced critic do it. [NETCM4-5] 
In fact, Robertson even went so far as to state that in the end, 'the business [of 
criticism] comes to be just the science of the personal equation.' [ETCM 68] In 
NETCM, Robertson offered an extensive survey of E.S. Dallas's The Gay 
Science, which constituted, as we have seen, an ambitious attempt at 
establishing just such a science. The book certainly appealed greatly to 
Robertson, who praised it as 'the most considerable English treatise yet penned 
on the philosophy of criticism'. [NETCM 5] But although the central argument 
of criticism as 'the science of pleasure' struck him as 'symmetrical and 
attractive' [NETCM 6], he felt that Dallas had greatly underestimated the 
far-reaching implications of his scheme: 
And without seeking to check his reasoning through the too 
discursive chapters actually written . . . we may at once decide that 
not only is a complete "science of pleasure," even of intellectual 
pleasure, an extremely complicated and difficult undertaking, 
amounting to the main part of a system of psychology, but even an 
elaborate presentment of it will leave us facing the fundamental 
fact that "tastes differ," that different things give different degrees 
of pleasure, or give respectively pleasure and pain, to different 
people, or to the same people at different times. [NETCM 7] 
While critics like Moulton and Howells had attempted to separate the 
subjective element of judgment completely from their theories of criticism, 
Dallas went to the other extreme and actually gave it pride of place in his 
system. Since, however, Dallas lacked the intellectual equipment to erect a new 
100
 Christopher Norris, Deconstruction and the Interests of Theory (Leicester, 1992), 
p. 211. 
ROBERTSON AND SCIENTIFIC LITERARY CRITICISM 147 
and comprehensive system of psychology, the attempt was doomed to fail, and 
Robertson showed himself not at all surprised that Dallas had only been able to 
finish two volumes out of the projected four. Dallas had, quite simply, set his 
aims impossibly high. 
However, the fact that Dallas and other scientifically oriented critics had 
failed to get round the problem of differing tastes did not, in Robertson's view, 
constitute a fatal hindrance to establishing a science of criticism. That such a 
science could not attain to the exact status of, say, mathematics or astronomy, 
he saw as no objection to the validity of its establishment. In both ETCM and 
NETCM, Robertson repeatedly pointed to the 'unchallenged' contemporary 
usage of the terms 'moral science' and 'ethical science', denoting branches of 
knowledge equally prone to the subjective influence. From this he concluded 
that 'it will appear there is a sense in which processes of literary and aesthetic 
judgment may be put under a scientific treatment' [NETCM 7]. In our present 
age, when the phrase 'moral science' sounds distinctly antiquated, such a 
conclusion certainly seems questionable, but to Robertson, living in a period 
when science still appeared to hold infinite possibilities, it was a perfectly 
logical one. 
ETCM and NETCM: Consistency of Appreciation 
If we for the moment follow Robertson in assuming the validity of a scientific 
form of criticism that takes the subjectivity of judgment into full account, the 
question remains as to what form such a criticism should take. Robertson's 
answer first of all seems to depend very much on the individual critic's 
capacity for logical reasoning: 
On the instant, there can be little question, each critic must fight 
for his own hand, giving his reasons for the faith that is in him; 
and that faith and these reasons will become part of the stream of 
tendency, either making or not making an effective eddy, telling on 
the banks. Here our problem becomes part of the general problem 
of history, and is no more and no less soluble than that. The 
science of criticism goes no further; but science in criticism 
remains to every critic who cares to methodically question his own 
consistency; and the practical question comes to be whether or not, 
in a given case, he can not only offer an estimate of a performance 
which shall be broadly congruous with a considerable body of 
instructed opinion, but give a persuasive explanation of such 
differences of instructed opinion as leave many cultured people 
perplexed. [ETCM 93] 
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The operative word here is once again 'consistency', the importance of which 
is relentlessly driven home to the reader: 
A man who refuses to accept the test of consistency as a criterion 
of truth is either confused by words or confused in the very faculty 
of judgment. In the former case he is a doubtful subject for 
enlightenment: in the latter, he is impossible. He may keep out of 
legal trouble; he may even be the most amiable of men; but he is 
not to be argued with. [NETCM12] 
It is therefore not surprising that Robertson finally sums up his conception of 
critical science as 'the science of consistency in appreciation'. [NETCM 17] 
What he means by this in more practical terms becomes apparent when we 
look at a number of pages he devotes in ETCM to a symposium which was run 
in the Fortnightly Review from August to November 1887. Prominent readers 
were requested by the editor to submit their favourite literary passages to the 
periodical, and Robertson finds much to quarrel with their choices. When 
Thomas Hardy selects three stanzas of Byron, Robertson is quick to comment 
that 'the students of poetry are surely quick to agree that these verses are much 
too lacking in fluidity of movement to be credited with excellence.' [ETCM 
97-98] Similarly, George Meredith is rebuked for choosing a passage from 
Villette, while in Robertson's view 'there would probably be general agreement 
in a literary committee that perfection is there missed by reason of stress and 
spasm of expression.' [ETCM 102] Overall, Robertson displays remarkable 
confidence in the possibility of reaching a more or less general consensus on 
which literary works (or even fragments of such works) might survive the test 
of time, as long as the laws of consistency are meticulously observed. He 
assumes a 'wide agreement as to the beauty and successfulness of certain 
samples of writing', which he sees as further proof 'that there are bases for a 
criticism which shall be scientific, or reducible to connected steps of reasoning 
from verifiable data.' [ETCM 105] 
The truth is, of course, that in this particular case, Robertson practises 
exactly what he preaches against. Taking his own personal preferences and 
dislikes, he turns them into general literary standards and judges by them 
accordingly. This sudden lapse from logical reasoning is, perhaps somewhat 
paradoxically, indicative of his faith in the progress that science might achieve 
in future. As an apostle of science, Robertson takes it for granted here that he 
has truth on his side, and consequently falls foul of his own theoretical criteria 
for literary judgment. Consistency in appreciation (his own phrase) is hardly 
achieved by laying down the law, as Robertson, again paradoxically, would 
have been the first to admit. 
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But although Robertson's belief in scientific, consistent method, engendered 
by the achievements of the natural sciences, may sometimes have led him to 
over-optimistic conclusions, it was far from boundless. Robertson could not, 
for instance, endorse the view propounded by the Reverend F.G. Fleay that a 
thorough grounding in the natural sciences, with an emphasis on mineralogy, 
classificatory botany, and chemical analysis, was a necessary prerequisite for 
effective criticism. Fleay was the author of an influential Shakspere Manual, in 
which he pioneered the use of metrical tests to establish the 'true' authorship of 
Shakespeare's plays. Although as a so-called 'disintegrator' Robertson found 
many starting-points in Fleay's methods for his own later research into the 
Shakespeare canon,101 he felt that Fleay overstressed the necessity of a wide 
training in the physical sciences for literary criticism. In his chapter on Troilus 
and Cressida, Fleay had written the following: 
We must accept every scientific method from other sciences 
applicable to our ends. From the mineralogist we must learn by 
long study to recognise a chip of rock at once from its general 
appearance; from the chemist, to apply systematic tabulated tests 
to confirm our conclusions; from both, to use varied tests - tests as 
to form, as for crystals - tests as to materials, as for compounds 
. . . . When these things are done systematically and thoroughly, 
then, and then only, may we expect to have a criticism that shall be 
free from shallow notions taken up to please individual 
eccentricities: a criticism that shall differ from what now too often 
goes under that name, as much as the notions on the determining 
causes of the relations between wages and capital differ in the 
mind of a Stuart Mill and that of a Trades-Union delegate.102 
Robertson found this 'a hasty and overstrained way of putting the case for the 
advantage to literary criticism from a hold on physical science.' [NETCM 41] 
Although he did agree with Fleay that 'the practice of a physical science may 
suggest to a student a new analytical test in literature', he felt nonetheless that 
'the same test may occur to a student who has never meddled with that science 
at all.' [NETCM 42] Ultimately, what the natural sciences had to offer to 
literary criticism did not so much have to do with the adoption of specific 
methods, as with the development of a scientific attitude, to be found 
first, in the mere habit of exactitude, the avoidance of 
inconsistency, the sense of the importance of proofs; secondarily, 
in the probable stimulus to speculative or theorising thought; and 
See Chapter 4, Part 1. 
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ultimately in the probable widening of philosophic view in 
general, and of estimate of human capacity in particular. [NETCM 
43] 
The truth is that Robertson's own interest in the specific findings and 
methodology of the natural sciences was always quite limited. To Robertson 
the humanist and rationalist (as well as to so many of his like-minded 
contemporaries), it was the idea of science that mattered above all, and proved 
the real source of inspiration for his critical thought. 
ETCM and NETCM: Evolution, Progress, and Rationalism 
The same point might justifiably be made with regard to Robertson's 
whole-hearted adoption of the concept of evolution. He did not so much 
embrace Darwin's theory as a plausible solution to an abstract scientific 
problem, but rather as scientifically authorized, all-encompassing proof for his 
rationalist philosophy of life. The concept of evolution is the backbone of all of 
Robertson's work, and with regard to his literary criticism, we find that ETCM 
in particular is suffused with evolutionary notions and jargon. Halfway through 
the essay, for instance, he offers an evolution-inspired modification of his 
earlier definitions of criticism: 
We might at this stage of the argument take philosophic stand on 
the final position that criticism (like philosophy) is in the long run 
the assertion of our personality in that struggle for survival which 
goes on among opinions as among organisms; [NETCM 71] 
In his straggle with the problem of subjective literary taste, Robertson 
subsequently introduces evolution as a possible scientific basis for evaluative 
judgment. At the core of Robertson's argument lies the contention, reminiscent 
of Brunetiere's theory of literary genres, that only those literary works (as well 
as periods) which lie closest to the main evolutionary line deserve the epithet 
'classic'. On this basis, he passes severe judgment on the Restoration and 
Augustan period, here referred to as the 'literary interregnum': 
We class the literary interregnum, in short, as a variation that did 
not persist; and looking from our point of view of life and destiny, 
we satisfy ourselves that, while it did a service as an interregnum, 
we can see in its jejune reasoning and consciously artificial key 
and style a kind of ineptitude of thought and speech, amounting to 
a falling off in total vitality which it was well to have got past. 
Beyond this, criticism need not go; but thus far, on the 
assumptions made, it must go. [ETCM74] 
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In other words, Robertson sees the outcome of the literary struggle for survival 
of the past two centuries as a decisive defeat for the Restoration and Augustan 
period. Time and evolution combined, he argued, have proven as much. 
It did not follow, however, that these periods should therefore be dismissed 
from critical attention. On the contrary: they too constituted important chapters 
in literary development, and Robertson emphasized that 'in our classification of 
aspects of literature, we should keep room for the strictly historic or 
techno-historic interest of every past art form to those interested in art.' 
[ETCM 75] The same historical relativism is applied in a lengthy discussion of 
the works of Ben Jonson, for which Robertson betrays but little sympathy. He 
sums up his opinion of Jonson with a cursory statement to the effect that, when 
set next to Shakespeare, Jonson showed himself a literary deviant, far removed 
from the main evolutionary line: 
Well, one passes judicial criticism on Jonson to the effect that his 
was on the whole an unfortunate literary variation, in itself and in 
respect of its consequences ill-related to the mental and neural life 
of to-day; and we say this with a conscious eye to what seem to us 
the elements of eternal fitness in Shakspere. [ETCM 83] 
However, such criticism, damning enough in itself, did not preclude historical 
interest in the literary figure as such: 
Yet we remain fully alive to the strong interest of Jonson's mind, 
character and work, and recommend him not only to the literary 
students as a great figure in the history of technique, but to the 
general reader as affording lights on the intellectual and art life of 
the Shaksperean period which are not to be got in Shakspere. That 
sufficiently said, judicial criticism has, broadly speaking, done its 
work with him. [ETCM 83] 
In spite of Robertson's evident aversion to Jonson, Robertson's keen awareness 
of the relativity of any literary judgment prevents him from dismissing 
Shakespeare's competitor completely, at least in theory. 
Halfway through his discussion of the 'literary interregnum' and Ben 
Jonson's work, Robertson asks himself a relevant enough question: 'Does all 
this sound arbitrary and uncatholic? Or other than "scientific"?' [ETCM 75] 
The gist of the answer he himself immediately supplies is that the very 
awareness of the relative truth-value of literary judgments secures the 
scientific status of the criticism proposed. Scientific criticism does not mean 
that the subjective human element should be eradicated from criticism, but that 
it should be taken into due account as an inalienable part of the process of 
judgment. After all, Robertson argues, 'I cannot in the nature of things be a 
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good eighteenth-centuiy Popean and a good Tennysonian.' [ETCM 75] It may 
be possible to defend a preference for Pope on all kinds of excellent grounds, 
but 'in the matter of art and language, rhythms and music, I cannot choose but 
prefer the modern, for the same reasons that make me prefer Shakspere to the 
Popeans on the points in question.' [ETCM 76] Robertson realizes that the 
evolution of taste may be such that a preference for Pope could come to be 
looked upon as distinctly outmoded, but that is a risk the critic should be 
willing to take, and, indeed, can never avoid: 
The fashion may change, of course: social evolution may yet take 
paths parallel to those followed before and after the Restoration; in 
which case nothing may convince the generation on these paths 
that to-day's taste is more healthily related to progress than that 
which we now describe as non-viable. . . . But if time prove to be 
on my side, as I of course suspect will be the case, the residual fact 
will be that my "taste" was nearer the main line of evolution. 
[ETCM76] 
As long as the critic is willing to concede the historical relativity of his 
judgments, science and criticism may go hand in hand. 
The phrase 'taste . . . related to progress' used by Robertson in the above 
quote gives us some first insight into the criteria which Robertson implicitly 
employs to decide upon the exact direction of this 'main line of evolution'. 
Like most of his contemporaries, Robertson tended to equate evolution with 
progress. By some intricate circular reasoning, he consequently based his 
decision to place a particular (literary) development on or off the main line of 
evolution on the extent to which this development contributed to overall human 
progress. 
This becomes especially apparent when we look at the concise history of 
criticism which constitutes the first part of ETCM. Robertson's account starts 
with the pioneering work of Aristotle, and then swiftly moves on to Longinus's 
essay 'On the Sublime'. His criticism is voiced (as usual) in no uncertain terms: 
The once-renowned treatise "On the Sublime" one reads now (and 
only the specialist reads it) with an unappeasable sense of futility; 
not because the criticism it embodies is felt to be bad - on the 
contrary, it for the most part satisfies the judgment and exhibits 
great expertness within its limits; but because it is become, as it 
were, parasitic and dilettantist, a pedant habit of tasting and 
relishing and objecting, with no real outlook on new practice; and 
with no suspicion that literature exists for the sake of life, and not 
life for the sake of literature. [ETCM 2] 
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Although Robertson can admire Longinus's treatise as to some extent a 
virtuoso performance, he finds it lacking in one essential quality, which he 
expresses in such phrases as 'forward impulse' [ETCM 7], or 
'forward-reaching temper' [ETCM 9]. What Robertson requires of literature 
and literary criticism alike is this 'outlook on new practice', a true creative 
impulse towards fresh literary form and content. 
At this point in his argument, Robertson draws an interesting analogy 
between literary and scientific progress, which sheds some light on how he 
actually envisaged the specific mechanics of progress. The 'forward-reaching 
impulse' in literature, he argues, seems to be 'analogous to that projection of 
the mind beyond experience which in science means discovery and new 
knowledge.' [ETCM 9] Scientific progress is not a matter of gradual, 
successive steps leading inevitably to new discoveries. Like evolution, science 
advances in a more haphazard manner, and has to rely on sudden outbursts of 
creative energy. It is 'in flashes of insight' that the progressive scientist or 
litterateur 'reaches beyond logic to new.' [ETCM 34] Such progress does not 
allow itself to be forced, nor can it be fully controlled. What it requires above 
all is a cultural climate conducive to progress, a climate in which the 'forward 
impulse' may flourish, so that it will stimulate these leaps into the future. 
Taking giant strides through the history of literary criticism, Robertson 
observes that the impulse to literary progress had not been current in critical 
practice for many centuries. In classical antiquity it did not flower: Horace was 
all but devoid of the 'forward-reaching temper', and while Apuleius may have 
evinced 'something of creative originality', his was after all an age of 
'antiquarianism', 'absorbed in bookish retrospect'. [ETCM 9] Skipping the 
Middle Ages entirely, Robertson arrives at a similar verdict of the Renaissance, 
'when critical practice was similarly restricted to a prescription of how best to 
be classic.' [ETCM 9] In England, the attempts of Webbe and Puttenham103 
came to very little: 'Both writers are essentially pedantic statists, duly 
proceeding to catalogue those large facts of life with which poetry is concerned, 
but ripe commonplacers in their own thinking.' [ETCM 13] Although Sidney's 
An Apology for Poetry (1595) may have had 'the virile note of the epoch', he 
too is 'fully half pedant', and incapable of leading criticism and literature into a 
new future. [ETCM 13] 
In Robertson's view, it is, in fact, not until roughly the time of the 
Restoration that things start to change: 
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From the time of the Restoration, however, or even earlier, there 
begins to be apparent a real correlation of non-religious culture 
with action, of which the sociologically better side is seen in the 
scientific and freethinking movements, and the rationalism, as 
apart from the poetry, of the verse. [ETCM15] 
From this time onwards, the cultural climate is changing in such a way - albeit 
very gradually - that it will stimulate rather than thwart progressive criticism: 
An efficient criticism, it is obvious, comes of an efficient culture; 
and an efficient culture, which means comprehensive knowledge 
brought into organic relation with life, only begins to be widely 
predicable of England towards the close of the Commonwealth -
that is, precisely at the time when strong political and social 
influences were about to work intellectual reaction in various 
directions. [ETCM 14] 
It is at this point that Robertson the literary critic most obviously and 
emphatically meets Robertson the rationalist philosopher and historian.104 The 
advance of rationalism, science, and literature now clearly all go hand in hand. 
As the rationalist movement rises and slowly but ineluctably proceeds to clear 
away the obstacles in the way of human progress - religion being first and 
foremost among these - so literature and literary criticism may at last come to 
reach to new heights. As critics, Pope and Addison had taken the first steps, but 
'it is not till the next generation that there appears, as part of the now 
broadened and deepened movement of historic rationalism, a deliberate and 
methodical survey of the bearings of modern literature, taken as something else 
than an imitation of the ancient.' [ETCM 17] 
Here the connection between the rise of rationalism and a new approach to 
literature is explicitly made, as Robertson heralds the advent of Lord Karnes's 
Elements of Criticism: 
The "Elements of Criticism," published in 1761, represented in its 
way the expression, in the walk of belles lettres, ofthat movement 
of fresh analysis of knowledge which, reaching Scotland, partly by 
way of France, in a period of quietude after the long fever of 
fanaticism, yielded such remarkable results alike in physical and 
mental science, historic research, and economic theory. [ETCM 
18] 
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Although, as we saw before, Robertson concedes that Karnes's attempt at a 
rational science of criticism 'throughout yields a musty odour, as of dry-rot, 
bodefully significant to those of us who follow his craft' [ETCM 19], he has 
high praise for the critic's catholicity of judgment and the ability to think for 
himself. These virtues, it is implied, could never have arisen in the figure of 
Karnes had not the broad movement of rationalism paved the way. After all, 
that which the spirit of rationalism truly touches can never be the same, a 
rationalist tenet which Robertson further illustrates by means of the combined 
cases of Wordsworth and Coleridge. He unconditionally attributes those 
Romantics' contribution to critical history and progress to their early contact 
with the spirit of freethought: 
That it [English criticism] made progress at all was due . . . to the 
fact that Wordsworth and Coleridge had in youth drank so deeply 
of that very revolutionary spirit against which they afterwards 
turned like their neighbours. [ETCM 37] 
ETCM and NETCM: Aesthetics, Morality, and Causality in Criticism 
The close link which Robertson thus establishes between rationalism and 
literature seems to preclude any form of literary criticism based on purely 
aesthetic criteria. Moreover, it significantly widens the boundaries of what is 
traditionally considered 'literature'. In ETCM, Robertson launches an attack on 
Swinburne - admittedly hardly a critic congenial to the rationalist frame of 
mind - for betraying 'a certain professional limitation in the naive narrowing of 
the [critical] outlook to just those forms of literary art which consist in 
rendering thought on things human in verse or prose with an artistic as distinct 
from a scientific purpose.' [ETCM 84] In Robertson's view, Chaucer and 
Milton do not inhabit universes entirely separate from those of Roger Bacon 
and Newton, nor are they to be judged by different sets of criteria. The critic 
who founds his judgments of belles lettres on strictly aesthetic, belletrist 
standards runs the severe risk of developing specialists' myopia: 
His data are no longer to him what they are to other people: he 
now cannot see the wood for the trees, and every tree has become 
for him a world, in which he notes, not the laws that relate it to the 
organic and the inorganic cosmos, but the variations of leaf shape 
and size; variations which he relishes as objective facts, never 
seeking for the new law which reduces them to intellectual order. 
That new.law comes suddenly from without, from the germinal 
idea of somebody who has been looking at the processes of things 
in their masses and tendencies, perhaps without even reading the 
specialist's literature of microscoped minutiae. [ETCM86-87] 
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It is, in other words, only the scientific generalist, the critic who has kept 
abreast of all the latest developments in human knowledge - in fact, such a 
critic as Robertson himself, or his intellectual mentor Henry Thomas Buckle105 
- who may hope to deliver judgments with any kind of pretence to authority: 
. . . if... the literature of the future, as the present argument will 
assume, is to have in its vein a blood digested from all the pabulum 
of the omnivorous modem intelligence, why then the purely 
belletrist criticism of our time will one day look curiously 
Byzantine to such historians as are called upon to give some 
account of it to a rationally educated generation that will no more 
dream of reading it as it stands than of repeating the abortive 
experiments of early alchemy. [ETCM 89] 
Alongside Robertson's apparent rejection of the aesthetic or 
art-for-art's-sake approach to literature,106 we find a wholehearted acceptance 
of the well-known (and well-worn) Arnoldian formula that literature is 
'criticism of life'. Although Arnold had been thinking in the first place of 
poetry, Robertson applied the phrase to the whole of literature, the boundaries 
of which might even be stretched to include the writings of a Newton or 
Darwin. Robertson's interest in literature was, in fact, primarily of a moral 
nature, which might with equal justice be said of his entire oeuvre}07 To draw a 
sharp distinguishing line in literary criticism between the aesthetic and the 
moral aspects of literature was - at least in theory - anathema to him: 
It is quite impossible in practice to separate the criticism of mere 
literary effect, of poetry and style, of writing which specifically 
aims at "pleasing," from the criticism of testimony, of theory, of 
method, of moral tone, of conduct, of "criticism of life," of literary 
criticism itself. We only need to rum to the work of the greatest 
critics to see that they will not let themselves be restricted to mere 
discrimination of artistic "pleasure," in Mr. Dallas's sense of the 
term. [NETCMil] 
105
 In this context, Robertson wrote of Buckle: 'He is still our one distinguished writer 
who had mastered alike history, literature, and science.' [ETCM38] 
104
 In Chapter 4, Part 3 I will show that, in actual fact, Robertson as a practical critic of 
poetry owed much more to the aesthetic approach to criticism than he was in theory willing to 
admit. 
107
 The phrase 'public moralist', coined by Stefan Collini in his book Public Moralists: 
Political Thought and Intellectual Life in Britain, ¡850-1930 (Oxford, 1991) is perhaps the 
most fitting description of Robertson's position in life. 
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On this moral basis, Robertson envisaged the actual process underlying literary 
judgment as the clash between two different 'criticisms of life': that of the 
author and that of the critic. Both these 'criticisms' are subject to 'individual 
variations', those causal factors which combine to determine the author's or 
critic's personality. In defining these factors as 'that of heredity and acquired 
bias, that of special expertness, that of education' [ETCM 89], or 'faith, bias, 
temperament, and training' [NETCM 25], Robertson plays a variation on the 
Tainean theme of ''race, milieu, moment'' by putting somewhat greater emphasis 
on individual qualities rather than on the influence of the environment. It is the 
comprehensive assessment of these qualities which forms the first prerequisite 
of effective criticism. 
Such an assessment should in the first place be a je/^appraisal on the part 
of the critic: 'In fine, the perfect scientific critic, the critic of the future perhaps, 
might be conceived as prefacing his every judgment - or the body of his 
judgments - with a confession of faith, bias, temperament, and training.' 
[NETCM 25] Robertson provides an elaborate example of such a 'confession', 
of which it is worth quoting a few lines: 
"I have a leaning to what is called "exact" [or religious or 
mystical] thought, with [or without] a tenderness for certain forms 
of arbitrary [or spiritual] sentiment which prevail among people I 
know and like. I value poetry as a stimulus to sympathy and moral 
zeal [or, as the beautiful expression of any species of feeling], 
caring little [or much] for cadence and phrase as such; accordingly 
I value Browning and Dante and Hugo above Heine and Musset 
and Tennyson [or vice versa]. Regarding literature and the arts as 
the crown of life, and fine letters as the flower of literature, I set 
the poets highest in the hierarchy of eminence [or, I seek to 
measure performers in the same line by their relative reach and 
depth and energy in their own departments]." [NETCM25] 
This rigorous self-assessment goes on for many lines more, although 
Robertson is not blind to the impracticality of the scheme. He modifies his 
proposal by suggesting that it might be left to the reader of criticism rather than 
to the critic himself'to draw up for himself a statement of every leading critic's 
idiosyncrasy, and thus to frame his own diagnosis and explanation of what he 
feels to be perversities or monstrosities of judgment, in respect of his own 
possibly fuller knowledge or expertness, or different education, or bias.' 
[NETCM 26] The reader of criticism thereby becomes a critic in his turn, 
whose 'idiosyncrasies' might again be subjected to the same kind of stringent 
examination. The critical process having thus been set in perpetual motion, all 
that criticism can do has in effect been achieved, and Robertson's somewhat 
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laconic conclusion is that 'Beyond that, I do not know that the errors of 
criticism can be rectified.' [NETCM26] 
In spite of this conclusion, Robertson felt that one critic in particular had 
made an important contribution to the rectification of essential critical errors: 
Emile Hennequin. In NETCM, he quotes extensively from Hennequin's La 
Critique Scientifique, and he even offers a full translation of the Frenchman's 
schematized analysis (divided into an aesthetic, psychological, and sociological 
analysis) of Victor Hugo. Robertson is unusually abundant in his praise, 
especially when comparing Hennequin's scheme with that of Taine: 
It seems hardly possible to carry vigilance and exactness of 
method further; and the whole scheme, in its way, seems to me a 
masterpiece of critical analysis. It improves in a measure on the 
method of Taine. It substitutes for a vague and largely arbitrary 
premiss of "race" characteristics an exact study of the 
characteristics of the author in hand, as gathered from his works 
themselves; it shows how special, how individual, was Hugo's 
literary bias; how he evoked applause in respect that many of those 
around him had his characteristics in a minor degree. On these 
heads Hennequin had previously shown the arbitrariness of 
Taine's implications as to race and environment, in that one race 
yields such divergent types, and one environment, one "moment," 
such differences of theme, predilection, and method. [NETCM33] 
Although building on his work, Hennequin had removed from Taine's scheme 
those elements which induced further arbitrariness of judgment, and replaced 
them by the fruitful suggestion that the influence of the reading public was a 
causal factor of tremendous importance in the processes of literary creation. 
Robertson was duly grateful to Hennequin for thus revealing a new link in the 
causal chain underlying the genesis of the literary work. 
He was not, however, entirely uncritical of Hennequin's work, particularly 
with regard to the latter's summing up of the spirit of the French nation: 
Can it be that, after rejecting as inexact and arbitrary Taine's way 
of summarising the qualities of a race, Hennequin himself, in an 
access of pessimism, fell into Taine's error, and summed up the 
French nation without any attempt at discrimination as to what 
characteristics are specially French, and what common to most 
European nations? [NETCM 34] 
The question, of course, is a rhetorical one, and Robertson was acutely 
conscious of the dangers involved in ascribing particular characteristics to 
particular nations. He adduces further evidence of the dubiousness of 
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Hennequin's propositions on national character by quoting the Frenchman's 
conclusions on Dickens. In an essay on Dickens which, like all of Hennequin's 
books, was published posthumously in a collection entitled Quelques Ecrivains 
Francisés, Hennequin concludes that 'the verbal faculty in him predominates 
over the reflective, that he idealises, that he misrepresented human nature, 
simplifying and twisting it, in his way, as much as did Hugo.' [NETCM 34] 
This harsh verdict - in which he certainly saw a measure of justice - made 
Robertson wonder why Hennequin did not logically conclude 'that Dickens had 
his English popularity in virtue of the commonness of his intellectual 
peculiarities and defects among the English nation; that his characteristics are 
"national"'. [NETCM 34] The answer is supplied by Robertson himself: had 
Hennequin in fact drawn such a conclusion, he would also have had to admit 
that those typically English 'peculiarities and defects' were as much typically 
German as English, since Dickens had always been extremely popular in 
Germany as well. On these grounds Robertson could not but assume that there 
was something wrong with Hennequin's concepts of national characteristics in 
general, and with his sociological analysis of the case of Hugo in particular. 
Much though he admired Hennequin's efforts, which may actually have 
inspired him to resume work on critical theory and write NETCM, such logical 
lacunae he could not forgive. 
The fact that even the contemporary critic with whom he was perhaps most 
in accord fell a prey to such logical inconsistencies was no reason for 
Robertson - eternal believer in progress that he was - to doubt the future of a 
form of literary criticism which the spirit of science had breathed upon. As in 
any other branch of science, the pronouncements of scientific criticism were 
subject to constant reappraisal, and ultimate truth always seemed to be receding 
just beyond the horizon. This is the conclusion we find at the close of NETCM, 
and to understand that it is by no means a fatalistic one, but rather an 
inducement to a constant renewal of critical efforts along scientific, methodical 
lines, is to get at the core of Robertson's philosophy of life as well as of 
criticism. It seems no more than appropriate to leave the final summing up to 
himself: 
With such tasks, such possibilities, and such duties, he [the critic] 
has surely enough to do, as beside any brain-worker whatever. 
That there is for him no finality, no "last word," no objective fixity 
of result, such as men are wont loosely to connect with the idea of 
"science," will be made a reproach to him only by those who do 
not distinguish between the spirit and purpose of science and 
certain of its data. And that he is finally a propagandist, an artist in 
judgment, so to speak, will be held to mark him off from scientific 
function only by those who miss the very plain truth that all 
scientific teaching commonly so called is at bottom propaganda 
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and the expression of an intellectual bias. At a time when it is 
zealously sought to tum this truth against all science, in the 
interest of Irrationalism, which is intellectual Anarchism, its use in 
the service of reason and science may perhaps be the more readily 
agreed to. And to the critic, finally, the certainty that, do what he 
may, he will leave inconsistency and oversight and fallacy in his 
work for the children of his tribe to detect, need be no more 
paralysing a thought than the general certainty of the mutation of 
all things. He plays his part like another. In the struggle of 
opinions for survival he takes his chance as all opinion-makers 
must. [NETCM 53] 
Conclusions 
In neither ETCM nor NETCM, Robertson can make us forget the extent to 
which he is a child of the intellectual climate of his time. He is as much the 
die-hard rationalist and controversialist in these works of critical theory as he 
is in his books on the history of freethought or the existence of Jesus, to name 
but two of his fields of interest. He believed in science, progress, and evolution 
in a way and with a certainty which we, from our endlessly more cynical 
perspective, can no longer share. It is in particular his evolutionary optimism 
that may strike the modem reader as naive. Robertson, as I have tried to show, 
displayed a disconcerting belief in a future in which a critical consensus might 
reign, in which all the complex conflicts and issues of 2,500 years of 
literary-critical history might be resolved by the combined workings of time 
and evolution. As a matter of course, he positioned himself and his own 
opinions squarely on the evolutionary line running towards this great goal. 
Thus Robertson, always so wary of utopias as a political thinker, nevertheless 
created his own literary-critical version of one. 
On similar grounds, it might also be argued that Robertson does not really 
offer a literary-critical method as such. In fact, his most fruitful suggestion 
towards such a method is borrowed (with slight adaptations) from Hennequin, 
who, in his turn, leaned heavily on Taine: to view the life and work of both 
author and critic (the critic responding to the author) in the light of 
psychological and sociological causes. It was in particular Hennequin's 
proposal that the author's literary ambience was a much underestimated factor 
in the genesis of his work which Robertson found stimulating, and adopted 
enthusiastically. However, he seems quite willing to leave it at that, and does 
not propose further emendations of Hennequin's scheme which might lead to 
the setting-up of an improved method of critical inquiry. In both ETCM and 
NETCM, the emphasis is quite clearly on the 'towards'; the actual goal, as 
Robertson frankly admits, is still a long way out of sight. 
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To no small extent, this is the result of the elusive quality of the problem of 
literary judgment, which, admittedly, Robertson too did not manage to solve. 
His attitude towards this problem is in fact an ambivalent one. On the one hand 
he quite obviously tries to come to terms with it, seeking out those 
psychological and sociological factors which contribute to the formation of 
literary opinion. On the other hand, he realizes full well that such attempts are 
in essence futile, and will lead to no other conclusion than the obvious: that 
'tastes will differ', no matter how the critic tries to intervene. On the latter 
count, he attacks those critics who attempt to oust judgment from literary 
criticism altogether, although, at least on the surface, critics like Dallas and 
Moulton go much further in proposing methods for literary criticism than 
Robertson. 
It is remarkable that the one critic with whom Robertson has, in certain 
specific respects, most in common should not have been discussed by him at 
all.108 John Addington Symonds would seem a strange ideological companion 
for a staunch rationalist like Robertson, but such, it appears, he is. Symonds 
and Robertson shared their belief in evolution as a concept which might 
coordinate all human knowledge, and, more particularly, they agreed on the 
extent to which science could play a role in literary criticism. Robertson would 
not have found it difficult to concur with Symonds's statement - already 
quoted in the previous section - that 
To this extent, then, through the perception of what criticism ought 
to be, through the definition of its province, and through the 
recognition of what is inevitably imperfect in its instrument, the 
method tends to being in its own way scientific.109 
Although both Robertson and Symonds had great faith in what science might 
achieve, they also felt that science in criticism had its natural limits, and could 
not finally solve the great problem of subjective judgment. Moreover, they 
were both literary moralists first and foremost (although their personal 
conceptions of morality might have differed a great deal). In fact, since ETCM 
precedes Symonds's article 'On Some Principles of Criticism' by a number of 
years, one might even speculate whether Symonds was not aware of 
Robertson's theories, and used them in his own writings. In any case, it is 
remarkable how such different figures might reach such similar conclusions on 
such an elusive subject. 
108
 Nor, for that matter, does Symonds seem to have been aware of Robertson's work. 
109
 Symonds, 'On Some Principles of Criticism', Essays, Speculative and Suggestive, 
p. 78. 
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The paradoxical truth seems to be that Robertson, like Symonds, is actually 
not interested in methods for literary criticism at all. Both ETCM and NETCM, 
in fact, constitute elaborate inducements to method. It is not a system that he is 
seeking, but a generally more systematic approach to literature. This plea, in 
spite of the fact that it is voiced in often outdated evolutionary/scientific jargon, 
is an important one. We must not forget that Robertson wrote his treatises at a 
juncture in critical history when, at least in numerical terms, criticism was 
blooming as never before, with myriads of literary periodicals professing even 
more myriads of literary opinions. Small surprise, then, that a rationalist like 
Robertson should feel the need for some degree of coordination, and small 
surprise, too, that he went about his business in the way that was most natural 
to him: not by framing elaborate - but ultimately hollow - systems of critical 
analysis, but by being, in fact, a critic proper. 
Reading ETCM and NETCM does not perhaps leave one with the impression 
that one has met with a great impetus to new critical practice on a systematic 
basis. That much has to be granted. Nor can it be said that Robertson's 
theoretical approach to literary criticism anticipates other than coincidentally 
critical views which are de rigoeur in this present post-modern, 
post-structuralist age. However, Robertson's writings on science and literary 
criticism do leave one with an acute sense of having been in the presence of a 
powerful, independent critic, whose opinions on literary and literary-critical 
subjects are his own, and are based on the authority of wide reading and sharp 
insight into the complex issues involved in literary analysis. When dealing with 
such systematizers as Taine, Hennequin, Dallas, or Moulton, Robertson may 
profess initial admiration for their scientific intentions, but he then cuts straight 
to the core of the problem: that these critics are insufficiently aware of the often 
dubious premises on which they base their suppositions. When Taine sees race, 
milieu, and moment as the driving forces behind literary creation, Robertson 
sharply exposes the randomness of Taine's choice of causes; when Moulton 
and Howells propose to eliminate the subjective element from criticism, 
Robertson shows up the subjectivity of their own literary standards. Even 
Hennequin, whose work Robertson greatly admires, does not escape scot-free, 
and it almost seems as if Robertson is most critical of those theorists with 
whom his ideological kinship is the greatest. In the end, Robertson as a theorist 
of criticism is above all a most effective critic of other critics' theories, and 
should be valued as such. Whether he is as effective when dealing critically not 
with theory but with actual literary texts is what the following chapter will set 
out to answer. 
Chapter 4 
ROBERTSON ON DRAMA, 
FICTION, AND POETRY 
Introduction 
Moving from Robertson's theoretical, scientifically inspired views on literary 
criticism to his actual criticism of literary texts, of belles lettres (in Robertson's 
preferred term) immediately and naturally begs the question in how far 
Robertson managed to practise what he preached. Do ETCM and NETCM 
really provide the theoretical foundation for Robertson's 'practical' criticism of 
the many dramatists, novelists, and poets whose works he undertook to 
examine? I think it is important to emphasize from the start that Robertson 
himself made no secret of the fact that his main theoretical treatises were 
written after the bulk of his essays on specific authors and texts. In the Preface 
to NETCM he admitted that 'It will readily be seen that no one of the 
studies . . . comes near applying all the tests mentioned in the preliminary essay 
on 'The Theory and Practice of Criticism' as proper to a critical inquiry.' 
[NETCM \] To make Robertson's adherence to his own theoretical precepts the 
focal point of an examination of his criticism of drama, fiction, and poetry 
would therefore be quite beside the point. The fact that Robertson himself was 
aware that the theory and practice of his criticism existed, as it were, largely on 
different planes, underscores the need to assess his 'practical' criticism on its 
own merits. 
What should also be clear from the outset is that the following assessment of 
Robertson's criticism of drama, fiction, and poetry will not constitute an 
attempt to extol the critic's virtues to the skies by carefully selecting only those 
of his literary verdicts which show him to be ahead of his time as far as 
anticipating views which happen to be current today are concerned. To the eye 
of the present, no critic of the past is, of course, ever completely in the right. It 
may, for example, be true and commendable that Robertson was able to give 
high praise to Zola's novels when many of his fellow-critics were far from 
ready for such a drastic step, but he was at the same time quite incapable of 
appreciating, say, Dickens and fell in readily enough with the tendencies of his 
time by assigning much higher literary merit to Thackeray. Few critics would 
agree with him today (also because the custom of comparing degrees of genius 
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2has fallen distinctly out of fashion), but this does not mean that the fact itself 
cannot be of interest from a literary-historical or even biographical point of 
view. It is the purpose of the present chapter to demonstrate that Robertson's 
views are those of a critic of strong individual taste and the expression of a 
powerful personality largely independent of the literary establishment of the 
age. Whether 'right' or 'wrong', Robertson's voice was one which deserves to 
be heard alongside those of establishment figures like Gosse and Saintsbury, 
who have had their fair share of critical attention in the past two decades. The 
fact that Robertson, as we shall see, could command the respect of a critic like 
T.S. Eliot, should alone be sufficient justification for a closer examination of 
his critical practice. 
In the following pages, I will examine Robertson's critical work under the 
three separate headings of Drama, Fiction, and Poetry. To a certain extent, such 
a division will always remain an artificial one; in the case of Shakespeare, for 
instance, the author is obviously as much poet as dramatist. Nonetheless the 
division seems justified here by the necessity to reduce the enormous bulk of 
Robertson's critical output to manageable proportions. That in itself will be no 
easy task, since Robertson has written on a multitude of authors and works, and 
it would be impossible to touch upon his views on all of these within the scope 
of this study. I have therefore rejected an inclusive approach in favour of a 
selective one, which should provide a representative impression of Robertson 
as a practical literary critic, with all his manifold faults and virtues. 
Part 1 : Robertson on Drama 
Introduction 
If Robertson is remembered at all in his capacity as a literary critic, it is as a 
critic of drama, or rather as a Shakespeare critic, since Shakespeare was the 
subject of most of Robertson's writings on the art of drama. Indeed, 
Robertson's dauntingly lengthy entry in the British Library General Catalogue 
proves that Shakespeare criticism took up a considerable portion of the time 
and energy he managed to spare from so many other large-scale projects. 
Between 1897 and 1932, the BLGC lists over fifteen titles of works dedicated 
to the study of Shakespeare's works, and in particular to the question whether 
the plays commonly known as Shakespeare's were genuinely and completely 
the playwright's own artistic creation. Robertson did not believe so and he 
spent many years of intense study of the Elizabethan drama trying to prove that 
they were in fact the products of composite authorship rather than of a single 
hand, always insisting on the necessity of a rigorously scientific approach to the 
problem. He thus became known as a Shakespearean 'disintegrator': one who 
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breaks down the Shakespeare plays into many small pieces on the basis of 
internal evidence, and assigns them to different contemporary playwrights such 
as Marlowe, Greene, or Peele. The theory generated a good deal of controversy, 
and we will have occasion to examine how it fared both in Robertson's lifetime 
and after his death. 
An overview of Robertson's main titles in this field may give some 
impression of the sheer scale of his work as a Shakespearean scholar. In 1897, 
Robertson published his Montaigne and Shakspere, a study of the French 
essayist's influence on Shakespeare which had originally appeared in 1896 as a 
series of magazine articles.' This book was followed in 1905 by Did 
Shakespeare Write Titus Andronicus?, an investigation into the true authorship 
of the play.2 In 1913, Robertson published a voluminous refutation of any 
claims (held, for instance, by Mark Twain) to the Baconian authorship of the 
Shakespeare plays, entitled The Baconian Heresy. A Confutation? A year later, 
Shakespeare also took pride of place in Elizabethan Literature, an introduction 
to the subject published for the Home University Library of Modern 
Knowledge. This useful little work was followed in 1917 by Shakespeare and 
Chapman, which was elaborately subtitled 'a thesis of Chapman's authorship 
of "A Lover's Complaint," and his origination of "Timon of Athens" with 
indications of further problems'. In 1919, Robertson published The Problem of 
"Hamlet", a pamphlet on the complex genesis oí Hamlet, which, as we shall 
see, was not to remain without influence, mainly through the intervention of 
T.S. Eliot. Robertson's theory about the play dates as far back as 1885, when, 
while still under the wings of Mrs. Besant, he published an article in Our 
Corner entitled 'The Upshot of "Hamlet"'.4 There we may witness Robertson 
taking his first steps on the long and winding road which he was to follow for 
1
 The book was reprinted in 1909 as Montaigne and Shakespeare and Other Essays 
on Cognate Questions, adding essays on 'The Originality of Shakespeare' and 'The Learning 
of Shakespeare' which also first saw the light in the periodical press in 1898. At the time of the 
first edition, 'Shakspere' was Robertson's preferred spelling, but he subsequently revised this 
view. 
2
 A greatly expanded edition of this book appeared in 1924 under the title An 
Introduction to the Study of the Shakespeare Canon, Proceeding on the Problem of "Titus 
Andronicus ". 
3
 An equally voluminous reply to The Baconian Heresy was published by 
Robertson's good friend Sir George Greenwood under the title Is there a Shakespeare 
Problem? (London, 1916). Other polemical books by Greenwood in which he attempted to 
undermine Robertson's theories on Shakespeare authorship are The Shakespeare Problem 
Restated (London, 1908), and Shakespeare's Law and Latin. How I was "exposed" by Mr. 
J.M. Robertson (London, 1916). 
" Arthur Gigadibs [i.e. J.M. Robertson], 'The Upshot of "Hamlet"', Our Corner, 5 
(1885), pp. 142-9. 212-20,275-83,353-60. 
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the rest of Ms life, in pursuit of the establishment of the true Shakespeare 
canon. 
This quest finally culminated in the publication of his magnum opus, the 
five volumes of The Shakespeare Canon, the first of which appeared in 1922; 
the final volume was not published until ten years later, a year before 
Robertson's death. The five volumes form a monument of Shakespeare 
scholarship, but whether the work has enduring qualities is a question that 
needs to be addressed later in this chapter. For the moment, we pick up our 
thread again in 1923, when Robertson returned to Hamlet with "Hamlet" Once 
More, which is mainly a polemical answer to A. Clutton-Brock's criticism of 
the earlier pamphlet.5 Three years later, in 1926, Robertson turned from the 
authorship of the plays to that of the sonnets, with The Problems of the 
Shakespeare Sonnets, again an attempt at a definitive settling of a highly 
controversial problem. His findings with regard to the Shakespeare canon were 
subsequently summarized in The Genuine in Shakespeare. A Conspectus of 
1930, which, for a student new to Robertson's Shakespeare criticism, is 
probably the best place to start. The following year was a particularly prolific 
one; 1931 saw the publication of two books on Shakespeare and one on 
Marlowe, who, Robertson argued, had had an important share in Shakespeare's 
early work. The first Shakespeare study of that year was The State of 
Shakespeare Study. A Critical Conspectus, an extremely critical - acerbic 
would perhaps not be too strong a term - survey of contemporary work in 
Shakespeare scholarship. For the second book, Literary Detection. A 
Symposium on Macbeth, Robertson adopted a somewhat unusual format by 
presenting his attempt to determine the authorship oí Macbeth in the form of a 
(highly) literary conversation between four learned amateurs in Shakespeare 
scholarship. The study of Marlowe of the same year was entitled Marlowe. A 
Conspectus, and subjected the works ofthat author to the same critical scrutiny 
as the Shakespeare plays, again with a view to establishing their real 
authorship, and also to determine Marlowe's share in the Shakespearean plays. 
This list becomes perhaps slightly less daunting when we take into account 
that there is in fact a great deal of overlap to be found in Robertson's books on 
Shakespeare. As in his non-literary work, Robertson is a man with a mission 
which he will not allow his readers to lose sight of. Again and again, he 
relentlessly pursues the same topics, so that the impression is easily gained that 
a smaller number of volumes would have sufficed to give currency to his 
theories and ideas. It should be remembered, however, that Robertson was 
5
 A. Clutton-Brock, Shakespeare's "Hamlet" (London, 1922). 
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never a rich man, and that spreading himself somewhat thin may well have 
been as much an economic as a psychological necessity.6 
In addition to his books, Robertson also published a number of periodical 
articles, the most important of which appeared in Eliot's Criterion, as well as 
pamphlets and lectures. He was an Honorary Associate of the Shakespeare 
Association and corresponded with such Shakespeare luminaries as John Dover 
Wilson, Richard Garnett, E.K. Chambers, Sidney Lee, E.W. Lummis, and A.W. 
Pollard.7 As radical a polemicist and controversialist in Shakespearean studies 
as in religious and philosophical matters, he seldom let slip an opportunity to 
respond to some new critical theory which did not correspond with his own 
disintegrationist views. In fact, many of the above works are extensive 
polemical disparagements of the theories of other scholars, in particular those 
who had the audacity to accept the Folio as entirely by Shakespeare's hand, as 
did his arch-enemy Sir Edmund Kerchever Chambers, whom we will meet 
again later in these pages. Taking all this restless wandering in the wide field of 
Shakespeare studies into account, it is not as surprising as it might at first 
glance appear that in 1919 Robertson should speak of 'a lifetime rather largely 
devoted to Shakespeare study'.' Whether it was a lifetime well spent is a 
question that will need to be examined in the following pages. 
However, before embarking on a closer study of Robertson's Shakespeare 
criticism, a few remarks are perhaps in order about the fact that Robertson had 
so little attention to spare for the contemporary theatre. In the mid 1880s, when 
his friend and fellow critic William Archer was attempting to prepare London 
theatre-goers for the reception of the bleak world of Henrik Ibsen, Robertson 
decided to look to the past instead of the future (as far as drama was 
concerned), and immersed himself in the fine intricacies of Elizabethan textual 
criticism. In fact, the most extensive discussion of the drama of his own age 
appears in a long essay on 'Evolution in Drama' of 1886.9 There, Robertson 
finds himself having to conclude at the end of a sweeping survey of over two 
thousand years of dramatic history that 'our best playwrights have produced 
nothing that approaches in value and importance to our best fiction, while by 
6
 In the Preface to his Literary Detection. A Symposium on "Macbeth", Robertson 
complains that The Shakespeare Canon 'is in the financial sense a thoroughly unprofitable 
undertaking', which he adduces as his reason for aiming at 'a more popular mode of inquiry'. 
7
 Robertson's letters to John Dover Wilson (eight in all) are in the National Library of 
Scotland, Edinburgh, as is a letter to A.W. Pollard; a letter to Richard Garaett is in the Harry 
Ransom Humanities Research Center at Austin, Texas; three letters to E.W. Lummis are in the 
Houghton Library, Harvard; the Bodleian Library, Oxford, has a letter to Sidney Lee and one 
to E.K. Chambers. 
8
 The Problem of "Hamlet " (London, 1919), p. 7. 
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far the greater part of our acted plays are simply beneath serious criticism.'10 
Robertson paints a vivid picture of the 'roaring melodramas at which a patriotic 
audience is thrilled to blatant ecstasy by scenic suggestions of our last 
campaign against one of the inferior races'.11 A performance in a London 
theatre of a play by Ibsen, 'who seems a hundred years ahead of us' seemed 
almost inconceivable: 'Such a play in such a place before such an audience, 
would seem to blow the roof off.' ' 2 
Nonetheless, Robertson was not an unqualified admirer of the work of the 
Norwegian playwright, feeling that 'that strong and bitter spirit is partly warped 
by his own keen perception of human weaknesses and baseness.'13 Clearly, 
Robertson's deeply-rooted evolutionary optimism made complete sympathy 
with Ibsen's dark outlook on life impossible. What he looked for in drama was 
finally not to be found in the theatre of his own time; in fact, he had already 
found it in Shakespeare's creations. 
The Science of Shakespeare Criticism 
Robertson's entire work on Shakespeare may be said to have started from the 
premise that before any critical statements could be uttered about 
Shakespeare's writings or personality, the question of the authorship of the 
so-called Shakespearean plays should first be settled. In his book on 
Montaigne and Shakespeare, he stressed the dependence of all problems in 
Shakespeare criticism on this particular issue: 
The nature of Shakespeare's culture-preparation and moral bias 
cannot be put with precision and comprehensiveness until we 
settle what is and what is not genuine in the plays attributed to 
him; and in so far as points of chronology turn on points of style, it 
is necessary to make sure whose style we are reading at any point 
in the series. Nor, until that be settled, can there be certainty of 
judgment all along the line as to the ethical content of the dramas. 
Yet, thus far, the interdependence of the problems in question has 
hardly been realised.14 
10
 'Evolution in Drama', p. 280. 
11
 /Ш.р.281. 
12
 Ibid, p. 336. In fact, this is not a bad description of the turmoil that broke loose 
when William Archer's rendering of Ibsen's A Doll's House was produced in 1889, three years 
after the writing of this essay. 
13
 Ibid, p. 336. 
14
 Montaigne and Shakespeare and Other Essays on Cognate Questions, p. 28. 
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He proposed to remedy this lack of a solid foundation for all Shakespeare 
studies by approaching the issue in the manner familiar from the previous 
chapter: by adopting the methods of science: 
Scrutiny of the problems of authorship in Elizabethan drama is 
equally a pursuit to be conducted in the scientific spirit, with a 
concern for testable inference such as is only latterly emerging. 
Without loyalty to inductive method it is but a procedure of 
literary or aesthetic impressionism not recognisable as scientific in 
any sense.15 
Robertson claimed that it was the persistent lack of scientific methodology in 
Shakespeare studies which had led to the establishment of a number of 'wild' 
theories regarding the authorship of the plays: 
Sheer apriorism, on a basis of minimum knowledge and lawless 
hypothesis, has yielded all the vain dogmatisms of the series of 
theories which began with Baconism and has successfully 
presented Rutlandism, Derbyism and Oxfordism,'6 all destroying 
each other, none offering reasonable evidence to the rational 
inquirer. Theirs is the method of speculative ignorance, wholly 
detached from the procedures of aesthetic and other testation 
which are indispensable to any induction worthy of the name.17 
Clearly, Robertson is as much the scientific rationalist in studies of 
Shakespeare as elsewhere. In fact, one might say that in his work on the 
authorship question, his claim to the scientific status of his methods is put 
forward with even greater emphasis. When he approached the problems of 
scientific criticism from a theoretical point of view in ETCM and NETCM, 
Robertson still left considerable room for the influence of subjective value 
judgment. However, when it comes to the practical issue of authorship 
attribution, he allows for no such leniency, and again and again stresses the 
overall scientific objectivity of his critical technique. There is no doubt that he 
15
 Marlowe. A Conspectus, p. 46. 
16
 In the course of the debate on Shakespearean authorship, Francis Bacon, Roger 
Manners (Earl of Rutland), William Stanley (Earl of Derby), and Edward de Vere (Earl of 
Oxford) have been the main 'candidates for Shakespeare'. In Who Wrote Shakespeare? 
(London, 1996), p. 37, John Micheli lists these candidates in order of popularity, judged by the 
number of books and articles which have been published in their support: Baconism takes the 
lead, followed by Oxfordism, Derbyism, and Rutlandism. 
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felt that, as far as the authorship question was concerned, scientific method put 
definitive answers within his reach. 
The New Shakspere Society: Furnivall and Fleay 
In order to gain an impression of the origin and exact nature of Robertson's 
scientific methods, we will have to go back in the history of Shakespeare 
studies by a number of years until we reach 1873, the year in which the 
remarkable Dr. Frederick James Furnivall (1825-1910) founded the New 
Shakspere Society.18 Furnivall was the very embodiment of the Victorian spirit 
of work, and a firm believer in the accomplishments of science. His most 
enduring claim to fame is perhaps his contribution to the New English 
Dictionary (later to become the Oxford English Dictionary), a project which he 
originally proposed himself and of which he became the particularly energetic 
and inspiring editor in 1861. Fumivairs talents as an organizer were 
prodigious, and he was the founder of a number of literary societies, which, as 
his biographer states, 'became the most powerful force in Victorian England 
for the advancement of English studies.'19 In 1864 he founded the Early 
English Text Society, his patriotic goal being to make available to modem 
English readers the thoughts and ideas of their forefathers in accurate, 
well-glossed editions. The Society proved of inestimable value to the study of 
medieval literature, and gave rise to a whole new movement of modem textual 
scholarship. Other societies Furnivall established included the Chaucer Society 
(1868), the Browning Society (1881), and the Shelley Society (1886), none of 
which could, however, rival the success of the Early English Text Society. 
In the 'Founder's Prospectus' of the New Shakspere Society, Furnivall 
announced the goal of his new enterprise as the establishment of a 
Shakespearean canon of authorship and chronology along scientific lines. 
Surely 'in this Victorian time, when our Geniuses of Science are so wresting 
her secrets from Nature as to make our days memorable for ever', it should be 
possible to achieve similar results in Shakespeare studies.20 At the first meeting 
of the new society on March 13, 1874, Furnivall further specified its purpose, 
which was 
" Unless the notes indicate otherwise, the information on Furnivall presented here is 
taken from William Benzie, Dr. F.J. Furnivall. A Victorian Scholar Adventurer (Norman, 
1983). 'Shakspere', incidentally, was the spelling to which Furnivall gave currency, and which 
was also adopted by Robertson, as we saw, in the early stages of his career. 
19
 Ibid, p. 117. 
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 F.J. Furnivall, 'The New Shakspere Society: The Founder's Prospectus Revised', 
New Shakspere Society Transactions, vol. 1, Appendix (London, 1874), p. 7. 
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by a very close study of the metrical and phraseological 
peculiarities of Shakspere, to get his plays as nearly as possible 
into the order in which he wrote them . . . and then to use that 
revised order for the purpose of studying the progress and meaning 
of Shakspere's mind .. .21 
The scholar who was given the daunting task to establish the order of the 
plays by means of metrical tests was the Reverend Frederick Gard Fleay, like 
Furnivall a man of tremendous energy.22 At Trinity College, Cambridge, where 
he received a thorough education in mathematics and the natural sciences, his 
dedication to his studies earned him the label 'the industrious flea'. We have 
already seen in the previous chapter how Fleay felt that no critic might call 
himself 'scientific' unless he 'had a thorough training in the Natural Sciences, 
especially in Mineralogy, classificatory Botany, and above all, in Chemical 
Analysis.'23 Being well-versed in all these fields, he regarded himself as 
eminently equipped for his task, which he described as follows: 
Our analysis, which has hitherto been qualitative, must become 
quantitative; we must cease to be empirical, and become scientific; 
in criticism as in other matters, the test that decides between 
science and empiricism is this: "Can you say, not only of what 
kind, but how much? If you cannot weigh, measure, number your 
results, however you may be convinced yourself, you must not 
hope to convince others, or claim the position of an investigator; 
you are merely a guesser, a propounder of hypotheses."24 
Fleay applied himself to his assignment with characteristic vigour, and he 
accordingly gave most of the first papers at the society, all of which exemplify 
his quantitative approach to textual criticism.25 For this purpose, he advocated 
the use of metrical tables, charting, for instance, the number of lines with 
double endings, the number of rhyming lines, or the number of lines with more 
or less than five measures. In this way, the scientific critic was to establish 
objectively a particular author's technical development, with a view to 
determining the chronology and authorship of his works. 
21
 Furnivall, quoted in 'Notices of Meetings', ibid., p. vi. 
22
 All biographical information on Fleay is taken from the D.N.B. entry. 
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 F.G. Fleay, Shakspere Manual (London, 1878), p. 108. 
24
 F.G. Fleay, 'On Metrical Tests as Applied to Dramatic Poetry', New Shakspere 
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Samuel Schoenbaum has pointed out the eccentricities of some of the results 
Fleay obtained in this way.26 Chronologically, for instance, Fleay made 
Macbeth precede Hamlet, Othello, and Lear, he assigned The Taming of the 
Shrew to 1600, Cymbeline to 1604, and Julius Caesar to 1607. As to 
authorship, he suspected Jonson's hand in Julius Caesar while doubting the 
Shakespearean authorship of the Porter scene in Macbeth. Unfortunately and 
ironically enough, all these unorthodox views were based on often highly 
inaccurate data (Schoenbaum comments that 'the mysteries of simple 
arithmetic seem always to elude his grasp') and the most subjective of value 
judgments. Take, for instance, such a statement as the following on Julius 
Caesar: 
There is a strange feeling about the general style of this play; 
which is not the style of Jonson: but just what one would fancy 
Shakespeare would become with an infusion of Jonson. I do not 
give passages here; as I look on the printing of long extracts from 
books in every one's hands, except for cases of comparison, as 
useless and wasteful. I prefer relying on the taste and judgment of 
those who will take the trouble to read the play and judge for 
themselves.27 
If criticism is after all a matter of 'taste and judgment', one may well inquire 
into the use of metrical tables and tests. It was not long before even Furnivall 
became distinctly disenchanted with the speculations and inaccuracies of his 
one-time torchbearer, and by the end of 1874, he and Fleay were no longer on 
speaking terms. Furnivall himself continued to do much work on metrical 
questions, but in spite of his scientific pretensions, he was essentially an 
old-fashioned patriotic moralist and romantic who yearned to see the Bard as 
one 'in whom we may fancy that the Stratford both of his early and late days 
lives again', and of whom it could be believed that 'the daughters he saw there, 
the sweet English maidens, the pleasant country scenes around him, passt [sic] 
as it were again into his plays.'28 No metrical tables could in any way alter for 
him this luxuriant image of the greatest English genius of all time. 
26
 S. Schoenbaum, Shakespeare's Lives (Oxford, 1991), pp. 351-2. 
27
 Fleay, Shakspere Manual, p. 265. 
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Robertson's Use of Verse-Tests 
If we now return to the work of Robertson on Shakespeare, we find that he was 
profoundly influenced by the methods and approach of the New Shakspere 
Society, although he credited Furnivall himself with but little critical insight. 
'FurnivalPs service to Shakespeare study by running the old New Shakespere 
[sic] Society', he made one of the speakers in his Symposium on Macbeth 
remark, 'may have been great, as was his service to Chaucer study; but his 
contribution of critical ideas was not much above zero.'29 Robertson found 
himself much more attracted to the stark quantitative methodology of F.G. 
Fleay, with whose conclusions he may have been in frequent disagreement, but 
to whose pioneering influence he paid tribute throughout his own work, feeling 
that 'no man . . . has contributed so large a number of really illuminating ideas 
to the investigation of the field of literary history with which we are here 
concerned.'30 
Following in Fleay's footsteps, Robertson developed his own system of 
metrical tests to separate the authentic wheat from the non-Shakespearean 
chaff, based on a particular theory with regard to the evolution of English blank 
verse. This theory permeates the whole of his Shakespearean work, but is most 
compactly and accessibly set forth in an article on the subject for the Criterion 
of February 1924.31 Robertson effectively sees the evolution of English blank 
verse as a process of gradual liberation from the restrictions of the single 
end-stopped line. English blank verse is commonly held to begin with the Earl 
of Surrey's translation of the second and fourth books of the Aeneid, written 
about 1540, and first printed in Tottel's Miscellany of 1557. Surrey, Robertson 
argues, found his inspiration in the advanced verse-forms of Italian poetry, 
from which, however, he 'takes . . . only the dismissal of rhyme.' [177] 
Following the traditional English practice of monosyllabic rhyme, Surrey still 
'ends nearly every line on a stress' [176], although his poetic genius enables 
him to transcend the limitations of this format through 'the free play of fluid 
rhythm'. [177] Robertson quotes with approval John Addington Symonds's 
insistence that 'though blank verse is an iambic rhythm, it owes its beauty to 
the liberties taken with the normal structure.'32 Within the restrictions of the 
end-stopped line, Surrey himself was capable of great rhythmic variation, but 
successors like Sackville and Norton never attain his measure of rhythmic 
M
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freedom: 'They are good and careful writers, sound in their diction; what kills 
their verse is fatal iambic regularity.' [179] 
It was, in fact, only with Christopher Marlowe that 'English blank verse 
emerges as a tested and powerful instrument.' [181] Robertson greets Marlowe 
as 
a signal master of line - the characteristic by which Jonson 
commemorates him. Relatively to the pedestrian gait of Kyd, the 
short and eager trip of Greene, and the flaccid fluency of Peele, his 
lines bound: he is the swift-foot Achilles alongside of the lesser 
men. [182] 
Marlowe's notable innovation was the persistent use of the double-ending as 
'an inevitable relief to the ultimate formal monotony of the decasyllabic 
metre'." [184] Robertson felt that Marlowe was able to carry the use of this 
metrical variation further than any contemporary, and certainly further than 
Thomas Kyd, who attempted to emulate Marlowe's example, but 'never 
became a rhythmist up to Marlowe's limit.' [182] In fact, he went so far as to 
say that not even Shakespeare could outdo Marlowe in the 'nude, elemental 
strength' of his single lines, of which Robertson quotes as an example the 
famous 'Was this the face that launched a thousand ships?' 
However, it was only in such rare instances that Marlowe could rise to the 
same level as Shakespeare, since it was with the latter that 'for the first time, 
and at once for all time, do we realise what blank verse can be, in the hands of 
one who is at once the master rhythmist and the master-poet.' [182] Robertson 
argued that Shakespeare had little need for such a relatively mechanical device 
as the double-ending, which could, at most, effect a relief from monotonous 
regularity within the line: 
Shakespeare had from the start added to unshackled variety of 
stress within the line the new spell of interfluent sense, under 
which the line is but the silken robe of the verse, the pauses 
varying endlessly, so that the line is felt only as a pulsation in the 
movement that may pause anywhere, recommencing at any point 
within the metre. Only when the ever-increasing pregnancy of the 
verse has compelled a condensation of the style does Shakespeare 
avail himself of the double-ending to anything like the extent to 
which Marlowe was doing at his close. The later developments of 
Shakespeare's verse are in the direction of an ever more 
untrammelled - we might say a more masterly careless - freedom 
" A double-ending is a line ending with an extra syllable, as in 'To be or not to be, 
that is the question.'' 
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in deviation from the norm, making the result always more 
dramatic. [184] 
Robertson was, in fact, so convinced of the infinite virtuosity of Shakespeare's 
handling of blank verse that he asserted without hesitation that 'In Shakespeare, 
runs of double-endings beyond three or four lines are always a ground for a 
suspicion of an alien basis . . . , so sure is his sense of balance.' [185] Certainly, 
among Shakespeare's contemporaries no Marston, Dekker, Jonson, Beaumont, 
Massinger, or Fletcher - whatever their respective qualities - could hope to 
attain such a mastery of blank verse; taking giant strides through literary 
history, Robertson finds no equals to Shakespeare even in more recent times, so 
that even his beloved Tennyson must satisfy himself with a remote second 
place. The final conclusion is inevitable: 'No blank verse has ever transcended 
Shakespeare's.' [187] 
The Disintegration of the Shakespeare Canon 
Armed with this conception of Shakespeare's greatness as a master of dramatic 
versification, Robertson proceeded to attack the Shakespeare canon, verse tests 
providing his main ammunition. As we shall see, these were not the only tools 
he used to 'disintegrate' the plays, but they did form the basis for his approach. 
It is, perhaps surprisingly, not the five volumes of The Shakespeare Canon 
which supply the best insight into his methodology. Although they represent a 
tour de force of Elizabethan scholarship, they are rendered relatively 
unreadable by a marked over-abundance of detail and excess of polemical 
content. A much more accessible guide to Robertson's scholarly work is 
provided by the volume entitled The Genuine in Shakespeare. A Conspectus of 
1930, in which he conveniently summarizes his findings on the canon, and 
suppresses his inclination to relentlessly chase after his enemies in all kinds of 
directions.34 Robertson, it should be admitted, is generally at his best when he 
does not allow himself too much space, a fact of which he himself was 
regrettably not always sufficiently aware. 
In the early pages of the book, Robertson demonstrates the importance of 
verse tests by applying them to the case of the Comedy of Errors. His confident 
claim is that 'A quite dispassionate study will probably lead us to the 
conclusion that the earliest surviving dramatic writing by Shakespeare is the 
first scene of the Comedy of Errors.'' [11] In that particular scene, 'easily fluent 
without poignancy' [14], Robertson counts only three double-endings, whereas 
in Scene ii, 24 out of 103 blank-verse lines end in an extra syllable. Moreover, 
3A
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he finds the versification in the second scene of quite a different order, so that 
he sets up the following line of argument: 
We who compare them carefully can see that Scene ii of the 
Errors is not Shakespeare's at all. Not only has it all those 
double-endings, its verse is in general end-stopped: that is to say, 
the sense and the rhythm generally end with the line, and even the 
sense is rarely "run on." In the first scene, on the contrary, 20 per 
cent of the lines "run on," and this mostly both in syntax and in 
rhythm. Here we have, in visibly early matter, the first vital 
difference between Shakespearean and pre-Shakespearean verse. 
The beginner is indeed writing like a beginner, not in the great 
style, yet in his own; and though the poetry is for him third-rate it 
is poetry. Scene ii is not only end-stopped and heavy with 
double-endings: it is in the main prosaic, in a way that 
Shakespeare is never prosaic in his demonstrable genuine work. 
[15-16] 
On this basis, Robertson concludes that the second scene - and, in fact, most of 
the play - was written by Marlowe, a claim first made by Fleay several decades 
earlier. 
Having thus set about his task, Robertson soon finds the Shakespeare canon 
collapsing under his hands. To summarize his theories on all of the separate 
plays would require a great many pages, but even a few examples may illustrate 
here how startlingly destructive Robertson's disintegrating work must have 
appeared to those scholars who believed the Folio to be by a single hand. In 
fact, only A Midsummer-Night's Dream is allowed by him to be entirely of 
Shakespeare's own devising, in both construction and versification. At the 
other end of the scale, a number of plays (Titus Andronicus, The Taming of the 
Shrew) are forthrightly dismissed as having nothing to do with Shakespeare 
whatsoever. Between these two extremes, Shakespeare is represented as having 
a varying stake in the plays we have come to know as his. In Romeo and Juliet 
or Julius Caesar, for instance, Shakespeare has to share the honours of 
authorship with a colourful band of Elizabethan colleagues, such as Marlowe, 
Greene, Heywood, and Chapman (although Robertson is always quick to point 
out that their contributions are quite inferior to Shakespeare's). In other cases, 
such as in the great tragedies Hamlet, Macbeth, Othello, and King Lear, the 
voice we listen to may be genuinely Shakespeare's in versification, but even 
there the master playwright is adapting older, sometimes intractable material, 
which, Robertson felt, accounts for some of the defects of construction in the 
plays. 
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Shakespeare and the Influence of the Audience 
There emerges from Robertson's disintegration of the canon along the lines 
sketched above an image of Shakespeare which is a far cry from the heavily 
romanticised conception of the Great Bard which dominated 
nineteenth-century Shakespeare studies, and to which even a self-professed 
scientific critic like Furnivall, as we saw, fell an easy prey. In this context, 
Schoenbaum discusses Edward Dowden's Shakspere: A Critical Study of His 
Mind, an immensely influential study which was first published in 1875 and 
went through a great many editions. Dowden, Schoenbaum comments, tended 
to see Shakespeare's oeuvre as an autobiographical poem, in which 'the 
autobiography holds more importance than the poem.'35 It was the mind of the 
creator which, for Dowden, ranked high above the artistic creations themselves, 
and the critic's engagement with that mind became a struggle of almost biblical 
proportions: 
There is something higher and more wonderful than St. Peter's, or 
the Last Judgment - namely, the mind which flung these creations 
into the world. And yet, it is when we make the effort which 
demands our most concentrated and most sustained energy, - it is 
when we strive to come into the presence of the living mind of the 
creator, that the sense of struggle and effort is relieved. . . . There 
is something in this invigorating struggle with a nature greater than 
one's own which unavoidably puts on in one's imagination, the 
shape of the Hebrew story of Peniel. We wrestle with an unknown 
man until the breaking of the day.36 
To Robertson the rationalist, such a view of the artist as a divinely inspired 
being or of biographical criticism as a kind of religious and superhuman 
struggle went completely against the grain. He was no less convinced than 
Dowden of Shakespeare's unsurpassable genius, but for him, the critic's 
struggle was primarily with the environment in which Shakespeare produced 
his timeless creations. Shakespeare as Robertson saw him was, although 
unquestionably a genius, destined by circumstances to remain above all a 
practical man of affairs, with both feet planted firmly on Elizabethan soil, and 
in the Elizabethan theatre. Throughout his work, Robertson insisted again and 
again that 
35
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To know Shakespeare, we must think of him as the actor-partner 
catering for his company, concerned primarily to find themes and 
frame plots that will "draw," and driven alike by his genius and by 
his experience as an actor to make the characters lifelike.37 
A unique blend of genius and pragmatist, Shakespeare never thought twice 
about adapting or revising older work, however inferior to his own. He knew 
his place and function: 'To please, somehow, the general audience' and 'To 
that modest end, he used his common sense as he used his singular faculty.'38 It 
was one of Robertson's deepest convictions that Shakespeare always 
deliberately placed his genius at the service of his audience. 
We have seen that early in his career, before his main works on Shakespeare 
were written, Robertson found in the writings of Hennequin the confirmation of 
his view that the audience was an essential environmental determinant in the 
creation of literary work. In his essay on 'Evolution in Drama', he argued that 
this was particularly true of the dramatic art-form: 
[Drama] stands alone in being absolutely shackled from the outset 
by certain claims of custom which amount to conditions of 
success. Now, this particular slavery of the dramatist to 
convention . . . arises out of his relation to his audience; and may 
therefore fairly be charged on the nature of his art and the state of 
civilisation. . . . Experiment is not open to him as it is to the 
painter and even to the composer, both of whom have at all times 
relied on a comparatively instructed public, capable to some extent 
of sympathising with their aims and being led forward by them.39 
In the general evolution of drama, it was not until the reign of Queen Elizabeth 
that, under the influence of the general flowering of culture, a highly varied 
audience arose which demanded a theatre vastly different from and superior to 
anything that had hitherto been available. Thus 
the living drama rose out of the "effective demand" of the 
populace for the kind of play suited to its taste and capacity; and in 
the liberty to meet that demand lay the secret of the English 
evolution. The actors must have audiences; and the playwrights 
had to cater for their requirements, to the extent even of mixing 
farce with history and tragedy. Many plays, in rhyme and in prose, 
had been produced under those conditions by men of small culture: 
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it was the need to draw educated as well as uneducated spectators, 
to please alternately the Court and the commons, that led to the 
enlistment of educated men, capable of producing dignified and 
sonorous poetry. From first to last, the economic factor counts.40 
Robertson sees a clear example of the significance of the 'economic factor', 
so largely determined by the demands of the audience, in Shakespeare's writing 
of the poems Venus and Adonis and The Rape of Lucrèce. On the one hand, 
these are clearly Shakespeare's, since they evince 'his gift for sheer metrical 
utterance'. In the composition of the poems, on the other hand, Shakespeare 
'had regard neither to propriety of theme, nor originality of phrase, nor 
congruity of matter.'41 Robertson finds the reason why such relatively inferior 
work could still be written by the man who would go on to write a masterpiece 
like King Lear in the circumstances under which it was produced. He 
maintained that the poems were written 'from hand to mouth' in 1593 and 
1594. In those years, the theatres were closed due to the plague, and the 
necessity to earn his livelihood compelled the young playwright to produce 
work which paid, but was otherwise outside his normal practice. 'That pressure 
over', Robertson concluded, 'he shows no more concern for the poetry of mere 
metrical expatiation, resuming to the task of adapting plays, whereby he has his 
income.'42 Catering for the requirements of his audience and thereby for his 
own, Shakespeare as seen through Robertson's eyes remained a practical man 
of affairs to the last. 
Robertson's Defence of Shakespeare's Genius 
Robertson was well aware that such a starkly realistic portrait of Shakespeare, 
diverging radically from the still prevalent romantic notion of the Great Bard, 
was bound to raise indignant opposition. If Shakespeare actually wrote so little 
of what literary history had passed on as his, and if Shakespeare made use so 
eagerly of material not at all of his own invention, was not the image of the 
greatest English genius of all time effectively destroyed? Was it still possible to 
reconstruct such an image from the shattered remains of the Shakespeare canon 
after Robertson had applied the sledge-hammer of disintegration? As far as 
Robertson himself was concerned, there was really no need for such 
reconstruction; what remained was brilliant enough, and at least it was 
indubitably Shakespeare's own work. As usual, he met his (imaginary) 
opponents head-on: 
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All such theses as the above are sure to elicit from many readers -
if, that is, many readers chance to see them - a quite spontaneous 
opposition, in which denial is first posited, and arguments are 
sought for, if at all, afterwards. It is apt to be hastily inferred that 
any elimination of matter from the Shakespeare Canon means a 
diminution of Shakespeare's glory. Yet there could be no greater 
misapprehension. So far as I know, no attempt at such elimination 
has ever touched any save inferior or second-rank work — a 
circumstance which might set objectors thinking. It is always by 
his sheer superiority that he is or can be finally discriminated. But 
still men chafe at every suggestion of discrimination.43 
As for the charge that he left Shakespeare indebted to a host of minor and 
inferior playwrights and with no faculty of original creation whatsoever, there 
again we find Robertson well-prepared: 
Had then Shakespeare, it will be asked, no "original" faculty 
whatever? Does not the very idea of greatness in a sense involve 
that of originality? I answer that it certainly does, and that the 
originality of Shakespeare lay precisely in his power (a) of 
transforming and upraising other men's crude creations, (b) of 
putting admirably imagined characters and admirably turned 
speech where others put unplausible puppets and unreal rhetoric, 
and (c) of rising from the monotonous blank-verse of his 
predecessors to a species of rhythm as inherently great as that of 
Milton at his skilfullest, and more nervously powerful, because 
more dramatic.44 
What is required, then, from the reader reluctant to accept this 'new' 
representation of Shakespeare is a fundamental change in perception of the 
notion of genius, which, Robertson insists, has nothing to do with plot-making 
or plot-constructing. Its springs lie elsewhere: 
The required genius consists, fundamentally, in the power to 
conceive and create what we feel to be living personalities; to 
enter into any kind of soul in any dramatic situation; to make us 
feel that in each we are listening to a real voice, even in verse, 
which actual people do not speak. . . . But when this creative gift, 
as we call it, is turned to the utterance in consummately rhythmical 
verse of every grade of thought and feeling and passion, playing 
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over the whole keyboard of humanity, it achieves a still more 
marvellous mastery of our souls, because it has conjoined the 
function of verbal self-portraiture with the function of poetry in 
the greatest of all poetic media.45 
In the great tragedies in particular, Shakespeare was capable of fusing the 
creation of living characters with great poetry in a way which no playwright 
before or after him ever achieved, even though the circumstances of the 
contemporary theatre world may have induced him to take already existing 
material as his starting-point. Where such material often seemed to have little 
life left in it, Shakespeare revived it, and transfigured it into drama worthy of 
his genius. 
It is precisely this balance between character-creation and poetic invention 
which Robertson finds lacking in the playwright whom he ranked second after 
Shakespeare himself: Christopher Marlowe. Robertson is undeniably a genuine 
admirer of Marlowe, whom he gave the credit for radically thrusting English 
drama into a new phase of its evolution by the sheer power of his innovative 
versification: 
The advent of Marlowe in the drama is somewhat like the portent 
of his Tamburlaine in the field of history. At one stroke a new and 
exorbitant energy makes a clean sweep of existing conventions, 
and barbaric force drives its path athwart the overthrown 
pretensions of all who had held the ground. . . . Such a picture of 
savage megalomania had never before been staged; such 
thunderous force of rhythmic phrase had never yet been found 
possible in any modern language.46 
But powerful versification alone, however ground-breaking, does not make 
effective drama, and Tamburlaine 'cannot live through five so-called Acts to 
any good dramatic purpose.'47 Ultimately, Tamburlaine the man fails to evolve 
into a living character. Some of the speeches Marlowe puts in his mouth may 
admittedly be powerful poetry, such as the one where Tamburlaine holds forth 
on the question 'What is beauty?': 
If all the pens that ever poets held 
Had fed the feeling of their masters' thought, 
Yet should there hover in their restless heads 
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One thought, one grace, one wonder, at the least, 
Which into words no virtue could digest.48 
However, Robertson felt that such a speech grossly defied 'the dramatic law of 
congruity' by the sheer unlikelihood of its coming from the ruthless conqueror 
himself.49 As in all his plays, however splendid in particular aspects, Marlowe's 
'passion for the utmost things'50 stood in the way of achieving the required 
balance between poetry and character-creation. 
In the case of that other famous contemporary of Shakespeare, Ben Jonson, 
Robertson felt that there the problems were decidedly to be found on the side of 
naturalistic character-creation. Discussing the characters in Volpone, he found 
them to be less than alive: 
These personified vices, virtues, passions, and foibles, baldly 
labelled as such, are painted from nothing and resemble 
nothing . . . Falstaff, if you will, is a caricature, the raciest ever 
drawn, known as such by the facts that (1) he moves mirth in a 
cultured reader, which Jonson, broadly speaking, never does; and 
(2) he can be readily conceived in any Shaksperean group of 
English characters, joining congruously in talk and action, though 
always in the burlesque key. Jonson's types, on the other hand, are 
unthinkable in their own or any other environment.51 
The highest praise Robertson can muster for Jonson is finally that he is 
'massive in his very futility',52 which hardly points to a deep and abiding faith 
in Jonson's dramatic powers. In Robertson's final summing-up, 'Jonson's 
comedy is joyless, and his serried tragedy cold.'53 
Character-creation aside, Robertson clearly finds himself repelled by the 
sardonic and exaggerated realism of Jonson's comedies, which hardly breathe 
the kind of uplifting 'life-giving spirit' that he finds in Shakespeare. Where 
Jonson's cynicism seems to be dragging humanity (further) into the mire, 
Shakespeare for Robertson represents the greatest humanizing force in the 
history of English drama, and indeed, of all English literature. In the end, it is 
Shakespeare's morality which places him above Jonson, Marlowe, and all 
others, not his craftsmanship, and Robertson does not hesitate to claim that 'a 
perception of Shakespeare's moral sanity is a main element in our total 
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perception of Mm.'54 In fact, it would not go too far to say that for Robertson, it 
was at bottom the main element. Considering Robertson's all-pervading 
positivist, progressionist rationalism, we should perhaps not be surprised that 
underlying all the praise of Shakespeare's ability to write unsurpassable poetry, 
we finally discover the profound belief that Shakespeare was 'the true humanist 
of his age'.55 Whether such a belief provides the best basis for a scientific, 
objective approach to the Shakespeare canon is another matter. 
Chambers's and Dover Wilson's Criticism of Robertson: Disintegration 
Disintegrated 
It was, in any case, a belief that Robertson was willing to defend to the death 
(as he almost literally did), which may without hesitation be said of his entire 
theory of the disintegration of the Shakespeare canon. With grim seriousness, 
he mercilessly attacked anyone who dared to try and invade his territory, and of 
those there were indeed many through the years. As a result, much of 
Robertson's work on Shakespeare represents the record of a polemical 
battlefield, with the corpses of his scholarly assailants lying scattered all about. 
It seems, however, that posterity has decided that Robertson did not win his 
battle, and he is now but seldom read, no doubt partly because many of the 
once hotly-debated issues he addressed have now become obsolete. As far as 
his reputation is concerned, Robertson would have done himself a service by 
adopting somewhat more graceful tactics and by being somewhat less eager to 
chase after his enemies, but that, indeed, would have gone entirely against his 
nature. A polemicist to the core, polemize he must. 
Robertson's chief animus is directed against those critics who were willing 
to accept the entire Folio as by Shakespeare's hand, and he dubs them 
'idolaters' or 'Foliolaters'. As Schoenbaum remarks, he shows himself not a 
little sensitive to his own lack of formal training, and 'irritably conscious of 
being outside the academic establishment' when he attacks the 'academics' to 
whom he mainly attributes such 'idolatrous' views.56 The following is a 
characteristic sample of his disparagement of the 'academic' position: 
Hence, even in the far-scattered world of academic studies, where 
above all one looks for scientific investigation, the output of 
serious research includes only a small quantity of intellectually 
disinterested and 'emancipated' Shakespearean work. In Biblical 
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criticism, investigation has been carried on largely by professional 
scholars and theologians, on whom the problems involved were 
forced as a result of more than a century of earnest challenge and 
inquiry. In Shakespeare-study, so far, there has been no such 
effective impulsion. Its problems have been, as it were, static - the 
'philological' scrutiny of texts and phraseology. Professors who 
have been expounding Shakespeare on that scholarly basis are as a 
rule very much unprepared for any large extension of the challenge 
to the authenticity of the Folio plays; though they have had to deal 
as best they can with the more limited challenges of the past. Even 
the newer bibliographical inquiries find them rather unresponsive. 
More radical changes simply repel them.57 
Robertson was always ready to strike out against the spirit of conservatism 
whenever he thought he met it, and this was no different when it came to 
Shakespeare scholarship. 
The 'Foliolater' against whom most of his attacks were directed was Sir 
Edmund Kerchever Chambers, the 'Grand Mandarin of the moment', as 
Robertson called him in one place.58 Chambers was, in fact, as much unlike a 
mandarin as can be imagined, nor was he an academic.59 For most of his life, 
Chambers worked for the Board of Education, where he eventually made it to 
Second Secretary. When he was knighted in 1925, it was as much in 
recognition of his services to education as to literature. Nonetheless, those 
services to literature, and in particular to Elizabethan scholarship, were 
considerable. His major works on the history of drama were The Mediaeval 
Stage (2 vols, 1903), The Elizabethan Stage (4 vols, 1923), and William 
Shakespeare: A Study of Facts and Problems (2 vols, 1930), and these were 
accompanied by numerous other books, editions, articles, and lectures. 
Considering that Chambers produced all this work alongside a demanding 
public function, Schoenbaum's words that 'The achievement of Sir Edmund 
Kerchever Chambers exceeds one's reasonable expectations of what may be 
accomplished in several lifetimes' certainly ring true.60 One wonders whether 
in all of Robertson's disparagements of Chambers's work, not more than a hint 
of jealousy was involved. After all, for him there were never such honours as 
for Chambers, and as he grew older (and certainly none the richer) some 
bitterness on his part would hardly have been surprising. 
This may be all the more true since in 1924, Chambers read a lecture before 
the British Academy on 'The Disintegration of Shakespeare', which, as 
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Schoenbaum has noted, inflicted a fatal blow to the cause of disintegration.*1 
This lecture is worth examining in some detail, since it brings to the fore a 
number of aspects of Robertson's approach to Shakespeare which are crucial in 
answering the question whether Robertson may claim an objective, 'scientific' 
status for his own researches. 
Chambers distinguishes three stages in Robertson's method of approach. 
The first is that of impressionist judgment: 
Certain passages do not answer to his conception of Shakespeare. 
Here is braggadocio, there an archaic stiffness, or flatness, or 
hackwork, or clumsy stage-craft, or pointless humour, or turgid i ty 
of thought, or falsity of moral sentiment. Or a whole play repels 
him. One reads like 'a mosaic of disparate parts'; in another he 
gets 'a strange feeling' about the general style. [5] 
The next stage sees Robertson seeking confirmation for his misgivings by 
applying metrical and stylistic tests, based on the evolution of Shakespeare's 
blank verse. Finally, he settles down to look for clues to the possible presence 
of non-Shakespearean authorship, which may, for instance, be found in the use 
of un-Shakespearean vocabulary or turns of phrase. All this, Chambers argues, 
may sound logical enough, but is nonetheless 'largely disputable'. [6] For each 
of the stages, Chambers then proceeds to demonstrate why this should be the 
case. 
As to the first, Chambers turns the tables on his opponent by showing that 
Robertson himself is the actual idolater of Shakespeare, by assigning to the 
playwright only the very best of what is present in the Folio: 
I am sure that Mr. Robertson desires to exalt and not to depreciate 
Shakespeare. And that is precisely where the mischief lies. Our 
heresiarch, in fact, is himself an idolater. We have all of us, in the 
long run, got to form our conception of the 'authentic' 
Shakespeare by means of an abstraction from the whole of the 
canon; there is no other material. Mr. Robertson abstracts through 
a series of rejections. He is repelled by childish work, by imitative 
work, by repetitive work, by conventional work, by unclarified 
work, by clumsy construction, by baldness or bombast. He 
idealizes. He looks for a Shakespeare always at the top of his 
achievement. This seems to me quite an arbitrary process. [8] 
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Chambers asserted that he himself had no problems accepting Shakespeare as 
an experimenter who tried his hand at different styles, sometimes abruptly 
taking up a new mode of writing, but perhaps rejecting it soon afterwards 
because it proved unprofitable, for whatever reason. Shakespeare was, after all, 
'receptive, as well as creative'. [9] 
Similarly, with regard to the second stage of Robertson's approach, the verse 
tests, Chambers saw no reason why Shakespeare's development as a versifier 
should have been smoothly continuous. If Shakespeare's early plays should 
display a fondness for double-endings, which was then discarded, but later 
picked up again, why should this diminish Shakespeare's stature as a 
dramatist? Chambers seeks the reason why Robertson apparently felt so in a 
particular 'philosophical predisposition': 
Mr. Robertson dislikes the idea of what he calls a 'cerebral 
cataclysm'. To suppose that Shakespeare passed suddenly from the 
merely average and imitative merit of Two Gentlemen to the 
'supreme poetic competence' of Midsummer-Night's Dream is 
contrary to a doctrine which sees in 'artistic growth as in other 
organic phenomena a process of evolution'. . . . And when Mr. 
Robertson expresses himself as taken aback by the notion of 'a 
literary miracle of genius elicited by some sudden supernatural 
troubling of the waters', I can only reply that he has given an 
admirable description of the way in which genius does in fact 
often appear to effloresce. [10-11] 
According to Chambers, Robertson the evolutionist severely narrowed the 
outlook of Robertson the Shakespeare critic. In actual fact, there were no 
palpable reasons to expect biological analogies to apply to literature. 
In his discussion of Robertson's final stage of assigning different hands to 
different plays, Chambers goes into some details of biographical and textual 
scholarship which again show Robertson to be in the wrong, but do not directly 
concern us here. What does concern us, however, is the fact that Chambers is 
so clearly right in his criticism of Robertson's methods, which no doubt must 
have infuriated Robertson beyond measure. Underlying all of the rationalist's 
investigations into the Shakespeare canon is the surprisingly simple notion that 
Shakespeare was a genius who could do no wrong. Rather than being the 
outcome of his researches, this is the basic premise on which the whole 
apparatus of Robertson's disintegration of the canon is founded. At times, this 
becomes blatantly obvious, as in the following fragment on Chapman's 
supposed authorship of The Merry Wives of Windsor: 
So here, once more, we have the traditional canon discrediting 
Shakespeare by fastening on him inferior work at a date at which 
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he was entering his middle period. He is made to break down in his 
handling of Falstaff, who a few years before he had raised to the 
topmost height of humorous efficiency, and he is made to produce 
other poor comic matter, as well as a quantity of wholly uninspired 
verse in another man's style. 
Readers who will assent to all this merely because the play is 
included in the Folio, when even some Foliolators admit that 
Heminge and Condell would not have hesitated for a moment to 
include alien matter, are doing as poor a service to Shakespeare's 
fame as to the cause of scientific criticism.62 
It seems that if there is one thing which Chambers makes clear, it is that in 
Robertson's perspective 'doing a service to Shakespeare's fame' and 'scientific 
criticism' are only too obviously connected. 
This view was shared by John Dover Wilson, renowned editor of the New 
Cambridge Shakespeare, who, at one time, had fostered disintegrationist 
sympathies himself, and was duly chastised in Chambers's lecture of 1924. In 
1929, Wilson gave a lecture to the British Academy on 'The Elizabethan 
Shakespeare' in which he mainly took Robertson to task over the latter's 
inability to see plays as plays, as dramatical performances within a particular 
theatrical context. Robertson responded as if he had been stabbed in the back 
by his most faithful ally. He attacked Wilson in the pages of the Criterion for 
having made a secret pact with his arch-enemy Chambers, so as to be rid of the 
odious epithet of 'disintegrator': 'Greater adaptability hath no man than this, 
that he mutilates his critical body in order to make a concordat with the 
mandarins!'63 Wilson, in his tum, did keep his calm, and responded to 
Robertson's assault in measured terms. He pointed out in the Criterion that 
there were no real grounds for what he perceived as Robertson's double 
complaint, 'first that your own Shakespearian studies lack appreciation in 
'academic' circles because they are too disturbingly subversive for orthodox 
scholars, and second that, cowed by the Olympian thunders of Sir Edmund 
Chambers in 1924,1 have deserted the revolutionary cause and begun to play 
for safety.'64 As far as Wilson was concerned, there was no single 'academic' 
view of Shakespeare, nor had he ever declared himself an official member of 
either Robertson's or Chambers's camp. 
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Like Chambers, however, Wilson came to the conclusion that Robertson's 
vision was impaired by his own idolatry of Shakespeare, and the resulting need 
to vindicate the Elizabethan against all possible assailants: 
What is this Shakespeare of your dreams? Someday, when your 
survey of the canon is complete, you will perhaps give us a 
collected edition of his works - a slender volume, I should guess, 
an anthology of dramatic verse rather than a collection of plays -
and write an introduction thereto in which we shall be permitted to 
catch sight of the Master's face as it has been revealed to you. 
Unless I am greatly mistaken, the features you display in such a 
mirror will not seem wholly unfamiliar to the gazing world. They 
will demonstrate what many Britishers have long suspected, that 
Shakespeare though no doubt bora at Stratford was of Scotch 
origin, and having got so far the world will find no difficulty in 
admitting the rest, namely his radicalism and his rationalism, both 
- such is the prophetic power of genius 'dreaming on things to 
come' - of a late nineteenth century pattern.65 
As was to be expected, Robertson could not let this pass, and reprinted his 
Criterion piece in The State of Shakespeare Studies of 1931, alongside a 
number of equally vitriolic diatribes against such members of the 'academic' 
establishment as A.W. Pollard and Peter Alexander. Schoenbaum has pointed 
out how 'The heavy sarcasm, the gestures of accusation and defense, reveal the 
acuteness of his distress and familiar patterns of conspiratorial thinking.'6* 
Clearly, a lifetime on the barricades had left deep marks, so that finally he 
could not live his life (or at least that limited part of it which we find expressed 
in print) without being haunted by the constant thought of hosts of enemies 
lurking just around the comer. In the case of his Shakespeare studies, it is 
tempting to speculate about the psychological motives which lie at the bottom 
of his lifelong defence of the flawlessness of Shakespeare's genius. There is no 
doubt that he clung to his vision with something approximating religious zeal, 
and some might perhaps argue that his belief in Shakespeare's genius filled the 
gap left by his total denial of conventional religious faith. The fact that it is 
hard to imagine any explanation which could have roused Robertson to greater 
polemical fury than this last, may in itself leave some room for thought. 
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Conclusions 
It would be unfair to Robertson not to attempt finally to redress the critical 
balance somewhat in his favour. His own reputation as a Shakespeare critic as 
well as that of the theory of disintegration may have suffered considerably since 
Chambers's lecture of 1924, but it should be remembered that in his own time 
he was widely respected as an Elizabethan scholar of unequalled erudition. In 
Augustus Ralli's massive History of Shakespearian Criticism, Robertson's 
work receives extensive treatment, and its author pays tribute to Robertson's 
'Intellectual power, aesthetic understanding, industry, and clear thinking', 
while declaring himself a convert to disintegration.67 One cannot help feeling 
that, had Robertson managed to keep his polemical instincts in check, his 
reputation would undoubtedly have stood the test of time much better. 
In contemporary reviews of Robertson's books, although they are generally 
not blind to his more obvious defects, there is much praise of his 
accomplishments as a scholar. The Westminster Review, for instance, hailed his 
Montaigne and Shakespeare as handled 'with consummate ability and rare 
critical skill'.68 Similarly, in a review of Literary Detection. A Symposium on 
Macbeth for the Spectator, J.M. Parsons congratulated Robertson on his 'sound 
critical judgment', 'accurate sense of verse rhythms', and 'unrivalled 
knowledge of the Elizabethan drama'.69 In the Review of English Studies, U.M. 
Ellis-Fermor found her admiration called forth by The State of Shakespeare 
Study for 'the ease with which he moves among data so numerous and so 
complex in their relations as almost to demand for their expression the 
formulae of the organic chemist.'70 Apart from Dover Wilson's skirmishes with 
Robertson, T.S. Eliot's Criterion proved particularly ready to extend a hearty 
welcome to a new Shakespearean study by Robertson. On the subject of 
Literary Detection, Bonamy Dobree found Robertson's rigorous methods quite 
stimulating: 
Mr. Robertson is a crusader: whenever he meets an infidel he 
slashes ruthlessly with his shining sword, and the limbs of his 
enemies, such as Sir Edmund Chambers, lie scattered and bloody 
about the battlefield. All his performances are exhilarating, and we 
run along by his horse's side, clinging desperately to his stirrup, 
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crying: 'Let me play the crusader, too!' and come out at the end 
flushed with victory. For it is extremely difficult not to agree with 
Mr. Robertson. His is not what you would call a persuasive 
manner in the ordinary sense, but there is no resisting him. Armed 
with the authority of profound erudition, which he wields with an 
authoritative mind, he conscripts us to his service - We are not 
unwilling soldiers.71 
The most famous among Robertson's admirers was undoubtedly T.S. Eliot 
himself, who declared in the Nation & Athenaeum of 12 February 1927 that he 
had 'always agreed' with Robertson's disintegration of the Shakespeare 
canon.72 In fact, Eliot's famous essay on 'Hamlet' of 1919, in which he 
concluded that the play was 'most certainly an artistic failure' turns out to be 
largely based on Robertson's theory of its genesis. Addressing the age-old 
question why Hamlet should have delayed the slaying of his stepfather, 
Robertson demonstrated that Shakespeare was reworking an older play by 
Thomas Kyd, which 'intractable material' prevented him from fusing the 
different parts of the play into an artistic whole.73 From a crudely plotted 
tragedy of revenge he transformed Hamlet into a subtle psychological study on 
the effects of a mother's guilt upon her son. Unfortunately, the feeble structure 
of the older play could not carry the weight of character study which 
Shakespeare imposed upon it, so that the final result is a play which is 'not 
finally intelligible as it stands'.74 However, considering the fact that he was 'as 
usual, adapting an old play for his company, in the way of business', 
Shakespeare, Robertson argued, nonetheless worked wonders, so that 'His real 
triumph was to rum a crude play into the masterpiece which he has left us.'75 
Eliot found in Robertson's theory the justification for his own misgivings 
regarding the play, which he finally and famously expressed in the notion that it 
lacked an Objective correlative'.76 
In the nearly seven decades which have passed since Robertson's death in 
1933, there have been only few attempts to stimulate a renewal of interest in 
Robertson's Shakespeare criticism. Perhaps the most notable effort was made 
in 1987 by Ian Mackillop, in a short article on Robertson entitled 'The Literary 
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Critic: Modernity and Modernism'.77 Mackillop's remarkable claim is that 
Robertson's belief in collaborative composition places him among the ranks of 
the Modernists; hence also Eliot's interest in him. According to Mackillop, 'it 
is surely completely plausible to find the poet [Eliot] recognising in the 
disintegrator an aesthetic which corresponded to his own' and he goes on to 
state that 'The 'fitting', or layering, of contrary parts is completely in tune with 
Eliot's own poetic method, and it is exactly the subject of Robertson's work on 
Shakespeare.' Much as one would like to give whatever possible new impetus 
to Robertson's reputation by agreeing with Mackillop and calling Robertson a 
modernist avant la lettre, it seems, unfortunately, that Mackillop misses the 
point entirely. The fact that Eliot may have been attracted by the idea that 
Shakespeare's plays were the product of a collaborative effort, does not make 
Robertson a modernist. Robertson emphatically did not have an 'aesthetic' 
which favoured 'layering' and 'fragmentization'; on the contrary, he spent 
many years of his life attempting to prove that in spite of the evidence for 
composite authorship, Shakespeare's genius was raised above all doubt. Nor 
did Robertson seem at all interested in the Modernist movement, which is - to 
my knowledge - never even mentioned in all his copious writings. In his 
attempt to incite new interest in Robertson the literary critic, Mackillop seems 
to have proceeded on the naive assumption that there exists a self-evident 
association between the use of terms like 'layering' and 'collaborative 
composition' on the one hand, and modernism on the ¿rther. On the same 
grounds, one might well call Robertson a deconstructionist; did he not, after all, 
'deconstruct' the Shakespeare canon? 
Rather than to claim for Robertson a position in the vanguard of some 
critical movement, it would be best to concentrate on his actual strengths. 
Although the above discussion has at times been severely critical of 
Robertson's efforts, there is still enough that may be salvaged from the wreck. 
Robertson's knowledge of Elizabethan drama is beyond question, and he shows 
himself acutely conscious of the circumstances in which that drama was 
produced: the fact that Shakespeare was the busy actor-manager of a theatre 
company, who constantly had to keep in mind the demands of his audience, if 
only for economic reasons; that these demands were uncommonly varied and 
wide-ranging, and necessitated a particular brand of theatre; that genius means 
nothing if the conditions are not available to make it flower. These are all 
useful propositions which were by no means common in Shakespeare 
scholarship when Robertson started his work on the canon, which is to no small 
extent based on such practical, realistic premises. With his recognition of the 
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relevance of the immediate environment to artistic creation, his knowledge of 
those actual circumstances, and his undeniable sensitivity to language, 
Robertson might have had a more important contribution to Shakespeare 
scholarship than he finally did. Shakespeare was his idol; had he been less 
prepared to jump to its defence at every hint of disparagement, had he been -
ironically enough - more 'rational' in the treatment of his adversaries, his own 
contribution to the history of dramatic criticism might have been an altogether 
different one. 
Part 2: Robertson on fiction 
Introduction 
When we turn from Robertson's criticism of drama to that of fiction, we also 
shift our main focus from the Elizabethan age to the contemporary literary 
scene. The criticism Robertson wrote for the periodical press in the late 
nineteenth, early twentieth century shows that he was keen to keep his finger on 
the pulse of the evolution of the novel, which he felt had progressed so much 
more rapidly and promisingly in the Victorian era than that of drama. 'Put the 
two lines of development side by side', he remarked in his essay on 'Evolution 
in Drama', 'and the force of the contrast becomes overwhelming.. . . even the 
creditable work of our abler dramatists stands wofully [sic] little chance of 
holding its own on the stream of time against the fiction which has made the 
last fifty years stand out as a literary period.'7' However, by the time Robertson 
started publishing his criticism of fiction in the mid-1880s, the great 
mid-Victorian novelists like Dickens, Thackeray, Trollope, and George Eliot 
were no longer alive, the death of Trollope in 1882 marking the end of a 
brilliant era. Surveying the literature of 1890 for the National Reformer, 
Robertson felt forced to conclude that 'We are still sinking in the quality of our 
general fiction.'79 Progress, in other words, was by no means ensured, and 
Robertson, as always, saw his own criticism of fiction as a means to smooth its 
path. 
Considering the fact that Robertson saw the nineteenth-century evolution of 
the novel as such a significant phenomenon, it comes as somewhat of a surprise 
that his output on fiction turns out to be considerably smaller than that on 
drama or poetry. In the end, Robertson's greatest interest was admittedly 
always in poetry (whether or not in dramatic form) first, and the novel simply 
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had to take second place in his consideration. Moreover, there is no denying 
that novel-reading is a time-consuming activity, for which a man as busy as 
Robertson may not always have been able to carve out the time. Be that as it 
may, it is an unfortunate fact that Robertson apparently never found the time or 
opportunity to write about some of the novelists he respected most. The most 
obvious case is that of Turgenev, the author whom Robertson tended to place 
highest in the international hierarchy of nineteenth-century fictionists. In a 
letter to his protégé Richard Curie (who is particularly known for his 
contribution to furthering Joseph Conrad's literary reputation), he congratulated 
the younger man on finishing an essay on the Russian novelist, since 'I have 
always failed to write one on him.'80 In other cases, notably Hawthorne and 
Thackeray, Robertson did write a number of short pieces, but these cannot be 
considered serious attempts at an in-depth evaluation of the author's work. All 
in all, it should be admitted that there are certain gaps in the picture we have of 
Robertson's views on the novel. 
It is, however, a picture which is certainly not lacking in vivacity and 
interest, nor should the gaps prevent us from taking in the whole. Most of 
Robertson's novel-criticism dates from the 1880s and 1890s, a period of 
transition in the development of the British novel and a period in which a 
number of important debates took place regarding the direction the relatively 
new genre was to take. At the centre of these debates was the question of 
realism in the novel, which, to a smaller or greater extent, permeated the work 
of most fiction critics of the day. Robertson proved no exception, and 
throughout his criticism of contemporary novelists we find him grappling with 
the problem of representing reality in fiction, and we see him adopt realism as a 
critical criterion for establishing a novel's success in various different ways. To 
place Robertson's criticism in context, this chapter therefore opens with a brief 
overview of the late-Victorian debate regarding realism. Subsequently, 
Robertson's views on a number of contemporary novelists will be discussed in 
detail. In spite of the fact that Robertson did not write as copiously about the 
novel as about drama and poetry, it would still require many more pages than 
available here to outline his views on all the novelists which received his 
critical attention. A selection has therefore been made on the basis of the 
quality and comprehensiveness of Robertson's treatment of a particular 
novelist, and the novelists who thus make their appearance as objects of 
Robertson's scrutiny here are W.D. Howells, Emile Zola, Robert Louis 
Stevenson, Rudyard Kipling, and Joseph Conrad. In the course of the 
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discussion of Robertson's criticism of these novelists, it will often be 
appropriate to refer to his views on other novelists by way of comparison, so 
that in the end a reasonably representative picture of Robertson's thoughts on 
the novel and on nineteenth and early twentieth-century novelists should 
emerge. 
The Late-Victorian Debate on Realism in the NoveP1 
The 1880s were crucial years in the development of the British novel. After 
decades of often vehement debate, the status of the novel as a morally, 
intellectually, and aesthetically respectable art-form finally seemed ensured. 
Although, as Kenneth Graham records, even as late as 1898 a critic could be 
found writing in Blackwood's that all novel-reading was in the end 'enervating 
and debilitating rather than bracing and tonic',82 the novel was no longer widely 
considered a danger to the moral sensibilities of its readers. The great 
mid-Victorian generation of Dickens and Thackeray was succeeded by 
novelists like Hardy, Moore, and Gissing, who were bent on establishing the 
novel in the educated public's eye as demanding serious intellectual 
consideration. Fiction's role as a supplier of popular entertainment receded into 
the background of the critical debate, and a theoretical discussion arose 
regarding the aesthetic properties of the new genre which found a notable high 
point in Henry James's 'The Art of Fiction' of 1884. The validity of the novel 
as an art-form, in short, was no longer under serious attack. The question now 
was: which direction was fiction going to take? 
In answering this question, the issue of realism loomed large. As Clarence 
Decker has observed, it is impossible to trace exactly the sources of nineteenth 
century realism, buried deep as they are in the cultural, economic, 
psychological, and other developments of the age.83 There is, however, no 
doubt that the rationalist-scientific revolution as briefly outlined for the British 
context in the second chapter of this study lies at its background. The rising 
concern for the physical, material aspects of human existence, the faith in 
science as providing essential insight into these aspects, the emphasis on the 
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workings of causality, the growing belief that heredity and the environment 
were the essential determinants in the making of human individuals, all these 
factors contributed to engendering a realist aesthetic which found such eloquent 
expression in the great nineteenth-century novel of Europe and America.84 
In England, the mid-Victorian generation of novelists had found its greatest 
champion of realism in fiction in George Eliot, outspoken (though not 
dogmatic) rationalist and scientific thinker. In Chapter 17 of Adam Bede she 
famously interrupted the flow of her narrative to expound her views on the 
subject: 
So I am content to tell my simple story, without trying to make 
things seem better than they were; dreading nothing, indeed, but 
falsity, which in spite of one's best efforts, there is reason to 
dread. Falsehood is so easy, truth so difficult. . . . Examine your 
words well, and you will find that even when you have no motive 
to be false, it is a very hard thing to say the exact truth, even about 
your own immediate feelings - much harder than to say something 
fine about them which is not the exact truth.85 
In Eliot's emphasis on 'truth' as opposed to 'falsity' we recognize the high 
moral tone of the period. Her view of realism does not so much concentrate on 
the exact representation of physical reality in fictional form (although any 
reader of Middlemarch would certainly affirm her powers in that department), 
as on the representation of the moral truth of life. In her novels she herself is 
emphatically present as a mediator between the reader and the fictional reality 
she constructs. The realism George Eliot represents is in that sense a realism 
cast in a subjectivist, idealist mould, and in this connection it is also instructive 
to glance briefly at the work of George Henry Lewes, who was such an 
important influence on Eliot, and who himself has received due credit for being 
one of the early supporters of the novel as a genre.86 In his Principles of 
Success in Literature, Lewes criticizes 'the rage for "realism"' for confounding 
'truth with familiarity', and for its 'predominance of unessential details'. 
Realism as Lewes sees it is idealist in nature, in the sense that it affords a 
'vision of realities in their highest and most affecting forms'.87 To Lewes as 
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much as to Eliot, it is finally not the depiction of realistic detail which makes 
art, but the subjective moral vision of the artist. 
In 1885, George Moore's published his The Mummer's Wife, widely 
considered the first British novel to challenge this traditional, morally infused 
idealist approach to realism in fiction.88 The book attracted little attention at the 
time, but it was not long before the naturalist realism advocated and practised 
by the Frenchman by which it was inspired, Emile Zola, came to occupy the 
centre of the critical stage.89 As Hippolyte Taine had proposed to remove the 
subjective element from criticism by adopting the methods of science, so Zola 
advocated a strictly objective approach to the writing of fiction along scientific, 
empirical lines. In his famous essay 'Le Roman Expérimental', he defined his 
conception of the 'experimental novelist' as follows: 
The experimental novelist is therefore he who accepts proved 
facts, who shows in man and society the mechanism of the 
phenomena which science has mastered, and who lets his personal 
sentiments enter in only concerning those phenomena whose 
determinism is not yet fixed, while he tries to control this personal 
sentiment, this a priori idea, as well as he can by observation and 
by experiment.90 
A novelist who thus based his practice on the impersonal observation of 
physical reality would naturally not shun the candid depiction of those aspects 
of human life at which Victorian morality and idealism recoiled, sexuality 
obviously being the main offender. On the whole, the British critics of the 
1880s were horrified at what they could then for the first time read in English 
translation. Although the enthusiasm for science reached its peak in this 
decade, a critic like W.S. Lilly (writing in the by no means unprogressive 
Fortnightly Review on 1 August 1885) was typically repelled by the uses to 
which it was put in Zola's naturalist fiction, finding that there 'obscenity and 
cruelty - the natural, the inevitable results of Materialism - have sought to 
conceal their foul and hideous lineaments under the mask of science.'91 In 
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Locksley Hall, Sixty Years After of 1886, Tennyson gave poetic expression to 
Ms nightmare-vision of 'maiden fancies wallowing in the troughs of Zolaism', 
voicing, as so often, the feelings of many of his contemporaries. 
It was through the enterprise of the publisher Henry Vizetelly (1820-1894) 
that Zola's work was brought to the attention of the British public in the first 
place. Vizetelly's love for French literature combined with his nose for 
business led him to'publish translations of seventeen of Zola's novels between 
1884 and 1889.92 Up to 1887, his venture proved a great commercial success, 
and while the critics in the periodicals and newspapers were loudly denouncing 
Zola's supposed moral depravity, Vizetelly and his sons Edward and Ernest 
could barely keep up with popular demand for the translations. However, 
trouble arose in 1887 when, on the publication of the (already heavily 
bowdlerized) translation of La Terre, the National Vigilance Society sought out 
W.T. Stead, editor of the Pall Mall Gazette and self-appointed guardian of 
Victorian morality, to head their attack on Vizetelly and Zola in the name of 
common decency. Stead, nothing if not an effective propagandist, managed to 
raise a public storm which finally led to Vizetelly being brought to trial twice, 
in 1888 and 1889, on charges of bringing obscene material before the public. 
The outcome was that Vizetelly, by that time an old and sick man, was sent to 
prison for three months. Robertson himself, outraged by this display of 
middle-class narrow-mindedness, attempted to come to Vizetelly's aid. In 
June 1889, he drew up a petition to the Home Secretary which he hoped to get 
signed by 'some literary men', and defiantly sent it for publication to the Pall 
Mall Gazette, of which Stead was the editor. Not altogether surprisingly, Stead 
simply refused to print it and so the plan foundered.93 However, one month 
later Robertson received a request from one of Vizetelly's sons to sign a new 
petition, which finally, carrying the names of progressive intellectuals like J.A. 
Symonds, Havelock Ellis, Leslie Stephen, Thomas Hardy, Olive Schreiner and 
many others, did manage to procure Vizetelly's release.94 However, the affair 
had broken the publisher's spirit and he died a few years later. 
The Vizetelly trial provides an appropriate symbol for the English 
opposition to French naturalist realism in the 1880s, in which the works of 
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Flaubert, De Maupassant and the Goncourt brothers were also commonly 
included. However, the debate on realism of this decade did not focus 
exclusively on French naturalism: there was also a powerful American 
influence to be reckoned with. The works of William Dean Howells and Henry 
James were widely discussed in the British periodical press, and received much 
adverse criticism which, however, as Kenneth Graham has remarked, was 
'more varied and on the whole more valuable than that devoted to Zola', being 
less dominated by moral denunciation and allowing more room for the 
discussion of aesthetic principles.95 On the whole, both Howells and James 
were charged with being excessively realistic, in the sense of presenting aspects 
of life which were simply considered trivial or uninteresting, regardless of the 
way they were treated. James, moreover, was criticized for not writing a 
conventional 'story', for being too analytical and pessimistic, and for setting his 
readers constantly on the wrong foot as far their sympathies for the main 
characters were concerned.96 Contradictorily enough, James was thus 
sometimes censured for being too realistic as well as too artificial at the same 
time. 
Like Zola, both Howells and James combined the function of novelist with 
that of critic, and made some of the most important theoretical statements on 
realism in fiction of the age. In Criticism and Fiction, a vigorous affirmation of 
the intellectual and moral status of the novel, Howells describes the true realist 
as one who is 
careful of every fact, and feels himself bound to express or to 
indicate its meaning at the risk of over-moralizing. In life he finds 
nothing insignificant; all tells for destiny and character; nothing 
that God has made is contemptible. He cannot look upon human 
life and declare this thing or that thing unworthy of notice, any 
more than the scientist can declare a fact of the material world 
beneath the dignity of his inquiry.97 
In spite of Howells's emphasis on the novelist's duty to overlook no aspect of 
life, he is clearly no outright follower of Zola's naturalism. Whereas Zola sees 
the role of the novelist as that of an objective, unobtrusive presenter of facts, 
Howells takes a more traditional line in assigning to the novelist the task of 
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explaining reality for the reader, something with which George Eliot would 
have found it hard to quarrel. One might argue that Howells's theoretical 
contribution to the late-Victorian debate on realism therefore consisted in the 
first place in widening the range of subjects fit for the novel to deal with, while 
retaining a pronounced moral bias to the novel's function. 
In 1875, Henry James was introduced in Paris to a group of realist and 
naturalist writers whom he would later refer to as 'the grandsons of Balzac': 
Gustave Flaubert, Edmond de Goncourt, Ivan Turgenev, Emile Zola, Alphonse 
Daudet, and Guy de Maupassant.98 In the years following this first encounter 
with naturalism, James came to sympathize more and more with its views and 
aims, a fact which is reflected in his most famous essay, 'The Art of Fiction', 
first published in Longman's Magazine of September 1884." At the centre of 
its argument lies James's contention, in sympathy with the naturalists' goals, 
that all we can legitimately ask of the novel is 'that it be interesting', and that 
the novelist should not otherwise be restricted in his liberty: 
A novel is in its broadest definition a personal impression of life; 
that, to begin with, constitutes its value, which is greater or less 
according to the intensity of the impression. But there will be no 
intensity at all, and therefore no value, unless there is freedom to 
feel and say.100 
This line of reasoning leads him eventually to the question of the relation 
between morality and art, in which he takes up the bold position that 'questions 
of art are questions (in the widest sense) of execution; questions of morality are 
quite another affair'.101 He cannot help but note that the English novel tends to 
be addressed to 'young people', which is unfortunate, since 'There are certain 
things which it is generally agreed not to discuss, not even to mention, before 
young people';102 truth to life simply cannot be achieved when the novel's 
scope is thus narrowed. James does grant that the final quality of a work of art 
depends on the quality of the mind of the producer, and that it is at this point 
(but at this point only) that the moral and the artistic sense come very close 
together. All in all, James's essay is a remarkably outspoken affirmation of the 
novelist's artistic autonomy. 
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Three months after its publication in Longman's Magazine, 'The Art of 
Fiction', itself a rejoinder to Walter Besant's essay of the same title, called 
forth a reaction entitled 'A Humble Remonstrance' in the same pages by 
Robert Louis Stevenson.103 James's and Stevenson's essays encapsulate neatly 
the debate regarding realism and romance which arose in the 1880s. In 'A 
Humble Remonstrance', Stevenson opposes to James's realistic 'novel of 
character', in which 'the statics of character' are analyzed and 'stronger 
passions' are avoided, his own 'dramatic novel', in which 'passion is the be-all 
and the end-all, the plot and the solution, the protagonist and the deus ex 
machina [sic] in one'.104 He offers the young writer advice from the heart: 
Let him not care particularly if he miss the tone of conversation, 
the pungent material detail of the day's manners, the reproduction 
of the atmosphere and the environment. These elements are not 
essential: a novel may be excellent, and yet have none of 
them . . . And as the root of the whole matter, let him bear in mind 
that his novel is not a transcript of life, to be judged by its 
exactitude; but a simplification of some side or point of life, to 
stand or fall by its significant simplicity.105 
In Stevenson's view, realism is therefore primarily a means which the novelist 
may employ as he wishes, not an end in itself. As far as morality and art are 
concerned, he does agree with James that there is no self-evident connection 
between the two. 
Stevenson became the great late-Victorian champion of the romance, the 
revival of which in the 1880s was greeted with what might be called relieved 
enthusiasm by critics like George Saintsbury and in particular Andrew Lang, 
who did not tire of extolling the virtues of the new wave of romance writers in 
his copious criticism of the period.106 Here at last was a literary movement 
which offered the weary reader relief from the supposed dullness and 
dreariness of the realist novel by unashamedly placing great passion, exciting 
incident, pure heroines, intrepid heroes and much more to thrill the reader once 
more at the centre of the literary stage, as Scott (now once more a great 
example) had done before. Only now, as Donald D. Stone has remarked, 'The 
documented romanticism of Sir Walter Scott gave way to the exotic 
romanticizing of H. Rider Haggard, just as the sympathetic realism of George 
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Eliot was replaced by the detached, analytical realism . . . of her disciple Henry 
James.'107 Romance writers like Rider Haggard, Hall Caine, Anthony Hope and 
Stevenson himself achieved tremendous popularity, among the critics as much 
as among the general public. This was, after all, a period in which the feeling 
that the great age of Queen Victoria was past its prime achieved general 
currency, and the rejuvenated genre of the romance offered the perfect outlet 
for escapist tendencies. Moreover, the revival of the romance may be seen as 
part of the wider movement of aestheticism which arose in the last two decades 
of the century, in the sense that its proponents placed particular emphasis on 
the formal aspects of fiction writing and saw morality and art (here Stevenson 
agreed with James) as belonging to distinctly different planes.108 
It is interesting to note that Edmund Gosse places the meteoric rise to fame 
of Rudyard Kipling from 1889 onwards in the context of the controversy on 
realism and romance:109 
The fiction of the Anglo-Saxon world, in its more intellectual 
provinces, had become curiously femininized. Those novel-writers 
who cared to produce subtle impressions upon their readers, in 
England and America, had become extremely refined in taste and 
discreet in judgment. People who were not content to pursue the 
soul of their next-door neighbor [sic] through all the burrows of 
self-consciousness had no choice but to take ship with Mr. Rider 
Haggard for the 'Mountains of the Moon'. Between excess of 
psychological analysis and excess of superhuman romance, there 
was a great void in the world of Anglo-Saxon fiction.110 
According to Gosse, it was this void which Kipling, with a novel blend of 
'exotic realism' and a 'vigorous rendering of unhackneyed experience', filled 
to great effect, so that only shortly after his arrival in London in October 1889, 
Kipling became a literary celebrity. In an unsigned review for the Daily News, 
Andrew Lang did in fact praise Plain Tales from the Hills for its unprecedented 
combination of realism and romance: 
It may safely be said that Plain Tales from the Hills will teach 
more of India, of our task there, of the various people whom we try 
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to rule, than many Blue Books. Here is an unbroken field of actual 
romance, here are incidents as strange as befall in any city of 
dream, any Kôr or Zu-Vendis, and the incidents are true.111 
The causes for Kipling's success in the 1890s are complex indeed, and may to a 
large extent also have their roots in the political dimension of Kipling's work. 
Nonetheless, Gosse's suggestion is a valuable one, and it also shows how 
intricately realism and romance are at some points interwoven, making it 
difficult to place either critics or novelists in separate, clearly defined 
categories. 
With Kipling we have now arrived in the 1890s, a decade in which criticism 
gradually began to reconcile itself with the changes realism, in particular 
French naturalism, had wrought in contemporary fiction. Not that Zola, for 
instance, could now count on general enthusiasm, but when he visited England 
in 1893 he was at least greeted with the respect due to a foreign master and was 
even made an honorary member of the Athenaeum Club."2 The climate was 
clearly becoming more favourable to the realist movement, a fact which is 
particularly apparent in the English reception of the Russian realists in this 
period.113 The great three, Turgenev, Tolstoy, and Dostoyevsky, generally 
received sympathetic and at times even enthusiastic treatment in the periodical 
press. Clarence Decker has argued that whereas the late-Victorians tended to 
find French naturalism 'materialistic, impersonal, futilitarian, mechanistic, and 
sordid', Russian realism appealed to them as being 'spiritual, humanitarian, 
moral, and permeated with faith, hope, and charity'.114 Although Tolstoy 
appears to have been more widely read, it was Turgenev in particular who, in 
spite of his close association with French naturalism, could count on the 
highest esteem among literary critics.115 It was by no means unusual to come 
across a verdict such as that of R.G. Burton, who, writing in the Westminster 
Review of December 1895, called Turgenev's novels 'practically perfect as 
works of art'.116 Aesthetes and moralists alike found in Turgenev's work a 
model well worth emulating, thereby contributing in their turn to the more 
general appreciation of the realist aesthetic. 
Paul Goetsch has shown that it would be far from correct to assume that 
after 1895, the debate on realism and naturalism was over, and to some extent, 
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Mrs. Grundy was still as alert as before.117 After all, it was in 1895 that Thomas 
Hardy turned from the novel to poetry, believing that the latter would allow 
him greater artistic liberty. In Goetsch's view, criticism of fiction between 1896 
and 1914 continued the earlier discussions, although the emphases tended to 
shift. The distinction between realism and romance, for instance, continued to 
be the subject of controversy, but with a growing awareness among critics of 
the points of contact between the two genres, which may well have facilitated 
the reception of an author as difficult to categorize as Joseph Conrad. On the 
whole one might conclude that such finer discussions point to the fact that in 
the course of two decades the debate on realism had greatly gained in 
intellectual and theoretical depth, in a gradual movement away from the 
outright denunciation of Zola in the 1880s. In the following section, I will 
attempt to place the novel criticism of J.M. Robertson in the context of this 
development. 
Robertson on Howells 
Robertson's response to the work of the American realist W.D. Howells is 
recorded in two essays. The first, 'Mr. Howells' Novels' was originally 
published in the Westminster Review in 1884,"8 at the very beginning of 
Robertson's career as a critic, while the second, 'Mr. Howells' Recent Novels' 
dates from 1890."9 Of the two, the first is by far the most interesting as giving 
the most wide-ranging overview of Howells's work, while also offering a 
useful introduction to Robertson's views on the novel in general and on realism 
in the novel in particular. I will therefore use this essay as the focus of the 
following discussion of Robertson's criticism of the American novelist. 
Robertson opens his essay with the observation that Howells's novels have 
rightfully received a friendly reception from the British public in the past few 
years, since there is in them 'something refreshing and stimulating' for the 
reader who does not demand sensationalism. [151] One of Howells's greatest 
assets is in fact his abandonment of those devices which detract from a realistic 
representation of life: 
Here there are no mysterious crimes; no studies in circumstantial 
evidence; no staggering surprises; few rescues, and these quite 
ordinary. The novelist has gone beyond George Eliot in his 
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abandonment of plot and intrigue, and challenges us to try how a 
dexterously handled love-story will do on its own basis. [152] 
On this head, Robertson has particular praise for A Chance Acquaintance, 
which to him calls to mind the work of Jane Austen, of which he elsewhere 
wrote that it 'is a revelation of the possibilities of the novel in the way of the 
presentment of normal character independently of thrilling plot.'120 However, 
Howells, who has had the opportunity to learn from realists like George Eliot, 
Balzac, and Turgenev, goes beyond Austen in his realization that 'a good 
fictionist is not simply to concoct for us a story with an agreeable ending, but is 
to impress us with a sense of his faithfulness to an actual life that is full of 
broken threads and pathetic failures.' [154] As Kenneth Graham has noted, the 
praise Robertson expresses here for the lack of happy endings in the earlier 
Howells is quite uncharacteristic of the time.121 Robertson even goes so far as 
to say that A Chance Acquaintance is 'only a good story in virtue of the final 
breach between the ill-assorted lovers.' As it is now, he pronounces it 'a sound 
and promising sample of realistic fiction' with 'the truthfulness of 
Tourguénief, which, by Robertson's standards, is high praise indeed. [155] 
However, Robertson feels forced to conclude that Howells's later work does 
not bear out his original promise: 
Now, the gist of the critical finding against Mr. Howells is, firstly, 
that after promising to give us sound realistic work, employing 
both observation and meditation on life, he has descended to the 
function of producing lollipops; and, secondly, that when he has 
sought since to present the desirable realistic and conscientious 
work he has exhibited a lack of the necessary width and depth of 
thought - in short, deficient philosophic capacity. [157] 
Robertson concedes that Howells remains an excellent stylist throughout his 
work (he gives several pages of examples), and that in that limited sense he 
may well be considered a deserving pupil of George Eliot, who 'brought into 
the language a new and complex harmony, in which all elements of strength 
seemed combined.' [159-60] But that does not prevent him from being reduced 
to producing 'work apparently inspired chiefly by the desire to tickle the 
palate', Robertson's first point of criticism. [170] With regard to the second 
point, Robertson observes that George Eliot, unlike Howells, 'added to the 
artistic gratification an impression of adequate mentality such as we do not 
seem likely to have from any one else for a while'. [158-59] What separates 
'Jane Austen', in Criticisms, I, p. 24. 
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truly great novelists like Eliot from more modest practitioners like Howells is 
the fact that their work is 'rounded and controlled by an adequate theory of life 
- a theory which makes itself felt behind all their work.' [176-7] To Robertson, 
this is a central critical criterion: 
We do not leave a novel of Hawthorne, of Balzac, of Tourguénief, 
of George Eliot, of Thackeray even, in a state of mere confusion 
and discontent. We feel that they are equal to their work; that they 
have their personages in hand; that they have a philosophy which 
sums matters up. [183] 
In Howells's case, the lack of a unifying philosophy not only affects his 
books as wholes, it also affects the intelligibility of his characters. When 
Howells wishes to create characters possessed with superior intellectual or 
psychological qualities, the outcome is severely limited by the relative 
shallowness of his own philosophical insight. This becomes particularly 
apparent in Howells's depiction of his women characters, of which Robertson 
is especially critical: 
Those of us who confess we find Mr. Howells's women charming, 
go far to say that we like a woman to be a trifle silly; that we do 
not want to find in her an intellectual or even a quite rational 
companion. [187] 
Thus Howells, in attempting to create realistic characters, cannot help running 
into the limitations of his own philosophy of life. In the final summing up of 
his literary merits, Robertson therefore describes him - note the telling choice 
of words - as 'an intermediate type in the evolution of fictional art', whose 
pursuit of realism is to be applauded as pointing the direction for future 
progress, but who himself cannot be promised 'a full bodied immortality'.122 
[199] 
It now becomes obvious that Robertson may be a champion of realism, but 
the mere depiction of realistic detail unregulated by a sustained moral 
philosophy is of little value to him. At this early point in his career as a critic, 
his ideal of the realist novelist was still very much embodied by George 
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Eliot.123 A few years later, Robertson was to come under the influence of an 
author who advocated a more radical brand of realism than Eliot (and certainly 
than Howells), and who, rather than praised for his moral rectitude, was 
generally denounced in the press for his supposed lack of it: Emile Zola. 
Robertson on Zola 
In October 1893, Robertson read a paper on Zola to the Liberal Social Union 
which was not reprinted until ten years later in volume two of his Criticisms.m 
The paper is an important one since even in 1893, when Zola received a cordial 
reception on his visit to England, it was still rare to come across a critic who so 
whole-heartedly (though not uncritically) welcomes Zola after years of 
wide-spread moral indignation. Not that Zola's novels were not a commercial 
success, a fact which Robertson notes at the opening of his paper; but, he 
argues, that success has largely been 'a success of scandal'. In France as much 
as in England, Zola was and continued to be generally read for the wrong 
reasons: either for the sake of relishing his 'improprieties', or for the more 
subtle pleasure of being able to denounce the improprieties after perusal. 
Robertson, who with his defence of Henry Vizetelly in 1889 had already shown 
where.he stood with regard to Zola's morals, now argued that the continuing 
emphasis on the supposedly 'scandalous' aspects of the French author's work 
had obscured the true issue at stake: the evaluation of Zola's status and merit as 
a literary artist. It is this task which Robertson sets himself in his paper. 
First of all, Robertson establishes the central principle which unites the 
many volumes of Les Rougon-Macquart: 
Here is a sociological as well as an artistic purpose; and both the 
sociology and the art are in a manner implicated in the scheme of 
heredity which is put forward as uniting the whole, the 
ramifications of the Rougon-Macquart being treated as expressive 
of a law or laws of heredity. [21] 
Robertson, much of whose work is devoted to exposing the workings of 
non-religious causality in history, must have recognized in Zola a fellow-spirit. 
It is the application of the unifying causal principle of heredity which, on the 
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whole, raises Zola above his great precursor Balzac. In comparison with Zola, 
who creates 'a great scientific art scheme', Balzac's body of work is 'straggling 
and uncertain, like the researches of early science'. [29] Although both authors 
are to be applauded for recognizing that 'mind, temperaments, are functions of 
bodies', Zola had the advantage of being able to benefit from the findings of his 
'more scientific generation' in founding his survey of an age on the biological 
principle of heredity'. [30] 
Robertson is not blind to the disadvantages of such a grand unifying scheme. 
He recognizes that a 'definite science of heredity' was not as yet in sight, and, 
more importantly, that the requirements of art and science tended to clash at a 
fundamental level. Zola might aim at the objective, realistic portrayal of the 
'pathology' of his characters, but the fact that art demands a 'sense of 
symmetry and satisfying order' sometimes results in 'a monstrous strain on our 
sense of probability'. Robertson questions, for instance, the scientific 
likelihood of a woman like Aunt Dide, mother of the first Rougon and 
Macquarts and subjected to the worst rigours of life, living to the ripe old age 
of 105. Clearly, it is the 'instinct for symmetry, the plan of the series' which 
causes such a departure from the realistic depiction of life. [30-31] 
Nonetheless, Robertson finds Zola's scheme on the whole 'greatly 
conceived', and proceeds to ask how it should be criticized in more detail. He 
enumerates a number of fundamental issues: 
Over such a scheme as Zola's the main questions to be raised are 
questions of power, insight and judgment. Does he seize with any 
broad truthfulness the society of the Second Empire? Does he see 
human beings in their relations to each other? Is his ethical grasp 
of life commensurate with the range of his artistic study? Does he 
help us to unify impressions? Does he widen our grasp of life? 
And does he all the while give us the artistic impression, making 
us feel that his people stand on their feet and are drawn in the 
round? [22] 
Robertson does not see how these questions can be answered with anything 
other than a resounding 'yes', unless the moral issue of Zola's supposed 'faults 
of taste' [23] should be allowed to obscure the critic's judgment. No one, 
Robertson argues, now denies Shakespeare or Dante genius, whereas obviously 
'Shakspere somewhat relished the lubricious, and Dante distinctly relished the 
horrible.' In Zola's case, one might therefore legitimately ask whether he 
depicted 'vice and evil under the Second Empire with either relish or moral 
indifference'. [24] 
Robertson admits that the answer is not entirely an easy one, in the sense 
that in his view, Zola does indeed tend 'overmuch to pessimism in his 
208 J.M. ROBERTSON: RATIONALIST AND LITERARY CRITIC 
estimates of life, tends to dwell overmuch on the evil and to overlook the 
good.' However, Zola's approach is ultimately validated by the fact that the 
fundamental question 'Does he set forth evil that really exists?' can only be 
answered in the affirmative: 
The vice and corruption portrayed by Zola are actual, not only in 
France, especially the France of last generation, but in England 
and other countries in varying degrees. The degradation and 
animalism of the peasantry, the corruption and baseness of the 
middle class and the rich, the instability and vice of the town 
workers - these are the fruits not merely of Imperialism but of 
commercialism - let us say of unrationalised society under any 
régime. [25] 
With his novels, Robertson feels, Zola makes a genuine contribution to 'curing 
social evils', and those who argue that the novel is not the place to do this 
forget that 'art is finally indefinable, or rather illimitable: it is for ever 
extending itself.' In the end, 'Zola really quashes the argument that art ought 
not to do certain things, by doing them.' [27] 
However, Zola's exposure of social evils alone does not make him a great 
artist. Robertson is well aware that 'Art is lost when in the name of science the 
artist makes his personages mere mouthpieces of doctrines, missing portraiture 
while professing to give it.' Zola to him is not a social scientist who happens to 
write novels, but 'always fundamentally an artist', whose characters are vividly 
alive even if at times they are used to advance the author's views. It is, in fact, 
in the first place Zola's command of 'the great physical facts of life' [32], his 
ability to make objective observation come to life in a consummate work of art, 
which makes him a great artist, and, as Robertson concludes, 'one of the great 
imaginative writers of modern Europe.' [36] 
Zola's naturalism, with its frank exposure of social abuses grounded on 
scientific principles, was clearly well-calculated to appeal to the rationalist 
critic J.M. Robertson, as was French realism in general. 'Beside the 
impassiveness and impersonalness of workers like Balzac, Flaubert, Zola, 
Daudet, and Maupassant,' Robertson declared, 'our latter-day novelists figure 
as lacking in balance and weight, as capricious, egotistic, wayward.'125 [28] 
Although his progressionist ideology made Zola's pessimism and emphasis on 
the darker side of human nature slightly distasteful to him - he was enough of a 
Victorian for that - he could not but voice his appreciation of Zola's work, 
which, with its emphasis on scientific causality, embodied precisely the kind of 
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unifying philosophy he had found missing in the novels of W.D. Howells. 
Robertson therefore deserves to be mentioned alongside better^known critics 
like George Moore, Vernon Lee, Arthur Symons, and Havelock Ellis as one of 
the first critics to demand serious attention for Zola from the English public 
and critics.126 
Robertson on Stevenson 
As a novel critic in the 1880s and 1890s, Robertson could hardly avoid taking 
position in the debate on realism and romance which then raged in the 
periodical press. In his criticism of the period, he pays considerable attention to 
the rise to fame of Stevenson as exemplifying the growing taste for the 
rejuvenated genre of the romance.127 A s we follow Robertson's criticism of 
Stevenson throughout the last two decades of the century, it will become 
apparent that his position in the debate was not a stable one, but, in fact, shifted 
from outspoken appreciation of the romance as practised by Stevenson to 
equally outspoken condemnation of the genre as different practitioners came to 
occupy the centre of the stage. 
In 1885, Robertson showed himself particularly enamoured of the most 
recent work by Robert Louis Stevenson, to the extent that, after a sympathetic 
appraisal of George Moore's naturalist novel The Mummer's Wife, he was 
brought to concede that 'realism is not everything, even in fiction.'128 He hailed 
Stevenson's 'Prince Otto' as 'perhaps the most excellent book of the year', 
although it was a story 'in which, save for the descriptions of scenery and the 
peculiar vividness of all the figure—painting, there is no realism 
whatever; . . . and in which hardly one character is really possible.' In 
Robertson's view, Stevenson's manifest abilities as a 'masterly and original 
story-teller' and as 'the master of a quite incomparable style' more than made 
up for his deviations from the realist rule, especially since the author also 
displayed adequate moral fibre in ' a curious, chivalrous wisdom, at once keen 
and gracious, that entirely conquers a reader's esteem.' Robertson's final, 
enthusiastic verdict is that 'It is permeated by that fugitive something we call 
126
 See Decker, The Victorian Conscience, pp. 106-11. 
127
 Robertson was highly appreciative of the work of Nathaniel Hawthorne, the great 
American romancist of an earlier generation, whom he called 'nearly the first great novelist of 
the psychological school, and still the most individual' (Modern Humanists, p. 112). 
Unfortunately, Robertson never discussed Hawthorne at any length; the short article which 
appears in the first volume of Criticisms (pp. 28-35) is mainly a review of Moncure D. 
Conway's biography, and has little to say about Hawthorne's novels. 
128
 'English Literature in 1885', National Reformer (3 January 1886), p. 3. The 
following quotes in this paragraph are from the same page. 
210 J.M. ROBERTSON: RATIONALIST AND LITERARY CRITIC 
genius' and he does not hesitate to compare Stevenson with Mozart and 
Schubert. 
One year later, Robertson 's enthusiasm does not appear to have waned, as 
the following aside from his review of Shaw's Cashel Byron's Profession 
shows: 
Keeping out of the reckoning his incomparable "Treasure Island", 
which is neither realism nor the other thing, but simply a first-rate 
story of adventure, the last perfection of its type, we have in his 
"New Arabian Nights" stories, and in still better shape in his 
"Prince Otto", a species of fiction in which there is no pretence, 
artistically speaking, of real reproduction of life; in which none of 
the personages can be said to be conceivable; but in which, 
nevertheless, there is a constant and telling analysis of human 
nature in the abstract, this being yet achieved with all the zest and 
sparkle that can be infused into animated dramatic narrative. It is 
the kind of effect we have in Shakspere. In the regions of 
Gerolstein and maritime Bohemia we find ourselves face to face 
with true human passion and folly, strength and weakness, foible 
and magnanimity, all playing in admirably projected 
character-types, none of whom can we really imagine ourselves 
meeting in the flesh.129 
Realism, in other words, need not necessarily be the only way fiction can 
achieve true insight into man ' s moral nature; in the hands of a genius like 
Stevenson, the romance may serve such a purpose equally well. 
In spite of such an unexpectedly tolerant attitude towards Stevenson's 
chosen fictional genre, Robertson's overview of the Scotsman's work at the 
end of 1886 betrays some initial signs of dissatisfaction with the artistic scope 
of the romance. Praise of Kidnapped is this time followed by the more 
cautionary statement that 'A writer who can tum out such pieces of perfect 
work might perchance be the great novelist of the immediate future, if his 
genius permitted him to alter his bent from the production of first-rate stories 
of incident to a comprehensive fictional treatment of life.'130 Two years later, in 
an article on 'The Position of English Literature', Robertson now more 
explicitly expresses his regret that Stevenson should choose to devote his 
talents to 'the novel of adventure', with its lack of moral and psychological 
subtlety: 'One day it will be seen to be a pity that such gifts for fiction should 
not have been brought to bear, in fiction as otherwise, on what Wordsworth 
was thinking of when he said that Scot t ' s poetry would die because he had 
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addressed nothing to "the immortal part of man".'131 Finally, in 1889, 
Robertson regretfully states that 'It is probably idle . . . to hope that Mr. 
Stevenson will alter his method and rum realist.'132 By this time, Robertson has 
clearly come to feel that the romance is in the end an inadequate vehicle for 
giving artistic expression to the greater moral truths of man's existence, and he 
takes it as a sign of the general creative dearth in English literature that it 
should thus have come to dominate the literary scene. 
Whereas Robertson admitted that Stevenson, in spite of his (in the end) 
regrettable predilection for the romance, could at least boast of great potential 
as a novelist, that much was regrettably not to be said for a fellow-romancist 
like H. Rider Haggard. In the opening essay on 'Science in Criticism' in 
ETCM, Robertson launches an attack on Andrew Lang for his passionate 
advocacy of the romance as exemplified by Haggard's work, asking himself 
how 'a reader with Mr. Lang's culture can possibly fail to recognize the 
bankruptcy of Mr. Haggard in all the higher qualities even of the 
romance-writer; his essential vulgarity of plan, aim, and method'.133 If even 
Stevenson could not finally raise the romance to an art-form of the highest 
moral and intellectual standing, in the hands of a writer like Rider Haggard it 
could only degenerate into mere sensational bed-time reading for schoolboys. 
Moreover, looking back on the rise of the romance in an essay on 'The Murder 
Novel' in 1899, Robertson concluded that romancists like Haggard, Anthony 
Hope and Robert Cromie had engendered a general taste for murder and 
bloodshed in literature which was not without its effect on the psychological 
novel such as practised by Mrs. Humphrey Ward and Thomas Hardy.13'1 On the 
whole, it seems no more than likely that Robertson's aversion to the 
sensationalist English romancists reinforced his feeling that the future of the 
novel was in the hands of the realists, and in particular of the French and 
Russian realists. 
Robertson on Kipling 
In 1890, Robertson witnessed the arrival on the English literary scene of 
Rudyard Kipling, the author who, according to Edmund Gosse, so successfully 
bridged the gap between realism and romance. To Robertson, Kipling's quick 
rise to popularity was a sign that 'We are still sinking in the quality of our 
general fiction.'135 On the one hand, he could not deny that 'There is much 
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cleverness in the new writer, a great deal of observation of character, and a 
happy knack of catching style.' On the other hand, he found in Kipling 'an 
entire adaptation to ordinary Philistine taste, and a plain incapacity to write a 
great novel.' On no account could Kipling ever aspire to being a great artist in 
the class of Turgenev, George Eliot, or Zola: 
All these, in their very different ways, strike deep into life: Mr. 
Kipling's vein is clearly the sentimental psychology of a 
thoroughly artificial society, the art of a dealer in the decorative 
and the chic. One must go to the French to describe Mr. Kipling's 
art: it is pimpant; the art of a great talent with a cheap culture and 
a flashy environment.136 
Although professing to offer his readers a slice of actual life, Kipling in effect 
gave his readers only a 'diluted realism', thus achieving great popularity with a 
public 'which in art buys piquant and flashy "story-pictures" and anecdotal 
sculpture'.137 In an article on 'Russian and English Fiction',138 Robertson 
compared Kipling's The Light that Failed unfavourably with a novel entitled A 
Russian Priest by the unknown Russian novelist E.N. Potapenko, whom he 
praises for being 'as austere, as genuine, as the best Frenchmen'.139 In 
comparison, Kipling 'recalls an artist who goes in for trick-work in paint; he 
sacrifices observation to piquant effect, struggles to look knowing, forces the 
lights and the shadows and the color, and in general seeks to titillate the nerves 
of the average diner-out rather than to convince the subtle observers and the 
good readers.'140 Such a form of realism has really no more to do with the 
accurate representation of life than the romance, a genre which it thus 
approximates in its aim to please the average reader. 
Robertson elaborated on this theme in an article on 'Kipling and his World' 
which he wrote over a decade later for the Indian Review, and which was 
reprinted in the Reformer in 1904.141 It is opened by the statement that if there 
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is one reason for the general admiration by which Kipling's work is met, it is 
'the sense of reality set up by his writing': 
No writer of English fiction, perhaps, has ever shown greater 
power of at once imagining so intensely and wording so richly as 
to make the reader's vision no less instantaneous than his own. 
This is indeed the master gift of all great writers of drama and 
fiction; and Shakspere and Thackeray142 exhibit it on planes of 
psychology which Mr. Kipling never reaches. But while their 
artistic level thus entirely transcends his, his intensity and lucidity 
of expression on his own plane is quite equal to theirs. The one 
species of intellectual discipline which he seems to have given 
himself is the discipline of style, in the sense of the search for 
color and force in vocabulary and nervous concision in phrase, and 
the result is quite masterly in its kind. [321] 
But this profession of admiration for Kipling's stylistic powers, is, of course, 
only a 'recul pour meilleur sauter'. It may very well be true that Kipling 
represents speeches and actions so that they have the semblance of reality, but 
his overall merit as an artist in fiction is to be measured by the question: 'Does 
his work add a total and enveloping truth to its primary function in the matter 
of verisimilitude of detail?' [323] What Robertson looks for in the realist in 
fiction (and what he found, for instance, in George Eliot and Zola, but not in 
Howells) is again the 'unifying philosophy', the large moral vision which raises 
a work above the mere representation of realistic detail: 
When we seek in what holds its ground through the ages as great 
literature, for the moral constituents of such greatness, they are 
found to include in especial a sense of the illusoriness of human 
hates and vanities and triumphs, and an elevation of spirit that 
challenges the reader to transcend the motives and ideals they 
involve. [328] 
The final critical test for a work of fiction is, in short, 'its total exhibition of 
moral judgment' [323]; Robertson states plainly that he does not believe in the 
theory that art is separate from morality, and since Kipling 'has deliberately 
chosen to meddle in morals, to pose as a teacher and leader no less than as a 
limner of life' [331], he deserves to be judged as such. 
142
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Robertson - after all, the author of the pro-Boer Wrecking the Empire 
(1901) - shows particular repugnance at Kipling's imperialist, jingoist 
tendencies, as so many critics after him have done: 
To begin with, Mr. Kipling is always vaunting. Even when he 
writes a story to oppose the ineptitude of some types of British 
officer, or to confess the possibilities of military miscarriage 
among untrained British troops, the picture is always planned to 
bring out the signal superiority of the "Race" under proper 
conditions.... His normal state is vainglory. And the worst of it is 
that the vainglory is not that simple pride in his own race which 
might pass as primary human emotion: it always goes doubled 
with an entirely vulgar hatred for other races. [329] 
Robertson is willing to grant Kipling his 'flashes of higher inspiration and 
aspiration', among which he ranges his Recessional, but on the whole he finds 
him 'beyond the pale of great art', because of 'his intellectual limitations, 
which keep him school-boyish, parochial, morally vulgar in his total relation to 
life and to his fellow-men.' [332] Of all the novelists of the age Robertson 
criticizes, Kipling - the epitome of 'political incorrectness' in Robertsonian 
terms - is without a doubt the one who rouses him to the greatest degree of 
moral indignation. His response to Kipling brings out most emphatically that to 
Robertson, realism cannot be separated from morality. 
Robertson on Conrad 
Robertson's article on 'Kipling and his World' seems to stand almost alone as 
an effort on Robertson's part to deal critically with a major novelist after the 
turn of the century. However, he had far from lost his interest in the novel in 
general and in the problem of realism in particular, which is demonstrated by 
the article he published on 'The Novels of Joseph Conrad' in 1918 in the North 
American Review,1*3 as well as by bis extensive correspondence with Richard 
Curie (1883-1968), who is best known as Conrad's close friend and the author 
of a number of influential studies on Conrad's life and work, but who was also 
a prolific writer of travel books, short stories, and novels in his own right. 
Robertson's correspondence with Curie may in fact be read as providing 
relevant background material to the article, since it deals with problems of 
realism which are also central to Robertson's discussion of Conrad's work. 
Robertson's letters to Curie (of which unfortunately only Robertson's side 
has been preserved) span a period of 25 years, from 1904 to 1929. The 
'The Novels of Joseph Conrad', North American Review, 208 (1918), pp. 439-53. 
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particular interest of these letters lies in the fact that these are the only known 
personal documents by Robertson's hand in which literary matters (other than 
technicalities of Shakespeare scholarship) are extensively discussed. At the 
start of the correspondence, Curie was a young man trying to make his way into 
the literary world by writing criticism and short stories, who clearly looked to 
Robertson as a literary mentor. He sent the older man his literary efforts, and 
Robertson, taking his role very seriously, meted out detailed and frequently far 
from mild criticism in return (all clearly offered, it should be stressed, with the 
best of intentions and coupled with generous praise). Curie professed himself a 
follower of the strictest realism in fiction, and it is around the question of the 
exact meaning of realism that the most interesting literary discussion in the 
correspondence revolves. 
On 10 October 1910, Robertson responded to a short story which Curie had 
sent him a week before, and in which, judging from Robertson's reaction, 
Curie had painstakingly tried to represent the workings of an insane brain. 
Robertson showed himself quite unsympathetic to his young friend's effort: 
Is insanity a theme for artistic treatment? How can you claim to 
know how a mad brain works? If you are as true to life here as in a 
presentment of sane experience, you are doing a bit of pathological 
science, not a piece of art work. If you are not faithful to fact, what 
is it you are doing? Madness is pathologically, not humanly 
interesting. And you can't pretend to know - to have any basis. A 
man who had been mad, and recovered, could give valuable 
details: your speculation can only be a tour de force. 
Robertson admits that in Maud, Tennyson had taken his hero through madness, 
but points out as a vital difference that this was 'literary madness - musical 
throughout, a mere raising to wildness of the natural feelings', not 'genuine' 
madness. Judging from the long letter Robertson wrote four days later, Curie 
had defended himself by presenting several examples of madness in literature 
which he felt might be called genuine, King Lear among them. Robertson, 
however, does not budge: 
The madness of Lear is literary, not a "document in madness" at 
all. Shakespeare puts in his mouth wildly sane indictments of life, 
readable as such, with just touches of lunacy enough to keep, up 
the illusion of madness; and it is Lear's return to sanity that 
crowns all, as regards our view of him. 
Once more we see that to Robertson, the mere representation, however 
accurate, of an aspect of reality such as insanity is of little interest, and that he 
demands much more of the art of fiction. 
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What exactly it is he demands is outlined in his letter to Curie of 16 July 
1912. In letters of 7 March and 10 July 1912, occasioned by new literary efforts 
on Curie's part, he had repeated his argument concerning literary madness with 
such emphasis that Curie had taken offence, and Robertson was now driven to 
restate his case more clearly. What he found missing in Curie's work was 
'motive', which, he argued, should not be mistaken for 'plot', but simply meant 
the kind of 'intelligible coherence' an actual transcription of life could not 
offer: 
You seem to argue that because life is merely stupid and nugatory, 
it suffices to transcribe stupidity and inanity for artistic purposes. 
Surely you will not hold to this. To make an artistic whole, great or 
small, there must be selection and combination: the stupidity must 
either be a foil to something else or be in itself so piquant as to 
constitute a theme, like a good portrait of an ugly face. Fatuity in 
itself is repellent: to make it matter of artistic satisfaction (as in 
Jane Austen's fools) there must be humorous handling and planned 
contrast. 
It is 'the artistic selection of the actual' which Robertson states as 'the greatest 
kind of art', and it is in this direction that he tries to steer Curie, 'away from the 
wilfully bizarre, the obscure, the disordered, the insane', and towards 
'consequentness'. 
From the correspondence with Curie, it becomes clear that Robertson's ideal 
in fiction is to no small extent embodied by the work of Joseph Conrad. In a 
letter of 23 April 1913 he exhorts Curie to follow Conrad's example: 'Look at 
Conrad's own hold on actuality: it is that no less than style which makes him. 
And he is actual without being ordinary - no man is less so.' Four years later, 
on 15 December 1917, Robertson reports to Curie that he has undertaken to 
write a short paper on 'The Novels of Joseph Conrad' for the Rainbow Circle, 
and it is probable that it was this paper which served as the basis for the article 
that appeared in the North American Review almost a year later.144 
Robertson opens his article by observing that Conrad's critical success is an 
encouraging sign that 'English appreciation has greatly quickened and widened 
in the past hundred years.' [439] After all, Conrad's art is 'much less facile in 
its appeal, is far more austerely unappealing, than that of almost any of the men 
of imaginative literary genius of the last century.' [440] In that sense, his case 
is similar to that of Meredith, whose - admittedly late - success can also hardly 
be explained by his appeal to popular taste. Both authors 'are not of the tribe of 
m
 Page numbers referring to this article are given in square brackets in the main text. 
For the Rainbow Circle, see Chapter 1. 
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entertainers; they try the spirit and toil the judgment, offering not pass-time but 
pilgrimage.' [440] However, in several respects Meredith finds his superior in 
Conrad. Whereas Meredith 'developed vices of style almost unparalleled in our 
previous literary history, till it became an affliction to read him',145 Conrad 
immediately asserted himself as 'a born writer, a born master of language'. 
[441] Moreover, and more importantly, Conrad's travels as a sailor to distant 
parts of the globe have given him à much wider perspective on life in all its 
various aspects, so that he finally represents a unique case, combining 'an 
intense susceptibility to the appeal of environment, the flow of things outward' 
with 'a no less intense inner life of imaginative reconstruction'. [441] 
In Conrad, 'the two faculties of perception and conception, vision and 
reproduction' achieve 'a spontaneous union', thus constituting an essential 
characteristic of his art: 
To his intense perceptivity, everything in nature is in relation to 
life; every living thing at the same time independently alive; every 
person a world in himself. . . . His is a universal response to all 
visible phenomena; he might be, on that side, a painter or a man of 
science; it is on his two sides of vision of Nature and the living, 
and imaginative reconstruction, that he is a novelist. As he puts it 
in the suppressed preface to his Nigger of the "Narcissus", the 
true artist's work is "a simple-minded attempt to render the 
highest kind of justice to the visible universe, by bringing to light 
the truth manifold and one, underlying its every aspect." [442] 
Robertson draws a parallel with painting, giving the example of 'a picture of a 
cow, by one . . . of the Marises, which I am disposed to call one of the most 
spiritual paintings I have ever seen.' This picture is much more than outward 
reality captured in paint, it is 'an embodied effluence, a natural incarnation, a 
transfiguration.' Compared to this, 'the notorious Bull of Paul Potter' is no 
more than 'a monstrous eleograph,146 representing so many hundred-weights of 
beef, with the skin on.' Whereas Potter's picture represents 'false realism' to 
Robertson, the first, like Conrad's novels, exemplifies 'idealistic realism'. 
[443] 
Robertson elaborates on this thesis by pointing out a number of instances in 
which Conrad achieves an effect of realism through unrealistic devices. In Lord 
Jim, for instance, Marlow as the actual narrator of the entire story is hardly 
145
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credible, 'Marlow is reciting written Conrad.' [444] However, the goal is 
always to create an effect of artistic illusion. Likewise, in Nostromo, it is 
impossible to believe in the literal truth of the narrative when 'Martin Découd, 
after forty hours of intense strain and excitement in the insurrection, sits down 
in the night, in the café of Viola, by the light of one candle, to write to his sister 
in Paris a small novel, describing it all.' [444] However, this is all a matter of 
literary machinery; in actual fact, in the case of Nostromo, 'The very device of 
making Découd write his story of the episode is employed to heighten the sense 
of reality, to give the special illusion of actuality by making one of the actors in 
the episode give it out in terms of his own doings and vivid sensations.' 
[444-^45] 
Robertson finds another main element of Conrad's conception of the 
technique of the novel in his use of 'atmosphere': 
The word comes from the technical criticism of painting, where it 
posits the requirement that a picture, as distinct from a portrait, 
shall present persons or objects in a framed space of light and air. 
That lacking, completeness of truth is lacking. In fiction, the 
cognate effect is that of physical and moral background, 
environment, "stagesetting." To an artist constituted as Conrad is, 
the provision of such atmosphere is a matter of course. For him the 
organism and the environment are a composite whole, and he 
simply cannot provide an event without framing it in a scene 
which for him is in vital relation to it. [445] 
Sometimes, the effect of this technique of 'backgrounding' can be somewhat 
strained, as when, in Nostromo, the parrot is made to cry 'Viva Costaguana' 
when Charles and Mrs. Gould are speaking of the country. However, it is 
completely successful in presenting the characters, whom we 'come to 
know . . . as we know them in life, by gradual intercourse: backward-looking 
revelations come only after we have become acquainted with the man as he 
lives.' Dr. Monygham, again in Nostromo, provides a typical example: 'we 
meet him a dozen times, with hints of a past many times withheld, till at the 
stage of his active entry into the plot it is all told with a concentrated intensity 
that suggests a novel used up for an incidental record.' [446] 
Robertson's final summing up of Conrad's achievement makes explicit 
those views on realism which were mostly implicit in his earlier criticism as 
discussed in these pages: 
The final impression left by Conrad's art then, is that of greatness, 
of tragic intensity, of vivid realization of life and circumstance, of 
invincible patience in the artistic reproduction, albeit there are 
miscalculations in the matter of the machinery, such as lesser 
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artists would in general shun. In calling him a realist, we are 
noting that he is an intense observer of reality, and is inspired by 
the spectacle of life. But this is the Shakespearean realism which 
does not merely reproduce or manipulate reality but imagines in 
terms of true vision; and in that sense he is equally an 
idealist. . . What I mean is that if it should be said that many of 
Conrad's characters are rather ideal than observed personalities, I 
should not offer a negative, but claim that his power lies in making 
the ideal pass as real. [449] 
According to Robertson, the effect of Conrad's idealism is to create characters 
who are 'more memorable, than the more receptive and transcriptive things 
beside them, as Juliet is more memorable than the Nurse, or Rosalind than 
Audrey, or Hamlet than Polonius.' Robertson does, however, make a notable 
and interesting exception for Conrad's women characters, in whom the novelist 
seems interested 'mainly as sufferers or victims', and with whom he appears to 
have 'fewer points of sympathy' than with men. Robertson feels that Mrs. 
Gould in Nostromo, for instance, is neither truly 'observed' nor effectively 
'idealized', however 'attractive and admirable in character' she may be. 
Conrad, Robertson concludes, 'has never matched Eugénie Grandet.' [450] 
At the end of his essay, Robertson turns to the question whether Nostromo 
or Lord Jim deserves to be called Conrad's masterpiece. Although he finally 
dismisses such a contest as irrelevant, he does proceed to give a number of 
reasons for placing Nostromo below Lord Jim. Mainly, he does not feel the 
character of Nostromo can carry the weight of the novel, so that, to reverse 
metaphors, 'The pedestal is too great for the titular figure.' Robertson perceives 
that Nostromo is 'a kind of flawed embodiment of commonplace distinction, 
ironically presented as the dominating or central figure' but has to conclude 
that 'this very irony . . . tends to lower the ultimate psychic impression' so that 
'the effort to develop the case of Nostromo in the latter part of the book leaves 
a sense of relative artificiality and strained ingenuity.' [451] The book, in all its 
panoramic breadth of conception, thus lacks a centre, so that 'The high 
centrality of Lord Jim, where the story turns on one pivot, leaves the 
profounder if not the larger impression.' Moreover, Robertson takes issue with 
Conrad's depiction of the revolution in Costaguana, which he finds limited in 
the sense that 'the collective play of forces in a community' [452] has not been 
given sufficient attention. 
However, in Robertson's consideration these are relatively minor points 
(although they seem relevant enough in themselves), which do not detract from 
his conclusion that 'Conrad has written no feeble book or story, has stamped 
with distinction all he has produced, and has absolutely respected his art.' [453] 
Robertson, it is clear, found in Conrad the author who, of all contemporary 
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fictionists working in English, most completely exemplified his ideal of the 
realist novelist. 
Conclusions 
As the foregoing samples of his criticism of fiction have tried to demonstrate, 
Robertson's position in the late-Victorian debate on realism is a rather 
ambiguous one. On the one hand we see him take the side of the more 
progressive developments of the age. Although he has serious reservations 
about Howells's final success as a realist, Robertson cannot but applaud the 
American's efforts as a step in the right direction. In Zola's adoption of 
scientific principles in fiction, combined with an overriding concern for social 
issues, he recognizes the future of the novel, at a time when Zola was still 
widely (though no longer generally) vilified in England as a danger to the 
nation's moral character. Robertson himself was always defiantly unconcerned 
about his reputation or position in the literary world, so that Mrs. Grundy never 
stood in his way as far as expressing controversial opinions was concerned. The 
least insular of critics, he looked abroad for his examples, to America, France, 
and Russia, and held them up to the English public without any fear of stepping 
on nationalist toes. As a matter of fact, a confirmed nationalist like Kipling 
could count on Robertson's openly and forcibly expressed scorn. 
On the other hand, one cannot help but feel that Robertson is substantially in 
agreement with the idealist realism of the mid-Victorian generation of George 
Eliot and G.H. Lewes. In fact, one might say that as Robertson grew older, he 
became more and more outspoken in his preference for the older tradition of 
realism, so that in the essay on Conrad, we finally find him making his most 
explicit statement on his idealist position in the realist debate. The fact that 
Robertson should choose to criticize fiction from this vantage-point is in itself 
hardly surprising. As a rationalist and a moralist, Robertson's sympathies could 
finally only be with the developments in fiction which not only ensured 
progress in the art-form of the novel itself, but also showed the way to progress 
for society as a whole. Robertson could not but respect the consummate 
craftsmanship of Stevenson's romances, but in the end he felt strongly that 
romance could never offer any new insight into human nature and relations, 
and was therefore a mere diversion, not unpleasant in itself, from the road to 
progress. 
It is to be regretted that Robertson did not decide to follow the developments 
in fiction more closely after the turn of the century. His essay on Conrad shows 
him capable of offering both detailed and wide-ranging criticism in a lively 
style, unhampered by heavy-handed excursions into controversy to which 
Robertson is admittedly often prone. His appreciation of Conrad is entirely 
genuine, yet he can criticize a novel like Nostromo with the detachment 
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required for an effective and detailed evaluation. It would have been 
particularly interesting to observe Robertson's response to the rise of 
modernism after the War, but while it seems certain that Robertson could 
hardly have been unaware of such a major development, his reaction, 
unfortunately, does not appear to have been recorded. Whether this is in itself a 
significant fact may be food for speculation; such as they are, Robertson's 
accomplishments as a critic of fiction are sufficiently valuable to merit a place 
in the history of literary criticism. 
Part 3: Robertson on Poetry 
Introduction 
From the very start of Robertson's career as a critic and journalist, poetry was 
to him a vital concern. In the 1880s and 1890s in particular, Robertson's most 
prolific years when it comes to literary criticism, he wrote frequently and 
voluminously about poets and the art of poetry, so that, in fact, his output on 
poetry far exceeds that on fiction in bulk. Robertson's earliest documented 
publication was a diminutive anthology of Wordsworth entitled Winnowings 
from Wordsworth which saw the light in Edinburgh in 1883. One year later, he 
contributed a fifty-two-page treatise on Walt Whitman, Poet and Democrat to 
the Round Table Series, again published in Edinburgh. In the following two 
decades, Robertson wrote extensively on poetry in Our Corner, Progress, 
National Reformer, and his own Free Review. The most important of these 
periodical contributions were reprinted in ETCM, in which we find a long essay 
on 'The Art of Tennyson', and in NETCM, where Poe, Coleridge, Shelley, 
Keats, and Burns receive extensive treatment. In the two volumes of Criticisms 
published in 1902 and 1903, we find short pieces on the poetry of Herrick, 
Marvell, W.E. Henley, Andrew Lang, Edward Carpenter, Lewis Morris, 
Tennyson, and Browning, which again mostly started life years earlier in the 
pages of the periodicals mentioned above, sometimes as reviews of biographies 
or editions of the collected works of the poet concerned. 
Although the greater part of Robertson's output on poetry does indeed date 
from the final two decades of the nineteenth century, this is not to suggest that 
his interest in poetry waned in later years. In 1903 he published a volume on a 
subject close to his heart, Browning and Tennyson as Teachers, while in 1911, 
the year when Asquith appointed him Secretary to the Board of Trade, he still 
found the time to contribute two crucial essays, 'Form in Poetry' and 
'Substance in Poetry', to the English Review. His book on Elizabethan 
Literature of 1914 naturally has much to say on the poetry of the age of whose 
literature he gives a sweeping survey. As late as 1928, Robertson published a 
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long, two-part essay on 'Bums and his Race' in T.S. Eliot's Criterion. In short, 
one may conclude that poetry continued to be the object of Robertson's critical 
attention throughout his career, although it should be added that, as tends to be 
true of Robertson's entire critical work, he essentially never abandoned the 
critical positions he initially adopted in the 1880s and 1890s. Also, as is the 
case with his criticism of fiction, the modernist movement appears to have 
fallen entirely outside his range of attention or interest, so that unfortunately we 
remain in the dark as regards his possible views on, say, Eliot or Pound. 
Robertson's interests continue to be those of the late-Victorian man of letters, 
even when he is writing well into the twentieth century. 
The following section on Robertson as a critic of poetry will consist of two 
parts. In the first, I will examine his views with regard to the complex question 
of the roles of form and substance in poetic art. As I will attempt to show, this 
question dominated Robertson's criticism of poetry, and it was essentially on 
the basis of his approach to it that he built his critical opinions. In the second 
part, I will present Robertson's specific judgments on a number of poets: 
Spenser (with some attention to Robertson's views regarding the literary period 
preceding Romanticism), Wordsworth and Coleridge, Shelley, Walt Whitman, 
and Tennyson. As was the case in the section on fiction, this selection is based 
on my view of the overall depth and representative quality of Robertson's 
treatment of his subject-matter. What should finally emerge from these pages 
is a fair impression of Robertson's range as a critic of poetry coupled with 
insight into the explicit or implicit ideas and assumptions underlying his critical 
judgments. 
Robertson on Form and Substance in Poetry 
For someone acquainted with Robertson's criticism of drama and fiction, in 
which, as I have tried to demonstrate, the rationalist's moral bias is in evidence 
throughout, it may come as a considerable surprise that in his criticism of 
poetry, Robertson goes to great lengths to convince his readers that there is no 
self-evident connection between morality and poetry. In particular, he 
castigates the poets of all ages for their tendency, as he sees it, 'to be forever 
under the burden of an aspiration to teach, to influence, to sway and guide'.147 
Again and again throughout his criticism of poetry he reiterates his deeply-felt 
conviction that 'Poets . . . are not by rights teachers.'148 Morality and poetry, he 
admonishes his readers and fellow critics, belong to distinctly different spheres, 
and any attempt to fuse them violates the very nature of the art-form. It is in 
'Form in Poetry', English Review, 8 (1911), p. 396. 
Browning and Tennyson as Teachers, p. 1. 
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the 'field of aesthetics' alone that 'poetry as such can be judged', and 'to frame 
for it alien laws' would mean 'the surrender of its right to existence'. This is 
not only true of poetry, Robertson finds, but, in fact, of art in a much wider 
sense: 'To make instruction the first instead of the last function of any of the 
fine arts is to bring them as arts to naught. This much must always be 
maintained, in the endless discussion as to the relations of art and morality.'1,19 
Thus we unexpectedly find Robertson adopting a critical position which 
appears to be diametrically opposed to the moralist tendencies so far laid bare 
in his criticism of drama and fiction, as well as to his theoretical position 
towards aesthetic literary criticism as discussed in Part 2 of the previous 
chapter. While in answering the question 'how to live' Shakespeare and Zola 
may apparently act as valuable guides, this is not to be expected from poets 
like, say, Wordsworth or Tennyson. 
Robertson even goes so far as to state that, in fact, the poet is particularly 
unfit to act as a teacher of moral lessons, since 'not only is he not specially a 
moral influence, but he tends not infrequently to be an anti-moral one.' This, 
Robertson explains, is a normal function of the respective natures of morality 
and art: 
The essence of morality is an anxious comparison and control of 
the impulse of conduct, to the end of perfecting action as between 
man and man. The essence or ideal of art commonly so-called is 
the perfecting of an action pursued for itself and its outcome apart 
from the artist's human relations.150 
Since it is, according to Robertson, the essence of art to reflect only on itself, in 
a way that may be termed a-social, the artist cannot be expected to be the 
natural guardian of morality, which is primarily a social phenomenon: 
. . . it stands to reason that while the artist, working in ideas and 
sensations aloof from human communion, may be constitutionally 
a highly moralised type, there is no security in his work for his 
becoming so, and there is a fair chance that he shall not clearly 
realise moral responsibilities. Moral indifferentism, in fact, might 
be regarded as the special defect to his special quality; just as it is 
to be said that the moralist, though he may have great artistic gifts, 
is on the whole more likely to lack them.151 
H
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It is hardly surprising, then, that Robertson should have little sympathy with the 
romantic notion of the poet as one who is uniquely gifted among mankind to 
unveil deep spiritual truth about human existence through the poetic medium: 
The notion of a poet as a semi-divine personage who gets his 
rhymes and rhythms from heaven, as it were, and whose function 
is to convey a superior form of truth to a world whose part it is to 
listen to him with reverence and allude to him as "the Poet" with a 
capital Ρ - this view of the matter is no doubt very agreeable to 
"the Poet," and has naturally received much support from his own 
deliverances on the subject; but a more rational analysis simply 
sets such transcendentalism aside, and reckons up the inspired one 
as an artistic organism of a particular kind, whose very 
constitution partly incapacitates him for steadiness, solidity, or real 
depth of thought, but whose work it is to put such ideas as he 
comes by into the perfectest form he can attain.152 
So it appears that to Robertson as a rationalist critic of life and art, the poet, 
whatever his artistic merits, is simply condemned by the very nature of his art 
to be an inadequate reasoner, and should therefore not be left in charge of the 
administration of moral truths. In that department, he is but an amateur who 
might do more damage than good, and the job had better be left to the 
'professional' thinkers and teachers of this world, of which Robertson, of 
course, considered himself not the least prominent. 
But not only is the messenger ill-qualified as a moral teacher, the medium 
itself also does not lend itself to such a task in Robertson's view. The manifold 
functions poetry once fulfilled have long been distributed among many 
specialized disciplines which had found their proper medium in prose. 
Robertson praises prose as 'a realm newly enriched in these latter days by 
sundry masters, but visibly capable of an incalculable tillage':153 
In short, whereas poetry once covered the whole field of culture, 
and whereas that has step by step been differentiated into history, 
biography, science, theology, philosophy, criticism, drama, and 
fiction, there arises the presumption that all forms of ratiocination 
and propaganda, all efforts towards particular prescription of 
conduct, all enunciations of creed and gospel, must in time be left 
to prose, the poet retaining only the field of emotion, which abuts 
on all the others, but is under a different law.154 
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Here we first catch a glimpse of what Robertson considered the true 
province of poetry: the emotions. It is not the function of poetry to serve as a 
vehicle for reasoned thought (that is exactly what prose is), but to express 
impassioned emotions which, as a matter of fact, cannot but get in the way of 
ratiocination and effective teaching: 
His truth, the poet's truth, is too simple, too sensuous, too 
passional, to be any such light for men's path as he deems it: it is 
in reality not truth, whereof the light is white and still, but the 
explosion of one or other of the coloured fires of instinct, out of 
which truth is to be subtly elicited by a slow and difficult alchemy. 
Therefore it is that we can never certificate poetry either by its 
reasoning, logically considered, or by its precept, morally 
considered; for on both lines it must somewhere break down as 
surely as it is poetry. 
The essence of the matter is just this, that poetry is the 
utterance of an emotion, and that, whereas perceptions of truth and 
wisdom have their emotional efflux like any other, not only does 
that grade of emotion yield the poet a much less facile stimulant 
than the emotions of instinct, but the process of developing the 
emotion for its own sake ends in reducing it to the level of any 
other passion, and the truth and the wisdom are left out of the 
circuit.155 
Considering Robertson's emphasis on the emotional as opposed to the 
rationalist bias displayed by the poet, it is perhaps rather surprising to find 
Robertson stating elsewhere that 'the poet as such is a realistic, or, in the 
non-philosophical sense, a materialistic instead of an idealistic person.' What 
he means, in fact, is that the poet does not take the abstract, the world of ideas, 
as his subject-matter, but that he has the concrete task of giving 'the sensuous 
and the passionate their most refined and ennobled expression.'156 The poet is 
not a philosopher, but rather a craftsman who uses the resources of language as 
the tools to transform his emotional material into poetry. This line of reasoning 
leads Robertson to various definitions of poetry and its function which strongly 
favour form over substance: 
Poetry is just beautiful metrical speech, speech become beautiful 
by selection of terms and cadences; and the poet's success lies not 
in his thinking proper but in the way he expresses his thought.157 
' " Ibid, p. 549. 
156
 Browning and Tennyson as Teachers, p. 5. 
157
 Ibid, p. 4. 
226 J.M. ROBERTSON: RATIONALIST AND LITERARY CRITIC 
The decisive credentials of perfect poetry are an organic oneness 
of substance, that substance being of a purer essence than ordinary 
speech; a quality of meaning which pierces to the sense without 
the methodic specifications of prose; and a charm of rhythm and 
phrase which is a boon in itself, permanently recognisable as such 
apart from any truth enclosed.158 
But what is it in poetry that makes us enjoy it, even when we reject 
its teaching? It is the poet's attainment of loveliness of speech 
- his artistic achievement - production of beauty which we feel to 
be admirable irrespective of the truth of the ideas expressed.159 
Such definitions, scattered throughout Robertson's criticism of poetry, point to 
an emphatically formalistic approach to poetry, which reminds us that in 
Robertson's Shakespeare criticism we have already observed a pronounced 
tendency towards formalism in the advocacy of verse tests (often relying on the 
individual critic's 'ear' for rhythm) as instruments to establish the true 
authorship of the plays. Robertson sees the real goal of poetry as the creation of 
beauty through the skilful manipulation of poetic devices such as rhyme, 
rhythm, and metre. He rejects the view that form is primarily led by substance; 
to a considerable extent, it is precisely the opposite which takes place in the 
creative process: 
The last word on the critical side of the question is that form is not 
a mere embellishment of substance: it modifies substance: and in 
the end the ill-formed is found to be at bottom ill-thought, since 
perfection of thought or teaching is never reached save in 
perfection of form.160 
The conclusion thus appears to present itself that we have found in Robertson 
an unexpected advocate of art for art's sake, for whom form and style provide 
the final criteria in his critical assessment of poetry. 
It was in music that Robertson found the ideal to which he felt poetry should 
attempt to aspire: 
. . . of all the arts that which has the greatest development before it 
is music. That alone has the mysterious virtue of lending itself to 
and giving birth to all emotions in turn without stamping on itself 
any doctrine, seeming the most profoundly sympathetic because 
'
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the most utterly undefined. Beethoven can "console" men of all 
ways of thinking who have the ears to hear him; Mozart is· never 
fallacious; Schubert never immoral.161 
Music being, in Robertson's view, only form and style and nothing besides, it 
deserved on that count to be placed above poetry in the hierarchy of the arts. 
Untrammelled by doctrinal discussions (of which, it is worth remembering, no 
one was fonder than Robertson himself), music attained to a measure of purity 
which every poet should set himself as the highest standard, and managed to 
stir the emotions in the most direct way possible. Interestingly, Robertson was 
also concerned to protect the art of music itself from any ideologically 
motivated intrusions. Indulging in some evolutionary wishful thinking, he 
predicted that 'despite the marked taste for chorus-singing, as well as for vocal 
music generally, such elaborate compositions as the music-drama and the 
oratorio are types unfitted to survive.'162 Although he respected Wagner as an 
important innovator, he asked himself rhetorically 'whether Wagner's poetic 
treatment of the past is not of the elementary, easy, effortless sort', which 
constitutes no praise in Robertson's book.163 Music should simply not lay itself 
open to doctrinal discussions, and thus show the way to poetry, an art-form 
even more apt to stray from the strictly formal, stylistic path. 
However, if it is the function of poetry to stir the emotions primarily by 
formal and stylistic means, the question inevitably arises what subject matter, 
which themes the poet may freely be left to deal with. Robertson appeared well 
aware of the problem: 
Now, as "immortality" or lasting status is the test by which all 
poets would best like to succeed, the practical problem for them 
and their critic is to divine what themes and what handling will 
best and longest stir assenting emotion - whether impassioned 
appeal, or brooding reverie, or grave counsel, or ecstatic cry, or 
impersonal expression and transcription of things and thoughts felt 
to be beautiful or otherwise memorable.164 
The answer to him is that the poet should attempt to address universal and 
timeless emotions, to sing 'the moods that are not merely of the hour and of the 
newspaper . . . but bind in words emotions of the ages which as such may keep 
men's sympathy even when another order of emotion reigns.'165 Such moods 
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might in fact be called up by a great variety of subjects, even such as would 
appear on the surface to be quite trivial or pedestrian. Taking Wordsworth as an 
example, Robertson asserts that 'there is nothing anti-poetic in the theme of an 
idiot boy, any more than in that of a thorn-tree or a solitary reaper.' Not the 
subject, but 'the quality of emotion that the poet extracts from it'16* finally 
determines the appeal of a poem. At this point, the contours of a vicious circle 
seem to emerge from Robertson's reasoning, since in answering the question 
how to achieve the highest 'quality of emotion', he again adduces formal 
criteria: the subject is finally subordinate to its treatment in technical terms. In 
other words, 'what themes and what handling will best and longest stir 
assenting emotion' is in the end down to the poet's proficiency in handling 
form, so that Robertson finds himself back at his starting-point. 
Examining Robertson's criteria for perfection in form a little more closely, it 
turns out that it is to be achieved predominantly in the format of the short lyric. 
The days of the epic, Robertson contended, were over: 
The modem taste is unmistakeably setting in the direction of short, 
concentrated, finished poetic effort - a perfectly natural result of 
the age's scientific scrutiny of belief and of its artistic 
development. The age of the greatest relative abundance of verse 
was the age of literary crudity;167 and there is this justification of 
the demand for set melodies, that fine lyrics are found to have a 
more enduring value than any epic, and that even such a poet as 
Dante is valued chiefly for brief, passionate pathetic passages -
that is, for his lyrical quality.168 
Robertson doubted whether 'poetry can ever be got on a large scale',169 since no 
poet, however brilliant, would be able to sustain formal and stylistic perfection 
throughout a work of epic proportions. From this perspective, Robertson 
looked relatively favourably on the vogue for archaic poetic forms imported 
mostly from France which, as John Gross wrote, 'kept the air humming in the 
1870s and 1880s with ballades and triolets and villanelles.'170 Austin Dobson 
and W.E. Henley were the best-known of to the so-called 'Rondeliers', one of 
whom was Andrew Lang, who typically produced collections with titles like 
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Ballads and Lyrics of Old France, Ballads in Blue China, Rhymes à la Mode. 
In a review of Henley's Book of Verses, Robertson took note of this 
'unprecedented phase of literary fashion' and addressed the contemporary 
criticism that 
the new tendencies were the beginning of the end of English verse 
properly so called; that our poetry was becoming played out - or 
that our poets were; and that this harking back to old and artificial 
French forms meant the advent of a new era of mechanical and 
constrained art, a sort of later Popeism, of which the musical sense 
was a trifle more sophisticated, but the intellectual grasp and moral 
ambition even narrower and slighter than those of the eighteenth 
century.171 
Robertson agreed that 'there is clearly no abiding-place for poetic energy at all 
in the pagoda of the archaic-artificial' but he nonetheless saw a particular 
positive significance in this 'outburst of artificialism': 
On the face of the matter it is an aspiration towards form, towards 
measure and completeness, towards concision, even if the 
seduction of experiment often lead to the mere dilution of one 
grain of motive with the required glassful of words. There is 
implied in such experiment a recoil from indeterminate and 
rambling utterance .. .172 
Even if the 'Rondeliers' had not produced much memorable poetry with their 
restrictive adherence to archaic verse-forms, they at least represented an 
important upward stage in the evolution of poetry, which, he felt, was heading 
towards a new level of perfection, combining 'the freest verse-form' with 'the 
maximum of concision'.173 There we have in a nutshell Robertson's vision of 
the poetry of the future: a poetry not bound by outdated rules, but aspiring 
through the creative mastery of formal elements to create an immediate 
concentrated effect on the emotions. This ideal, no epic could finally approach. 
With Robertson's persistent emphasis on the formal aspects of poetry and 
his anti-Arnoldian denial of the poet's and critic's right to link poetry with 
morality, there appear to be excellent grounds for concluding that Robertson 
was substantially influenced by or even part of the movement that is broadly 
described as 'aestheticism'. In his book on the subject, R.V. Johnson outlines a 
number of characteristics of aestheticism which seem perfectly compatible with 
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Robertson's views of poetry.174 First of all, Johnson describes the movement as 
'a drastic attempt to separate art from life', thus promoting art for art's sake. 
One way of interpreting art for art's sake, Johnson explains further, 'is to say 
that the nineteenth-century aesthete discarded instruction, as a justification of 
art, and settled for delight alone', which is a fair description of Robertson's 
critical principles with regard to poetry as described so far. Moreover, Johnson 
continues, 'Aestheticism commonly attaches a high value to 'form' in art, the 
value of a work of art being dependent on form rather than on subject-matter', 
a view which assumes that 'there are certain formal properties - in poetry, such 
things as rhyme-patterns, rhythmic effects, what is now called 'verbal texture', 
diction, imagery - that can be appreciated entirely for themselves, 
independently of the thought for which they are the vehicle.' Again, Robertson 
would have found little to quarrel with such a characterization of his approach 
to poetry. Finally, Johnson stresses the aesthete's tendency to set up the 'purer' 
arts such as painting, sculpture, and in particular music as examples for 
literature to emulate, which reminds us of Robertson's pronouncements on 
music and poetry. When we substitute 'poetry' for 'art' in Walter Pater's 
famous saying that 'all art aspires to the condition of music', we end up with an 
apt summing-up of Robertson's critical position. 
When we pursue the question of Robertson's connection with the aesthetic 
movement further, we find a strong resemblance between Robertson's views on 
poetry and the critical work of Edgar Allen Poe, 'one of the major aesthetic 
heroes of the later nineteenth century'.175 In his seminal essay on 'The Poetic 
Principle'176 Poe establishes a number of poetic laws with which Robertson 
found himself fully in accord. First of all, he attacks the long poem, arguing 
that the very phrase 'long poem' is a contradiction in terms and that such a 
work as Paradise Lost is only to be considered poetical when 'we view it 
merely as a series of minor poems.' It is, in fact, only in the short lyric poem 
that the true poetic effect may be achieved. Secondly, Poe takes up arms against 
what he calls 'the heresy of The Didactic', the idea that 'every poem . . . should 
inculcate a moral; and by this moral is the poetical merit of the work to be 
adjudged.' To Poe, there is no poem more 'supremely noble' than the 'poem 
which is a poem and nothing more', the 'poem written solely for the poem's 
sake'. Not the moral message, but 'Music, in its various modes of metre, 
rhythm, and rhyme' is the essential component of great poetry, and its 
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development is to be ensured by the 'union of Poetry with Music'. All this 
finally leads up to Poe's well-known definition of poetry as 'the rhythmical 
creation of beauty', which Robertson endorsed beyond question. Robertson was 
well acquainted with Poe's work, and the essay on Poe which appears in 
NETCM is an eloquent defence of the man and his writings, in which he shows 
himself particularly charmed by those lyrics in which Poe put his poetic 
theories into practice, such as To Helen ('one of the most ripely perfect and 
spiritually charming poems ever written' [p. 81]) and For Annie ('I know little 
in the way of easeful word music that will compare with this' [p. 91]). 
Moreover, Robertson hailed Poe as 'a keen and scientific literary critic' [p. 75], 
so that it becomes plausible to conclude that Poe as an aesthetic critic may well 
have exerted considerable influence on Robertson's views of poetry. 
It appears, all in all, that there are quite sufficient grounds for regarding 
Robertson as a fully paid-up member of the aesthetic movement, if we shall for 
the moment assume that all these different strands of thought and ideas 
concerning art ever constituted what might strictly be called a 'movement'. 
However, it is possible to make a significant case against this point of view as 
well. For one thing, although Robertson expresses views which are suggestive 
of involvement in aestheticism, he never discusses any of the main 
representatives of the movement, such as Pater, Swinburne, or Wilde. Their 
names may appear in Robertson's writings, but only sporadically and never in 
connection with any discussion regarding aesthetic principles of art or art for 
art's sake. While he entered the debate on realism in fiction in his usual 
polemical spirit, the debate on aestheticism seems to have passed him by 
completely. If it were not for his interest in Poe, it would almost seem as if his 
views were formed in a kind of intellectual vacuum, hardly the atmosphere in 
which a controversialist like Robertson usually prospered. There are simply no 
indications that Robertson's ostensibly aesthetically-inspired ideas were 
formed through reading, say, Pater or Swinburne. Moreover, we should bear in 
mind that Robertson's advocacy of art for art's sake is limited to poetry alone, 
and is never afforded wider application. We are finally left with the puzzling 
question how this rationalist and moralist, hardly the kind of aesthetic figure 
ridiculed by Gilbert and Sullivan in Patience, came by this aestheticism in 
poetry, and in poetry alone. 
It is, I would suggest, precisely in Robertson's rationalism that the key to the 
answer may be found. In the Autobiography of one of the greatest 
nineteenth-century rationalists (and a man much admired by Robertson), John 
Stuart Mill, we can read how the author was saved from emotional starvation 
by the soothing ministry of Wordsworth's poetry. It appears from such a 
statement as the following that poetry may well have performed a similar 
function for Robertson. 
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Its [poetry's] great vindication is that for all of us it may be a 
life-long ministry of refined enjoyment, an inward music that can 
transfigure jarring circumstance and lighten sombre hours as 
nothing else can; a music that the poor man can command when he 
has no access to the other joy of actual sound.177 
The music of poetry offered Robertson a means of escape from a life spent at 
the centre of an intricate web of rationalist polemics and controversy, and his 
radical separation of form and substance appears to have been to no small 
degree an attempt to defend this poetic haven of rest against outside intrusion. 
By concentrating on the formal aspects of a poem which in terms of content 
should have roused him to furious indignation, Robertson created for himself a 
quiet little comer where he would not be disturbed by the ideological bickering 
of the outside world. In other words, Robertson's aesthetic formalism appears 
to be expressive of a profoundly personal psychological need, rather than of a 
rationally chosen position in a literary debate. Rationalism furnished Robertson 
with most of what he needed in life, but it could not furnish everything. 
Thus the separation of form and substance allowed Robertson to take great 
pleasure in reading, for instance, Tennyson, a poet for whose philosophy of life 
he could muster but little sympathy. It is remarkable that in this formalist 
approach to poetry, Robertson found himself in the company of George 
Saintsbury, though on a different side of the ideological spectrum. Like 
Robertson, Saintsbury advocated a form of art for art's sake in his 
preoccupation with the formal aspects of poetry. In 1926 he described himself 
as a 'critic who for more than half a century has done his little best to 
accentuate the importance of treatment over subject'178 and his histories of 
English prose rhythm and English prosody alone bear powerful witness to that 
view. Gross has called Saintsbury 'an aesthete on paper' to whom 'there was 
nothing incongruous about a solid conservative making his critical debut with 
an encomium of Baudelaire: you simply praised the poet as a superlative verbal 
craftsman, and dismissed his obsession with evil as a pose.'179 As we will see in 
the following pages, a similar tactics was constantly adopted by Robertson, 
when dealing with poets whose views clashed with his own. The haven of rest 
was, after all, not to be disturbed. 
The only problem is that the fundamental question whether Robertson was 
actually able to keep the intruders from the world of morality and ideology at 
bay has to be answered with an emphatic 'no'. It turns out that in practice the 
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clear theoretical separation Robertson envisaged between form and substance 
cannot be consistently maintained, at least not by Mm. Again and again in his 
criticism of poetry, Robertson strays into discussions of moral issues which he 
asserts should not be there in the poetry in the first place, but which he cannot 
avoid exploring now that they are staring him in the face. He simply cannot 
cease being the moralist he so ostensibly is in his manifold other fields of 
interest, so that, to give but one example, we find him dedicating an entire 
volume to the teachings of Browning and Tennyson. This, then, is the great 
paradox which runs through all of Robertson's criticism of poetry: in his very 
attempt to do away with morals in poetry, he cannot help but moralize. It is 
also, I believe, what rescues his criticism from being solidly one-dimensional. 
Had he consistently concentrated on the formal aspects of poetry alone, his 
criticism would only have had a very limited interest. Now, however, we find 
reflected in it a much wider range of ideas, thus making a far more persuasive 
demand on our attention. 
Having arrived at this conclusion, it is now time to turn to Robertson's 
concrete judgments of a representative selection of poets in order to examine in 
more detail in how far Robertson's theory guides his practice, and in how far 
that practice itself yields results which may continue to interest us. 
Robertson on Spenser 
Robertson's criticism of Spenser is to be found in his book on Elizabethan 
Literature, in which the poet of The Faerie Queene shares the main focus of 
attention with Shakespeare.180 Robertson regarded Spenser as the poet who had 
ensured that 'English rhymed verse was now once for all placed upon its 
modern basis of regular metres and rhythms.' [15] Before Spenser, important 
innovative work had been done by Wyatt and Surrey, to whom it was left 'to 
effect a new departure by a free assimilation of both Italian and French poetry, 
in which both themes and measures broke fresh ground.' [44] Of the two, 
Wyatt was the lesser influence, since - an important criterion in Robertson's 
book - 'in many cases no metrical rules will avail to make Wyatt's verse scan.' 
[45] Surrey, on the other hand, is credited by Robertson with the 'memorable 
achievement of creating English blank verse, the one fortunate imitation of 
classical methods of which the language was capable', and, moreover, with 
displaying 'an inwardness of feeling as well as subtlety of music' [51] in some 
of his love poetry that made him speculate regretfully about what Surrey might 
180
 Page numbers referring to Elizabethan Literature are given in square brackets in the 
main text. 
234 J.M. ROBERTSON: RATIONALIST AND LITERARY CRITIC 
have achieved had he lived longer. It was, however, left to Spenser to truly take 
English poetry into a new age. 
In his discussion of Spenser, Robertson emphasizes from the start that it is 
essential to separate Spenser the teacher from Spenser the poet: 
Spenser, for his age a teacher, is for us first and last a maker of the 
music of words, a creator of rhythmical and phraseological beauty; 
and it is in virtue ofthat faculty that he has retained through three 
poetic eras the status of "the poets' poet." [67] 
Turning first to Spenser as a craftsman in form, Robertson takes the date of the 
publication of the Shepherd's Calender (1579) as representing a new departure 
in poetic achievement: 
The Calender might be compared with the concert performance of 
a modem virtuoso in music: it reveals at once the highest reach of 
executive faculty in the widest range of artistic forms that 
Englishmen had yet seen in their own language. Only a born and 
trained master of verse could have achieved such vigour with such 
melody of utterance; such ease in a dozen styles; such expert 
facility in transfigured folk-song along with such evident scholarly 
accomplishment. [70-71] 
Of Spenser's later work, Robertson singles out the Epithalamion and 
Prothalamion as incomparable among earlier and contemporary work for 
'sheer variety of melody and wealth of charm', while with the Faerie Queene, 
Spenser showed his power 'to produce without limit continuous and canorous 
verse, as perfectly ordered in its own fashion as that of any other language'. 
[72] Moreover, Robertson felt that with the creation of the Spenserian stanza, 
'a new felicity' had been achieved, 'the long closing line having an incalculable 
melodic value'. [73] All in all, Robertson could not but conclude that, in view 
of Spenser's formal virtuosity, he was to be regarded as 'the first great master 
in modem English poetry'. [72] 
Had Robertson's analysis of Spenser stopped at this point, the conclusion 
might be warranted that Robertson did but intend to write a very one-sided 
eulogy of the Elizabethan's work. However, after much praise along such lines 
as demonstrated in the above quotes, Robertson proceeds to approach Spenser 
from a different angle with the observation that 'It is too true that all this new 
wealth of beauty is in part countervailed by artistic blemishes of the most 
grievous kind.' [73] Curiously enough, these 'artistic blemishes' actually turn 
out to be of a moral kind when Robertson once more turns to the Faerie 
Queene: 
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In the Faerie Queene, the master of the lovely line and the 
exquisite phrase outgoes the popular dramatists in his resort to 
images of nastiness; and with all his moralizing his imagination is 
often gratuitously gross. . . . The mere nauseousness of much of 
his imagery must set a sensitive modem reader chronically 
thinking of disinfectants. [74-75] 
Such gross moral insensitivity reminds us, Robertson argues, that 'we are 
dealing with a poet, and a poet of the English Renaissance at that; not with a 
thinker.' [75] As a result, Spenser's masterpiece, as Robertson sees it, is in the 
end a 'long poem without unity, an eked-out string of similar episodes without 
vital connexion, a procession of personages distinguishable only as good and 
bad, fair and foul, brave and craven.' [76] Spenser's ultimate failure is that, not 
possessing the qualities of a true thinker or even a sufficient amount of moral 
refinement, he was none the less led by 'the aesthetic fallacy ofthat age to hold 
by the didactic view of all art' [76] to adopt the role of teacher. Not only was he 
ill-fitted for that task, but it also affected him in the formal application of his 
aesthetic talents. Since with Spenser, 'the didactic view of poetry served as an 
anaesthetic to the artistic sense' [79], the Faerie Queene 
often suggests a dredging machine which with equal facility pours 
forth gold, diamonds, and mud, as being bound to keep going, 
whatever be the material forthcoming. No other great poet has 
produced so many lines of doggerel, so much unashamed 
line-padding. All that must be accepted as a by-product of the 
gold and the gems. [77-78] 
By his regarding 'the main aim of a poem as moral instruction' and 'beauty of 
workmanship as an embellishment rather than as essential' [79], Spenser's 
work becomes for Robertson a telling example of the damage that can be done 
to potentially beautiful poetry by imposing elements of moral didacticism upon 
it. 
In spite of such criticism as outlined above, Robertson nonetheless seemed 
convinced of Spenser's greatness. He showed himself, however, considerably 
less charmed by the generation of poets which came to the fore in the final 
decades of the sixteenth century, notably the droves of sonneteers who catered 
for the literary fashion of the age: 
Never had there been such an outburst of lyricism in England; and, 
despite the facility of much of the output, never, perhaps, was 
there in proportion so little of satisfying result to garner for 
posterity. The poets at first sight seem a very nest of singing birds, 
singing because they must, on the ancient, the primal impulse. A 
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perusal soon arouses a cold suspicion, fully confirmed by exact 
modern research, that the nest of singing birds is a cage of parrots. 
[144] 
The notable exception in this situation of creative dearth was Shakespeare, 
whose 'abnormal perceptivity and responsiveness' as evinced in his dramatic 
work, combined with his 'unique facility of rhythmic utterance' made the 
sonnet for him 'an instrument as apt as to others it was recalcitrant.' [147] On 
the whole, however, poetry appeared to Robertson slow to follow Spenser's 
lead, and it even took a direction in the poets we now know as the 
Metaphysicals which he regarded with frank aversion. Some credit was perhaps 
due to Donne as one who 'deliberately departed from merely regular metres, 
anticipating the larger rhythm of stresses which . . . was to be established in the 
nineteenth century by Coleridge, and more effectually by Tennyson', but 
Robertson could command only little respect for a poet who 'so frequently and 
so wilfully turned verse, as did Donne, to purposes remote from beauty.'181 
Another Metaphysical, Andrew Marvell, was granted by Robertson to have 
produced some 'clear music', which, however, was 
jarred by those glassy and chilling conceits which seem to 
represent an inevitable disease in the poetry of the time, turning 
the excesses and extravagances of the older verse into something 
inorganic and repulsive, like (to fall into the very vein) the 
chalkstones which the gout of eld produces after a middle-age of 
wine.182 
It was not until the arrival of Milton, 'sealed of the true tribe of song', that a 
man of genius once more took charge of the innovation of English poetry. In 
Robertson's view, Milton achieved a 'combination of meaning and melody' in 
his blank verse which the Elizabethan poets, even Spenser, had rarely 
achieved.183 Unfortunately, apart from a number of equally laudatory passing 
references, we have no other evidence of Robertson's admiration of Milton, let 
alone a full-scale essay. 
Similarly, we lack any extensive treatment by Robertson of the poetry of the 
eighteenth century, but in this case the reasons for his silence are rather more 
obvious. Here, Robertson appears to have been in full accord with Matthew 
Arnold, who dismissed the poetry of the eighteenth century as the product of an 
'age of prose and reason'. It is evident that Robertson found little to interest 
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himself as far as formal poetic innovation was concerned in an age of poetry 
dominated by 'the simple pentameter couplet',184 of poetry that 'rarely goes into 
its subjects deeply.'185 He was willing to concede that 'the standards of 
pregnancy and diction set up by Pope doubtless kept eighteenth-century verse 
at a level of sheer craftsmanship as high as the average of either the previous or 
the following age',186 but good craftsmanship alone did not make great poetry. 
Whatever Pope's abilities may have been, the fact that he was 'so unfortunate 
in his artistic ideal', which was the ideal of the age, prevented him from 
achieving greatness. On the whole the eighteenth century constitutes to 
Robertson a period in literary history which, as far as its poetry is concerned, is 
best relegated to oblivion. 
Robertson on Wordsworth and Coleridge 
Considering Robertson's distaste of the restrictions imposed on poetic 
expression by the iron uniformity of the eighteenth-century rules of poetic 
diction, it is not surprising that he should turn to the age of Romantic poetry 
with considerably more enthusiasm. At last the circumstances had arisen in 
which thé 'preference for freer rhythm and feeling',187 which Robertson shared, 
was no longer a measure of eccentricity. What is perhaps surprising is the fact 
that Robertson could muster relatively little enthusiasm for the work of one of 
the main protagonists of the movement, William Wordsworth, and that he 
should choose, of all places, the preface to his own anthology Winnowings from 
Wordsworth of 1883 as the battlefield for his critical assault on the Lake 
Poet.188 For an assault it truly is, and once again formal criteria are at the heart 
of Robertson's criticism. 
As his starting-point, Robertson, always the controversialist, takes issue 
with Matthew Arnold's selection of Wordsworth's poems in the volume he 
published in 1879, and to which the famous essay on Wordsworth which later 
appeared in Essays in Criticism. Second Series formed the preface, In 
Robertson's opinion, 'the editor who gives us "Simon Lee", "Margaret", 
"Michael", fifty of the Sonnets, "The Pet Lamb", and a score of pieces of no 
greater value, and all with the assurance that trained taste will not be offended' 
was one who had to be guarded against. To prove his point, he quotes one 
stanza from Simon Lee as typical of Wordsworth's worst and adds the 
following comments: 
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These amazing lapses of triviality and doggerel - if we may speak 
of one stanza in "Simon Lee" as constituting a lapse - meet one in 
almost every second page of Wordsworth, and can only be set 
down to the injurious influence of his solitary life. It is inevitable 
that a Boetian [sic] quality should enter into the work of a man 
who regards nature as the most potent instrument of culture, is 
constantly turning out verse, and submits it to no harder test than 
the edgeless criticism of an admiring domestic circle, [ix] 
Wordsworth, in other words, was far too uncritical of his own work, nor did his 
environment do much good in correcting his poetic 'lapses'. As a result, 
Robertson contends, he frequently forgot the essential law that 'it is, in the long 
run, strong feeling that finds the best words' and that 'the poet who versifies on 
everything is sure to be frequently feeble, simply because strong feeling is but 
an occasional visitant.' [xiv] A selection of Wordsworth's really valuable work 
is therefore likely to be relatively short, in any case much shorter than Arnold 
found necessary in his anthology. 
Robertson argues that Arnold's more copious choice may have been the 
result of the fact that 'the selector has been influenced by his appreciation of 
the moral of the poem, despite his distrust of a similar tendency in the 
"Wordsworthians", the adherents and admirers of Wordsworth's philosophical 
position.'1" [10] Once again, Robertson points out that 'poetry is in the last 
analysis perfection of style', and refers to Coleridge to clarify his position: 
Coleridge's favourite definition, "The most proper words in their 
proper places", or, as it was expressed before him, "The best 
words in the best order", embraces all that is of value in 
Wordsworth's prefatory vindications of his poetic method, and 
indicates the final critical test. Our constitutional love of measure, 
rhythm, and rhyme determines that verse is the "best order" for 
him who can lay hold of the best words . . . [xi] 
Small wonder, then, that Robertson's own aversion to the 'Wordsworthians' 
should be even greater than Arnold's. Not only did their following of 
Wordsworth's teaching violate to him 'the true poetic creed', but he also 
regarded that teaching itself as 'often extremely questionable', a point on which 
he does not find it necessary to elaborate. 
The selection of poems (thirty-seven in all) which Robertson finally 
presents is a testimony to his preference for short lyric poetry. He has given no 
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place to any of Wordsworth's longer work in blank verse; rather, we find lyrics 
like To a Butterfly, To the Cuckoo, To the Daisy, and To a Skylark particularly 
well represented. It is on these that he must have based his final conclusion -
presented as somewhat of an afterthought - that Wordsworth 'has given us 
poetry which, by its exquisiteness of style and depth of clarified emotion, 
charms us as we are seldom charmed by other verse of his own or previous 
generations.' [xxvi]'In spite of such a conciliatory statement, it is clear that 
Robertson found Wordsworth's poetry of only very limited interest. 
If we now turn from Robertson's criticism of Wordsworth to that of 
Coleridge, we find that, again, only a very limited portion of Coleridge's output 
can satisfy him. In the essay on Coleridge that was first published in the Free 
Review and later reprinted in NETCM,190 Robertson poses the central question 
how Coleridge could go on composing Religious Musings and 
other Sibylline Leaves up till his twenty-fourth year, attaining at 
most a rhetorical impressiveness and an odie emphasis, and should 
then suddenly irradiate in the musical splendours of Kubla Khan 
and The Rime of the Ancient Mariner, and the ethereal harpings of 
the first part of Christabel. These three masterpieces were begun 
or done in 1797, his twenty-fifth year. Just after that again there 
are some successes, such as Love (1798-99) and The Ballad of the 
Dark Ladie (1798); but thenceforth, with very few exceptions, we 
have the merely respectable performances of the earlier academic 
manner; and to the last Coleridge figures for us as a poet with 
some magical moments, never quite regained. [137] 
The answer to the above question, Robertson proposes to find in the physical 
circumstances of Coleridge's existence, by setting up, in scientific fashion, 'a 
simple study of his organism, in itself and in relation to its environment.' [132] 
Robertson singles out Coleridge's 'abnormal facility of discourse' and 'equally 
abnormal fluidity of mind' [134] as his leading intellectual traits, which were 
not, however, conducive to the development of his sense of poetical beauty. 
Rather, 'the general lack of any such sense in his pastors and masters' [136] led 
him to become, in most of his work, 'only an imitative performer of unstable 
judgment, at times sinking to an artistic abjection on a par with his 
temperamental collapse.' [141] As primarily 'a combination of great faculties 
with a feeble personality' [142-3], Coleridge required the stimulus of opium to 
produce his best work. In fact, Robertson argued that 'what men regard as his 
mere bane, the drug to which he resorted as a relief from suffering, and which 
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De Quincey declared to have "killed Coleridge as a poet," is rather, by reason 
of its first magical effect, the special source of his literary immortality.' [140] 
Thus, Coleridge's masterpieces become the outcome of an unusual 
combination of internal and external circumstances, rather than the products of 
a creative mind in relative control of its material. 
What attracts Robertson in Coleridge's masterpieces, is, interestingly 
enough, not merely their stylistic proficiency, although this continues to be an 
important element. Robertson, sternest of rationalists and vigorous advocate of 
realism in fiction, displays a rather unexpected fascination with the dream-like, 
other-worldly quality of Coleridge's best verse: 
The Ancient Mariner is a triumph of sheer poetic style; or more 
strictly, a triumphant application of a rare method to a strange 
theme; and its mere technique and treatment keep it perpetually 
fascinating. In the handling of a moral fantasy we have enshrined 
for us a harmony and variety of colours, a wealth of rightly felt 
and phrased impressions of the real inner and outer world, such as 
no other poetic work can surpass. [187-8] 
Coleridge's poem [Kubla Khan] is the visualising of an 
opium-dream, a rarity of sensation at least as well worth literary 
immortality as any other experience whatever; and the feat is 
accomplished with a magic of sound and thought wholly 
incomparable. The radiant vision hangs in his words transparent 
and complete as a rainbow, and permanent as marble. [189] 
Here, carried along by genuine enthusiasm, Robertson shows himself capable 
of looking beyond the technical aspects of the poem he examines and 
immersing himself completely and willingly in the dream world created by 
Coleridge. Unusually for him, he is no longer the detached, analytical observer 
but becomes almost an active participant in the aesthetic experience rendered 
by the poet. This, in Robertsonian terms, is probably the highest praise a poet 
can be afforded, and it is remarkable indeed to see it bestowed upon a poet in 
whom Robertson otherwise found so little to praise, certainly as far as politics 
or philosophy were concerned. 
Robertson on Shelley 
It seems likely that, to a considerable extent, Robertson's praise of Coleridge's 
masterpieces has to do with the fact that they appeared to him particulary 
remote from abstract thinking on general or topical intellectual or moral issues. 
That this is not something that can with justice be said of Shelley's poetry is a 
fact not lost upon Robertson, who felt that Shelley's attempts to incorporate the 
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world of abstract intellectual ideas into imaginative poetry were doomed to 
failure. In his essay on 'Shelley and Poetry' in NETCM,m he unfavourably 
compared Shelley with Keats in this respect: 
Keats's foot is firm on the earth, however far his fancy may fly: he 
half turns old dreams into life, with his ardent sense of earthly 
beauty: his pulse throbs through all his singing: it is the poesy of 
warm-blooded youth, dreaming itself alive in the world's 
spring-time. With Shelley, the case is almost precisely the reverse. 
Brooding on the present, and inspired by an intellectual idea, he 
turns life into a dream, spiritualising his youth and maiden into 
phantoms who move in a world of abstractions and visions, "where 
the wild bee never flew." [194] 
The vital quality that Robertson does discern in Keats's Ode to a Nightingale 
and Ode on Melancholy,™2 but finds fatally lacking in Shelley's poetry is 'the 
element of flesh and blood' [194], the concrete hold on reality which ensures 
that even the most fanciful flight of the imagination has its roots in solid earth. 
As a result of this deficiency, the figures in Shelley's Prometheus Unbound, for 
instance, 
are of a shadowy consistency, abstractions mingling with spirits, 
and all uttering unearthly speech. The vital idea of the poem is 
embroidered with fantasy till it hardly counts with us: if we read 
on it is because we care more for fantasy than for human 
significance in song. [195] 
In contrast, the figures and pictures in Keats's Hyperion have 'much the larger 
measure of definiteness', precisely because they lack those 'qualities of 
etherealness and devotion to ideas' [195] which, Robertson observed 
regretfully, were partly the cause of attracting so many readers to Shelley. 
Furthermore, Robertson also found Shelley grossly deficient in what he so 
clearly considered a fundamental element in poetic creation: careful attention to 
form. Throughout his essay on Shelley, Robertson restates again and again his 
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conviction that poems should first of all provide 'the combined pleasures of 
perfectly choice expression and exquisite cadence, and, in the case of their 
being rhymed, harmony of sound' [197], and he felt strongly that, especially in 
his longer poems, Shelley only rarely lived up to this standard. With regard to 
The Revolt of the Islam, the main butt of his criticism in this essay, Robertson 
could not but conclude that 
seeing he [Shelley] is so far content to find his account in the 
primitive love of rhyme for rhyme's sake as to pad out his longest 
poem with innumerable far-fetched chimes and spurious echoes, 
and seeing he is thus diffuse throughout even in excess of his 
natural tendency to diffuseness, the work is technically bad. [200] 
Although Shelley may at times have achieved a certain 'sonorous and 
impressive rhetorical quality', The Revolt of the Islam is on the whole to be 
written off as one of the worst samples of inattention to technical care in 
Shelley's already uneven poetic output. 
Interestingly, Robertson does not limit himself to aesthetic criticism of 
Shelley's technical proficiency, but also proposes to address 'the quality of 
Shelley's thought'. Here, in the face of a poet whose work he cannot but 
consider the outcome of 'vaporous thinking' [203], we suddenly find the 
rationalist and moralist in Robertson reasserting himself. After all, he asks 
himself, 'how shall a mere set of recurrent cadences support to infinity a train 
of incoherent and intangible ideas?' [201-2] Art for art's sake may all be very 
well, but poetry does not in the end deserve to be treated with silk gloves 
merely on account of its formal properties: 
We must come to a poem as to any other form of human utterance, 
demanding worthy reward. It is simply foolish to spend our 
reading hours in absorbing rhythms and rhymes, unless we are all 
the while obtaining the intellectual food and nerve stimulus of 
finely worded thought or delightful fancy.... What are rhyme and 
rhythm without these attributes? To prize them for their own sake 
is playing with toys; the occupation is little more respectable on 
the part of adults than the systematic collection of postage stamps. 
[202] 
Unfortunately, Robertson does not actually look very closely at Shelley's world 
of ideas. He especially takes issue with the fact that in the preface to 
Prometheus Unbound, Shelley professed to dislike didactic poetry, while 
producing in The Revolt of the Islam a poem which, for Robertson, represented 
the very epitome of blatant didacticism. Inconsistency in reasoning is to 
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Robertson always the worst possible intellectual vice, and in Shelley he finds it 
to a degree which greatly exasperates him. 
Inconsistency, however, is also what Robertson himself may well be charged 
with when he addresses the criticism of Matthew Arnold, who, in his essay on 
Byron in Essays in Criticism. Second Series, deplored 'the incurable want, in 
general, of a sound subject matter' in Shelley's poetry. To Robertson, the fact, 
for instance, that Shelley frequently made politics the topic of his verse does 
not in itself reflect negatively on his poetic powers, since there is no theme 
'which cannot be treated at once melodiously and with penetrating expression.' 
[205] He does not hesitate to partially contradict his earlier statement on the 
intellectual content of poetry in a re-affirmation of his aesthetic creed: 
We do not go to poetry for arguments and facts: to do so would be 
to imitate the legendary personage who asked what was proved by 
Paradise Lost. We certainly ask that the poet's thoughts shall 
cohere - that they shall be the results of his careful thinking; or 
that when he resorts to myth and fantasy he shall use his utmost 
skill to make these melodious and exquisite; but it no more spoils 
his poetry for us to know that his serious thought is after all 
mistaken than to know that the myth is myth. [209] 
While first asserting the importance of judging poetry on its intellectual merits, 
Robertson now once again professes to relegate these to a place of relative 
insignificance, by springing to the defence of a complete separation of form 
and content. Shelley, first accused of 'vaporous thinking', is now released from 
any intellectual responsibility. In this wavering between two different positions 
we may read familiar signs that Robertson's apparent advocacy of art for art's 
sake was based on unstable foundations, and that, in the end, the rationalist and 
moralist in Robertson will assert themselves. 
In Robertson's actual judgments of Shelley's poems, both the intellectual 
and aesthetic viewpoint may be seen to play an important role. Shelley's long 
poems found little favour with Robertson, who judged both their 'controlling 
intellectual function' [216] and their technical command weak. The Revolt of 
the Islam is thus dismissed on both counts: 
Bad rhyme, bad grammar, banal phrase, preposterous figure, 
fustian rhetoric, confused logic, meaningless collocations of 
words, extravagant comparisons, ideas thin-spun to puerility - all 
these are there in the most fatal abundance, unredeemed by 
countervailing beauties or by subtle or striking thought. [219] 
Prometheus Unbound, while yielding 'some exceedingly melodious lyrics', is 
chastised for wrapping the subject in a kind of 'luminous fog', instead of 
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'condensing the emotions set in action by theme'. [224] As a result, Shelley's 
poem tends to go both everywhere and nowhere. As expected, Robertson 
displayed more sympathy with Shelley's shorter, lyrical work, 'in which we 
find a marked degree of those qualities of finish, beauty, and condensation for 
which we have thus far [in the longer work] looked in vain', although here too 
there was 'still much necessity for discrimination'. The Cloud was felt by 
Robertson to be 'a marvel of technique and of beauty', 'a masterpiece of 
controlled fancy and delicate yet reposeful art, presenting a combination of 
beautiful phrase, wealth of imagery, and music, such as had not appeared 
before in the language.' [220] Robertson also quotes the two short and 
relatively unknown pieces Dirge and To the Moon as examples of what Shelley 
could achieve at his best. 
His verdict on The Skylark is, however, far less positive, emphasizing that 'it 
is ruinously defective in point of technique.' The following is a fair sample of 
Robertson's analytical approach to this and other poems: 
Let the reader go over the poem line by line, and see for himself. 
The second line, "Bird thou never wert," is an entirely infelicitous 
extension of the "blithe spirit;" the "from heaven or near i(" is 
'prentice-work in ideas as in rhyme; and the fifth line will not 
scan. In the second stanza we have: "Higher . . . and higher from 
the earth thou springest," and "Like a cloud oí fire the deep blue 
thou wingest." What, next, is to be said of the lines: "Thou dost 
float and run - like an unbodied [embodied?] joy whose race is 
just begun?" How reconcile such terms? [221] 
The passage continues in this vein for at least a page more, so that in the end, 
little of Shelley's poem is left standing. It should be observed that here, as 
elsewhere, Robertson's method of analysis does frequently not so much rely on 
demonstrating in a reasoned manner exactly what is wrong with Shelley's 
technique, but rather on simply indicating numerous blemishes and assuming 
that they are so self-evident that the reader will see at once why Robertson 
objects to them. Often, however, the reader may find himself wondering why 
precisely Robertson finds fault with a particular, angrily italicized phrase or 
passage. As in his Shakespeare scholarship, Robertson tends to rely heavily on 
his 'ear' for metre, rhythm, and rhyme. 
Robertson finally singles out one 'remarkable faculty' as underlying 
Shelley's worst as well as his best work, namely 
the freedom in the use of words, in which, judgment apart, he 
excels all previous English poets save Shakspere. It is no doubt 
this extraordinary capacity for mere verbal movement which 
overpowers most Shelleyites; it seems so wonderful, so 
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superhuman, so independent of the ordinary trammels of thought 
and speech, that men in their surprise cease to be critical, and 
simply bow down and worship. [228] 
Robertson saw Shelley's capacity to convey so passionately the 'impression of 
impressiveness' by his sheer command of vocabulary as both his greatest asset 
and his greatest liability. Thus, Robertson criticized Ode to the West Wind as 
'Wild, passionate yearning, undefined aspiration, expressed with an eagerness 
always tending towards incoherence and unintelligibility'. [229] Leo Storm has 
pointed out that it is in such judgments that Robertson seems to anticipate F.R. 
Leavis's and T.S. Eliot's criticism of Shelley. Leavis's analysis in Revaluation 
of the vagueness of the imagery in Ode to the West Wind certainly chimes in 
perfectly with Robertson's views on Shelley's 'extraordinary capacity for mere 
verbal movement', while, in more general terms, there is indeed a 'striking 
similarity' between Robertson and Leavis 'in point of assertiveness of manner 
and force of style in pursuit of Shelley's flaws in thought and technique.'193 
Robertson would certainly also have found himself in full agreement with 
Eliot's well-known statement that 
The ideas of Shelley seem to me always to be ideas of adolescence 
- as there is every reason why they should be. And an enthusiasm 
for Shelley seems to me also to be an affair of adolescence; for 
most of us, Shelley has marked an intense period before maturity, 
but for how many does Shelley remain the companion of age?194 
Considering the interest Eliot generally displayed in Robertson's work, it seems 
probable that he was well aware of the rationalist's views, as may be true of 
F.R. Leavis.195 However, before claiming for Robertson the distinction of 
pioneering New Criticism avant la lettre on the basis of his essay on Shelley, as 
Storm does, it should be kept in mind that Robertson's criticism of Shelley 
generally tends to bear out Matthew Arnold's more famous verdict of the 
Romantic poet as a 'beautiful and ineffectual angel, beating in the void his 
luminous wings in vain'.196 It seems likely that in this case, Arnold and not 
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Robertson was the dominant influence, although the latter's contribution 
should certainly not be entirely ruled out. 
On the whole, Robertson's essay on Shelley is an ambitious undertaking, in 
fact, no less than an attempt to settle once and for all the poet's critical status. It 
ranges - albeit in a somewhat rambling manner - widely over Shelley's poetry, 
and, moreover, discusses in depth a number of crucial issues, such as the 
relation between form and content, and the suitability of certain themes as the 
subject-matter for poetry. In many of its concrete judgments, we recognize the 
view of Shelley's poetic status which came to dominate twentieth-century 
critical opinion through the influence of Eliot and Leavis. Even if the opinions 
it expresses do not appear to us to have retained their validity, it may, for the 
above reasons, still be considered one of Robertson's most central critical 
performances. 
Robertson on Whitman 
Robertson's criticism of Whitman, as we find it in the little volume entitled 
Walt Whitman. Poet and Democrat which appeared in 1884,197 may serve as an 
illustration of the fact that when Robertson applied his criticism to a poet with 
whose ideas he found himself largely in sympathy, he was considerably less 
eager to condemn the artist for not striving after beauty in form and technique 
alone. In Whitman, Robertson appears to have recognized to some extent a 
kindred spirit, and as a consequence he displays a leniency towards the 
American's poetry that elsewhere we may look for in vain. 
At the opening of his treatment of Whitman, Robertson notes how 'English 
readers had long been demanding from the United States a new and 
autochthonic poetical product' a demand which he attributes to 'a sense of 
distinction and high birthright attaching to the young nation whose gianthood 
was so early surmised.' [2] When the poet who seemed the embodiment of the 
spirit of democracy which the new nation epitomized first made himself known 
in England, it was not surprising that he should be welcomed with enthusiasm. 
In fact, Whitman received a much warmer welcome in England than in his 
native country, where his acceptance was slow, which leads Robertson to ask 
himself whether 'our attachment has not been too unadvised, too sudden.' [3] 
After all, what to think of a poet who deliberately sets out to provide his age 
with its own 'special kind of poetry'? 
Is not the very conception suggestive of the doomed prosaist who 
labours to turn an idea into rhyme, instead of finding, poet-wise, 
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his thought run to song; - of Ben Jonson writing his tirades in 
prose and then blank-versifying them? 
In surprising disregard of the aesthetic creed he proclaims nearly everywhere 
else in his 'practical' criticism and which seems to allow so little room for 
original thought in poetry, Robertson's answer is emphatically 'no'. He even 
goes so far as to state that 'nothing more decisively identifies Whitman with his 
age and his literature than this backbone of critical and didactic purpose in his 
work', [4] and shows himself resigned to the fact that, after all, 'we are brought 
up against the discovery that all poetry is criticism of life, and must be content 
with demanding that the criticism shall take a less formidably crude shape than 
an Essay on Man.' [5] Thus Whitman, 'the very democrat of practice as well as 
of faith and philosophy' escapes being rapped on the knuckles by Robertson for 
proclaiming his democratic ideas in verse. 
Robertson's own validation for this unexpected leniency towards the 
expression of philosophical ideas in poetry is that Whitman is more or less a 
force of nature, who, in this respect, cannot be stopped in his tracks: 
His whole nature tends to rapturous expression: in very truth he 
cannot choose but express himself as he does. From his first line 
he is not only the vowed singer of democracy and the dear love of 
comrades, but the self-poised, self-centred, self-possessed 
democratic unit; a manifestation of the force which is democracy; 
the typical self-asserting individual. [6] 
On this ground, Robertson can even forgive Whitman his tendency to be 
'self-esteeming, vigorously egotistic, and exclusive by fits', and the 'naïf 
popular theism of the day which finds the universe made for man, and the land 
for the race.' [7] He actually goes so far as to proclaim Whitman 'the most 
expert scholar of democracy': 
Let any one who has gone through his prose say whether any 
writer has looked more piercingly and patiently into all the aspects 
of the subject, fair and foul; accumulated more facts and ideals or 
placed any in a greater variety of lights. In this department 
- philosophy apart - no man can teach him anything. Optimism is 
the raison d'être of his work as a whole, and the ground tone of 
his personality, but he has been in the deeps, and at least felt 
pessimistic pangs in ebb-tide moods. Only after having seen all 
round his theme, only after having thought over it in all weathers 
and all companies, in sunlight and moonlight, in ecstasy and in all 
despondency, in complacent ease, and in grey and dreary hours of 
sorrow, could he have reached his matchless certitude of belief. [8] 
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Clearly, this is no longer the voice of the detached critic who so coolly 
dismissed Wordsworth and Coleridge as philosophical lightweights and 
accused Shelley of 'vaporous thinking'; here we are listening to the almost 
religious language of a disciple of the great American prophet of democracy. It 
may be that Whitman is not the most versatile and subtle of thinkers, but, 
Robertson argues, 'when the Zeitgeist wants to strike an important blow he 
makes a heavy hammer.' [12] What finally matters is 'that the singer of 
democracy shall be fully charged with his theme; and that an idea which feeds 
on optimism and confidence shall be carried with a confidence that no 
adversity will dash.' [13] In this respect, it is impossible to find fault with 
Whitman. 
Robertson thought it exceedingly ironic that in spite of Whitman's 
'enthusiastic accounts of the elements of greatness in American life', he should 
be regarded by 'the respectable, cultured, American population' as 'nothing but 
a coarse propounder of loose notions on sexual morality.' [21] Robertson, 
somewhat circumspectly, grants that in Leaves of Grass 'Whitman does more 
than talk plainly of what society objects to talk of in mixed circles.' [22] 
However, he wholeheartedly applauds Whitman's 'entire superiority to that 
mere pruriency which so strangely goes unrebuked in many writers so long as 
they До but avoid directness, biblical or other', [24] while asking his readers 
'How many of us, in the first place, can without prudery or puritanism or false 
pretences say that the spirit of Whitman's condemned poems is quite alien to 
us?' [29] After all, the poet is only 'singing a passion which he knows to be 
human' [32] and should not be condemned on that account. Moreover, 
Robertson reminds his readers of Whitman's 'loving and patient work in the 
hospitals through the years of the war' [21] as evidence for the poet's 
unquestionable overall morality, so that in the end, a condemnation of 
Whitman's verse on moral grounds is likely to be a sign of hypocrisy on the 
part of the critic. 
Robertson does, however, leave room for criticism of Whitman's poetry as 
far as its formal proficiency is concerned, so that here he falls back again into 
his familiar role of aesthetic critic. He grants Whitman that his verse has 
'distinctly that quality of "lilt," which is after all the generic difference between 
poetry and prose', but he also observes that it often seems 'hopelessly 
unrhythmical' and is hardly to be termed 'a successful poetic product'. [34] 
Robertson argues that in his verse, Whitman returns to 'elementary methods', 
to 'a prior stage of development' [35]: 
The essence of modem poetry may be said to be indicated in 
Wordsworth's idea of emotion recollected in tranquillity and 
artistically expressed; while Whitman chafes at the drill, and 
rejects the artistic pains as belonging to the department of "polite 
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kinks," grammar, and fine manners. And the upshot is that the 
world is impelled to view Whitman's aversion to graceful poetic 
form as it does his rejection of manners, and pronounce him a fine 
specimen of the barbarian. [35] 
What Whitman appears to be lacking mainly in Robertson's eyes, is the artistic 
discipline to make his verse conform to the formal rules which the best 
literature of the past centuries has set for the genre. Instead, Whitman prefers to 
take one step back on the evolutionary ladder and to start again from there. 
Robertson admits that there may be advantages to such a viewpoint, that 'In 
the very act . . . of diving back to the primitive, such a poet may supply us with 
the germs of a new artistic growth.' [36] These, he contends paradoxically 
enough, are mainly to be found in Whitman's more conventional later work, 
when 'It is a softer pulse that writes, a more cultured brain that muses and 
chooses its words.' [38] In terms of technique, Robertson has little taste for 'the 
remarkable features of the early "Leaves of Grass'", with its 'grotesque 
phraseology, the coined mongrel words, the abrupt transitions, the reckless 
collocations of parts of speech, the slang, the insupportable catalogues'. [40] 
Moreover, he frowns on Whitman's 'depreciation of rhyme, that, too, seems 
largely referable to an incapacity or indisposition to take pains' [44], and 
argues that 'if Whitman had had Tennyson's art, his sense of the comicality of 
rhyme would never have been developed.' [45] On the whole, Whitman's work 
seems to run precisely opposite to the development of contemporary poetry: 
It is becoming more and more rich in complexities, and it runs 
more and more to concise treatment; it does not demand great 
frames and canvases; it seeks subtle condensations and essences, 
Pisgah-sights, mood-visions, raptures, sighs, and elusive ideas. 
Does this mean garrulity, and sentences that run on anyhow? The 
very reverse. . . . Our poets will in future assuredly sing less, 
because all their work must be a more complex product. [48] 
Thus, Robertson does not so much see Whitman as an innovator in poetic form, 
but rather as a kind of eccentric loner who should not count on ever gathering a 
large following. 
In spite of such criticism, Robertson concludes that 
the poetry of Whitman, ill-smelted as so much of it is, cataloquial 
as is so much of his transcription from life, and lacking as his song 
so often is in music, somehow does not seem thus marked for 
doom even in respect of his didacticism. And the reason would 
seem to be not merely that his message is the intense expression of 
the deepest passion, but that the passion is the very flower of the 
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life of the race thus far, and carries in it the seeds of things to 
come. He cannot soon be left behind - he has gone so far before. 
[52] 
Here we see clearly that, given a message which sufficiently appeals to him, 
Robertson is quite willing to overlook what are to him formal deficiencies. It is 
curious how Robertson shows himself at the same time progressive in his 
whole-hearted embrace of Whitman's democratic message and denunciation of 
Victorian prudery, and conservative in his wish to make Whitman adhere to 
established formal rules of poetry. On the whole, however, the reader of 
Robertson's little volume on Whitman will come away from it with the 
impression that he has read a well-reasoned, balanced account of a poet who 
does not tend to instill balanced opinions in his critics, certainly not those of 
the end of the nineteenth century. In his book Walt Whitman in England, 
Harold Blodgett claimed 'a high place in Whitman literature' for Robertson's 
critique, because 'while admiring Walt, it keeps its head and gives the poet his 
due without surrendering incontinently . . . to rhapsody.'198 In the age in which 
'Whitmania' reached its height, this was indeed no small achievement. 
Robertson on Tennyson 
If Robertson's criticism of Whitman shows him admiring the American poet in 
spite of serious doubts about a lack of attention to poetic form and largely on 
the basis of his ideological viewpoints, Robertson's writings on Tennyson 
present us with precisely the reverse of this situation. In terms of technical and 
formal ability, Robertson had nothing but the highest praise for Tennyson, who, 
in his eyes 'has preserved the crown for poetry, so to speak, by the most 
unwearying, the most devoted cultivation of sheer poetic art of which literary 
history preserves any record'199 and in that respect ranked above any other poet 
in the history of English poetry, Milton included. However, as far as his 
'teachings' were concerned, Tennyson's moral and intellectual opinions as 
expressed in his poetry and elsewhere, Robertson had nothing but scorn for the 
Poet Laureate, and in the long essay on 'The Teaching of Tennyson' that makes 
up over half of the volume entitled Browning and Tennyson as Teachers, he 
painstakingly recorded the many ideological offences of which he considered 
Tennyson guilty. Overall, Robertson is extremely careful in his criticism to 
maintain a strict division between the aesthetic and moral-intellectual aspects 
of Tennyson's poetry, almost as if he is discussing two separate individuals. In 
Harold Blodgett, Walt Whitman in England (Ithaca, 1934), p. 199. 
'De Mortuis: IV. Tennyson', in Criticisms, II, p. 210. 
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fact, Robertson's estimate of Tennyson's work is essentially founded on his 
perception of 'the moral duality' in the poet's nature, 
a duality in virtue of which he is at once the most nearly infallible 
of literary judges and the most impeccable of artists, while for all 
purposes of abnormal moral criticism he remains to the end a 
schoolboy, with moments of ethical elevation, the precarious fruit 
of mere revulsion against other men's blatancies. [68]200 
In order to give an accurate impression of Robertson's criticism of Tennyson, it 
is perhaps best to follow him in this 'duality', and to discuss his views on 
Tennyson as a thinker and as a poetic craftsman separately, starting with the 
first aspect. 
'The Teaching of Tennyson' opens with the somewhat regretful observation 
that Tennyson leaves the critic no choice but to attack him on the 
moral-intellectual side of his work, since 'he has again and again attacked men 
of another way of thinking, not only with arrogance but with fanaticism.' [7] 
Thus provoked, he contrasts Tennyson unfavourably with Browning, who 
'seems to have been incapable of malice', whereas Tennyson could show 
himself 'distinctly malevolent'.201 True to his scientific tenets, Robertson 
sought the causes of Tennyson's imperfectly balanced personality in his early 
environment and upbringing, pointing to 'the often unkind and often despairing 
father, and the mother who grovelled for fear in a thunderstorm' and an 
altogether 'abnormal stock'. [9] Robertson argued that this hardly constituted 
the kind of background favourable to developing intellectual depth and 
equilibrium, and he adduced Two Voices and The Palace of Art, 'the earliest 
poems in which he philosophised at any length' [12] as evidence. His 
conclusion as regards the first is that 'there is no escaping the fact that this 
simple, superficial, and inconclusive process of reflection is for him a survey of 
the philosophy of life - as penetrating a study as he is minded to make.' [14] 
200
 The page numbers in square brackets which appear in the main text refer to 
Brwoning and Tennyson as Teachers. The essay on 'The Teaching of Tennyson' we find there 
is essentially an extended reworking of the essay on 'The Art of Tennyson' in ETCM, which is 
itself reprinted from Our Corner, 9 (1887), pp. 87-97, 167-80. Since 'The Teaching of 
Tennyson' most completely embraces Robertson's views of Tennyson, it is used as the basis 
for the present discussion. 
201
 As is apparent from the essay on 'The Teaching of Browning', Robertson was much 
more sympathetic to Browning as a personality than to Tennyson. However, he felt that 'the 
superfoetation of ideas which is his great characteristic is opposed to the very nature of verse' 
[p. 86], while he looked upon the theological and philosophical ideas themselves as decidedly 
simplistic. Moreover, Robertson judged Browning's command of poetic form to be greatly 
inferior to Tennyson's. 
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The 'inexpensive thesis' [15] of The Palace of Art he summarizes as 'setting 
forth how, after a period of that absorbing devotion to the aesthetic and 
mentally pleasurable side of things which is so natural to intellectual youth, he 
comes to realise the force of human claims and human bonds.' [14] While 
Robertson appreciates in both poems 'a very large proportion of artistic labor 
and power', they function to him in the end as 'a plain disproof of the claim 
that he [Tennyson] is a thinker of authority or capacity.' [15] 
It is this claim which Robertson continues to attack in the course of his 
essay. One aspect of Tennyson's thinking which proves to Robertson the poet's 
limited intellectual capacity is his inconsistent attitude towards the denial of 
religious faith. To Robertson, this fatally undercuts, for instance, the 
philosophical significance of In Memoriam. There we find 
a simple statement, in still more admirable verse, of the 
alternations of hope and fear in a temperament which is not 
healthily related to life, and which yearningly craves for the sense 
of "cloudy companionship" beyond the verge of knowledge. The 
most majestic passages in the entire poem, or rather book, are 
those which confess the baselessness of the assumption of the 
traditional, personal, and sympathetic Deity, and of future personal 
human existence. Against these great strains there stand as 
antiphonies only the despairing cry that if that be the truth, life is a 
wholly desperate thing; and the simple reiteration of the old 
revulsion of hope. [21] 
Such a poetic statement, Robertson predicts with some justice, may one day 
'have a special charm and interest because of its very perturbation, its dramatic 
mirroring of the intellectual conflict of his time' [24], but can never lay claims 
to real philosophical depth. The fact that in the poem Tennyson shows himself 
well abreast of the scientific developments of his age may to some extent serve 
as a saving grace, but then Tennyson also spoke out against the rise of science 
in other places, so that the charge of inconsistent reasoning remains. All in all, 
Robertson is repelled by Tennyson's religious attitude, which is to him that of a 
man who 'from first to last . . . is confessedly afraid of life without the 
protecting presence of Something-not-Himself, and not his fellow-creatures.' 
[32] Such 'weakness' the stern rationalist could never condone. 
Nor could he muster sympathy for the political ideology of the later 
Tennyson. He observed, admittedly with regret, that 
His lyric life, always ready to be swayed to didactic ends, yet 
unruled by any higher political wisdom than the commonplaces of 
domestic conservatism, is a grievous series of services to those 
destructive instincts with which conservatism so strangely goes 
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hand in hand. Every rumor of international dispute sets him 
whooping: to every wind of international change he reacts as 
promptly as the weathercock, and as wisely as the mob, whose 
psychology he duplicates and whose ethic he voices. England is 
for him always in the right. [59] 
It was with loathing that Robertson turned to a poem like The Charge of the 
Heavy Brigade, where 'the poet seems to foam at the mouth' and appears to 
have 'sunk.. . to a panting and convulsive rhythm that vainly stamps and leaps 
to get along, and to imagery of mere delirious struggle, as of maddened herds 
of horned beasts.' [64] Tennyson's blind nationalism and defence of 'War for 
War's sake' [66] added up to a spectacle, which, Robertson hoped, might be 
averted in others by 'the way of knowledge, of reasoned discipline, of the life 
of the head' [72], all of which were departments in which Tennyson had proved 
deficient. 
Robertson was particularly troubled by Tennyson's teaching in Maud, by 'Its 
cadenced gospel of war, its harmonised heroics, its lyric shrieks against the 
"long, long canker of peace", its absurd national partisanship, its worse than 
absurd sociology'. [50] Nevertheless, he did not hesitate to praise it as 'the 
high-water mark of Tennyson's genius' [57], as 'the most lyrically beautiful 
and variously masterful volume of poetry that the century had yet seen, studded 
with the rarest jewels of song and wrought with a subtlety of rhythmic 
craftsmanship that was a new glory in English literature'. [54] Robertson 
regarded Maud as representing the very height of the evolution of poetic form. 
By reason of its 'sheer newness - newness of rhythm, of metres, of matter, of 
themes' its initial reception had understandably been difficult: 
Maud opens with a rhythm absolutely new in serious English 
verse, and the strangeness is maintained through a score of metres 
to the close. The strangeness of the matter is no less marked: a new 
intimacy of psychic presentment, . . . an explosively dramatic 
statement, a continuously rapid action, shock upon shock, scene 
upon scene - all this demands a newly nervous intensity of rhythm. 
The thing is a tour deforce; and the contemporary public, brought 
up mainly upon Byron, and friendly to Tennyson mainly because 
of the less revolutionary symmetria alike of his best and of his 
most popular pieces before 1850, was taken aback. Yet for his 
rhythmic genius the development was inevitable: it is always 
genius that innovates in art, as it is genius that invents in other 
'Form in Poetry', p. 380. 
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However, now that the shock of novelty had worn off, Robertson failed to see 
how any reader could be satisfied with the conventionality of the Idylls of the 
King, where 'the poet is writing to fill a given scaffolding, and as a result we 
have a constant and laboured archaism of style instead of the telling simplicity 
and robust modernness of his best rhymed verse'.203 It was in Maud that 
Tennyson had afforded a glimpse of the future of English poetry, and it was 
much to be regretted that he had not chosen to follow his own lead. 
More than any other example, Robertson's attitude towards Maud illustrates 
his almost schizophrenic approach to poetry in general, and to Tennyson in 
particular. In page after page of the most disparaging criticism Robertson writes 
off Tennyson as not in any way deserving of serious intellectual consideration, 
while constantly extolling his technical mastery and capacity to create poetic 
beauty. His criticism of Tennyson is filled with regret that the poet should have 
chosen to venture again and again into intellectual territory where he had no 
business to go, rather than to be satisfied with perfecting the gift he so clearly 
possessed. It is as if, by his rigorous separation of form and content in the 
poet's work, Robertson is constantly attempting to secure for himself the right 
to admire and enjoy the work of a poet who might doctrinally be called his 
enemy. Yet, untainted and serene enjoyment is not, I think, ever achieved by 
him, since he always returns to the moral, intellectual, or philosophical issues 
involved in the work of the poets he discusses. He simply cannot escape being 
what he must always remain in the very first place: a rationalist. 
Conclusions 
There are few conclusions left to be drawn on Robertson's criticism of poetry 
which have not been given in the previous pages, but one point which perhaps 
deserves somewhat greater emphasis is the fact that, ultimately, Robertson has 
no very high opinion of the overall status and function of poetry. As we have 
seen, he does not give poets any credit as original thinkers and actually 
attempts to demonstrate that poets are by nature unfit to achieve even a 
reasonable level of profundity in their ideas. Poetry is for him something which 
is to be enjoyed in the leisure hours, when the 'weary giant' who has occupied 
his day with the more relevant pursuits of, say, politics or sociology, can find 
solace in the soothing melodies of Tennyson, as long as that poet refrains from 
reminding him of the issues which filled his busy day-time. 
Admittedly, poetry may act as a kind of stimulant to the brain, and in his 
short pamphlet What to Read, Robertson states with approval that 'So practical 
a thinker as Buckle has gone so far as to say that the poets are among the best 
'The Art of Tennyson', p. 278. 
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trainers of the scientific intelligence.'204 However, this still leaves poetry only a 
secondary task as a stepping-stone to greater things, which becomes apparent, 
for instance, when Robertson cites the example of Thomas Burt, a miner who 
educated himself and became a politician of note. Burt, Robertson claimed, 
'could get pleasure from remembered poetry in the coal-pit, and through taking 
such pleasure he was the sooner qualified to leave the coal-pit and to work 
with his brains for his fellows in the council-chamber of his country.'205 No 
clearer statement of Robertson's priorities is needed, and one is reminded of 
Leslie Stephen's dictum that 'There is a good deal to be said for the 
thesis . . . that art in general is luxurious indulgence, to which we have no right 
whilst crime and disease are rampant in the world.'206 
Poetry was, however, a 'luxury' which Robertson would never deny himself 
and which - and this too needs to be stressed - he genuinely loved. He may not, 
in theoretical terms, have seen it as a truly vital human occupation, but 
considering the energy he devoted to it in his writing, it is obvious that it was 
of vital concern to him personally. Thus the sternest of rationalist critics may 
not finally have attained to the consistency he so unwearyingly pursued through 
many thousands of pages, but I hope to have shown in the previous chapters 
that this does not disqualify him as a critic and man of letters worthy of 
attention alongside better-known figures like Leslie Stephen, George 
Saintsbury, and Edmund Gosse. 
What to Read, p. 8. 
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Samenvatting 
De Schot John Mackinnon Robertson (1856-1933) was een van de meest 
erudiete en productieve auteurs van zijn tijd, hoewel hij nu goeddeels in de 
vergetelheid is geraakt. Robertson schiep een omvangrijk oeuvre van boeken en 
tijdschriftartikelen waarin hij zich deskundig toonde op vele uiteenlopende 
gebieden, van sociologie tot economie, van antropologie tot geschiedkunde, 
van literatuurgeschiedenis to Bijbelse kritiek, etc. In vrijwel al zijn geschriften 
laat Robertson zich zien als een fervent pleitbezorger van het rationalistisch 
gedachtengoed, en bepleit hij de noodzaak om het aan de natuurwetenschappen 
ontleende wetenschappelijk denken toe te passen op alle gebieden van 
menselijke kennis. 
Hij zag religie als het voornaamste obstakel dat deze ontwikkeling in de weg 
stond, en zijn leven en werk stond dan ook voor een belangrijk deel in het teken 
van anti-godsdienstig activisme. Robertsons reputatie als gevreesd voorvechter 
van compromisloos atheïsme is ongetwijfeld een van de redenen waarom zijn 
werk op het gebied van literaire kritiek niet de aandacht heeft gekregen die het 
verdient. Deze studie probeert dan ook een lans te breken voor Robertson als 
literair criticus, met bijzondere aandacht voor het spanningsveld dat zijn 
achtergrond als rationalistisch denker vaak in zijn literair-kritische werk 
creëerde. 
In Hoofdstuk 1 wordt Robertsons levensloop geschetst. De autodidact 
Robertson kwam al op jonge leeftijd in contact met het secularisme, een anti-
religieuze volksbeweging die concrete sociale verbeteringen voorstond. De 
charismatische leider van de beweging, Charles Bradlaugh, maakte Robertson 
tot zijn rechterhand, en gedurende Robertsons hele leven zou Bradlaugh zijn 
grote voorbeeld blijven. Onder Bradlaughs invloed ontwikkelde Robertson zich 
in dejaren 1880 tot een vaardig journalist en criticus met een sterk ontwikkelde 
politieke belangstelling. Aan het einde van de jaren 1890 besloot hij zich 
definitief aan de politiek te wijden, zodat hij uiteindelijk in 1906 voor de 
liberalen toetrad tot het Lagerhuis. Zijn loopbaan in de politiek duurde tot 
1918, waarna hij de gelegenheid kreeg zich meer toe te leggen op zijn grote 
liefde: het Elizabethaanse drama, en met name de heikele kwestie door wie 
Shakespeares stukken nu daadwerkelijk geschreven waren. Hierover 
publiceerde hij vele studies die niet zonder invloed bleven, en ten tijde van zijn 
dood in 1933 stond hij dan ook voornamelijk bekend als een tegendraads 
Shakespeare criticus. 
Deel 1 van Hoofdstuk 2 beschrijft in kort bestek de opkomst in het Engeland 
van de negentiende eeuw van het rationalistisch-wetenschappelijk denken ten 
koste van religie en kerk. Dit opkomend rationalisme nam vele vormen aan, 
van gematigd tot radicaal, waarvan de belangrijkste hier aan de orde komen. 
Deel 2 van dit hoofdstuk is gewijd aan Robertson als rationalistisch denker, 
waarbij al snel duidelijk wordt dat voor Robertson filosofie in het teken stond 
van anti-religieuze propaganda. Zoals veel intellectuelen in zijn tijd was 
Robertson van mening dat Darwins evolutietheorie de strijd tussen wetenschap 
en religie definitief beslecht had in het voordeel van de wetenschap. Alleen als 
het wetenschappelijk denken op alle gebieden van intellectuele activiteit zou 
worden doorgevoerd, zou menselijke vooruitgang daadwerkelijk gewaarborgd 
zijn. 
Deze stellingname was van grote invloed op zijn positie als literair criticus. 
Robertson constateerde een bedroevend gebrek aan consistentie in de 
literair-kritische oordelen van zijn tijd, en zag ook hier een rol voor de 
wetenschap weggelegd. Deel 1 van Hoofdstuk 3 behandelt de ideeën van een 
aantal negentiende-eeuwse Britse en Franse critici (G.H. Lewes, E.S. Dallas, 
Hippolyte Taine, Ferdinand Brunetière, Emile Hennequin, H.M. Posnett, R.G. 
Moulton, J.A. Symonds) die dezelfde overtuiging waren toegedaan, terwijl 
Deel 2 ingaat op Robertsons reacties op deze ideeën en op zijn eigen theorieën 
hieromtrent. Robertson voelde zich bijzonder aangetrokken tot de ideeën van 
de Franse criticus Emile Hennequin, die getracht had de factoren die bij het 
vormen van een literair oordeel een rol spelen zo compleet mogelijk in kaart te 
brengen. Uiteindelijk was Robertson echter niet zozeer een voorstander van het 
doorvoeren van een bepaalde methode in de literaire kritiek als wel van een in 
het algemeen meer methodische benadering van de totstandkoming van literaire 
opinie. 
In Hoofdstuk 4 komen Robertsons concrete literair-kritische oordelen aan 
bod. Deel 1 richt zich op Robertson als toneelcriticus, waarbij de nadruk ligt op 
zijn pogingen, vervat in talrijke boeken en artikelen, via 'wetenschappelijke' 
methoden de ware auteur(s) van Shakespeares stukken te achterhalen. 
Robertsons conclusie dat deze het resultaat zijn van een collectief auteurschap 
blijkt uiteindelijk voor een belangrijk deel te stoelen op Robertsons welhaast 
blinde geloof in Shakespeares genie. 
Deel 2 van dit hoofdstuk gaat vervolgens in op Robertsons romankritiek 
tegen de achtergrond van het contemporaine debat over realisme in de roman. 
Zijn oordelen over het werk van W.D. Howells, Emile Zola, Robert Louis 
Stevenson, Rudyard Kipling en Joseph Conrad maken duidelijk dat Robertson 
geen voorstander was van een 'fotografisch-objectieve' weergave van de 
werkelijkheid in fictie, maar van een meer idealistische, moreel geladen vorm 
van realisme die hij bij uitstek in Conrads werk belichaamd vond. 
Deel 3, tenslotte, behandelt Robertson's poëziekritiek, waarbij opvalt dat hij 
de esthetisch-formalistische aspecten van poëzie aanmerkelijk hoger aanslaat 
dan de moreel-inhoudelijke, in schijnbare tegenspraak met zijn opvattingen 
over de roman. Deze voorkeur blijkt nadrukkelijk uit zijn kritiek op het werk 
van Edmund Spenser, Wordsworth en Coleridge, Shelley, Whitman, en 
Tennyson, die hier afzonderlijk wordt behandeld. 
Al met al laat Robertson zich kennen als een onafhankelijk criticus die 
krachtige oordelen niet schuwt, ook al slaagt hij er niet altijd in de hoge doelen 
die hij zichzelf stelt, met name als literair theoreticus, te bereiken. Bovendien 
stelt zijn werk ons in staat nieuw inzicht te verwerven in een groot aantal 
literair-kritische debatten die zich in Groot-Britannië en daarbuiten aan het 
einde van de negentiende en het begin van de twintigste eeuw afspeelden. 
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